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We should include courts in the climate change picture
because we have no other option. No substitute exists
for the court system. If judges are in charge of deciding all
sorts of conflicts about life, death, love, human rights, and
national security, it makes no sense to leave climate change
outside the courtroom.
—Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin
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FOREWORD
CLIMATE CHANGE AND JUDGES

C

limate change poses the most urgent existential challenge of our lifetime—not
only for humanity’s survival and protection of the planet’s biodiversity, but also
for the proper functioning of the Environmental Rule of Law. Our global climate’s
accelerating volatility—with its adverse impacts on ecosystems, vast landscapes,
and human health and dignity—is transforming how lawyers and judges
address Environmental Law’s traditional principles, objectives, instruments, and
institutions. From an institutional point of view, the climate crisis fundamentally
affects the way we perceive the role of courts in natural resource disputes.
Judges are trained and work in boxes of legal knowledge, practical expertise, and jurisdiction. The “little
world” of a judge is one of unavoidable boundaries: political and judicial arenas that fragment ecological
spaces instead of respecting them.
Climate change profoundly modifies these ancient premises and rattles judges’ comfort zones. Some
perceive the subject matter of climate protection—the atmospheric common good, ecosystem
services, and intergenerational values—as extending beyond the jurisdiction of local courts. In fact,
judges may feel that climate issues reside outside the sovereign borders of national courts. Particularly
in respect to the planet’s climate, the material good—the atmosphere as a whole—is one that just a few
decades ago, following the lessons of Roman law, was considered alien to the categories addressed by
domestic legislation.
It is also disturbing to judges that, while those who need protection and would benefit from judicial
measures taken to address climate change are spread across the world, only a fraction might live
within their jurisdiction. The same applies to the causes of climate change—perpetrated in large part
by seemingly faraway activities and actors. Even more complicated for the generalist judge is the
inability to see, touch, hear, or directly know the subject of the case. Although intangible categories are
not unknown in the judicial context, the more this “physicality” is weakened or dissipated, the more
ordinary judges begin to think that the conflict should be decided by someone else or somewhere else.
The climate crisis poses even greater judicial complication when we realize that many countries still do
not have comprehensive or effective environmental laws. In others, judges may lack jurisdiction over
the whole spectrum of environmental matters. Or, worse, when they can exercise authority, judges
may lack the independence, knowledge, or integrity to discharge their responsibilities properly. In
other words, although the biodiversity and climate change crises are universal, environmental law and
adequate access to courts and justice are not. People in developed countries with robust democratic
systems take fair and effective environmental adjudication for granted. For a large portion of the world,
however, fundamental access to justice cannot be assumed. Sadly, those large areas are frequently
home to rich biodiversity hot spots and tropical forests in desperate need of judicial enforcement.

xvi

FOREWORD

Therefore, we may fairly raise the question: should we expect—and trust—courts to address climate
change? Despite the above difficulties, my qualified answer is yes, for at least four pragmatic, legal,
ethical, and policy and/or institutional reasons.
First, the pragmatic argument. We should include courts in the climate change picture because we
have no other option. No substitute exists for the court system. If judges are in charge of deciding all
sorts of conflicts about life, death, love, human rights, and national security, it makes no sense to leave
climate change outside the courtroom. This assumption does not mean that we do not recognize the
enormous differences between climate and “regular” environmental cases. However, the lack of other
or better alternatives makes courts an inevitable choice.
Second, it would not be reasonable to entrust Environmental Law to judges, as we already do globally,
without including climate change. At the end of the day, many key parts of nature—biomes, ecosystems,
species, and genetic diversity—and the human environment will be directly and perhaps irreversibly
affected by climate change. For obvious reasons, the exclusion of climate cases would handicap and
ossify environmental jurisdiction, transforming it into a body without its heart and preventing the legal
system’s evolution in a world of rapid transformations. Climate change is already affecting and will
continue to affect not just Environmental Law. It will also impact most, if not all, legal disciplines that
compose the conventional field of judicial intervention—from constitutional to tax and insurance law,
from civil and administrative liability to criminal law, and from family to international and civil procedure
law. In other words, if climate change is not allowed to enter the courtroom through the front door
(Environmental Law), it will undoubtedly invade the judicial sanctum through the back door.
Third, except for a few areas of law (contracts, for example), judges are merely part of the solution for
social problems; even then, they are not the only or even the best option. Courts do not replace the
constellation of actors and measures in the climate change domain—both national and international.
They complement whatever is in place. Some judges may see this role as a second-class type of judicial
intervention, one filled with humility (not a widespread characteristic in the profession) as opposed to
the ordinary exercise of jurisdiction in which judges have the final and most authoritative word on any
complaint brought before them. That misguided but understandable sentiment fails to grasp judges’
role in contemporary society as one that is not uniform for all aspects of human conflicts.
Fourth, the position of judges in climate adaptation is much less daunting than in climate mitigation. Take,
for instance, the thousands of cases around the world where judges are already dealing with permits,
environmental impact assessments, protected areas, deforestation, water resources, wetlands, and
desertification. Is it really defensible to keep addressing those legal issues without taking into account the
impacts of climate change? Can a judge decide an objection to a permit for building a hotel resort in the
middle of endangered mangroves without considering sea level rise due to climate change? Or adjudicate
a case of significant deforestation in a region that is already suffering from growing water stress?
None of these reasons ignore or reduce the relevance of legitimate counterarguments that advocate
that climate change policy issues should be fought outside the courtroom. Climate change is not the
only or the first highly technologically or economically complex issue facing the courts. Software and
DNA cases are common nowadays in many countries. Climate change is no more politically charged
than national security, torture, discrimination, abortion, immigration, corruption, same-sex marriage, or
election disputes. Even war and peace are not entirely beyond the judicial realm.

FOREWORD

It is also worthwhile mentioning that, in light of general or specific legislation dealing with the subject,
including constitutional provisions, judges do not make climate change law. They apply (within the limits of
the separation of powers) norms discussed and approved by legislative bodies or enacted by administrative
authorities. Under these circumstances, it is not judicial lawmaking, but rather judicial law implementation.
Once clear and detailed policies—that go much further than vague, conditional and noncommittal
statements of public intentions—are legislated, they become legal policies that can and should be
enforced by judges. Otherwise, what would be the purpose of legislating? Therefore we should here make a
distinction between activist environmental judges and activist environmental legislation (or legislators).
Thus, with a qualified yes, I respond to the initial question I have posed. It is qualified because it comes
with one major and several secondary requirements, especially if we want to have judges involved in
responding to the climate change crisis adequately. Let me focus on the primary requirement only.
In general, judges are still not fully aware of the existential threat that the climate crisis poses to humanity
as a whole and every person on the planet, in every jurisdiction. Judges tend to ignore that environmental
law regimes they use in their daily practice already include contact points that allow for easy connection
to the climate change dimension. In other instances, new and specialized laws have been passed,
but remain unknown to or insufficiently understood by judges and therefore endure as untouched
laws in the books. Finally, bound by their training and jurisdictions, judges are prone to feel isolated as
professionals—a state of mind that discourages innovation and the kind of learning from each other that
greater interaction and communication could bring. From the judges’ perspective, the most effective
medicine for this complex set of attributes and attitudes, which impair their ability to confidently manage
climate change litigation, is judicial education.
And judicial education has been precisely the road chosen by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
in its work with judges from this immense and diverse part of the world. It has been a most successful
journey, one that developed a judicial community around Environmental Law. The present reports are
testimony to such an initiative and a component of the broader series of successful ADB endeavors in
the Environmental Rule of Law universe. As the first publication of its kind with a focus on judges, this
report series will greatly benefit those who already know the subject. It will also particularly serve the
many for whom climate change is (until now) a remote area of law.
On behalf of the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment, I offer my effusive congratulations to
ADB’s extraordinary team and the distinguished coauthors of this innovative report series.

ANTONIO HERMAN BENJAMIN
Justice, National High Court of Brazil
Lead founding member of the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment
6 November 2020
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Climate change is a global challenge.
While the emphasis on the Paris Agreement is on
nationally determined contributions, to be
enforced by national legal measures, the problems
are common to all, and we all have much to learn
from each other.
—Lord Robert Carnwath
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FOREWORD

I

am delighted to welcome this important series of reports on climate litigation
and legal frameworks.

It was in 2002 that the Global Judges’ Symposium in Johannesburg affirmed
the vital role of an independent judiciary and judicial processes in interpreting
and enforcing environmental laws, and called for a UNEP-led programme of
judicial training and exchange of information on environmental law. Since then,
as member of the UNEP judicial advisory group, I have taken part in numerous
judicial conferences on environmental law in different parts of the world. Since
2010, the Asian Development Bank has taken a lead in encouraging judicial
interchange and training through its Law and Policy Reform Programme, including a series of judicial
conferences in the Asia and Pacific region, in which I have been honoured to participate. The cases
collected in this study are testament to the richness of the contribution of judges from that part of
the world.
Climate change is a global challenge. While the emphasis on the Paris Agreement is on nationally
determined contributions, to be enforced by national legal measures, the problems are common to
all, and we all have much to learn from each other. Two of the most significant climate change cases
in recent years—the Urgenda case in Holland and the Leghari case in Pakistan—came from countries
with widely differing legal systems. But the principle they established is universal—that effective action
on climate change is a human right and fundamental constitutional responsibility of governments
everywhere. As was said in 1993 by the Philippines’ Supreme Court in the famous Oposa case, rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology are “basic rights” which “predate all governments and constitutions”
and “need not be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.” a
I congratulate the Asian Development Bank team responsible for these remarkable reports. I have no
doubt that they will be of immense value to all those involved in giving legal force to the Paris commitments,
whether as judges, legislators, or legal professionals.

LORD ROBERT CARNWATH
Commander of the Royal Victorian Order (CVO)
Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
April 2020

a

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993.

This report chronicles green and climate
jurisprudence that emerged over the years
and is a testament to ADB’s tireless effort
over a decade in building a judicial coalition.
—Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah

Photo by Gerhard Jörén/ADB.

FOREWORD
“I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic...
and act as if the house was on fire.”
—Greta Thunberg

U

nbridled human desire, supported by unsustainable development over
centuries, has disrupted the rhythm of nature. Defiling of the local environment
slowly snowballed into a threat for the entire planet as carbon emissions sullied
the atmosphere. Humanity’s disruption of Earth’s system is climate change.
Any remedial response to this global challenge can only be through the collective
coordination of humankind. Nationalism needs to give way to global cooperation and solidarity. While
nations of the world try to coalesce to combat this challenge, politics and powerful vested interests
continue to hamper such a consensus. Nations have been unable to implement their international
commitments to meet this most serious existential threat. Dissatisfied citizenry of the world has been
compelled to consider other options to combat this challenge. Some of them have knocked at the
doors of the courts of justice to fight climate change by making their governments answerable and
accountable and by seeking climate justice.
Courts, unlike other limbs of government, are not elected and have no constituencies or voters or
political agendas to tow. They are not swayed by politics or other vested or corporate interests, but
are guided by ethos of justice and fair play. They function within the frame of constitutionalism and
the rule of law. This gives the courts of the world a common language to communicate. It is, therefore,
easy to build a global judicial consensus on climate justice. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
realized this and put together a judicial environmental coalition in Asia and the Pacific in 2010. Since
then, “green” judges in Asia and the Pacific have met and shared ideas in a series of roundtables and
knowledge-sharing events. This unique congress of judges from different jurisdictions debated and
dialogued to evolve innovative and avant-garde judicial techniques to safeguard the environment.
These judges put these ideas to work and produced far-reaching jurisprudence that has touched the
soul of the planet.
Several judiciaries from Asia have a rich tradition in public interest litigation and enforcement of
constitutional human rights and, therefore, did not take long to absorb environmentalism in its fold.
The jurisprudence that evolved showcased a new judicial technique of forming judicial commissions
comprising environmental scientists, experts, and members of the civil society to sit face to face with
the government and evolve sustainable solutions. The overarching environmental judicial approach of
this period remained inquisitorial and consensus-based.
These judges were ready with their jurisprudence and sharpened tool kit when climate change walked
into their courtroom. Climate litigation brought with it a host of new issues that slowly overshadowed
the erstwhile environmental litigation. Climate change cut across sectors which were not earlier part of
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the environmental checklist. Climate litigation has to embrace multiple new dimensions like Health
Security, Food Security, Energy Security, Water Security, Human Displacement, Human Trafficking,
and Disasters Management. Climate Justice covers agriculture, health, food, building approvals, industrial
licenses, technology, infrastructural work, human resource, human and climate trafficking, disaster
preparedness, health, etc.
Most countries from Asia and the Pacific do not significantly contribute to climate change but suffer at
the hands of it. Adaptation, as opposed to mitigation, has a totally different judicial response. Climate
change, therefore, has a much broader meaning for the judiciaries of Asia and the Pacific. Adaptation
entails issues that, facially, might not appear to be climate related but, upon deeper probe, show a
causal link with climate change. The jurisprudence on climate justice emerging from the developed
economies is more focused on mitigation and review of governmental decisions to curb emissions. On
the whole, jurisprudence evolved by the courts has played a key role in fashioning climate governance
and effectively combating climate change.
This report chronicles green and climate jurisprudence that emerged over the years and is a testament
to ADB’s tireless effort over a decade in building a judicial coalition. The Asian Judges Network on
Environment helped the judges meet, discuss, and share ideas, which contributed to developing judicial
inventiveness that emerged from Asia and the Pacific. The report is an invaluable exposé of judicial
innovation and a valuable source for judiciaries around the world.
As I close this foreword, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has stalled the wheels of
human activity and has caged humans with self-isolation and global lockdown. Weeks into it, I see
blues skies out of my window, greener pastures, clean air, less noise, singing of the birds, and a general
sense of relief on the face of nature. I guess the lesson for humankind is to back up and learn to coexist
with nature. A new world is taking shape as I write this. A world that requires us to shed our old ways
and move to a new normal. This report and the rich jurisprudence it puts out on display will help
us fight and defy going back to the pre-corona world of greed, avarice, mindless consumerism, and
unchecked carbon emissions.
I wish this report a huge success.

SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH
Justice
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Islamabad
20 April 2020
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ADB is committed to supporting the global climate agenda,
including by developing the capacity of judicial systems
within Asia and the Pacific to play their vital role.
—Thomas M. Clark

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.

PREFACE

J

udges are vital development partners for institutions promoting a sustainable
and inclusive future, with an indispensable role to play in climate governance in
Asia and the Pacific. This work is for them.
The Office of the General Counsel within the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
started judicial capacity development on environmental law in 2010 as part
of its Law and Policy Reform Program. ADB chose to work with judges for
three principal reasons. First, judges form a distinct, independent, and critical
branch of government; yet, development partners frequently overlook the
benefits of judicial capacity building. Second, judges play a significant role in
advancing the rule of law and as guardians of justice in Asia and the Pacific. Third, despite these
critical responsibilities, judges need greater resources and opportunities for professional development,
information sharing, and judicial networking.
Initially, ADB’s program focused on judicial trainings on environmental protection issues, more narrowly,
without inclusion of climate mitigation and adaptation. Then, over the past decade, global awareness
of climate change and of the need for concerted action to address it surged. Countries expanded their
domestic legal and policy frameworks to address climate impacts, and came together in global fora to
coordinate this response, most notably by signing the Paris Agreement in 2015. Driven by the need to
protect themselves, their children, and their environment from climate change, people turned more to
litigation to address climate change, under a variety of theories. With these shifts, ADB expanded the focus
of its judicial capacity building program to incorporate climate change and sustainable development.
In our work with judiciaries over the last 10 years, ADB has seen the extraordinary potential of judicial
capacity building, along with the huge gaps that remain to be filled.





Issuing judgments advancing environmental protection can see judges labeled “anti-development.”
This label isolates and demotivates judges and can hamper them from addressing the serious
legal and constitutional issues that may be implicated by climate change. For such judges, we
created the Asian Judges Network on Environment (AJNE), a platform to connect judges and
legal professionals, facilitate the sharing of knowledge and legal developments on a regional and
global level, and boost motivation. ADB also launched annual conferences on environmental
and climate law to share best practices. We complemented that work with assisting on targeted
national judicial reforms in almost all host countries.
During the annual judicial conferences, Asian and Pacific judges debated and developed the
concepts of environmental and climate justice for the region. These sessions helped develop
shared judicial language and frameworks to assess climate issues, and gave impetus to the
development of seminal jurisprudence across the region. Despite these successes in the region,
broader global audiences are often not aware of the phenomenal work that Asia and Pacific
judiciaries do for lack of international reporting.
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The Law and Policy Reform Program realized that ADB could, with these reports, both provide practical
support to judges facing complex climate litigation as well as showcase climate jurisprudence from Asia
and the Pacific to a broader audience.
In service of these overarching objectives, this report series seeks to (i) share environmental and
climate jurisprudence from Asia and the Pacific, contributing to global knowledge on regional climate
law and litigation; (ii) provide a comprehensive benchbook and tool kit for judges, especially those
from Asia and the Pacific, to facilitate decision-making in this ever-evolving field of law; (iii) capture
the results of ADB’s judicial capacity development work—the legacy of ADB’s work to date; and finally,
(iv) acknowledge the prodigious work done by the judiciaries of Asia and the Pacific—ADB applauds
their dedication and progress.
ADB was pleased to collaborate with the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law on this project.
Michael Burger, Ama Francis, and the team at Sabin provided extraordinary support for ADB,
contributing authoritatively on climate litigation around the world in Report Two, supplementing ADB’s
own research, and drafting the national legal frameworks report.
With pleasure, I acknowledge and introduce ADB’s young and extraordinarily smart team of
researchers and authors. Seventeen researchers gathered laws and cases from the 32 countries covered
by these reports. Gregorio Rafael P. Bueta and Francesse Joy J. Cordon-Navarro contributed to and
assisted with reviewing the reports. Maria Cecilia T. Sicangco wrote the report on international climate
change legal frameworks and assisted with reviewing and editing these reports.
Many thanks to Irum Ahsan who led this initiative. Irum headed the Law and Policy Reform team
between 2017 and 2020, under the guidance of ADB’s former Deputy General Counsel Ramit Nagpal.
Her energy, drive, and creativity have created a flagship program for ADB. I thank Briony Eales, who
steered this initiative tirelessly over the last 3 years, working with researchers and authors, and juggling
work with a young child. She worked with the researchers; wrote about climate science, climate
litigation, and climate laws; and created a synthesized and cohesive series of reports.
The team diligently works on strengthening the rule of law, a key driver for robust and sustainable
economic development. This will be vital work over the coming years. The global efforts to mitigate
climate change and address its harmful impacts must only intensify in the near future, especially in
Asia and the Pacific. The region is too large, diverse, and globally significant not to be at the center of
these efforts. ADB is committed to supporting the global climate agenda, including by developing the
capacity of judicial systems within Asia and the Pacific to play their vital role.
We look forward to our continued work with the region’s judiciaries to strengthen climate justice and
the rule of law.

THOMAS M. CLARK
General Counsel
Office of the General Counsel
Asian Development Bank
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Notes: 1. Tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy measuring the amount of energy released
by burning one tonne of crude oil. The standard international measure is described
as a tonne of oil equivalent, or metric ton of oil equivalent. Countries vary in their
reporting, with some reporting on tonne of oil equivalent and others reporting on ton
of oil equivalent. This publication uses the term and/or spelling reported by a particular
country with a standardized definition (toe) that covers both terms—tonne of oil
equivalent and ton of oil equivalent.
2. Tonne of carbon dioxide (tCO2) measures the mass of carbon dioxide emissions. The
standard international measure is described as tonne of carbon dioxide, or metric ton of
carbon dioxide. Countries vary in their reporting, with some reporting on tonne of carbon
dioxide and others reporting on ton of carbon dioxide. This publication uses the term
and/or spelling reported by a particular country with a standardized definition (tCO2)
that covers both terms—tonne of carbon dioxide and ton of carbon dioxide.
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Kiribati, a nation facing climate disaster.
According
to the IPCC, Kiribati could lose
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate Change: A Clarion Call for Judges
It is 2020 and the world is at a crossroads on climate change.
The Paris Agreement aims to limit global warming to 1.5ºC–2ºC above preindustrial
temperatures. Current international climate responses will not meet these targets.
Thus, urgent and widespread action is indispensable. Recent Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change reports showed a significant difference in the degree of
impact between 1.5ºC and 2ºC of warming. Indeed, the 1.5ºC goal is the safest for
most of Asia and the Pacific.
And then the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic entered the equation,
shutting down economies and claiming almost 1,163,459 lives by 28 October 2020.
Its devastating impacts leave the world struggling to rebuild. After COVID-19, the
world must choose the path toward a safer, inclusive, dignified, and resilient future.
Frustrated by government inaction and threatened by climate change impacts on
their lives and human rights, global citizens are taking the fight for climate justice
to the courts. Climate litigation is demanding that judges play a role in climate
governance.
Asian courts have issued groundbreaking climate decisions. Their approaches
diversify the global discourse on climate jurisprudence and are worth sharing. For
other judges in Asia and the Pacific, climate change is coming soon to your courts.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has worked with courts in Asia and the
Pacific for over 10 years to build networks and support judges with environmental
and now climate change decision-making. This report series captures the wisdom
gained over the last 10 years and provides resources for judges, decision-makers,
and lawyers involved in climate litigation.

Why These Reports?
Climate Change, Coming Soon to a Court Near You is a series of four reports on
climate law, policy, and litigation. Climate litigation is growing in Asia and the
Pacific, so judges and quasi-judicial decision-makers must have access to climate
law resources.
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Cases from high-income countries dominate global literature about climate
litigation. These countries have different mindsets, legal and policy frameworks,
and climate change challenges. Although judges from Asia and the Pacific
have much to gain from reading this literature, they also need perspectives and
approaches closer to home from peers working with similar challenges.
Most Asia and the Pacific countries have low emissions and are incredibly
susceptible to climate change. The region therefore focuses on climate
adaptation and resilience—activities supported by ecosystem resilience and
biodiversity.
Unfortunately, weak environmental governance is common in Asia and the
Pacific, creating cascading effects in this era of climate change. Frail ecosystems
and biodiversity offer communities less protection from the impacts of climate
change, e.g., healthy mangrove forests protect humans and other species from
storm surges. Ecosystems are also more easily damaged by climate change.
Unchecked environmental degradation leaves indigenous, agrarian, and island
communities even more vulnerable to death, homelessness, and displacement.
Judiciaries in the region benefit from understanding the role of ecosystem
protection, biodiversity, and sustainable development in boosting local climate
resilience. Hence, these reports outline links between environmental protection,
biodiversity, and climate change.
Prioritizing environmental protection and low-emission development is challenging
in Asia and the Pacific, a region dominated by low to lower middle-income
countries with development objectives. Judges who do that are often labeled
“anti‑development,” isolating them from their peers. Judges need access to
resources and networks that boost their knowledge, and to information that
proves that balanced and appropriate environmental and climate protection
makes business sense and aligns with national climate commitments.
Judicial knowledge about climate change, legal frameworks, and relevant legal
principles are fundamental to a strong rule of law. Many core principles in climate
law stem from environmental law, a field that a few judges in Asia and the Pacific
have studied or practiced.
Resource limitations, ad hoc publication of laws, and language barriers in Asia
and the Pacific also make it difficult for judges to maintain current knowledge
about climate law, climate science, and local climate change impacts, diminishing
judicial effectiveness. These reports seek to overcome some of these barriers
by synthesizing climate information and achievements and weaving a regional
perspective into the global discourse on climate law.
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Report Series Structure
Within this series are four reports:







Report Series Purpose and Introduction to Climate Science: a brief
introduction to climate change and climate science
Climate Litigation in Asia and the Pacific and Beyond: a comparative
analysis of climate litigation in Asia and the Pacific and the rest of the world
National Climate Change Legal Frameworks in Asia and the Pacific:
analyses of the national climate change policy and legal frameworks in ADB
developing member countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
and the People’s Republic of China, with tables to highlight constitutional
provisions relevant to climate change and a discussion of trends in climate law
International Climate Change Legal Frameworks: a ready reference to key
international climate change instruments and soft law, with tables showing
treaty commitments by country

ADB has specifically designed these reports for judges, quasi-judicial decisionmakers, lawyers from Asia and the Pacific, and those interested in Asian and
Pacific climate law.

Key Takeaways
Litigation
Climate litigation is growing—in Asia and the Pacific and around the world. Most
climate lawsuits in Asia target government respondents, seeking climate action
or challenging decisions with climate impacts. The number of cases against
governments based on treaty obligations, particularly the Paris Agreement, is
increasing, and so is litigation against private entities.
Litigation preferences reflect domestic legal frameworks, with litigants looking
for appropriate hooks to support their claims. Of the countries surveyed in
this report, 25% have adopted framework climate legislation—economy-wide
framework climate change law. The other states use climate policies and existing
laws to achieve their goals. Unclear or incomplete legal and policy frameworks
combined with weak enforcement frequently lead litigants to sue for violations of
constitutional rights.
Petitioners in Asia favor constitutional litigation because it (i) has been used
successfully in environmental litigation, (ii) allows direct access to superior courts,
(iii) provides a legal basis for a claim where the existing legal and policy framework
is incomplete, and (iv) is easier for petitioners to demonstrate standing where a
constitutional right has been breached. The preference for rights-based litigation
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reflects a global trend. Roughly one-third of all climate litigation outside the
United States hinges on fundamental, human, and constitutional rights.
Most lawsuits target climate mitigation—the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. However, litigation seeking climate change adaptation is growing and
frequently emerges as a silent issue in Asian environmental lawsuits. In various
cases, neither the parties nor the court identified climate change as an issue,
but the case outcomes had co-benefits for climate resilience and, therefore,
adaptation. These reports treat such cases as climate cases.
Climate litigation in Pacific courts remains rare, which does not reflect the
existential nature of the climate threat in the Pacific.
Pacific islanders are more likely to rely on customary dispute resolution to
resolve local conflicts, reducing the likelihood of litigation. Pacific nations know
that their contribution to climate change is negligible. Lawsuits against national
governments are also counterproductive if the state has limited resources to
respond. Therefore, Pacific islanders are more likely to pursue human rights
petitions in United Nations bodies or engage in transnational litigation, e.g., the
climate migration cases filed in Australia and New Zealand.
Women, children, indigenous communities, and older adults—people who are
particularly vulnerable to climate change—have also been active in domestic and
international climate litigation.

National Legal and Policy Frameworks
Legal and policy frameworks are growing in Asia and the Pacific as governments
plan for low-emission and resilient growth and ramp up climate responses in line
with the Paris Agreement.
National legal and policy frameworks help drive global climate action. The period
preceding the Paris Agreement (2009–2015) saw the most intense adoption
of domestic laws and policies globally. This factor underscores the relationship
between bolstering national climate action and driving forward the global agenda.
Only collaborative, widespread, and urgent local responses can limit climate change,
requiring quality national legal and policy frameworks backed up by well‑informed
judiciaries supporting implementation.
Legal and policy commitments need strengthening across the region. Most
procedures for environmental impact assessments do not expressly require
consideration of climate change. Laws requiring proponents to account for
climate effects on a project and incorporate climate durability into its design
are rare, undermining climate-resilient development. A few laws cover climate
change and oceans.
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Climate impacts, the Paris Agreement, technology, and markets will shape
domestic climate laws and policies, as governments seek to keep up with changes.
Courts in Asia and the Pacific are shaping national legal and policy frameworks
with their decisions. Further, given the existential crisis presented by climate
change, courts have been willing to assess whether national laws and policies
meet international climate commitments.

International Legal and Policy Frameworks
COVID-19 put much of 2020 on hold, including meetings central to the Paris
Agreement implementation. The 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was postponed
until 2021, delaying agreement on a carbon trading mechanism, common time
frames for reporting under the agreement, and ramping up climate finance and
technology transfers.
The Paris Agreement is mainly silent on oceans and aviation. However, the adoption
of domestic laws and policies in the 6 years leading up to the Paris Agreement
showed the power of national legal frameworks to shape global action.

Judges Can Contribute to Better Climate Outcomes
Judges’ role in government makes them gatekeepers, even climate emergency
managers. Judges are central to
• holding governments accountable for meeting policy commitments and
complying with legal obligations on climate change, the environment, and
sustainable development, and thereby shaping legal and policy frameworks;
• admitting relevant and credible scientific evidence for climate change in
courtrooms and making judicial findings of fact about climate change,
which can elevate the national discourse on climate change (indeed,
courts have successfully incorporated international scientific consensus,
synthesized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, into
domestic legal common ground, ensuring that advancements in climate
science filter into local law); and
• balancing outcomes and protecting citizens’ fundamental, constitutional,
and other legal rights, frequently closing the gaps through which people and
ecosystems fall.
These functions demonstrate that judges have a vital role in climate governance
in Asia and the Pacific. Supporting judges to respond to climate litigation
contributes to better quality climate governance.
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Moving Forward
Today’s judges are being asked to decide on the burning issue of our generation—
climate change. It is a challenge that threatens to eclipse all others in modern
history.
As Albert Einstein once said, “We cannot solve our problems with the same
thinking we used when we created them.” Significant judicial advancements
have often rested on the shoulders of jurists who were willing to apply new
consciousness and imagination to existing principles to resolve society’s pressing
problems. We need new perspectives to create climate justice. Justice will only
be fair if it considers diverse perspectives and rights—those of women, children,
elders, indigenous peoples, the differently abled, and future generations, as well as
those of the traditional power structures.
These reports are for those who must adjudicate climate litigation in Asia and the
Pacific. ADB lauds the advancements that Asia and the Pacific judiciaries have
made in environmental and climate justice and sustainable development. The
authors hope that this jurisprudence brings diversity and a fresh perspective to
the global discourse on climate law.
As for climate justice, more work is needed. Emissions continue to rise, and global
commitments do not yet have the world on track to limit global warming to well
below 2ºC above preindustrial temperatures. Gaps persist in climate change
legal and policy frameworks, allowing action to stagnate. To promote climate
justice in Asia and the Pacific, judges can assess these gaps. They can ask, do
these frameworks support the overarching 1.5ºC–2ºC temperature goal under the
Paris Agreement?
These reports encourage judiciaries to equip themselves with knowledge about
climate science and law because litigation demands that judges take part in
reckoning climate justice. The future rests heavily on each of us. Those able to
make powerful decisions must choose action. This work is in the service of judges
and decision-makers. We hope it lights the way, a little.

Photo by Jawad Jalali/ADB.

Managing flood and riverbank erosion on the banks of
the Brahmaputra River in Assam. Flood and riverbank
erosion measures help communities adapt to climate change
impacts and boost economic and national interests
(photo by Rakesh Sahai/ADB).

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION
I. Judiciaries Play a Role in Domestic
Climate Action and Need Resources
The diplomats have done their job: the Paris Agreement points the world
in the right direction, and with sophistication and clarity. It does not,
however, ensure implementation, which necessarily remains the domain
of politicians, businessmen, scientists, engineers, and civil society.1

T

hese words reveal a fundamental truth—the Paris Agreement is just
the beginning of what needs to be done. How might we ensure that the
agreement is implemented? Everyone must “make climate change personal”
in their life and contribute to global action.2 Only with collective action
can humankind limit global warming to well below 2ºC above preindustrial
temperatures, ideally to a maximum of 1.5ºC.3 Climate change results
from emissions all around us, affecting citizens and ecosystems globally.
Implementation must, therefore, occur where emissions and impacts arise.
Countries adopt policies and laws consistent with their global commitments to
regulate domestic responses to climate change. As of 26 November 2020, there
were 2,082 policies and laws globally.4 National legal and policy frameworks are
vital for low emission and resilient green growth because they integrate international
commitments into the national context and ensure domestic implementation.
Despite the global agreement and growth in climate laws, climate change impacts
are mounting, and it is apparent that existing climate pledges are insufficient to
meet agreed temperature goals.5
Faced with devastating impacts on their lives, citizens are suing for climate action.
Climate action includes activities to (i) reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas
1
2

3
4

5

A. Doyle et al. 2015. Factbox: World Reacts to New Climate Accord. Reuters. 13 December.
D. Falvey. 2019. ‘Make Climate Change Personal in Your Life’, Mary Robinson Urges. The Irish
Times. 20 July.
Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113. Art. 2(1)(a).
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. Climate Change Laws of
the World (accessed 26 November 2020).
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2019. Emissions Gap Report 2019. News
release. 26 November. For infographics, see Climate Action Tracker. The World Is Not on Track
to Meet 1.5ºC.
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emissions or concentrations (mitigation), (ii) adjust to the impacts of climate
change (adaptation), and (iii) boost the capacity of people and ecosystems to
recover from climate impacts (resilience). By 26 November 2020, there were
more than 1,200 climate suits in the United States alone and at least 400 climate
cases in other countries.6 Climate litigation is also growing in Asia and the Pacific,
requiring judiciaries to interpret or apply their domestic climate change legal
frameworks (see Report Two for a discussion about climate litigation in Asia and
the Pacific).
The central role of judges—interpreting, upholding, and shaping laws—makes
the judiciary integral to domestic climate action. Courts are “increasingly
complementing the actions of legislators” by deliberating over climate change
court cases worldwide.7 Patricia Espinosa—Executive Secretary of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—recently commented,
“Relevant legislation, carefully used, supported and backed by an informed
judiciary, will also be crucial for realising our shared aspirations for shaping a
resilient, low-carbon and truly sustainable future” (footnote 7).
This report—Climate Change, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: National Climate
Change Legal Frameworks in Asia and the Pacific—focuses on national climate
change legal and policy frameworks in 32 countries in Asia and the Pacific. It
belongs to a series of reports on climate law and policy for judges in Asia and the
Pacific. Due to the judges’ growing concern about climate change and the fact
that more people are suing over it, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) prepared
these papers to provide more resources about climate change law.
When determining the usefulness of this report to judges in Asia and the
Pacific, ADB took into account the resource constraints that prevent many of
its developing member countries from publishing their laws and policies online
or translating documents into English. These challenges make the records of
national climate laws and policies online incomplete. Consequently, judges,
lawyers, interested parties, and international development partners are unable to
access exhaustive information about various national climate change legal and
policy frameworks in the region. Access to laws benefit everyone, and this report
seeks to boost accessibility.
Legal and policy frameworks must also facilitate access to climate finance
and other resources from international donors. Each country covered by this
report has a national designated authority with the Green Climate Fund.8 Clear
information about national legal and policy frameworks makes it easier for donors
to assess sectoral responsibilities and national reporting standards. These factors
are vital for the provision of green finance and other resources.

6
7

8

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. About (accessed 26 November 2020).
M. Nachmany et al. 2017. Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. p. 4.
Green Climate Fund. NDA Directory.
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II. Report Structure and Scope
Report Three—National Climate Change Legal Frameworks in Asia and the Pacific—
reviews climate law and policy frameworks across 32 countries in South Asia,
Southeast Asia, and the Pacific (Table 1). ADB collected some 880 laws and
policies for this report.

Table 1: Regions and Countries Covered by the Report
South Asia

Southeast Asia and the
People’s Republic of China

Pacific

Afghanistan

Cambodia

Cook Islands

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Federated States of Micronesia

Bhutan

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Fiji

India

Malaysia

Kiribati

Maldives

Myanmar

Marshall Islands

Nepal

People’s Republic of China

Nauru

Pakistan

Philippines

Palau

Sri Lanka

Singapore

Papua New Guinea

Thailand

Samoa

Viet Nam

Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

Source: Asian Development Bank.

Report Three contains seven parts, with the body of the report falling within
• Part Two—trends in climate laws and policies in Asia and the Pacific,
• Part Three—constitutional rights survey, and
• Parts Four, Five, and Six—national legal climate change frameworks summaries.

A. Part Two: Trends in Climate Laws and Policies in Asia
and the Pacific
Part Two outlines some key trends relating to climate law and policies. For
example, it is clear that (i) climate litigation is shaping domestic legal frameworks,
(ii) legal adaptation frameworks across Asia and the Pacific can be strengthened,
and (iii) most countries regulate climate change responses with policies and
implementation via existing laws.
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The clear preference for defining climate responses via policies, action plans,
and existing laws has benefits. It allows countries to roll out policies quickly
and update them after testing their usefulness. But without an overarching
instrument like a framework climate law to steer the response and ensure that it
works cohesively, national collaboration can flounder. Bureaucracy can impede
information sharing and reporting, undermining outcomes.
Trends in climate laws and policies are useful predictors of litigation preferences
and growth areas within national frameworks. Typically, citizens sue because
climate change laws or policies do not or will not achieve the Paris Agreement’s
goals, or implementation or enforcement is weak. This report does not comment
on the adequacy of any country’s framework or the application of laws. However,
Part Two provides insights into how gaps in legislation and international
developments may influence future litigation.

B. Part Three: Constitutional Rights Survey
Rights-based climate lawsuits are growing in popularity. Outside the United States,
they constitute around 35% of all climate litigation against governments.9 Within
Asia, rights-based cases typically rely on constitutional rights, particularly the rights
to life, environment, and equal protection before the law (see Part II of Report Two
for a more detailed discussion of constitutional rights climate litigation).
Given the trend toward rights-based climate litigation, Part Three shows tables
identifying constitutions containing the rights to life, environment, food, water,
health, housing, self-determination, cultural identity, property, biodiversity, public
participation, access to information, and sustainable development. The tables
also help judges and practitioners identify which constitutions within South
Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific contain related rights, making it easier to
determine relevant and comparable climate jurisprudence.

C. Parts Four, Five, and Six: National Legal Climate Change
Frameworks Summaries
Most countries regulate climate action with a combination of climate policies,
plans, and existing laws (see Part Two above for more information about this
preference). This approach can make it challenging to gain a holistic perspective
on how the entire framework functions.
Parts Four, Five, and Six contains high-level summaries (5–8 pages) of the
national climate change legal frameworks for the 32 countries covered by this
report. The discussion shows not only the summary of laws, but also how various

9

“The Rights Turn in Climate Litigation,” YouTube video, 43:47, from a presentation given by
César Rodríguez-Garavito at the World Commission on Environmental Law Webinar 4: Climate
Change in the Courts on 5 June 2020.
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instruments combine to regulate multiple aspects of climate action. Every section
(i) begins with a snapshot of the country’s climate and environmental challenges;
(ii) explains the overarching climate change legal and policy framework, including
mitigation and adaptation targets; (iii) lists all relevant climate laws, policies, and
instruments in a table; and (iv) enumerates the sector-specific laws, policies, and
regulations pertinent to climate action.
Each of the national summaries discusses climate laws, policies, regulations, and
instruments that focus on
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)

climate change specifically, such as overarching laws on mitigation or
adaptation, or which create institutional frameworks;
climate finance and carbon financing;
cities and buildings;
disaster risk reduction and management;
energy;
food production and security;
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in
developing countries (REDD+) and land use, land-use change, and
forestry (LULUCF);
transportation;
vulnerable groups;
waste; and
water resources and coastal zone management.

Not every country has laws or policies regulating these thematic areas, so each
summary focuses on the current status of the legal and policy framework in
2019–2020.

III. Report Methodology and Preparation
A. Defining Climate Law and Policy in This Report
This report defines climate laws and policies as any law, policy, regulation, or
instrument that contributes to national climate change mitigation and adaptation.
In researching for this report, ADB surveyed laws, policies, regulations, and
instruments furthering climate mitigation and adaptation related to
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

carbon pricing;
cities and buildings;
energy;
environmental impact assessments;
food production and food security;
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(vi) institutional and administrative arrangements;
(vii) materials and manufacturing;
(viii) other relevant laws, such as those targeting pollution or solid waste
management;
(ix) LULUCF and REDD+;
(x) refugees, migration, and displacement;
(xi) research and development;
(xii) transportation;
(xiii) water resources and coastal zone management; and
(xiv) women and girls.

B. Report Preparation and Accessing Laws Online
ADB prepared this report in collaboration with the Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law.10 ADB also engaged researchers to collate national laws and policies,
especially those not available online and not available in English, to fill the gaps in the
information currently available. ADB contributed Parts One, Two, Three, and Seven,
while the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law prepared Parts Four, Five, and Six.
To facilitate access to information, this report links with online copies of all
laws, policies, regulations, and instruments discussed, where possible. ADB also
collaborates with the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment and the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law to upload laws,
policies, and other instruments discussed in this report onto the Climate Change
Laws of the World database (footnote 4).

IV. Looking Forward
Uncertainty shrouds global responses to climate change and, therefore, the
extent of climactic change. In 2020, there remains a big gap between current
global pledges on climate action and the action needed to limit global warming
to 1.5ºC above preindustrial temperatures—the safer option.11 The international
community is currently on track to exceed 1.5ºC of warming by 2035, 2ºC by
around 2053, and 3.2ºC by 2100.12
The parties to the Paris Agreement designed the accord to start slowly and
improve. The authors recognize that even the countries’ imperfect climate action,
defined in nationally determined contributions (NDCs), could enhance and reach
the net-zero goal by 2050. However, the pledges outlined in the first NDCs were
10
11

12

Sabin Center for Climate Change Law.
Footnote 5. Additionally, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) acknowledged
that 1.5ºC is a safer limit in IPCC. 2018. Summary for Policymakers. In V. Masson-Delmotte et al.,
eds. Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report. In Press.
Climate Analytics and NewClimate Institute. 2019. Climate Action Tracker: Warming Projections
Global Update. Berlin.
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low. In 2019, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) reported that
“dramatic strengthening of the NDCs is needed in 2020. Countries must increase
their NDC ambitions threefold to achieve the well below 2°C goal and more than
fivefold to achieve the 1.5°C goal.”13
Unfortunately, the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic is a
considerable speed bump for global climate action. Infections in Asia and
the Pacific reached 11.37 million by 26 November 2020, with almost 178,000
deaths.14 Global deaths were around 1,405,000 (footnote 14).
The widespread shutdown has slowed the passage of laws, the adoption of
updated policies and NDCs, and postponed international forums for climate
negotiations.15 But it has not slowed global warming significantly.16 The global
monthly mean of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) in August 2020 was
409.50 parts per million (ppm), compared with 407.43 ppm in August 2019.17
Emissions will also pick up again when economies reopen. Therefore, any
emissions reductions must be sustainable and enable economies to function.
Infection control measures that require restricted face-to-face interaction also
impact the ability of courts to manage climate litigation. For this reason, in 2020
ADB has supported the Asia-Pacific Judicial Conference on Climate Change:
Adjudication in the Time of COVID-19. As its name suggests, the conference
(an online forum) explores themes to support judges hearing matters in online
courtrooms, a by-product of rolling COVID-19-related shutdowns. Virtual
courtrooms might also support judges with climate litigation, particularly matters
involving offshore parties.
Climate litigation will not stall for long. Global citizens and businesses are aware
of the urgency of improving climate action. Lawsuits will inevitably question
the effectiveness of NDC pledges and the legal and policy frameworks that
support the international commitments and drive domestic implementation (see
Report Two for a more detailed discussion of climate litigation trends.) These
cases will ask the courts to intervene.
In the face of climate litigation, judiciaries will need good quality information
about national legal and policy frameworks. This report seeks to support judges by
providing information about

13
14

15

16

17

UNEP. 2019. Emissions Gap Report 2019: Executive Summary. Nairobi. p. x.
World Health Organization. WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard (accessed
26 November 2020). Countries from Asia and the Pacific fall within the WHO Southeast Asia
and Western Pacific regions.
The 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 26) has been postponed to 2021.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Earth System Research
Laboratories (ESRL). Can We See a Change in the CO2 Record Because of COVID-19?
NOAA, ESRL. Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide: Global Monthly Mean CO2 (accessed
26 November 2020).
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• national legal and policy frameworks for 32 countries in Asia and the Pacific,
• rights and obligations enshrined in the constitutions in Asia and the Pacific,
and
• current trends in climate change legal and policy frameworks.
ADB’s overarching objective in providing holistic syntheses of national climate
change legal and policy frameworks is to aid judges, quasi-judicial decisionmakers, and lawyers involved in climate litigation to do the following:



Understand the connectedness of issues in this era of anthropogenic
climate change, e.g., water, energy, and building permits should now
consider climate change. A robust understanding of a country’s legal and
policy framework makes it easier for decision-makers to apply a climate
lens to cases that do not raise climate change as a prima facie issue, where
appropriate. Such approaches should result in more just, equitable, and
sustainable outcomes.



Assess the cogency of climate-related laws and policies, particularly when a
case argues that a country’s national climate laws and policies do not meet
international commitments.



Determine the composition of the legal and policy frameworks of
comparative jurisdictions in Asia and the Pacific. Globally, climate litigation
results in jurisprudence that cites, adopts, and expands decisions from
other jurisdictions. Understanding the nature of another country’s national
legal and policy framework helps judges discern whether that other
jurisdiction’s laws and jurisprudence are comparative.

Report Three is just one of many resources that judges can access for relevant
and timely information on climate laws and legal frameworks. While this
document and the rest of the series focus on Asia and the Pacific, other
databases and websites showcase developments in different regions and across
the globe:



Climate Change Laws of the World Database, managed by the Grantham
Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the Sabin
Center for Climate Change Law, to which ADB is contributing.
See https://climate-laws.org/.



ECOLEX, an information service on environmental law, a joint initiative
of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO),
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and UNEP.
See https://www.ecolex.org/.



FAOLEX, a database maintained by the FAO, which is a comprehensive
and up-to-date database of national laws, regulations, and policies on food,
agriculture, and natural resources management. See http://www.fao.org/
faolex/country-profiles/en/.
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Asian Judges Network on Environment, which contains laws, regulations,
case laws, and reference materials on environmental and climate laws in
Asia and the Pacific. See http://www.ajne.org/.



Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute, an initiative of the University
of the South Pacific School of Law, which collects and publishes legal
materials from 20 Pacific island countries, including legislation, subordinate
legislation, and cases. See http://www.paclii.org/.



Asia Pacific Energy Portal, an open-access information platform
containing energy statistics, full-text policies, and interactive infrastructure
maps maintained by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific. See https://asiapacificenergy.org/.



Climate Change Litigation Databases, two databases of climate change
case law maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law in
collaboration with Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP.
See http://climatecasechart.com/?cn-reloaded=1.



Global Judicial Portal on Environmental Law, a database supported by the
Global Judicial Institute on the Environment and UNEP. The database was
created for judges by judges. See https://judicial-portal.edw.ro/.



InforMEA, a United Nations Information Portal on Multilateral
Environmental Agreements. See https://www.informea.org/.

ADB hopes that this report will provide judges, quasi-judicial decision-makers,
and climate lawyers across the region with a much-needed reference on climate
law and policy. Armed with knowledge about the composition of their country’s
climate change legal and policy framework, judges will have better capacity to rule
on climate-related issues. By shaping the advancement of more dynamic climate
legal systems, judges contribute to their country’s sustainable future.
During one of the Paris Agreement negotiations, the President of Palau commented,
“we need a Paris agreement to include a strong long-term goal and a regular
review process … robust transparency rules and a permanent loss and damage
mechanism.” 18 If national legal frameworks and the Paris Agreement are mutually
reinforcing, we need domestic laws and policies that do the same. Citizens and
judges can actively participate in this outcome with balanced and intelligent
lawsuits and decisions.

18

T. Remengesau, President of Palau, quoted in A. Doyle. 2015. 18 Quotes from World Leaders on
Climate Change. World Economic Forum. 1 December.
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Khandke Wind Power Project. The farmers of Khandke
continue with their planting and farming around the wind farm
(photo by Ian Taylor/ADB).

CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS.
Smoke stacks from coal-fired and
nuclear power plants.

PART TWO

TRENDS IN CLIMATE LAWS
AND POLICIES IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC

V

arious trends are emerging in climate law and policy frameworks, providing
insight into changes in laws and future litigation, which is relevant information
for judiciaries.

I. The Paris Agreement and National Laws
and Policies Are Mutually Reinforcing
With 189 parties, the Paris Agreement is almost universally ratified.1 Unlike
its predecessor, the accord does not impose targets on countries.2 It shifts
responsibility to countries for determining appropriate climate responses.
Nations must adopt policies and laws that strive to achieve the Paris Agreement’s
temperature goal—“holding the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.” 3
To sustain global commitment and enable scrutiny of governments’ progress,
the Paris Agreement requires parties to communicate their climate action as
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every 5 years. NDCs must become
more ambitious over time, enabling action to ramp up. Greenhouse gas emissions
should also peak as soon as possible, rapidly reduce after that, and reach net zero
in the second half of this century.4
The Paris Agreement and domestic climate law are mutually reinforcing. Its
widespread adoption reflected the evolving global consensus on climate change
1
2

3
4

United Nations Treaty Collection. Paris Agreement (accessed 21 August 2020).
The Paris Agreement focuses on action post-2020, succeeding the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which regulated pre-2020 climate
action. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto,
11 December 1997, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2303, No. 30822. p. 162.
Paris Agreement, Paris, 20 May 2020, United Nations Treaty Collection, No. 54113. Art. 2(1)(a).
Footnote 3, art. 4. Net-zero emissions means that there is “a balance between anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases.”
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during 2009–2015, between the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and
the Paris Agreement. In that time frame, all governments passed 100–143 new climate
change laws each year.5 In its 2018 assessment of global climate law trends, the
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment concluded
that the spur of domestic legislation supported and enabled the Paris Agreement
(footnote 5). In 2013, Christiana Figueres—former Executive Secretary of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—remarked, “nothing
is going to be agreed internationally, until enough is legislated domestically.”6 Domestic
law and policy, therefore, are critical to driving global action on climate change.
The Paris Agreement’s defining features—global temperature targets, nonbinding
national pledges, improved ambition, transparent reporting, human rights,
and participation—are also shaping domestic climate law. During 2016–2020,
countries adopted 474 climate laws, policies, and other executive instruments
in furtherance of meeting the Paris Agreement goals.7 The accord also drives
post-2020 global climate action. New reporting requirements, public scrutiny
over the adequacy of commitments and financing, and a new carbon trading
scheme (yet to be agreed) will likely result in additional domestic regulation.8

II. National Preferences Guide Climate
Change Legal and Policy Frameworks
Each country that adopted the Paris Agreement now has one or more laws or
policies governing climate change or the transition to a low-carbon economy
(footnote 5). Aside from submitting their NDCs, countries have adopted or
plan to adopt policies and strategies for achieving low-emission and climateresilient growth.9 These green growth or sustainable development strategies have
taken many forms, from dedicated, economy-wide climate change legislation
(framework legislation) to broad strategies that allow countries to integrate lowemission and climate-resilient policies into development goals and existing laws.
In Asia and the Pacific, 24 of the 32 countries surveyed in this project (75%)
regulate climate action via national or sectoral policies and existing legal
5

6
7

8

9

M. Nachmany and J. Setzer. 2018. Policy Brief—Global Trends In Climate Change Legislation And
Litigation: 2018 Snapshot. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the
Environment.
C. Figueres. 2013. Speech given at the 1st GLOBE Climate Legislation Summit. London. 14 January.
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law. Climate Change Laws of the World (accessed 7 October 2020).
In late 2019, parties to the Paris Agreement deferred reaching agreement about carbon trading
under art. 6 of the climate pact. Further negotiations are scheduled for the 26th Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 26), deferred to
late 2021.
United Nations. 2013. The Role of Legal Instruments to Support Green Low-Emission and ClimateResilient Development: A Guidebook on Assessing, Selecting and Implementing Legal Instruments.
Nairobi: UNON Publishing Services Section. p. 1.
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frameworks.10 This approach allows for the rapid adoption of short- or long-term
climate policies, with existing laws and legal frameworks facilitating implementation,
e.g., regulations in forestry or energy. It also enables sectors to devise appropriate
goals and actions. However, this approach has drawbacks. It can lead to gaps
and inconsistent climate responses, making it challenging for countries to build
effective climate responses over the long term.
The Paris Agreement encourages parties to submit a mid-century, long-term
development strategy for low greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.11 The long-term
strategy should lay a path toward decarbonization by 2050. By late November 2020,
only 19 parties had filed their long-term strategy, and not all strategies commit to
net zero by 2050.12 Fiji and the Marshall Islands communicated strategies aiming
for carbon neutrality by 2050.13 These strategies will shape future domestic
climate change policies and laws as countries contemplate and plot out the
realities of a net-zero, resilient future.

III. Framework Climate Laws Are Growing
and Have Benefits for Propelling
Coordinated Action
Countries across the region are increasingly adopting framework legislation. The
Federated States of Micronesia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
(Lao PDR), Pakistan, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Philippines, Tuvalu, and
Vanuatu have passed dedicated climate framework legislation that establishes
institutional frameworks. Fiji and Nepal have climate change bills, and Singapore is
the only country in the 32 countries studied across Asia and the Pacific with a specific
carbon pricing law. Bangladesh has legislatively created a climate change trust fund.
Framework legislation creates a foundation for unified national climate goals,
along with long-term approaches to climate governance.14 Clear institutional
10

11

12

13

14

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Kiribati, Malaysia,
Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and
Viet Nam do not yet have a framework climate change law, but regulate national climate
responses with a combination of national policies and plans and updates to existing legislation.
Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113. Art. 4(19); and
Conference of the Parties to the Paris Agreement. 2016. Decision 1/CP.21. 12 December. Art. 35.
Costa Rica, Fiji, the European Union, France, the Marshall Islands, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom’s long-term strategies commit to net zero by 2050. See UNFCCC. Communication of
Long-Term Strategies (accessed 26 November 2020).
See also Government of Fiji. 2018. Fiji Low Emission Development Strategy 2018–2050. Suva; and
Government of the Marshall Islands. 2018. Tile Til Eo. 2050 Climate Strategy: “Lighting the Way”.
Majuro.
For a discussion regarding the importance of framework legislation, see M. Nachmany and
J. Seltzer, footnote 5.

13

14

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

frameworks are critical for enabling cohesive climate responses domestically
and establishing transparent channels for the flow of green finance. All of these
factors are vital for achieving the Paris Agreement goals.

IV. Data and Reporting Requirements
Are Influencing Legal Frameworks
Data will be central to successful climate action. Countries will need data and
information about baselines, impacts, successes, and failures, and for reporting
within the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework.15 For example,
climate risk information is particularly pertinent to adaptation planning. It helps
countries identify priorities for adaptive capacity and building resilience.16
However, data sharing requires clear frameworks and authorities to enable the
communication of information between sectors and government ministries.
Further, to optimize data inputs and centralized analysis, governments must
facilitate data collection, sharing, and reporting under a measurement, reporting,
and verification framework. Framework climate legislation can mandate data
sharing and reporting responsibilities, making data sharing easier.

V. Climate Litigation Is Shaping
Climate Law Globally
Citizens will continue using litigation to hold their government accountable for
meeting global climate goals, involving judges in climate governance. Judges are
the referees of government, reviewing executive decisions and upholding rights.
Jurisprudence from common law countries, where courts may create law, has
shaped domestic climate governance, both directly and indirectly.
In December 2019, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands expressly ordered the
government to reduce carbon emissions by 25%–40% by 2020.17 The court did
not consider that its orders requiring specific reduction targets constituted an
impermissible foray into the field of political decision-making. It reasoned that the
15

16

17

For information about reporting requirements and the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency
framework, see S. Barakat et al. 2017. A Guide to Transparency under the UNFCCC and the Paris
Agreement. London: International Institute of Environment and Development.
See M. Nachmany, R. Byrnes, and S. Surminski. 2019. Policy Brief—National Laws and Policies on
Climate Change Adaptation: A Global Review. London: Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment.
The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) v Urgenda
Foundation, Case No. 19/00135, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Supreme Court of the Netherlands,
20 December 2019 (unofficial translation from the court).
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limitation on the political domain prevents courts from issuing an order to create
legislation with particular or specific content. Beyond that, courts may “issue a
declaratory decision to the effect that the omission of legislation is unlawful.” 18
Following the Supreme Court’s decision, the government announced measures in
April 2020 to cut coal use, reduce cattle and pig herds, subsidize garden greening,
and reduce pollution.19
Courts in Asia have also issued decisions directing governments to implement
or prepare appropriate climate responses. Such outcomes have shaped legal and
regulatory responses. In Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, the High Court of Lahore
created the Climate Change Commission to ensure the implementation of the
country’s climate change policy.20 In 2019, the Supreme Court of Nepal directed
the national government to enact climate legislation and effectively implement
its Climate Change Policy of 2011 in Advocate Padam Bahadur Shrestha vs Prime
Minister and Office of Council of Ministers and Others.21
Like the Urgenda case, Leghari and Shrestha did not include specific directions
about content, but they required the government to make good on its policy
and treaty commitments and take appropriate action in the face of an existential
threat.22 In Shrestha, the court reasoned that it was necessary to enact a climate
change law to effectively address climate change.
Rights-based lawsuits are growing in popularity. Outside the United States,
rights-based actions constitute around 35% of all litigation against governments.23
About 90% of these cases were filed after 2015.24
Within Asia, litigants have frequently built their cases upon constitutional rights,
reflecting a few factors. Asian litigants have long used constitutional rights
in environmental public interest litigation, a concept termed environmental
constitutionalism.25 Applying environmental constitutionalism in the climate
change context makes sense because many of the issues overlap. National climate
Footnote 17, paras. 8.1–8.4. See also J. Fahner. 2018. Climate Change before the Courts: Urgenda
Ruling Redraws the Boundary between Law and Politics. EJIL: Talk. 16 November.
19
J. Watts. 2020. Dutch Officials Reveal Measures to Cut Emissions after Court Ruling. The
Guardian. 24 April.
20
Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2018 Lahore 364.
21
Advocate Padam Bahadur Shrestha vs Prime Minister and Office of Council of Ministers and Others,
Order No. 074-WO-0283, Supreme Court of Nepal, 25 December 2018 (2075/09/10 BS).
22
The recent case of R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport & Others [2020]
EWCA Civ 214 is another example of courts requiring governments to take policy commitments
into account. In this case, the High Court of Justice required the English government to take
into account its climate change policy commitments when preparing the airport national policy
statement that allowed the construction of a third runway at Heathrow Airport.
23
		“The Rights Turn in Climate Litigation,” YouTube video, 45:00, from a presentation given by
César Rodríguez-Garavito at the World Commission on Environmental Law Webinar 4: Climate
Change in the Courts on 5 June 2020.
24
Footnote 23, at 43:47.
25
See J.R. May and E. Daly. 2017. Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism. Nairobi:
United Nations Environment Programme.
18
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change commitments contained within policy documents are harder to challenge,
given that the political domain has traditionally been off-limits to the courts.
Constitutional rights enable petitioners to remove an issue from the political realm
and bring an actionable challenge. The decision in Leghari also demonstrates that
Asian courts are willing to hold governments accountable for policy commitments,
particularly where implementation failures injure a constitutional right.
Jurisprudence can transcend borders, influencing judicial decisions on laws in other
jurisdictions. Rights-based cases transfer easily across jurisdictions because they use
common language and principles. Claimants and courts have referred to decisions from
other Asian courts.26 The comparative nature of rights-based cases makes it useful for
judges to have access to the laws cited in such decisions—another benefit of this report.

VI. Science Is Evolving Responses
to Climate Change
Technological advances are improving climate science, which is shaping global
responses and, consequently, legal frameworks.
During negotiations for the Paris Agreement, small island developing states pushed hard
for the inclusion of the 1.5ºC temperature goal. Given the lack of scientific knowledge
about the new target, the parties to the Paris Agreement invited the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to report on global warming of 1.5ºC. It revealed that
1.5ºC of warming is far safer for many than 2ºC.27 It is not safe for everyone, though,
especially those living in low-lying coastal areas—around 680 million people globally.28
The IPCC report shifted global awareness of emissions cuts needed to meet the
climate accord’s goals. It stressed that countries must affect widespread and
urgent measures before 2030 to limit global warming to 1.5ºC above preindustrial
temperatures. Global greenhouse gas emissions must decrease 7.6% annually
during 2020–2030, and countries must reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
to net zero by 2050—the net-zero target.29 The director of the Energy and
Climate Intelligence Unit recently observed, “Having a net zero target with a date
26

27

28

29

See for example, Maria Khan et al. v. Pakistan et al., Writ Petition No. 8960 of 2019, High Court
of Lahore, in which the petitioners cite decisions on the public trust doctrine on climate change
from the United States and India; M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) 1
(1997), citing Asian decisions on standing; and Advocate Ramchandra Simkhada and Others vs
Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, Government of Nepal and Others, Writ Petition
No. 068-WO-0597 (Supreme Court of Nepal, 13 February 2019), citing Lalit Miglani v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2017) SCC Online UTT 392, an Indian decision recognizing nature’s right to exist.
IPCC. 2018. Summary for Policymakers. In V. Masson-Delmotte et al., eds. Global Warming of
1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report. In press.
IPCC. 2019. Summary for Policymakers. In H.-O. Pörtner et al., eds. IPCC Special Report on the
Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate. In press.
United Nations. 2019. Report of the Secretary-General on the 2019 Climate Action Summit and
the Way Forward in 2020. New York. p. 9.
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before mid-century is probably the best single indicator of whether a nation is
serious about delivering what it promised at the Paris summit.”30
The UN Climate Action Summit 2019 declared 1.5°C as the “socially, economically,
politically and scientifically safe limit to global warming by the end of this century,
and net-zero emissions by 2050 as the global long-term climate objective for all.” 31
During the summit, 75 countries committed to creating a 2050 net-zero emissions
strategy by 2020. Bhutan and Suriname have declared themselves carbon negative.32
Five states have enacted legislation with 2050 net-zero emissions targets: France,
New Zealand, Scotland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (footnote 32). Chile and
Fiji have proposed laws with 2050 net-zero goals, while 10 other countries plus Fiji and
the Marshall Islands have outlined their intent to achieve carbon neutrality in policies.33

VII. Courts Are Integrating Scientific
Consensus into National Law
Courts have also integrated international scientific consensus on climate change
into domestic law. Such integration enables them to assess the viability of
national commitments against globally accepted scientific benchmarks.
In Urgenda, the court reasoned that the state was obliged to do its part in responding
to climate change because it was a signatory to the UNFCCC and European
Convention on Human Rights. As such, the state should act consistently with broadly
accepted scientific opinion captured within the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
The Supreme Court of Pakistan is currently hearing a rights-based challenge
to the government’s decision to mine untapped coal reserves.34 The petitioner
(a minor) asserts that the government should contribute to global efforts to
maintain atmospheric CO2 concentrations within a “safe level”—350 parts per
million (ppm) atmospheric CO2 by 2100. Within its broad scope, this lawsuit tests
climate science and energy regulatory frameworks.
Report Two, Climate Change, Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Climate Litigation in
Asia and the Pacific and Beyond, provides more information regarding climate litigation.

30

31
32

33

34

Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit. 2019. One-Sixth of Global Economy under Net Zero Targets.
News release. 25 June.
Footnote 29, p. 5.
S. Fleming. 2019. These Are the Countries That Have Made Their Climate Commitments Law.
World Economic Forum. 13 November.
Footnote 32. Austria, Costa Rica, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia,
and Switzerland have committed to net zero by 2050. See Energy & Climate Intelligence Unit.
Net Zero Tracker: 2020 Scorecard. For information on Fiji’s bill, see Government of Fiji, Ministry
of Economy. 2019. Climate Change Bill 2019. Suva.
Ali v. Federation of Pakistan & Another, Constitution Petition in the Supreme Court of Pakistan, 2016.
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VIII. Adaptation Legal Frameworks
Need Strengthening
Gaps in laws and policies on adaptation persist in Asia and the Pacific, an
undesirable state for a climate-vulnerable region. Five of the 10 countries most
affected by climate change globally in 2018 were in Asia and the Pacific.35 Further,
the Natural Hazards Risk Atlas 2015 reported that 56 of the world’s 100 most
hazard-prone cities are in Bangladesh (10), Japan (11), the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) (16), and the Philippines (21).36
Domestic law and policy frameworks in Asia and the Pacific tend to focus on early
warning systems for disasters. However, few laws and policies work to enhance
or require the construction of resilient infrastructure, which mitigates the loss of
life and property during disasters. Kiribati’s Building Act 2006 stands out because
it requires construction projects exceeding $200,000 to prepare a sustainability
report detailing the effects of climate change on the building.37 Policies and laws
regulating energy infrastructure also lack adaptation components.
These gaps in adaptation law and policy reflect international trends (footnote 16).
Globally, legal frameworks still lack incentives for investment in the physical and
social infrastructure needed for climate change adaptation (footnote 16).

IX. Environmental Impact Assessments
Should Consider Climate Change
Explicit language requiring proponents to analyze a project’s climate ramifications
within an environmental impact assessment (EIA) is not widespread in the legal
frameworks of Asia and the Pacific.38 More often, the obligation to consider
climate change is implicit within EIA procedures.
However, EIAs are fertile ground for climate litigation, and courts will probably see
more cases arguing that EIAs should consider a project’s climate impact. Litigants
in Bali, Indonesia used this ground to challenge a coal-fired power station.39 The

35
36

37
38

39

D. Eckstein et al. 2020. Global Climate Risk Index 2020. Bonn: Germanwatch e.V.
Verisk Maplecroft. 2015. Which Cities Are Most Exposed to Natural Hazards? Natural Hazards
Risk Atlas 2015.
Building Act 2006, s. 19(1)(h).
The Lao PDR and Myanmar are examples of jurisdictions that specifically require proponents
to account for climate change. See the Lao PDR Environmental Protection Law 2013, art. 22
and Government of Myanmar, Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. 2015.
Notification No. 616 of 2015, Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure. Art. 6.2.1(ii).
Administrative Court of Denpasar, Decision No. 2/G/LH/2018/PTUN.DPS, Ketut Mangku Wijana
et al. v. Governor of Bali et al. (2018).
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case was unsuccessful because the court held that the petitioners did not have
standing and that new technology could mitigate the risk of emissions.40
Few jurisdictions in Asia and the Pacific explicitly require reverse EIAs. Reverse
EIAs oblige proponents to assess the impact of climate change on a project
throughout its life and equip governments to limit approvals to climate-resilient
ventures. Myanmar requires proponents to identify the effects of climate change
on a project.41 Viet Nam’s strategic environmental assessments require project
planning to evaluate and forecast the impact of climate change.42
Some private sector entities grasp the importance of climate change assessments.
Equator Principles Financial Institutions now require climate change risk
assessments in connection with environmental and social assessments. They
impose this requirement on projects with adverse environmental impacts or
that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually (in all project
locations).43 Borrowers must submit to independent monitoring and reporting
during the project life.44 The Equator Principles are voluntary, with 111 financial
institutions in 37 countries adopting them as of 15 November 2020.45 Five
financial institutions in the PRC and one financial institution each in South Asia
and Southeast Asia have adopted the Equator Principles.46

X. Legal Frameworks on Oceans
Need Strengthening
Around 60%–70% of countries discussed marine environments in their first
NDCs, with coastal states focusing more on marine factors than landlocked
countries.47

40
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M. Taylor. 2018. Indonesian Court Rejects Bid to Stop Coal Power Plant Expansion. Reuters.
17 August.
Government of Myanmar, Ministry of Environmental Conservation and Forestry. 2015.
Notification No. 616 of 2015, Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure. Art. 6.2.1(iii).
Government of Viet Nam. 2019. Decree No. 40/2019/ND-CP, amending Decree No. 18/2015/
ND-CP. Hanoi.
The Equator Principles Association. 2020. The Equator Principles. Principle 2.
Footnote 43, Principle 9.
The Equator Principles Association. EP Association Members & Reporting (accessed 15 November
2020).
Within the PRC, Bank of Huzhou, Bank of Jiangsu, Chongqing Rural Commercial Bank, Industrial
Bank Co., Ltd, and Mian Yang City Commercial Bank have adopted the Equator Principles.
IDFC FIRST Bank in India and DBS Bank in Singapore have also adopted the Equator Principles.
See footnote 45.
N.D. Gallo, D.G. Victor, and L.A. Levin. 2017. Ocean Commitments Under the Paris Agreement.
Nature Climate Change. 7 (11). pp. 833–834, Figure 3 and Table 1. The study found that 70% of
161 NDCs were ocean inclusive. One hundred and eighty-six countries have now filed their first
NDCs. If the additional 25 NDCs did not cover marine environments, only around 60% of first
NDCs would include commitments on this topic.
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Of the countries covered by this report, 55% of the Asian countries and 64%
of the Pacific countries discussed ocean warming in their first NDCs.48 Fewer
NDCs from countries in Asia and the Pacific covered ocean acidification, ocean
deoxygenation, mangroves, coral reefs, or blue carbon.49 Seven of the Asian
countries (almost 39%) and three of the Pacific countries (around 22%) included
in this report series made commitments about mangroves, recognizing their value
in carbon sequestration and adaptation (footnote 49). Five Pacific countries
(36%) outlined measures for coral reef protection in their NDCs, typically in the
adaptation content (footnote 49). National laws, regulations, and protections for
coastal inundation, storm surges, ocean acidification, mangroves, and coral reefs
should now be strengthened to accomplish these international pledges.
This report limits its research to laws, regulations, policies, and other instruments
issued by the national governments. It might be that many governments treat coastal
adaptation as a local measure, explaining why legal and policy frameworks on climate
change and oceans are less comprehensive than they are in other sectors.
Legal frameworks on oceans might again reflect and influence international legal
frameworks. The Paris Agreement mentions oceans once, potentially taking its lead
from national preferences and priorities. Recent scientific developments may help
countries determine legal and policy options, particularly the 2019 IPCC report,
IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate.50

XI. Technology and Markets
Need Responsive Legal and
Regulatory Frameworks
Markets are responding to climate risk, technological advances (some disruptive),
changing preferences, and emerging opportunities. Countries will need legal
and policy frameworks that enable the shift to new technology. For example, the
International Energy Agency reports that current global policies aim to produce
over 50% of new electricity generation by 2040 from wind, solar photovoltaic,
hydro, and nuclear power.51 Meeting this target requires policymakers and
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N.D. Gallo, D.G. Victor, and L.A. Levin. 2017. Ocean Commitments Under the Paris Agreement.
Nature Climate Change. 7 (11). p. 835, Table 1 states that NDCs from the following countries
cover ocean warming: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives,
the Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the People’s Republic of
China, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Viet Nam.
N.D. Gallo, D.G. Victor, and L.A. Levin. 2017. Ocean Commitments Under the Paris Agreement.
Nature Climate Change. 7 (11). p. 835, Table 1.
H.-O. Pörtner et al., eds. IPCC. 2019. IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing
Climate. In press.
International Energy Agency. 2019. World Energy Outlook 2019: Executive Summary. Paris. p. 4.
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regulators “to move fast to keep up with the pace of technological change and the
rising need for flexible operation of power systems.” 52
This International Energy Agency report does not assess the efficacy of the
region’s energy frameworks. Asian energy markets are central to the battle against
climate change because they consume 41% of global energy.53 By 2040, Asia will
use around 50% of the world’s energy supply and drive 66% of growth in energy
consumption (footnote 53). Coal remains a primary energy source in Asia. In
2000–2020, Asia built 90% of global coal-fired capacity, with the average age of
coal-fired plants being 12 in its low- to middle-income countries (footnote 51).
Energy policies and laws will be integral to enabling lower-emission energy generation
and have featured in regional litigation. Citizens in Bali challenged the government’s
approval of a coal-fired power station (footnote 39). In Pakistan, six women allege
that the government has not approved renewable energy projects or created
legal frameworks aiding the uptake of renewable energy. These failures, argue the
women, mean that the government will not meet its commitments on renewable
energy, undermining its international pledge to support emissions reductions.54

XII. Carbon Pricing Laws and
Policies Remain in the Minority
Across the Region
Laws and policies to promote carbon pricing are uncommon.
India’s 2010 Finance Bill created the National Clean Energy Fund, which invests
in research and entrepreneurship in clean energy fields. The PRC launched a
national carbon market program in 2017, expecting to establish a nationwide
carbon emissions trading scheme by the end of 2020.55 Thailand and Viet Nam
have launched carbon trading schemes. Bhutan, Nepal, Papua New Guinea,
Samoa, and Tonga also have policies that support the creation of carbon trading
(see Part Five for more information on country legal and policy frameworks).
In 2018, Singapore passed the Carbon Pricing Act (No. 23 of 2018), which
requires greenhouse gas emitters to report and pay tax on their emissions.
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Footnote 51, p. 2.
N. Butler. 2018. Of the Two Big Shifts in the Energy Market, One Is a Surprise. Financial Times.
26 November.
Maria Khan et al. v. Pakistan et al., Writ Petition No. 8960 of 2019, High Court of Lahore.
H. Harvey and M. Hu. 2017. The China Carbon Market Just Launched, And It’s the World’s
Largest. Here’s How It Can Succeed. Forbes. 19 December; and M. Xu and D. Stanway. 2020.
China to Make National Carbon Trading ‘Breakthrough’ by Year-End: Official. Reuters.
14 January.
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The general absence of carbon pricing laws is significant. Economists treat climate
change as a market failure because CO2 emissions are a side-effect of economic
activities.56 Free markets have not priced CO2 emissions, hence not reflecting the
external costs of climate change (e.g., droughts, floods, and storms).57
“Economists recognize that external costs are a form of market failure,” and “the
most straightforward way to rectify the market failure is to put a price on carbon
emissions” (footnote 57). As future generations from low-income countries will
pay the worst of these costs, the market has little incentive to shift without policy
and legal intervention.

56

57

Grantham Research Institute and D. Clark. 2012. Why Do Economists Describe Climate Change
as a ‘Market Failure’? The Guardian. 21 May.
Price on Carbon. 2017. Oreskes Nails It. 1 March.

Photo by Ariel Javellana/ADB.

Maternal care and malaria testing
in Myanmar. Climate change will
increase the distribution of vector-borne
diseases like malaria, undermining health
outcomes (photo by Gerhard Jörén/ADB).

PART THREE

COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL SURVEY
I. Constitutional Rights Litigation in
Asia and the Pacific

C

itizens are increasingly relying on constitutional rights when suing their
governments over climate action.1 Rights-based climate litigation constitutes
around 35% of all climate lawsuits outside the United States.2 It is growing in Asia,
with claimants drawing on their constitutional rights to support their cases.3

Rights-based lawsuits use fundamental rights expressed in constitutions,
international human rights instruments, and universal legal principles. Such cases
generally argue that environmental damage and climate change are existential
threats undermining the petitioner’s fundamental or constitutional rights to life,
environment, or equal protection before the law.4
Various factors explain why litigants opt for rights-based lawsuits in climate
litigation around the world. Modern technology aids access to law, helping
litigants recycle successful arguments in receptive jurisdictions. The cases also
hinge on human, social, political, and environmental rights, which are enshrined in
legal systems globally.
Most of the 32 countries studied in this report series have constitutions that
identify and protect fundamental rights. Thirty of the constitutions took effect
1

2

3
4

See B. Preston. 2018. The Evolving Role of Environmental Rights in Climate Change Litigation.
Chinese Journal of Environmental Law. 2 (2). 19 November. pp. 131–164.
“The Rights Turn in Climate Litigation,” YouTube video, 43:47, from a presentation given by
César Rodríguez-Garavito at the World Commission on Environmental Law Webinar 4: Climate
Change in the Courts on 5 June 2020.
See Report Two in this report series.
For regional examples, see Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993; Leghari v. Federation
of Pakistan PLD 2018 Lahore 364; and Advocate Padam Bahadur Shrestha vs Prime Minister
and Office of Council of Ministers and Others, Order No. 074-WO-0283, Supreme Court of
Nepal, 25 December 2018 (2075/09/10 BS). For global cases, see The State of the Netherlands
(Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) v Urgenda Foundation, Case No. 19/00135,
ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Supreme Court of the Netherlands, 20 December 2019; and Future
Generations v. Ministry of the Environment and Others, Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.]
[Supreme Court], Abril 5, 2018, M.P: L. Villabona, Expediente: 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01
(Colomb.).
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after the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
1948.5 Twenty-five countries promulgated their constitutions after the United
Nations adopted the (i) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
(ii) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966.6
Additionally, 19 of these constitutions explicitly contain either a right or a directive
principle regarding the environment.7
Given the growing preference for rights-based climate lawsuits, it is useful to
survey constitutional provisions in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.
When courts can access information about constitutional rights, legal arguments,
and reasonings applied in complementary jurisdictions, it is easier for judges to
discern which climate jurisprudence is comparable.

II. Constitutional Climate Litigation
Is More Common in South Asia
Using constitutional rights in climate litigation is an extension of environmental
constitutionalism, i.e., environmental litigation based on express or implied
constitutional rights.8 South Asian lawyers and courts have spearheaded
environmental constitutionalism in Asia and the Pacific.
Constitutionalizing environmental and climate claims is an efficient way to
hurdle procedural challenges, secure relief, and spur governments into action.
Constitutional writs in South Asia frequently allow petitioners direct access to
superior courts, facilitating faster relief.
Rights-based claims satisfy the standing requirement in many jurisdictions.
Historically, environmental and climate change public interest lawsuits struggled
to demonstrate that the petitioners had a genuine interest in a case—a common

5

6

7

8

The constitutions of Indonesia (1945) and Tonga (1875) predate the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. See General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, A/RES/217(III) (10 December 1948). The Declaration created the foundation for
international human rights law in the 20th century.
Except for the following countries that did it before: the Cook Islands (1965), India (1949),
Indonesia (1945), Malaysia (1957), Samoa (1960), Singapore (1965), and Tonga (1875). See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 999, No. 14668. p. 171; and International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 993, No. 14531. p. 3.
The number of Asian and Pacific island states with explicit constitutional provisions increases
to 24 if we include non-ADB member countries. See A. Raine and E. Pluchon. 2019.
UN Environment—Advancing the Environmental Rule of Law in the Asia Pacific. Chinese Journal
of Environmental Law. 3 (1). pp. 117–126.
For a discussion of environmental constitutionalism globally, see J.R. May and E. Daly. 2017.
Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism. Nairobi: United Nations Environment
Programme.
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threshold test for standing.9 However, courts in Bangladesh, India, Nepal,
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have relaxed standing to recognize “a form of open
standing to vindicate environmental harms on behalf of the public interest.” 10
This approach breaks “away from the right-duty pattern of Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence . . . broadening the ambit of access to justice by adopting the
doctrine of participatory justice with public interest litigation as a prime strategic
tool in its hands.” 11
In South Asia, only the constitutions of Maldives and Nepal contain an express
citizen right to a healthy or clean environment.12 Nevertheless, courts in the
region have been willing to infer environmental constitutional rights in the
absence of express rights. Judicial techniques include (i) drawing inferred rights
from within the scope of existing constitutional rights, and (ii) interpreting
environmental rights as naturally progressing from constitutional directives on the
environment and related state policies (e.g., the public trust doctrine).
For example, in 1995, the Supreme Court of India held that the constitutional
rights to life and dignity included the right to a hygienic environment.13 The
court reasoned that there could be no dignity or quality of life without a clean
atmosphere and ecological balance. In addition, the court concluded that a state
directive to care for the environment, when combined with the right to life, could
amount to an inferred, legally enforceable fundamental environmental right.
The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka also concluded in the Sugathapala Mendis case
that a constitutional directive on environmental protection, when combined with
the public trust doctrine, obliged the government to protect the environment
in furtherance of the people’s trust.14 Citizens could rightfully seek redress
for violations of this obligation because “to hold otherwise would deprive the
citizenry from seeking accountability of the institutions to which it has conferred
great power and to allow injustice to be left unchecked solely because of
technical shortcomings.” 15
Courts in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka reached similar conclusions,
inferring the right to a clean and healthy environment within the scope of the
right to life or equality before the law.16 The courts reasoned that environmental
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16

In M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) 1 (1997). Mustafa Kamal, J. of the
Supreme Court of Bangladesh surveyed the various tests for standing for environmental public
interest litigation in South Asia.
Footnote 8, p. 7.
M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) 1 (1997). p. 15, para. 35.
See Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008, art. 23(d); and Constitution of Nepal, 2015, art. 30.
Virender Gaur and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 577.
Sugathapala Mendis v Chandrika Kumaratunga and Others 2008 2 Sri LR 339.
Footnote 14, p. 17.
See M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD 1 (AD) 1997; Advocate Raju Prasad
Chapagain vs Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and Others, Nepal
Kanoon Patrika (NPK) 2066 (2009), Part 10, Decision No. 8239; Shehla Zia and Others v. WAPDA,
PLD 1994 SC 693; and Watte Gedara Wijebanda v Conservator General of Forests 2009 1 Sri LR 337.
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degradation endangers fundamental rights, like the rights to life; clean
environment; and adequate food, water, health, and shelter.

III. Rights-Based Climate Litigation
Is Less Frequent in Southeast Asia
and the Pacific
Indonesia and the Philippines have the largest number of climate lawsuits within
Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Otherwise, there are fewer examples of climate
and environmental cases across these regions despite the presence of rights to
life or a clean environment within various constitutions.
The small number of rights-based climate cases reflects factors that are not
unique to climate litigation. The lower litigation rates likely reflect factors such
as societal reluctance to take legal action, especially over environmental issues;
the dominance of civil law jurisdictions in Southeast Asia; and procedural barriers
to suing.17 In Southeast Asia, only Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines
have relaxed standing requirements in environmental litigation.18 Thailand also
allows registered environmental nongovernmental organizations to sue for
environmental and natural resource protection.19
Four of the nine Southeast Asian countries (around 44%) surveyed have explicit
environmental rights or duties under their bill of rights. Indonesians enjoy the
right to live in a “good and healthy environment.” 20 Viet Nam’s citizens have
the right to a clean environment, with a corresponding duty to protect it.21 The
Constitution of Myanmar obligates citizens to assist the state in environmental
conservation.22 Thailand’s bill of rights grants individuals and communities
the right to “manage, maintain and utilize natural resources, environment and
biodiversity in a balanced and sustainable manner, in accordance with the
procedures as provided by law.” 23
17

18
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20
21
22
23

Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Thailand, and Viet Nam
have civil law systems. The Philippines has a mixed civil and common law system. Malaysia,
Myanmar, and Singapore have common law systems.
See Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993; Supreme Court of the Philippines. 2010.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Manila; and District Court of
Central Jakarta, Decision No. 820/Pdt./G/1988/PN, PT Inti Indorayon Utama (PT IIU) (1988). In
Malaysian Trade Union Congress & Ors v Menteri Tenaga, Air Dan Komunikasi & Anor [2014] 2 CLJ
525, the Federal Court of Malaysia relaxed standing requirements for judicial review applications.
Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, 1992 (BE 2535),
secs. 7–8; and Central Administrative Court No. 754/2556, Stop Global Warming Association and
Others v. Department of Highways (1st Defendant) and Ministry of Transport (2nd Defendant).
The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, art. 28H(1).
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 2013, art. 43.
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008, sec. 390.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2017, sec. 43.
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The placement of these provisions in the bill of rights, alongside other
constitutional rights, suggests that they are judicially enforceable, even
without implementing legislation. Therefore, constitutionalized climate and
environmental cases can directly anchor their causes of action on these
provisions and, if warranted, secure relief.
Cambodia’s and the Lao PDR’s constitutions also articulate duties to protect the
environment. In Cambodia, the state is duty-bound to protect the environment
and balance natural resources, an obligation in the chapter on the economy.24
In the Lao PDR, people and organizations must protect the environment,
biodiversity, and natural resources. The state must ensure that socioeconomic
development is sustainable by supporting “the protection, restoration, and
development of natural resources.” 25
As these provisions do not fall under the bill of rights, they are not immediately
self-executing. “Policy directives are intended to influence governmental
decision-making but are generally not judicially enforceable.” 26 Still, they
are useful aids to adjudication in a case interpreting related legislation or
related constitutional provisions. The Virender Gaur case from India and the
Sugathapala Mendis case from Sri Lanka exemplify this judicial technique.
The Philippines has a constitutional right to a clean environment stemming from
the basic right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation.27
There are no instances of rights-based climate lawsuits in the Pacific.
Only Fiji and Timor-Leste—roughly 14% of the surveyed Pacific countries—
recognize an explicit right to environment in their bill of rights.28 Palau’s and Papua
New Guinea’s constitutions contain directive principles regarding the conservation
of the environment.29 In particular, Papua New Guinea’s constitution expressly
references both intergenerational and intragenerational equity and responsibility.
Vanuatu’s constitution imposes a fundamental duty on each citizen “to safeguard
the national wealth, resources and environment in the interests of the present
generation and of future generations.” 30 However, this duty is nonjusticiable.31
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The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993, art. 59.
The Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2015, art. 19, which is found within the
“Socio-economic Regime” chapter.
J. May and E. Daly. 2019. Global Judicial Handbook on Environmental Constitutionalism. 3rd ed.
Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. p. 24.
See Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993. The Philippine constitution directs the
state to ensure a clean and healthful ecology. However, that direction sits within the Declaration
of Principles and State Policies and not within the bill of citizens’ rights.
The Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, 2013, sec. 40; and The Constitution of the Democratic
Republic of Timor-Leste, 2002, sec. 61.
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau, 1980, art. VI; and The Constitution of the Independent
State of Papua New Guinea, 1975. Preamble.
The Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, 1979, art. 7.
Footnote 30, art. 8.
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While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be
found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it
is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation—aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As
a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned
in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies
by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation
to preserve the first and protect and advance the second,
the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come—
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
Source: Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, per Davide J.

Impediments to standing for public interest litigation, resources (financial and
skilled environmental lawyers), and dispute resolution preferences more likely
explain why there are fewer rights-based climate cases in the Pacific. Melanesians,
Micronesians, and Polynesians have demonstrated a preference for suing parties
outside the Pacific, potentially reflecting local perceptions about who should pay
for or resolve climate change and who has the resources to do so.32

32

See Judgment of 8 May 2019, Carvalho and Others v Parliament and the Council, T-330/18, not
published, EU:T:2019:324, litigation in the European Union in which one petitioner was Fijian, and
Teitiota v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment [2014] NZCA 173,
in which an i-Kiribati sought refugee status in New Zealand.

COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SURVEY

IV. Rights-Based Litigation
Applies Universal Principles,
Making It Readily Transferable
Rights-based litigation translates easily across different jurisdictions because it
relies on universal rights and principles. Courts acknowledge the universality of
rights-based jurisprudence when they cite cases from comparative jurisdictions.33
The success of rights-based lawsuits globally means that savvy petitioners
may adopt this trend in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In such cases, judges in
Southeast Asia and the Pacific may find it useful to explore the sizeable number
of lawsuits on this topic in South Asia. (See Report Two, Climate Change, Coming
Soon to a Court Near You: Climate Litigation in Asia and the Pacific and Beyond for a
further discussion regarding rights-based climate litigation in Asia and the Pacific.)

V. Using Tables 3.1–3.3
This report maps out constitutional provisions to aid judges and decisionmakers in determining which countries have equivalent constitutional rights and
potentially comparative constitutional jurisprudence.
Tables 3.1–3.3 highlight explicit and inferred environmental and related rights,
obligations, and state directives in the constitutions of South Asia, Southeast Asia
(plus the People’s Republic of China), and the Pacific.34 The tables also make it easier
to discern the environmental and climate dimensions of national constitutions.
Furthermore, given the trend toward environmental constitutionalism in the
climate change context, understanding the available constitutional rights might
hint at trends in future climate lawsuits. These tables complement Report Two of
this series, which extensively discusses climate change litigation and dedicates a
section to the link between constitutional rights and climate litigation.

33
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See M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) 1 (1997) (disputing flood plans);
BELA Vs. Bangladesh, WP No. 57 of 2010, D-/01-02-2012 (seeking to protect mangroves
against shrimp cultivation in Cox’s Bazar); Shehla Zia and Others v. WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693
(considering various international interpretations of the constitutional right to life); and Watte
Gedara Wijebanda v Conservator General of Forests 2009 1 Sri LR 337 (in finding that the right
to a clean environment and the principle of intergenerational equity were intrinsic to the right
to equality before the law in Sri Lanka, the court considered jurisprudence from India and the
International Court of Justice).
In some countries, an environmental or related right may not be enshrined in the constitution
but covered by legislation (e.g., Bangladesh’s Right to Information Act, 2009). Tables 3.1–3.3 do
not cover statutory rights.
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Table 3.1: Constitutional Rights, Obligations, and State Directives in South Asia
Country

Life

Environment

Food

Water

Health

Housing

Afghanistan

 b



–

–





Bangladesh



d



e





b

g

–

–



–

 b

h

 i

j

 k

l

Maldives













Nepal













Pakistan

 b

r



s

t



Sri Lanka

b, v

w



–

x



Bhutan
India

Legend:  indicates there is an express constitutional right that (i) is found under the bill of rights, and (ii) may not need
implementing legislation.
 indicates there is an express directive principle or state policy.
 indicates there has been a court decision inferring the right.
 indicates there is an express citizen obligation that the constitution characterizes as fundamental.
Notes: 1. The entries in this table are based on available information as of 31 August 2020.
2. Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan declares that the state shall observe the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
3. Art. 68 of the Constitution of the Republic of Maldives requires courts and tribunals interpreting and applying the rights
and freedoms under the bill of rights to “consider international treaties to which the Maldives is a party.”
a

b
c

d
e

f
g

h

i

j

k

The right to public participation is broadly construed to include political freedoms (e.g., suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom
of association, freedom to form political parties, freedom to form unions).
The constitution has directive principles on the quality of life and/or standard of living.
The constitution does not explicitly mention sustainable development but requires the state to foster a society based on “social
justice, preservation of human dignity, protection of human rights, realization of democracy, attainment of national unity as well
as equality between all peoples and tribes and balance development of all areas of the country”—see art. 6.
See M. Farooque Vs. Government of Bangladesh 17 BLD (AD) 1 (1997).
See Rabia Bhuiyan MP v. Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, et al., 59 DLR (AD) (2007)—the government’s
noncompliance with its statutory duties to provide access to safe and potable water violated the constitutional right to life.
Article 15 also directs the state to provide for the people’s necessities.
See Metro Makers and Developers Ltd Vs. BELA 2012 65 DLR (AD) 181.
Bhutan is the only Asian country whose constitution requires the government to maintain at least 60% forest cover over the
kingdom to conserve its natural resources and prevent ecosystem degradation—see art. 5(3). Although the state’s obligation to
protect the environment does not sit within the citizens’ bill of rights, it is one of the main pillars of Bhutan’s constitution. See
L.S. Tobgye. Undated. The Constitution of Bhutan: Principles and Philosophies. Thimpu: Supreme Court of Bhutan.
See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161; and Virender Gaur and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1995)
2 SCC 577—the constitutional rights to life and dignity include the right to a hygienic environment, including the right to
pollution‑free air and water.
See People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors., Civil Writ Petition No. 196 of 2001 (Supreme Court, 20 August 2001)
—the right to life under article 21 includes a right to food. Article 47 of the constitution also directs the state to improve national
nutrition, living standards, and public health.
See Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664; and AP Pollution Control Board II v. Prof. MV Nayudu, (2001)
2 SCC 62—clean drinking water is an inseparable part of the right to a clean environment and the right to life.
See Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161—the right to live with human dignity under article 21 includes the
protection of health.
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l
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q
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u

v

w

Cultural
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–





c

Afghanistan









–

f

Bangladesh













Bhutan



m

n



o

p

India













Maldives



q









Nepal





–

–



u

Pakistan



y

 z





 z

Sri Lanka

Country

See Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545; Shantistar Builders v. Narayan K Totame, (1990) 1 SCC 520; and
Chameli Singh v. State of UP, (1996) 2 SCC 549. Contrast Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC 664, which
allowed the resettlement of tribal peoples to construct the Sardar Sarovar Project dam.
Citizens’ obligation to safeguard property is limited to public property—see art. 51A(i).
Virender Gaur and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 577—the State and citizens have a duty to forge an ecological balance
and hygienic environment. Article 21 protects the right to life as a fundamental right, encompassing the protection and preservation
of environment and ecological balance. “Promoting environmental protection implies maintenance of the environment as a whole
comprising the man-made and the natural environment” (p. 581).
See SP Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. The Government of India has since enacted the Right to Information Act, 2005,
which grants citizens the right to information under any public authority’s control.
See Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2715; and T.N. Godavaraman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2008)
2 SCC 222.
Citizens’ obligation to protect and preserve property is limited to public property—see art. 48(d).
See Shehla Zia and Others v. WAPDA, PLD 1994 SC 693—the right to life includes a right to environment; and Leghari v. Federation
of Pakistan, PLD 2018 Lahore 364—the jurisprudence of Pakistan incorporates environmental justice.
See General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour Union v. The Director, Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab, 1994
SCMR 2016; and Sindh Institute of Urology and Transplantation v. Nestlé Milkpak Limited, 2005 CLC 424 (Karachi).
See Messrs Getz Pharma (Pvt) Ltd. through Authorised Person v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2017 Sindh 157—article 38(d) of the
constitution directs the government to provide necessities of life, such as medical relief.
See Imrana Tiwana v. Province of Punjab, 2015 CLD 983—Environmental justice blends constitutional principles with the
fundamental rights to life, liberty, and human dignity, “which include the international environmental principles of sustainable
development, precautionary principle, environmental impact assessment, inter- and intra-generational equity and public trust
doctrine” (see p. 37).
See Sriyani Silva v Iddamalgoda, Officer-in-Charge, Police Station Paiyagala and Others 2003 2 Sri LR 6—“Article 11 (read with Article 13(4)),
recognises a right not to deprive life whether by way of punishment or otherwise and by necessary implication, recognises a right to
life” (p. 77); and Rathnayake Tharanga Lakmali v Niroshan Abeykoon, SC/FR Application No. 577 of 2010 (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka,
17 December 2019)—“The Fundamental Rights Chapter in our Constitution does not expressly refer to a right to life. However, the
Constitution, as a living document, should not be construed in a narrow and pedantic sense. I am of the view that constitutional
interpretation should be informed by the values embodied in it. The preamble/svasti of the Constitution recognises Dignity and
Well-being of the People as a fundamental value that should be furthered by assuring to all People FREEDOM, EQUALITY, JUSTICE,
FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS and the INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. In my view, recognition of a right to life is in
furtherance of this fundamental value” (p. 13).
See Watte Gedara Wijebandara v Conservator General of Forests 2009 1 Sri LR 337; Bulankulama v Secretary, Ministry of Industrial
Development 2000 3 Sri LR 243; and Sugathapala Mendis v Chandrika Kumaratunga and Others 2008 2 Sri LR 339—the
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x

y
z

constitutional directive to protect the environment and the public trust doctrine oblige the state to act in furtherance of the trust
of the people.
See Sanjeewa, Attorney-at-Law (on behalf of Gerald Mervin Perera) v Suraweera, Officer-in-Charge, Police Station and Others,
SC No. 328 of 2002 (FR), (Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, 27 February 2003)—citizens have the right to choose state or private
medical care. The court also recognized everyone’s right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
Citizens’ obligation to preserve and protect property is limited to public property—see art. 28(d).
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not explicitly mention biodiversity or sustainable development. However, citizens have a
constitutional duty to protect nature and conserve its riches: art. 27(f). The state must also establish a just and equitable
economic and social order: art. 27(15). In Watte Gedara Wijebandara v Conservator General of Forests 2009 1 Sri LR 337, the court
held that all policy decisions covering the nation’s environment and resources must align with the state’s obligations under public
trust doctrine and seek long-term conservation consistent with the principle of intergenerational equity. “The principle of intergenerational equity and the long-term sustainability of our delicate eco-system and biological diversity vests mainly in the hands
of such officials” (p. 362).

Sources:
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2004;
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972;
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008;
The Constitution of India, 1949;
The Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008;
The Constitution of Nepal, 2015;
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2019; and
The Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978 and Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, 2020.

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.
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Table 3.2: Constitutional Rights, Obligations, and State Directives in Southeast Asia and
the People’s Republic of China
Country

Life

Environment

Food

Water

Health

Housing

Cambodia

b



–

–

c

–

Indonesia

b

–

e

Lao PDR

b




–

–




f
–

Malaysia



i

–

–

–

–

Myanmar

b



k

–



k

b



–

–



–

Philippines

b

p

q

–





Singapore

u

–

–

–

–

–

Thailand

b



–



 w



Viet Nam

b

x

–

–





PRC

Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Legend:

 indicates there is an express constitutional right that (i) is found under the bill of rights, and (ii) may not need implementing

legislation.
indicates there is an express directive principle or state policy.
indicates there has been a court decision inferring the right.
indicates that the right or directive applies only to a certain class or subset of the population.
 indicates there is an express citizen obligation that the constitution characterizes as fundamental.





Notes: 1. The entries in this table are based on available information as of 31 August 2020.
2. Art. 31 under the bill of rights (Chapter III: The Rights and Obligations of Khmer Citizens) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Cambodia declares that the state “recognizes and respects human rights as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and all the treaties and conventions related to human rights, women’s rights and children’s rights.”
3. Art. 28J(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia states that each person has the “duty to respect the human rights
of others.” Sec. 50(6) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand articulates the duty of every person to “respect and not
to violate the rights and liberties of other people.” Art. 15 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam characterizes
the citizen duty to respect the rights of others as “inseparable” from citizens’ rights. These provisions may open the door to
horizontal application of constitutional rights.
4. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China is not justiciable. See F. Hualing and Z. Xiaobo. 2018. What Makes the
Chinese Constitution Socialist? International Journal of Constitutional Law. 16 (2). p. 56.
a

b
c

d

e

f

The right to public participation is broadly construed to include political freedoms (e.g., suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom to form political parties, freedom to form unions).
The constitution has directive principles on the quality of life and/or standard of living.
Children have a right to health—couched as a state duty to protect—under art. 48 of the constitution’s bill of rights (Chapter III: The
Rights and Obligations of Khmer Citizens). Art. 72 under Chapter VI (Education, Culture and Social Affairs) is a general directive
principle “guarantee[ing]” the health of the people.
The bill of rights protects the fundamental right to property. But art. 60 (under Chapter V: Economy) allows the state to temporarily
use private property as authorized by law under special circumstances. Furthermore, the citizens’ obligation to respect property is
limited to public property and legally acquired private property—see art. 50.
See Decision 85/PUU-XI/2013 (18 February 2015) of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, which held that access to water is a basic,
fundamental human right that the state has the responsibility to fulfill.
Art. 28H (under the bill of rights, Chapter XA: Human Rights) states that every person shall have the right to have a home. However,
the constitution is silent on the other elements of the right to housing, e.g., protection against forced evictions and arbitrary
demolition of one’s home.
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Country



d

–





–

Cambodia

g

–



h

–

Indonesia






–







Lao PDR

j



–



–

–

Malaysia



l

–



–

–

Myanmar



m

n



–

o

PRC

r



–

 s



t

Philippines



v

–



–

–

Singapore













Thailand









h

y

Viet Nam

Art. 28I(3) under the bill of rights defines the right to cultural identity of traditional communities. A broader state directive to advance
the national culture of Indonesia is found under Chapter XIII: Education.
Art. 28F of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia articulates the right “to obtain information for [self] development.” Similarly,
Art. 25 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam states that citizens shall enjoy the right to access information. However,
in both cases, there is no constitutional provision that specifically guarantees the right to access information held by public bodies.
See Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan & Anor. [1996] 1 MLJ 261—“the expression ‘life’ appearing in art. 5(1) does
not refer to mere existence. It incorporates all those facets that are an integral part of life itself and those matters which go to form the
quality of life. . . . It includes the right to live in a reasonably healthy and pollution free environment” (p. 288).
Part XIIA of the Constitution of Malaysia provides additional protections specifically for the states of Sabah and Sarawak. These
protections include the use of native languages, the reservation of land for “natives” of Sabah and Sarawak, and preferential treatment
regarding the alienation of land. List 2A of the Constitution’s Ninth Schedule also deals with native law and custom in these two states.
Sec. 26(b) (under Chapter I: Basic Principles of the Union) indicates that the state shall enact the necessary laws for civil servants to
have security and sufficiency of food, clothing, and shelter. There is no corresponding provision for the general population.
Citizens’ obligation to protect and preserve property is limited to public property—see sec. 390.
Citizens’ obligation to protect property is limited to public property—see art. 53.
See art. 9 (under Chapter I: General Principles); and the Preamble, which references “ecological civilizations.”
The term “sustainable development” does not appear in the constitution. However, there are discrete directive provisions that
promote economic development (e.g., art. 14 under Chapter I: General Principles) and environmental objectives (e.g., the Preamble;
and arts. 9, 10, and 26 under Chapter I: General Principles).
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993—the right to a balanced and healthful ecology stated under sec. 16, art. II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies) is a self-executory natural right.
Children have a “right to proper care and nutrition.” However, this right is found under sec. 3 of art. XV (The Family), not the bill of
rights (art. III). This provision does not extend to other citizens.
See sec. 14 (under art. XIV: Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports) on the “Filipino national culture.” Other
provisions protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions.
Broad participation rights (e.g., freedom of expression and freedom of association, including the right to form unions) are found in
the bill of rights (art. III). See also sec. 16, art. XIII. The constitution further states directive principles on the participation rights of (i)
workers, farmers, and landowners (secs. 3 and 5, art. XIII [Social Justice and Human Rights]); and (ii) families and family associations
(sec. 3, art. XV [The Family]).
The term “sustainable development” does not appear in the constitution. However, it has directive principles that, taken together,
reflect the substance of sustainable development—e.g., sec. 16 (under art. II: Declaration of Principles) and sec. 1 (under art. XII:
National Economy and Patrimony).
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Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2010] SGCA 20—art. 9(1) protects the right to life. However, the court declared that it was “not
possible” to interpret art. 9(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore in the expansive way that the Supreme Court of India
interpreted art. 21 of the Constitution of the Republic of India.
Art. 15 (under Part II: Fundamental Liberties) of the constitution states that religious groups have the right to acquire and own property,
and hold and administer it in accordance with law. There is no express reference to a similar right to property for individuals or citizens.
See sec. 58 (under Chapter V: Duties of the State) on health impact assessments.
Art. 63 explicitly references the state policy to “respond to climate change.”
The term “sustainable development” does not appear in the constitution. However, it has directive principles that, taken together,
reflect the substance of sustainable development—e.g., arts. 50 and 63 (under Chapter III: Economy, Society, Culture, Education,
Science, Technology, and Environment).

Sources:
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993;
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945;
The Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 2015;
The Constitution of Malaysia, 1963 and Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2019;
The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008;
The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1965;
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982;
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987;
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2017; and
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 2013.

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.
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Table 3.3: Constitutional Rights, Obligations, and State Directives in the Pacific
Country

Life

Environment

Food

Water

Health

Housing

Cook Islands



–

–

–

–

–

FSM



–

–

–



–

Fiji



Kiribati



 c
–

 d,e
–

d
–

d
–

 d,f
–

Marshall Islands



i

–

–

–

Nauru



–

–

–


–

Palau





–

–








–

j

m

–

–

–

–

–

Solomon Islands



–

–

–

–

–

Timor-Leste



–

–

Tonga




–

–

–


–


–

Tuvalu



–

–

–

–

–

Vanuatu



o

–

–

–

–

PNG
Samoa



k



l

–
–

FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, PNG = Papua New Guinea.
Legend:  indicates there is an express constitutional right that (i) is found under the bill of rights, and (ii) may not need implementing
legislation.
 indicates there is an express directive principle or state policy.
 indicates there has been a court decision inferring the right.
 indicates there is an express citizen obligation that the constitution characterizes as fundamental.
Notes: 1. The entries in this table are based on available information as of 31 August 2020.
2. Sec. 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Fiji expressly allows courts to consider relevant international law when interpreting
the rights and freedoms in the bill of rights.
3. See Teriaki v Kauongo [2009] KIHC 27—the High Court of Kiribati ruled that the bill of rights provisions in the constitution can
also apply in actions to protect a right between private citizens (i.e., the horizontal application of constitutional rights).
4. Sec. 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands states that a court, in interpreting and applying the
constitution, “shall look to the decisions of the courts of other countries having constitutions similar, in the relevant respect, to
the Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.” Local courts are not bound by foreign decisions. In following any such
decision, a court must take into account the constitution as a whole and the circumstances in the country.
5. The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea categorizes basic rights into fundamental rights and qualified rights.
A law that is “reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having a proper respect for the rights and dignity of mankind” may limit
qualified rights. In determining whether a law complies with this standard, sec. 39 of the constitution allows courts to have regard to,
among others, (i) the Charter of the United Nations; (ii) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and (iii) “any other declaration,
recommendation or decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.”
6. The constitutions of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea (sec. 34) and Tuvalu (sec. 12) generally allow the horizontal
application of constitutional rights. Bill of rights provisions apply (i) between individuals, and (ii) between governmental bodies
and individuals. They also apply, in relation to corporations and associations (other than governmental bodies), in the same way
they apply to and in relation to individuals. However, horizontal application may not be applied to the extent that the contrary
intention appears in the constitution.
7. Art. 23 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste states that fundamental rights shall be interpreted in
accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
8. Sec. 15 of the Constitution of Tuvalu states that “all laws, and all acts done under a law, must be reasonably justifiable in a
democratic society that has a proper respect for human rights and dignity.” In determining whether a law or an act complies
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–
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–



h

–
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–









–




–
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Country

Fiji
Kiribati

Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

with this standard, a court may have regard to, among others, (i) the law, practices, and judicial decisions of other countries
that the court reasonably regards as democratic; and (ii) international conventions, declarations, recommendations, and
judicial decisions concerning human rights.
a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

The right to public participation is broadly construed to include political freedoms (e.g., suffrage, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom to form political parties, freedom to form unions).
See Linter v Federated States of Micronesia [2016] FMSC 37—unpaid salary is interest in property, which the government cannot
withhold without due process.
Sec. 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Fiji incorporates the principle of intergenerational equity—the right to a clean and
healthy environment includes the right to have the natural world protected for the benefit of present and future generations.
However, a law or an administrative action may limit this right to the extent necessary.
Secs. 35, 36, and 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Fiji state that “it is the responsibility of the state to show that the resources
are not available,” if the state “claims that it does not have the resources to implement the right” to (i) adequate food of acceptable
quality; (ii) clean and safe water in adequate quantities; (iii) health, conditions, and facilities necessary to good health and health care
services; and (iv) accessible and adequate housing and sanitation.
See Rarasea v The State [2000] FJHC 146—reducing a prisoner’s food rations as a form of punishment (i) violates his constitutional
right to be free from “cruel, inhumane, degrading or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment;” and (ii) is not consonant
with the state’s undertaking under art. 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) to provide
its people with adequate food.
See Proceedings Commissioner v Kant [2017] FJHC 407—a private landlord violated his tenants’ constitutional right against arbitrary
evictions when he (through an agent) locked the house because they were in arrears. This decision is notable because Fiji’s
constitution does not expressly provide for the horizontal application of constitutional rights. The High Court also considered sec. 39
of the constitution (freedom from arbitrary evictions) in relation to (i) its impact upon vulnerable groups (women, children, and the
elderly); and (ii) General Comment No. 4 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (on the scope of the human right
to housing in art. 11 of the ICESCR).
The High Court of Fiji has ruled that members of the public have the right to secure copies of environmental impact assessments without
restrictions, pursuant to sec. 17 of the Environment Management Act. The Fiji Times. 2016. Court Rules on EIA Regulations. 25 May.
The Constitutions of the Republic of Kiribati (sec. 12, under Chapter II: Protection of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the
Individual), the Solomon Islands (sec. 12, under Part II: Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual), and Tuvalu
(sec. 24, under Part II: Bill of Rights) states that the freedom of expression includes the freedom to receive and communicate ideas
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and information without interference. However, there is no constitutional provision that specifically guarantees the right to access
information held by public bodies.
See Kabua, et al. v. M/V Mell Springwood, et al. SCT Civil 2016-001, 22 October 2019—customary and traditional owners of wetos
(land running across atolls from the lagoon to the ocean) do not have a legal interest in the coral reef that was damaged by a vessel’s
grounding, and thus do not have standing to file a civil case for damages for injury allegedly caused to the reef and the associated
marine resources.
The Preamble of the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea expressly integrates the principles of
intergenerational and intragenerational equity and responsibility. The country’s natural resources and environment are “to be
conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all and be replenished for the benefit of future generations.”
See Yasause v Keko [2017] PGNC 183—prison food rations that do not conform with the minimum dietary standard imposed by law
do not violate the constitutional guarantee against cruel or inhuman treatment. But the court determined that the authorities failed
to comply with the minimum standard of food provision, thus failing to afford the detainees equal protection by the law. See Regional
Rights Resource Team of the Pacific Community. 2019. Yasause v Keko. In Chris Yuen, ed. Pacific Human Rights Law Digest. 6. p. 24.
There is no express right to water in the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea. However, in a case involving an
asylum seeker, the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that withdrawal of, among others, access to water, amounted to a violation
of constitutional rights. Boochani v The Independent State of Papua New Guinea et al. (2017) SC1633.
See Jackson v Attorney General [2009] WSSC 122—the constitutional guarantee of life only applies to intentional deprivation of life. It
does not include an implied right to be free from unintended deprivation of life. Neither does it impose a positive duty on the state to
protect life.
The Preamble of the Constitution of Tuvalu states that the stability of Tuvaluan society and the happiness and welfare of its people
depend largely on the maintenance of Tuvaluan values, culture, and tradition. In addition, sec. 29 allows the government to regulate or
place some restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights if their exercise may directly threaten Tuvaluan values or culture.
Art. 7 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu states that every person has the fundamental duty to “safeguard the national
wealth, resources and environment in the interests of the present generation and of future generations.” Art. 8 clarifies that this duty
is nonjusticiable. Nevertheless, public authorities have the duty to encourage compliance with it.
Chapter 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu grants limited rights to the Malvatumauri Council of Chiefs, composed
of custom chiefs elected by their peers. The council advises the Parliament on land matters, customs, and traditions and may make
recommendations for the preservation and promotion of ni-Vanuatu culture and languages.
The Republic of Vanuatu’s Right to Information Act No. 13 of 2016 became operative on 6 February 2017. Two of the stated purposes
of the law are to (i) “give effect to the right to freedom of expression under art. 5(1)(g) of the Constitution,” and (ii) “increase public
participation in governance.”

Sources:
The Constitution of the Cook Islands, 1964;
The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia, 1978;
The Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, 2013;
The Constitution of the Republic of Kiribati, 1979 and Constitution (Amendment) Act 2013;
The Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 1979;
The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru, 1968 and Constitution (Amendment) Act 2018;
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau, 1980 and Committee on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties under Article 44 of the Convention—Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2002—Palau (Received 27 July 2016),
CRC/C/PLW/2 (15 March 2017);
The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 1975;
The Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, 1960, Constitution Amendment Act 2019, Constitution Amendment Act (No. 2)
2019, and Constitution Amendment Act (No. 3) 2019;
The Constitution of the Solomon Islands, 1978;
The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2002;
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Tonga, 1875;
The Constitution of Tuvalu, 1986; and
The Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, 1979.

Photo by Samir Jung Thapa/ADB.

Punakha Dzong. In 1994, floods nearly destroyed
Punakha Dzong, also called Pungtang Dechen Photrang
Dzong (the palace of great happiness). Melting and
shrinking glaciers make Bhutan vulnerable to flooding
and water scarcity (photo by Eric Sales/ADB).

PART FOUR

SOUTH ASIA
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
I. Afghanistan
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Afghanistan is a landlocked country in Central Asia and South Asia, vulnerable
to the effects of climate change. Major environmental hazards in the country
include droughts and flooding.1 For example, Afghanistan experienced a 9-year
drought during 1998–2006, its most severe drought on record.2 Climate change
threatens to undermine agriculture, energy, health care, and infrastructure.3
Given that 80% of Afghans depend on cattle grazing and rain-fed agriculture for
their livelihoods, food and income security has become a particular challenge
(footnote 2). Since 1978, the area of arable land has decreased by approximately
60%, leaving only 12% of national land area suitable for agriculture (footnote 2).
Other challenges include inadequate potable water, overgrazing, soil degradation,
desertification, and deforestation (footnote 1).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Afghanistan signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) in June 1992.4 In November 2016, Afghanistan submitted
its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement,
pledging a 13.6% decrease in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030
compared with a business as usual (BAU) 2030 scenario.5 This first NDC remains
conditional on external support in finance, technology and legal assistance, and
capacity building.

1
2
3

4

5

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Afghanistan.
UNDP. Climate Change Adaptation Afghanistan.
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 2015. Climate Change Threats and
Vulnerabilities in Afghanistan.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 21 March 1992, United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, No. 30822. p. 107.
Government of Afghanistan. 2016. Afghanistan First Nationally Determined Contribution. Kabul.
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2. Overview of Climate Change Laws and Policies
Although Afghanistan has not yet adopted any laws or policies expressly devoted
to climate change mitigation or adaptation, climate change cuts across the
country’s environmental, development, and energy strategies. The National
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) coordinates all environmental
management activities and is mandated to mainstream environmental and
climate change issues into Afghanistan’s national development framework.6
Various agencies subsidiary to NEPA also deal with environmental management,
such as the
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)

Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock;
Ministry of Energy and Water;
Ministry of Public Health;
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development;
Ministry of Urban Development and Housing;
Ministry of Public Works;
Ministry of Mines and Petroleum;
Ministry of Industry and Commerce;
Ministry of Finance; and
Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (footnote 6).

In 2008, the government launched the 5-year Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS) to outline a vision for “a society of hope
and prosperity based on a strong, private sector-led market economy, social
equity, and environmental sustainability” by 2020.7 The ANDS contains the
National Environment Strategy, which seeks to “(i) secure a clean and healthy
environment; (ii) attain sustainable economic and social development while
protecting the natural resource base and the environment of the country;
and (iii) ensure effective management of the country’s environment through
participation of all stakeholders.”8
Climate change is not addressed explicitly in the ANDS, but priority program
areas include forest restoration and sustainable use, conservation of biodiversity,
and pollution control. The ANDS recognizes the importance of integrating
environmental challenges into planning processes and requires oversight of the
development project’s environmental impacts.
Afghanistan, which is in its “Transformation Decade” (2015–2024), strives for
self-reliance by 2024.9 This self-reliance plan covers Afghanistan’s “development
6

7

8
9

Government of Afghanistan. 2015. A Summary of Afghanistan’s Progress on Climate Change
Adaptation. Kabul.
Government of Afghanistan. 2008. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008–2013):
A Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction. Kabul. p. i.
Footnote 7, p. 151.
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2017. Country Partnership Strategy: Afghanistan, 2017–2021.
Afghanistan—Inclusive and Sustainable Growth. Manila. p. 1.
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goals, key reforms, and investment priorities” (footnote 9). The country also
drafted the National Peace and Development Framework (2017–2021).10
Additionally, the National Environmental Action Plan of 2009—which the
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and NEPA drafted—asserts
the importance of integrating environmental concerns into national policies to
minimize negative environmental impacts and take advantage of environmental
opportunities. The National Environmental Action Plan focuses on air, land,
biodiversity, and water. It also calls for “a study to determine the likely impacts of
climate change on the agricultural and natural resource base of Afghanistan.” 11
The World Food Programme (WFP), UNEP, and NEPA published a climate
change impact study in 2016.12 The study assessed livelihood vulnerability to
drought and floods over 30 years, allowing the authors to map food security hot
spot areas and project future climate impacts to food security.
Afghanistan has also prepared a combined National Adaptation Programme of
Action for Climate Change and National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for
Global Environmental Management.13 The document allowed the government to
determine priority needs for adaptation climate change against the backdrop of
desertification and biodiversity loss.

C. Energy Supply
The state primarily owns Afghanistan’s energy sector.14 Reliable or recent data
on the mix of Afghanistan’s energy sources is sparse. However, the national
energy strategy observed that Afghanistan had transitioned from being an energy
exporter—natural gas to the Soviet Union before the onset of civil crises in
1978—to importing over 50% of the energy consumed in 2005.15 The strategy
stated that energy imports were necessary due to deteriorating infrastructure,
incapable of meeting local energy demand (footnote 15). The failure of
electricity utilities to recover sufficient levies to cover operating and capital
costs exacerbated infrastructure maintenance issues (footnote 15). However,
Afghanistan has a strong potential for renewable energy generation, particularly
solar, wind, geothermal, and micro-hydropower (footnote 14).
Table 4.1 summarizes Afghanistan’s climate change legal and policy framework.
10

11

12

13

14

15

Government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan National Peace and Development Framework (ANDF):
2017 to 2021. Kabul.
Government of Afghanistan, National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), and UNEP.
2009. National Environmental Action Plan. Kabul. p. 24.
WFP, UNEP, and NEPA. 2016. Climate Change in Afghanistan: What Does It Mean for Rural
Livelihoods and Food Security: What Does It Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Security?
UNEP, GEF, and Government of Afghanistan, NEPA. 2009. Afghanistan: National Capacity
Needs Self-Assessment for Global Environmental Management (NCSA) and National Adaptation
Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA). Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme.
R. Rostami et al. 2017. An Overview of Afghanistan’s Trends Toward Renewable and Sustainable
Energies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews. 76. pp. 1440–1464.
Government of Afghanistan. 2007. Energy Sector Strategy (2007/08–2012/13). Kabul.
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Table 4.1: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Afghanistan
The Constitution of Afghanistan, 2004

Afghanistan National Development Strategy,
2008–2013

Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Energy

Afghanistan Renewable Energy Policy, 2015
Energy Sector Strategy 1387–1391,
2007/8‑2012/13
Rural Renewable Energy Policy, 2013

LULUCF and REDD+

National Forestry Management Policy, 2012

Food production and
food security

National Comprehensive Agriculture
Development Priority Program
2016–2020

Disaster risk
management

Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster
Risk Reduction, 2011

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan, 2014
National Environmental Action Plan, 2009

Acts

Law on Disaster Response,
Management, and Preparedness,
2012

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
The Energy Sector Strategy 2007/08–2012/13 establishes Afghanistan’s energy
sector targets for 2008–2013 as part of the ANDS (footnote 15). Sector-specific
goals include electrification of 65% of households and 90% of nonresidential
buildings, and deploying 10 megawatts (MW) of wind power by 2011 and 50 MW
by 2016. It also aims to rehabilitate 94 MW of hydropower capacity by 2008.
The strategy’s five primary pillars are (i) increasing the efficiency of existing
operations; (ii) promoting public–private partnerships and sector governance;
(iii) prioritizing improved capacity development and coordination; (iv) providing
rural energy; and (v) increasing supply (including wind energy), reducing
consumption, and expanding energy and electricity. Poverty reduction is a priority
across the five pillars.
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The Energy Sector Strategy also aims to address the environmental impacts of
energy and reduce GHG emissions effectively by
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

focusing on efficiency in energy production and end use,
moving toward renewable energy production,
shifting to energy that minimizes indoor air pollution,
coupling energy supply with activities that generate income to reduce
pressure on natural resources,
(v) ensuring that all electricity infrastructure complies with
environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and pollution control
provisions of the Afghanistan environmental law, and
(vi) promoting coordination between energy sector institutions and NEPA.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
Renewable energy has become a significant part of Afghanistan’s Energy Sector
Strategy. The Ministry of Energy and Water has estimated the national capacity
of renewable sources to be at least 800 MW, including mini and micro power
capacity. This capacity includes wind power of 66,726 MW, solar energy of
222 gigawatts (GW), biogas energy from livestock manure of 6,619 gigawattshour (GWh) annually, energy from waste incineration of 134 GWh annually, and a
large yet unquantified geothermal potential.16
The first major policy on renewables was the Rural Renewable Energy Policy
(RREP) of 2013 (footnote 16). A component of the Energy Sector Strategy, the
RREP seeks to improve environmental and socioeconomic conditions in rural
regions. Recognizing the potential for rural growth, it promotes the development
of rural renewable energy technologies by capitalizing on local resources as well as
off-grid destinations. The RREP also describes the benefits of renewable energy
as (i) providing enhanced energy independence and supply, and greater energy
security; and (ii) boosting job creation, social cohesion, rural development, local
industries, and environmental benefits.
The RREP explicitly frames energy as a climate challenge. It aims to “alleviate the
environmental and health impacts of electricity generated by unsustainable and
inefficient traditional biomass fuels and fossil fuels. Displacing GHG emissions
will provide significant global climate change benefits.”17 The RREP brings
together a range of stakeholders including nonprofits, international donors, the
private sector, government agencies, and the rural communities themselves.
In 2015, the Ministry of Energy and Water published the Renewable Energy Policy,
which encourages renewable energy use and production to gain a place in the
international renewable energy market, meet national energy needs, and achieve
16

17

Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Energy and Water and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development. 2013. Afghanistan Rural Renewable Energy Policy. Kabul.
Footnote 16, p. 5.
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sustainable development.18 The policy specifically aims for the deployment
of 4,500–5,000 MW of renewable energy capacity by 2032 through private
investment, on- and off-grid initiatives, utility purchasing rules, net metering
programs, the deregulation and delicensing of smaller solar and hydro projects,
and the promotion of carbon credits. The policy set up the Renewable Energy
Coordination Committee within the Ministry of Energy and Water to supervise
the policy implementation for 2015–2020 (first term).
In 2017, the Government of Afghanistan commissioned the Renewable Energy
Roadmap or RER2032.19 The roadmap was developed to realize the vision and
intent of the Renewable Energy Policy (i.e., 4,500–5,000 MW of renewable
energy capacity by 2032) and to transition from donor grant-funded renewable
energy projects to a fully private sector-led industry by 2032 (footnote 19).

D. LULUCF and REDD+
Land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) is one of the highest-emitting
sectors in Afghanistan, alongside energy and agriculture.20 Against this backdrop,
the National Forestry Management Policy of Afghanistan promotes an integrated
and holistic approach to environmental management and conservation, focusing
on watersheds and ecosystems.21
Acknowledging the country’s enormous agricultural potential, the government
created the 2016 National Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority
Program, a strategic framework for reforming and developing Afghanistan’s
agriculture sector in 2016–2020.22 These are the seven priority areas:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

improving irrigation systems,
increasing wheat production,
managing the horticulture value chain,
developing the livestock sector,
managing climate-sensitive natural resources,
building nutrition and food security resilience, and
reforming institutions.

Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Energy and Water. 2015. Renewable Energy Policy. Kabul.
IT Power Consulting Private Limited. 2017. Renewable Energy Roadmap for Afghanistan: RER 2032.
Bangkok: Asia Pacific Energy Portal.
20
		Government of Afghanistan, NEPA. 2017. Second National Communication under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Kabul.
21
Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. 2012. National
Forestry Management Policy of Afghanistan. Kabul.
22
Government Afghanistan, Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock. 2016. National
Comprehensive Agriculture Development Priority Program 2016–2021: A Strategic Framework for
Agriculture Sector Development and Reform. Kabul.
18
19

SOUTH ASIA LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Strategic priority five (managing climate-sensitive natural resources) identifies
community-based sustainable forest management as essential to developing
the economy and building sustainable rural livelihoods. Specific national targets
include conserving 210,000 hectares of rangeland. Additionally, the program
seeks to increase protected areas from 0.34% to 2.00% of Afghanistan’s land.
In 2014, NEPA prepared the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan to
guide biodiversity management and conservation for the Afghan government to
implement the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity.23 The action plan
also deals with forest management. According to the action plan, preparing and
implementing a program on climate change adaptation is a high-priority strategy.
It recommends expanding the network of protected areas, as well as integrating
an ecosystem-based approach to biodiversity conservation into climate change
mitigation and adaptation.

E.

Disaster Risk Management

The frequent earthquakes, floods, mudslides, droughts, dust storms, and melting
glaciers and snowmelt shape Afghanistan’s disaster risk management policies.
The 2011 Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction builds on
the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015.24 The action plan acknowledges
that climate change hazards drive poverty and identifies disaster risk reduction
as critical in promoting development, security, and peace. It contains six
objectives for disaster risk reduction: (i) strengthening the disaster management
mechanism, (ii) improving stakeholder knowledge sharing, (iii) enhancing the
early warning system, (iv) increasing public awareness of disaster risk reduction,
(v) improving community resilience to reduce foundational risk factors, and
(vi) strengthening disaster preparedness capacities in the government.
Additionally, the Law on Disaster Response, Management, and Preparedness,
2012 regulates activities related to prevention, mitigation, and the management
of both natural and unnatural (human-generated) disasters. It also seeks to
manage the post-disaster landscape and protect legal properties. Finally, the law
establishes the Office of Disaster Preparedness to coordinate all disaster-related
activities including the implementation of the National Disaster Management
Commission’s decisions and recommendations, with support from multiple levels
of government and impacted communities.

23

24

Government of Afghanistan, NEPA. 2014. National Biodiversity Strategy & Action Plan. Kabul;
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1760, No. 30619. p. 79.
Government of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority. 2011.
Afghanistan Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction: Towards Peace and Stable
Development. Kabul.
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II. Bangladesh
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Bangladesh is one of the most vulnerable countries to the adverse impacts of
climate change.25 It experiences cyclones, floods, and saltwater inundation, and
is also vulnerable to storm surges and drought (footnote 25). These climate
impacts hinder Bangladesh’s development and its goal of eliminating poverty
and becoming a middle-income country by 2021.26 Adverse climate effects
also undermine the livelihoods of some of the world’s poorest people—one
in four Bangladeshis lives in poverty.27 The government estimates that it will
need $27 billion for mitigation and $42 billion for adaptation measures during
2015–2030.28

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
In its nationally determined contribution (NDC), Bangladesh pledged a 5%
unconditional reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 from business as usual
(BAU) levels for its transport, industry, and power sectors (footnote 28). This
target is based on goals set out in the 2008 Renewable Energy Policy and the
Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan (BCCSAP) 2009.29 The
NDC, submitted in 2015, also contains a conditional pledge to reduce GHG
emissions by 15% below a BAU scenario by 2030.
To achieve this conditional reduction, the NDC sets targets for the power,
transport, industry, agriculture, waste, household, and commercial sectors.
These 2030 targets include (i) reducing the commercial sector’s overall energy
consumption by 25% compared with BAU, (ii) increasing rice cultivation
using alternate wetting and drying irrigation by 20%, (iii) shifting up to 20% of
passenger traffic from road to rail compared with BAU, and (iv) diverting 50% of
the managed waste fraction from landfill to composting.

25

26

27

28

29

Displacement Solutions. 2012. Climate Displacement in Bangladesh: The Need for Urgent Housing,
Land and Property (HLP) Rights Solutions; World Bank. 2012. Bangladesh Climate Change
Resilience Fund. News. 22 May.
L. Gimenez, D. Jolliffe, and I. Sharif. 2014. Bangladesh, a Middle Income Country by 2021: What
Will It Take in Terms of Poverty Reduction? Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Bank. 2017. Bangladesh Continues to Reduce Poverty But at Slower Pace. News. 24 October.
Washington, DC.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2016. First Nationally Determined
Contributions. Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. 2008. Renewable
Energy Policy of Bangladesh. Dhaka; Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and
Forests. 2009. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009. Dhaka.
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2. Overview of Climate Change Laws and Policies
Given Bangladesh’s high rates of poverty, unemployment, underemployment,
and extreme vulnerability to natural disasters and climate change, sustainable
development is critical to the country’s growth (footnote 25). A key challenge in
achieving sustainable development—as identified in the National Sustainable
Development Strategy (2010–2021)—is climate change.30
Referring to the BCCSAP as a guiding document, the strategy calls for scaling up
existing investments in disaster risk reduction. Investments to strengthen disaster
resilience include climate proofing coastal polders, afforestation, removing
waterlogging, developing crop varieties that can tolerate climate stress, and
mainstreaming disaster risk reduction and climate change. The strategy also highlights
ways to address mitigation, adaptation, and capacity building across sectors, but
particularly within agriculture, transport, energy, utilities, urban housing, and shelter.
The Ministry of Environment and Forests, the key government actor in the climate
realm, has developed two critical pieces of domestic strategy—the BCCSAP and
the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA).31 Launched in 2005, the
NAPA was significantly revised in 2009 to meet Bangladesh’s extensive adaptation
needs.32 The revised NAPA outlines 45 adaptation measures across six themes:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

food security and pro-poor social safety net,
comprehensive disaster management,
climate-resilient infrastructure,
mainstreaming climate change,
capacity and knowledge enhancement, and
strategic natural resources management.

The NAPA also calls for the creation of the BCCSAP. Issued in 2009, the
BCCSAP seeks to establish a medium- to long-term plan for building resilience
and achieving sustainable, low-carbon development over 10 years.33 The BCCSAP
targets 44 national programs focused on six priority areas:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

30

31

32

33

food security, social protection, and health;
comprehensive disaster management;
infrastructure;
research and knowledge management;

Government of Bangladesh, General Economics Division of the Planning Commission. 2013.
National Sustainable Development Strategy (2010–2021). Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2009. Bangladesh Climate
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009. Dhaka; and Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of
Environment and Forests. 2005. National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA). Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2009. National Adaptation
Programme of Action (NAPA). Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2009. Bangladesh Climate
Change Strategy and Action Plan 2009. Dhaka.
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(v) mitigation and low-carbon development; and
(vi) capacity building and institutional strengthening.
The BCCSAP prioritizes vulnerable populations—women, children, and the
poor—across all these areas. Examples of specific programs include river
restoration, reforestation, landfill methane capture, improved vehicle fuel
efficiency, increased use of public transport, reduced agricultural emissions,
and improved energy efficiency in the domestic and commercial sectors. These
initiatives were financed in part by the Bangladesh Climate Change Trust Fund
(BCCTF) through the Climate Change Trust Fund Act, 2010, and the Bangladesh
Climate Change Resilience Fund.34
The government’s Seventh Five-Year Plan, 2016–2020 outlines goals for supporting
the BCCSAP.35 It seeks to create a framework for continued high economic
growth and hopes to build on the success of earlier five-year plans. It contains
a chapter on sustainable development, climate change, and the environment.
This chapter articulates a three-pronged sustainable development strategy:
environmental management, climate change management and resilience
(mitigation and adaptation), and disaster management.
Bangladesh also has over 180 statutory laws relating to environmental management
that were developed before climate change became a national and international
priority. However, they may still be relevant in a climate context by providing a
legal basis for government-led adaptation and mitigation measures. For example,
the 1965 Factories Act regulates industrial emissions and can be used to regulate
GHG emissions. The Water Act of 2013 governs integrated management of water
resources. As climate change affects water availability and sets limits for sustainable
water use, this act will likely become relevant for water-related adaptation initiatives.
Table 4.2 summarizes Bangladesh’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
As of 2018, Bangladesh’s energy mix comprised 23,011 kilotonnes of oil equivalent
(ktoe) of natural gas, 9,628 ktoe of biofuels and waste, 6,504 ktoe of primary and
secondary oil, and 2,202 ktoe of coal.36 Hydropower and wind and solar made
minor contributions to the total energy mix, with hydropower supplying 93 ktoe,
and wind and solar supplying 26 ktoe (footnote 36). In 2008, the Power Division
of the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources published the Renewable
Energy Policy in recognition of the scarcity of nonrenewable fuels, the dependence
on foreign fuels, and the contribution of fossil fuels to climate change.37
34
35

36
37

World Bank. 2012. Bangladesh Climate Change Resilience Fund. News release. 22 May.
Government of Bangladesh, General Economics Division of the Planning Commission. 2015.
Seventh Five Year Plan: FY2016–FY2020: Accelerating Growth, Empowering Citizens. Dhaka.
International Energy Agency. Energy Supply: Bangladesh (accessed 17 September 2020).
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. 2008. Renewable
Energy Policy of Bangladesh. Dhaka.
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Table 4.2: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Bangladesh
Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh,
1972

Seventh Five-Year Plan, 2016–2020, 2015

National Sustainable Development Strategy
(2010–2021), 2013

Perspective Plan of Bangladesh, 2010–2021, 2012

Vision 2021, 2007

Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Climate Fiscal Framework, 2014
Bangladesh Climate Change
Strategy and Action Plan
(BCCSAP), 2009
National Adaptation Programme
of Action (NAPA), 2009
NAPA, 2005

The Climate Change Trust
Act, 2010

Energy

Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Master Plan up to
2030, 2016
Action Plan for Energy Efficiency
and Conservation, 2013
Country Action Plan for Clean
Cookstoves, 2013
Renewable Energy Policy, 2008

Sustainable and Renewable
Energy Development
Authority Act, 2012
The Bangladesh Energy
Regulatory Commission
(BERC) Act, 2003
(amended in 2010)

Food production
and food security

National Agriculture Policy, 2018
National Agriculture Policy, 2013
National Agriculture Extension
Policy, 2012

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Energy Efficiency &
Conservation Rules,
2016

continued on next page
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Table 4.2 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Waste

National 3R Strategy for Waste
Management, 2010

Disaster risk
management

National Disaster Management
Policy, 2015
National Plan for Disaster
Management (2016–2020), 2017

Disaster Management Act,
2012

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan, 2016–2021

Biodiversity Act, 2017
Environment Court Act,
2000

Non-Legislative
Instruments

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

The Renewable Energy Policy sets a goal of 5% renewable energy by 2015
and 10% by 2020 (footnote 37). It includes three other key provisions: the
development of renewable energy projects, the creation of a national regulatory
framework to encourage renewable electricity generation, and the approval by the
Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission (BERC) of an energy tariff containing
an option for green energy tariffs.
On the recommendation of the Renewable Energy Policy, the Sustainable and
Renewable Energy Development Authority Act, 2012 was passed. The act
establishes the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority to
promote renewable energy use and development, heighten energy security, and
mitigate and adapt to climate change. The authority has various responsibilities:
(i)
(ii)

promoting, standardizing, and labeling energy-efficient equipment;
assisting the government in creating and implementing a building
code focused on energy efficiency;
(iii) promoting renewable energy commercialization and private sector
energy efficiency;
(iv) providing financial and technical support in research, development,
demonstration, and training on renewable energy; and
(v) sending tariff proposals to the BERC.
The Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority also promotes
energy conservation and efficiency measures, which help reduce overall use and
GHG emissions related to electricity generation.
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D. Energy Demand
Demand for electricity in Bangladesh is estimated to reach 34,000 megawatts
(MW) by 2030.38 It is growing due to population growth, industrialization, and
increasing demand for modern household appliances.39 The government plans to
expand power generation beyond projected demand to propel economic growth,
especially in the export sector. It also aims to meet the demands of the growing
middle class (footnote 38).
In 2003, the BERC was established through the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory
Commission Act, 2003 to promote the efficient use of energy. It is mandated to
(i) determine institutional energy efficiency standards; (ii) monitor institutions
through energy audits; and (iii) ensure energy efficiency in generation,
transmission, and distribution.
In 2016, the government issued the draft Energy Efficiency & Conservation
Rules to help the Sustainable and Renewable Energy Development Authority to
function effectively.40 The rules concern
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

equipment and appliance labeling and standards,
building energy conservation,
small and medium-sized enterprises,
service and industry,
government operations,
energy conservation and efficiency information,
policy development and reporting,
public awareness-raising, and
additional funding sources (including the Clean Development
Mechanism [CDM] and the Bilateral Offset Credit Mechanism).

The rules also detail the equipment and appliances eligible for energy efficiency
labeling requirements, the criteria to determine large energy consumers, and a
timeline for voluntary and mandatory energy audits for large energy consumers.
In 2016, the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources also developed the
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Master Plan up to 2030 to expand on a 2013
action plan for energy efficiency and conservation.41 Given the predicted increase
in energy consumption with the simultaneous decrease in natural gas production,
38

39

40

41

Government of the United States (US), Department of Commerce, SelectUSA. Bangladesh–
Power & Energy.
P. Wester et al. 2019. The Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment: Mountains, Climate Change,
Sustainability and People. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources. 2016. Energy
Efficiency & Conservation Rules. Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources (Sustainable and
Renewable Energy Development Authority). 2016. Energy Efficiency and Conservation Master Plan
up to 2030. Dhaka.
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the master plan addresses the need for demand-side energy management. This
need is bolstered by the workforce shift from labor- to energy-intensive industries
and the desire to prevent further dependency on imported fuels. As a result, the
master plan reiterates the national target to improve energy intensity by 20%
compared with the 2013 level by 2030, which would save 95 million tons of oil
equivalent (Mtoe).

E.

Climate Finance

After the launch of the BCCSAP, the BCCTF was established under the Climate
Change Trust Fund Act, 2009. The act seeks to initiate mitigation, adaptation,
and other climate action measures under the BCCSAP. It included a $100 million
budget annually for 2009–2011, stipulating that 66% of this budget be allocated to
BCCSAP-related projects. The BCCTF is the first national climate fund established
by a least developed country and focuses on supporting adaptation efforts.
In 2014, the Ministry of Finance created the Climate Fiscal Framework to guide
climate fiscal policy-making.42 The framework helps identify the supply and
demand of climate fiscal funds, and prioritizes the sustainability and transparency
of climate finance policies. It prepares the public finance system to access
and use domestic and international climate finance efficiently and effectively.
To this end, it seeks to cost and prioritize climate actions, access domestic
and international sources for climate finance, deliver climate finances, track
climate expenditures through the Climate Expenditure Tracking Framework,
and make climate finance and expenditure more transparent and accountable.
The framework also recommends updating the BCCSAP, establishing a climate
fiscal cell in the Finance Division of the Ministry of Finance and increasing fund
allocations to the BCCTF.

F.

LULUCF and REDD+

Some laws and policies address the connection between forest issues and climate
change. For example, the Constitution of Bangladesh recognizes that “the state
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to preserve and
safeguard the natural resources, bio-diversity, wetlands, forest and wild life for
the present and future citizens.”43 This article could support mitigation activities
under REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation,
conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management,
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks).
Furthermore, many local government laws have provisions relating to either
afforestation or street planting in urban areas—e.g., the Paurashava Ordinance,
1977; the Union Parishad Act, 2009; and the Laws on Hill Districts. The
42

43

Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Finance. 2014. Bangladesh Climate Fiscal Framework.
Dhaka.
Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. art. 18A.

SOUTH ASIA LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Acquisition of Waste Land Act, 1950 allows for afforestation of wasteland.
The BCCSAP pushes Bangladesh to take both mitigation and adaptation
measures, which could include REDD+ activities. The National Forest Policy,
1994,44 which aimed to raise total forest cover to 20% by 2015, preceded the
Forestry Master Plan (2017–2036).45 Given that reforestation falls under the
“plus” components of REDD+, National Forest Policy, 1994 provided a supportive
framework for REDD+ activities. The Ministry of Environment and Forests
approved the National REDD+ Readiness Roadmap in 2012.46

G. Transportation
GHG emissions from transportation are growing faster than those from any other
sectors (footnote 33). Thus, the BCCSAP identifies increasing energy efficiency
in the transport sector as a key priority. In particular, the BCCSAP recommends
promoting public transport and energy efficiency, improving transport planning,
and moving away from fossil fuels where possible and appropriate.

H. Adaptation
With its key planning document, Vision 2021, Bangladesh aims to eradicate
poverty and achieve lower middle-income country status by 2021, which it
did 6 years ahead in 2015.47 Although Vision 2021 is primarily a development
document, it also guides the country’s adaptation strategy. It is implemented
in part through the Perspective Plan of Bangladesh (2010–2021), which breaks
down the vision into medium- and long-term goals.48
One of the perspective plan’s goals is “to implement strategies to protect
Bangladesh from unpleasant effects of climate change and global warming.”49 The
perspective plan discusses the state of climate change in Bangladesh as well as
the strategies to protect the Bangladeshi people, especially the most vulnerable
communities. Focus areas include preventing transport- and industry-related
air pollution, ensuring scientific waste disposal, and taking all needed actions to
protect people from disasters. More specific strategies include afforestation; crop
diversification; integrated coastal zone management; and regional cooperation for
drought, flood, and river management.

44

45

46

47
48

49

Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 1994. National Forest Policy.
Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2016. Bangladesh Forestry
Master Plan 2017–2036. Dhaka.
United Nations REDD Programme and Government of Bangladesh. 2012. National REDD+
Readiness Roadmap. Geneva: United Nations REDD Programme.
Centre for Policy Dialogue. 2007. Bangladesh Vision 2021. Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, General Economics Division of the Planning Commission. 2012.
Perspective Plan of Bangladesh 2010–2021: Making Vision 2021 a Reality. Dhaka.
Footnote 48, p. 9.
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Bangladesh has also prioritized water resource management. The Water Act, 2013;
the Coastal Zone Policy, 2005; and the Integrated Coastal Zone Management
Plan, 2005 set goals and guidelines for managing water.50 Both Vision 2021
and the Water Act have supported adaptive measures concerning water
management. For example, the Ganges Barrage Project—enabled by Vision 2021
and the Water Act—is a large-scale project to expand irrigation, prevent saltwater
intrusion, and increase freshwater availability in the Sundarbans region, a delta
mangrove area in the Bay of Bengal.
The government targets food and nutrition security in the National Agriculture
Policy and aims to enhance agricultural productivity and diversification.51
The National Food Policy, 2013 also supports food security, focusing on food
availability and nutrition for women and children by enhancing women’s
purchasing power.52 The National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008–2015)
supported implementing the National Food Policy by identifying strategic
interventions, responsible actors, and priority targets.53

I.

Disaster Risk Management

In 2016, the updated National Plan for Disaster Management (2016–2020)
was promulgated by the Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief based on
the previous National Plan for Disaster Management (2010–2015) published
by the Ministry of Food and Disaster Management.54 The plan builds on the
government’s success in disaster management and international disaster risk
reduction frameworks. It has three core goals: saving lives, protecting investments,
and recovering effectively. Adopting a phase-wise approach with 34 core targets
to be implemented in partnership with relevant stakeholders in the context of
rapid changes in Bangladesh, the plan takes a whole-of-government approach
and attaches importance to engaging the private sector.
Parliament passed the Disaster Management Act in 2012, which seeks to
substantially reduce disaster risks to a level deemed acceptable through
interventions, emergency response implementation, recovery and rehabilitation,
humanitarian assistance, institutional capacity improvements, and
comprehensive disaster management system.

50

51

52
53

54

Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Water Resources. 2005. Coastal Zone Policy, 2005.
Dhaka; and Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Water Resources. 2005. Integrated Coastal
Zone Management Plan. Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Agriculture. 2013. National Agriculture Policy. Dhaka; and
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2016. Bangladesh Country Fact
Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends. Rome.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Agriculture. 2013. National Food Policy. Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Food and Disaster Management, Food Planning and
Monitoring Unit. 2008. National Food Policy Plan of Action (2008–2015). Dhaka.
Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief. 2017. National Plan
for Disaster Management (2016–2020). Dhaka; and Government of Bangladesh, Ministry of Food
and Disaster Management. 2010. National Plan for Disaster Management, 2010–2015. Dhaka.
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III. Bhutan
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Bhutan is a constitutional monarchy, in which the King serves as Head of State
and the Prime Minister leads the executive branch of government. It is the world’s
only carbon-negative country.55 According to its second national GHG inventory,
Bhutan’s estimated sequestration capacity in 2000 was 6.3 million tons of carbon
dioxide (tCO2), while emissions were only 1.6 million tCO2.56 Bhutan serves as a net
sink for GHGs because it has extensive forest cover, low levels of industrial activity,
and almost 100% electricity generation through hydropower (footnote 56).
Nevertheless, Bhutan faces some projected climate-related impacts because
of its fragile mountainous ecosystem and economy, including challenges to its
water resources, agriculture, forests and biodiversity, and hydropower sectors
(footnote 56). Increasingly frequent and extreme weather events also pose a
challenge to the landlocked least-developed country (footnote 56).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Committed to remaining carbon neutral when it signed the Paris Agreement,
Bhutan has demonstrated significant climate leadership. According to its
nationally determined contribution (NDC), Bhutan’s GHG emissions will not
exceed the sequestration capacity of its forests—estimated at 6.3 million tCO2.
The NDC also sets a goal of offsetting 22.4 tCO2 equivalent per year by 2025 by
exporting hydropower.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Bhutan’s approach to climate change has been policy-driven and carbon
neutrality-focused. In 2019, the National Environment Commission Secretariat
issued the Climate Change Policy.57 The policy’s overarching goal is to ensure
that Bhutan remains carbon neutral in its development while adapting to
climate change by (i) providing strategic guidance to identify and respond to the
challenges and opportunities of climate change, (ii) integrating climate changerelated measures into relevant documents and implementing them appropriately,
and (iii) establishing meaningful participation of all stakeholders.

55

56
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M. Tutton and K. Scott. 2018. What Tiny Bhutan Can Teach the World about Being Carbon
Negative. CNN. 11 October.
Government of Bhutan, National Environment Commission. 2016. Kingdom of Bhutan: First
Nationally Determined Contribution. Thimphu.
Government of Bhutan, National Environment Commission. 2019. Climate Change Policy of the
Kingdom of Bhutan 2019. Thimphu.
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The Climate Change Policy recognizes the constitutional right of citizens—and
the responsibility of both citizens and the government—to enjoy and maintain
sustainable development and environmental conservation for current and
future generations. It also reaffirms several features of the National Environment
Protection Act, 2007, such as the (i) polluter-pays principle, (ii) precautionary
principle, (iii) payment of ecosystem services, and (iv) right to information and
engagement of all stakeholders.
The National Environment Protection Act provides a framework for Bhutan’s
climate action, although it does not contain any explicit climate-related
provisions. The act aims to “provide for the establishment of an effective
system to conserve and protect environment . . . , so as to independently
regulate and promote sustainable development in an equitable manner.” 58 It
incorporates fundamental environmental principles into the law of Bhutan, such
as the principles of precaution, polluter pays, and intergenerational equity and
responsibility; critical to climate action. The act prescribed emissions standards
and empowered the National Environment Commission to impose those
standards. The goal is to regulate polluting technologies and products and make
producers responsible for their products’ full life cycle through reuse, recycling,
recovery, or paying for waste management.
Bhutan’s commitment to carbon-neutral development is further outlined in its
National Strategy and Action Plan for Low Carbon Development.59 Launched in
2012, the action plan analyzes sector emissions under a business as usual (BAU)
scenario. It models three alternative energy scenarios for 2005–2040: (i) option
one—achieving a high degree energy efficiency in the industrial, tertiary, and
residential sector; (ii) option two—generating a high degree of electricity from
renewable energy; and (iii) option three—combining options one and two.
Under the baseline scenario, emissions in 2009 were around 2.1 million tCO2
equivalent, with half coming from agriculture and a quarter each from energy and
industry. Under a BAU scenario, emissions will reach 4.7 million tCO2 equivalent
by 2040, which is still below the national sequestration capacity. However,
increased energy efficiency (option one) could reduce Bhutan’s emissions by
10% in 2040 compared with the baseline. Option two—increasing the share of
renewable energy—could reduce emissions by 42%, and option three—boosting
energy efficiency and renewable energy generation—could reduce emissions by
49% relative to the baseline level in 2040.
The Action Plan for Low Carbon Development also explores options for financing
its goals, including the CDM and the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions.
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National Environmental Protection Act, 2007. sec. 3.
Government of Bhutan, National Environment Commission. 2012. National Strategy and Action
Plan for Low Carbon Development, 2012. Thimphu.
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Bhutan also recognizes climate change as integral to its economic growth in its
Economic Development Policy (2016), which focuses on boosting a green and
self-reliant economy.60 The policy aims to achieve a minimum average economic
growth rate of 10%, become a middle-income country by 2020, achieve economic
self-reliance by 2020, and sustain full employment (97.5%). It sets out the
following strategies:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

promote the “five jewels” (hydropower, agriculture, cottage and small
industries, tourism, and mining);
diversify the economic base with minimal ecological footprint;
harness and add value to natural resources sustainably;
increase and diversify exports;
promote Bhutan as an organic brand;
promote industries that build the image of “Brand Bhutan”;
reduce fossil fuel dependency; and
promote industries through a cluster effect and championing
approach.

The Economic Development Policy also outlines strategies the government
should promote for sustainable development, such as green and climate-smart
agriculture, sustainable tourism, and sustainability in education.
Table 4.3 summarizes Bhutan’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
As a result of privatization in Bhutan’s energy sector in 2002, commercial
management and ownership is no longer the exclusive purview of the
government.61 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Economic Affairs serves as the
primary policy-making body on energy.
Hydropower from run-of-the-river schemes generates almost 100% of national
electricity supply (footnote 56). Hydroelectricity exports offset 4.4 million tCO2
equivalent per year in 2015, and could offset up to 22.4 million tCO2 equivalent per
year by 2025 (footnote 56). Consistent with this goal, the Economic Development
Policy seeks to build 5,000 MW of hydropower by 2022 (footnote 60).
The Economic Development Policy also encourages the development of other
renewable energy projects (footnote 60). It calls for (i) adopting a feed-in-tariff policy
by 2018; (ii) granting incentives to promote rooftop water and space heating systems;
(iii) researching and developing renewable energy and efficiency; and (iv) creating the
National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Policy, and Energy Efficiency Building
Codes and Guidelines. The policy also designates funds to conserve catchment areas
and support renewable energy and energy efficiency initiatives.
60
61

Government of Bhutan. 2016. Economic Development Policy. Thimphu.
ADB. 2014. Country Partnership Strategy: Bhutan, 2014–2018. Manila.
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Table 4.3: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Bhutan
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008
Twelfth Five-Year Plan 2018–2023, 2019
Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, Prosperity and Happiness
(Part 1 and Part 2), 1999
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2017 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Climate Change Policy, 2019
Bhutan National Strategy and
Action Plan for Low Carbon
Development, 2012
Bhutan National Adaptation
Programme of Action, 2006

Energy

National Energy Efficiency
and Conservation Policy,
2017
Alternative Renewable
Energy Policy, 2013

LULUCF and REDD+

National Forestry Policy, 2009

Food production and
food security

Food and Nutrition Security
Policy, 2014

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

National Integrated Water
Resources Management
Plan, 2016
National Irrigation Master
Plan, 2016

Disaster risk
management
Waste

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Electricity Act of Bhutan,
2001

Disaster Management
Act, 2013
Waste Prevention
and Management
Regulation, 2012
Waste Prevention
and Management
(Amendment)
Regulation, 2016
continued on next page
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Table 4.3 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Other

Economic Development
Policy, 2016
National Biodiversity
Strategies and Action Plan,
2014

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

National Environment
Protection Act, 2007

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

Bhutan’s Electricity Act, 2001 also allows for evolution in the national power
supply. Although the act does not mention climate change, three of the
seven objectives relate to climate change: (i) promoting renewable energy
development, (ii) considering the environment when developing electricity
sources, and (iii) promoting efficiency in electricity service delivery and
management. The act enables private sector participation and explains the
required licenses and regulations for power companies. It also establishes the
Bhutan Electricity Authority, an autonomous entity tasked with outlining the
specifications, standards, and codes for the industry to “ensure the protection of
the natural resources, the environment and other public interests affected by the
development of electricity supply.” 62

1. Renewable Energy Policies
The Alternative Renewable Energy Policy, 2013 directs the development and
promotion of renewable energy through the adoption of solar, bioenergy,
wind, geothermal, waste-to-energy, and hydro technologies (pico, micro, mini
and small).63 The policy acknowledges the importance of diversifying energy
production given “rising energy demand, the reliance on a single electricity
source, increasing fossil fuel imports, and low hydropower production in winter
months.” 64 By diversifying energy production, Bhutan can work toward energy
security and mitigate climate change.
The policy sets a preliminary minimum target of 20 MW of renewable energy
by 2025. It hopes to achieve this by promoting green growth and using a mix of
renewable energy technologies, including 5 MW each of solar, wind, and biomass
energy. Long-term objectives include developing a framework for carbon trading
mechanisms.

62
63
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Electricity Act of Bhutan, 2001. sec. 11.2(vi).
Government of Bhutan, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2013. Alternative Renewable Energy Policy
2013. Thimphu.
Footnote 63, p. 5.
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D. Energy Demand
Total fuel consumption in Bhutan is dominated by traditional sources of fuel,
such as biomass (fuelwood, biogas, and briquettes), which accounts for 36% of
consumption.65 Electrification since 2005 has resulted in a growing shift from
biomass to electricity, with electricity constituting more than a quarter (28%)
of fuel consumption. Other major fuel sources include coal (15%) and diesel
(16%).66 Petrol, kerosene, and liquefied petroleum gas make up the remaining 5%
of the total fuel mix. As of 2015, Bhutan had achieved 100% access to electricity
in urban areas and 94% in rural areas.
Following the release of Bhutan’s Economic Development Policy, the National
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Policy (NEECP) was launched in 2017 to
promote, incentivize, govern, and monitor energy efficiency and conservation
measures.67 The NEECP recognizes the economy-wide benefits of energy
efficiency and conservation, which include reduced energy intensity, lesser
GHG emissions, less pressure on forest resources, and higher revenues as more
electricity becomes available for export.
While the NEECP assigns roles and responsibilities to many agencies regarding
energy efficiency and conservation, it focuses on the organizational strengthening
of the Department of Renewable Energy. The department is responsible for
utilizing the Renewable Energy Development Fund to support efficiency and
conservation measures. It also develops a monitoring, reporting, and verification
mechanism to assess energy efficiency and conservation programs.
The NEECP identifies sectors—such as industry, transport, buildings, and
appliances—in which energy performance standards can be improved. These
standards are then developed, enforced, and promoted by the Department of
Renewable Energy, the Ministry of Works and Human Settlement, and the Ministry
of Information and Communications. The average annual savings potential in
electricity consumption in the buildings, industry, and appliances sectors is about
300 million kilowatt-hours annually. The NEECP also recognizes that fuel-efficient
vehicles, electric vehicles, mass transportation, and nonmotorized transportation
can reduce fuel costs, harmful vehicular pollution, and congestion.

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Bhutan’s extensive forest cover serves as a net sink for GHGs (footnote 56). The
Constitution of Bhutan requires a minimum of 60% of forest cover at all times.68
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Government of Bhutan, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2016. Energy Data Directory 2015.
Thimphu. pp. 48–49.
Footnote 65, p. 48.
Government of Bhutan, Ministry of Economic Affairs. 2017. National Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Policy. Thimphu.
Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 2008. art. 5(3).

SOUTH ASIA LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

Currently, 71% of the total land is under forest cover.69 Launched in 2009, the
National Forest Policy provides guidelines for the sustainable use and protection
of forests, wild plants, and animals, as well as the conservation of water and soil
resources in Bhutan.70 The policy outlines six key objectives:
(i)

sustainably producing goods and services to meet societal needs
through forest management;
(ii) preserving biodiversity, natural habitats, and ecosystem services by
maintaining protected areas such as biological corridors, nature reserves,
botanical parks, conservation areas, wildlife sanctuaries, and national parks;
(iii) managing forested watersheds to maintain high-quality water supply
and sustainable rural livelihoods;
(iv) ensuring that rural communities can meet the majority of their
demands for timber as well as benefit economically from the
sustainable management of community forests;
(v) preserving an efficient and profitable forest-centered industry; and
(vi) engaging in institutional and organizational reform to meet these
objectives.
The National Forest Policy also notes the value of forests in maintaining income
from ecotourism and environmental services, and high-quality water supply for
hydropower, irrigation, and domestic use.

F.

Adaptation

Bhutan is a small, landlocked, and mountainous country. Its climate vulnerability
stems from a heavy dependence on climate-sensitive sectors—such as
hydropower and agriculture—and large areas of glacial lakes and glaciers
(footnote 56). Bhutan is at risk of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs) from rising
global temperatures; land degradation from landslides, intense rainfall, cyclones,
and erosion from changing weather patterns; and flashfloods from intense rainfall
and cyclones (footnote 56).
In 2006, the government launched its National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) to address Bhutan’s climate vulnerability.71 The NAPA addresses the links
between responding to climate change and developing sustainably. It identifies
key adaptation needs by sector and by climate hazard. Nine priority adaptation
projects are
(i)
(ii)
69

70
71

a disaster management strategy with a pilot implementation of food
security and emergency medicine;
the artificial lowering of Thorthormi Glacier Lake;

Government of Bhutan, Department of Forests and Park Services. 2017. National Forest Inventory
Report: Stocktaking Nation’s Forest Resources: Volume I. Thimphu.
Government of Bhutan, Ministry of Agriculture. 2009. National Forest Policy of Bhutan, 2009. Thimphu.
Government of Bhutan. 2006. Bhutan National Adaptation Programme of Action. Thimphu.
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(iii) a weather forecasting system to serve farmers and agriculture;
(iv) landslide management and flood prevention, with pilot schemes in
critical areas;
(v) the flood protection of downstream industrial and agricultural area;
(vi) rainwater harvesting;
(vii) GLOF Hazard Zoning, with a pilot scheme—Chamkar Chu Basin;
(viii) the installation of Early Warning System on Pho Chu Basin; and
(ix) the promotion of community-based forest fire management and
prevention.
The 2012 addendum to the NAPA notes that while the project to address the
threat of flooding from Thorthormi Glacier Lake was implemented, a lack of
funding has prevented the implementation of further NAPA priority projects.
The update also recognizes that cyclones and other new climate hazards have
emerged, requiring reassessment of remaining priority projects.

G. Disaster Risk Management
Seeking to mainstream disaster risk reduction, the Disaster Management Act,
2013 establishes the National Disaster Management Authority as the decisionmaking body for disaster management. The body approves contingency plans,
hazard zoning, and national standards for disaster risk management and
reduction.

IV. India
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
India has a federal system of government and is the world’s second most populous
country, being home to 17.7% of the world’s population.72 Around 42% of India’s
workforce works in agriculture, making them susceptible to climate impacts like
heat waves, flooding, and drought, and vulnerable to displacement.73 During
2004–2014, the Indian economy grew by about 11% each year. In 2014, the
country was the third-largest economy in the world.74
Climate change has already impacted India’s climate. India experiences unusual and
unprecedented heat waves more frequently and more extensively.75 Monsoon patterns
are changing. Since the 1950s, monsoon rainfall has diminished, but India has also
experienced more frequent heavy rainfall events (footnote 75). Rising temperatures
72
73
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Worldometer. India Population (live) (accessed 18 September 2020).
H. Plecher. 2020. Distribution of the Workforce Across Economic Sectors in India 2019. Hamburg:
Statista; and World Bank. 2013. India: Climate Change Impacts. News. 19 June.
United States (US) Energy Information Administration. 2016. India: Analysis.
World Bank. 2013. India: Climate Change Impacts. News. 19 June.
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and unpredictable rainfall significantly impact the agriculture, forestry, and power
sectors, threatening food and energy security.76 India’s two dominant forms of power
generation—hydropower and thermal power—require consistent water supplies.
India has shown strong support for climate action, adopting climate adaptation
and awareness strategies early (footnote 75).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
In its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement,
India committed to both conditional and unconditional GHG emission reductions
by 2030.77 Unconditionally, India pledges to reduce the emission intensity of its
gross domestic product (GDP) by 33%–35%. Conditionally, it pledges to meet
40% of installed power capacity from nonfossil fuel sources. India’s conditional
target is contingent upon receiving international financing from mechanisms such
as the Green Climate Fund as well as technology transfers.
India still actively participates in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
established under the Kyoto Protocol. It has hosted 1,748 registered CDM
projects as of December 2019.78

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Instead of developing binding climate legislation, India has taken a policy‑based
approach to tackle climate change. In 2006, India released its National Environment
Policy, which guides action on sustainability.79 The policy articulates key elements
of India’s climate response. For example, it notes the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities; recognizes the need for climate change adaptation;
and identifies India’s vulnerabilities to climate change and the impact on agriculture,
health, the coasts, forests, and water resources. Critically, the policy encourages
Indian industries to take part in the CDM of the Kyoto Protocol, to which India
had no binding emissions targets as a non-Annex I country.
In 2008, India issued its most crucial executive policy on climate change: the
National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC).80 The NAPCC provides
a framework and guiding principles for sectors creating low-carbon growth
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Footnote 75; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Climate Change Adaptation: India.
Government of India. 2016. India’s First Nationally Determined Contribution: Working Towards
Climate Justice. Delhi.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Clean Development
Mechanism. Project Search–India (accessed 28 December 2019).
Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2006. National Environment Policy,
2006. Delhi.
Government of India, Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change. 2008. National Action Plan
on Climate Change. Delhi.
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strategies. It focuses on improving climate change understanding and initiating
action on mitigation, energy efficiency, adaptation, and conservation of natural
resources while simultaneously promoting economic growth. It sets a target of 5%
renewable energy in the national grid by 2010 and aims to increase the share of
renewable energy by 1% annually to reach a 15% share of the grid by 2020.
The NAPCC’s eight strategic missions concern solar, enhanced energy efficiency,
sustainable habitat, water, sustaining Himalayan ecosystems, Green India,
sustainable agriculture, and strategic knowledge. After the NAPCC was released,
states were asked to prepare action plans. All Indian states have completed or are
preparing their own State Action Plans on Climate Change.81
The government established the Advisory Council on Climate Change alongside the
NAPCC and designated the Prime Minister as its chair. Reconstituted in 2014, this
council is made up of diverse stakeholders including members of industry, civil society,
and the government. The council establishes directives on national climate change
action and aids in coordinating the domestic agenda as well as reviewing research
and development under the NAPCC. Furthermore, it advises on international
negotiations and periodically reviews the progress of the respective missions.
In 2010, the Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment—an organization of
research institutions—published Climate Change and India: A 4x4 Assessment.82
The assessment details impacts on forests, water resources, human health,
and agriculture in the northeast, the coastal areas, the Western Ghats, and the
Himalayan region. The Indian government has responded to the threats posed by
climate change through its policies, which cover carbon pricing; energy supply and
demand; LULUCF and REDD+; cities and buildings; and climate change adaptation.
The government released the last five-year multisector development plan in 2012.83
The Twelfth Five-Year Plan for 2012–2017 aimed for 8.2% growth and prioritized
the reduction of energy intensity and the increase in domestic energy supply. The
government established the Expert Group on Low Carbon Strategy for Inclusive
Growth after this plan to write a low-carbon development road map.84 The road
map recommended a strategy for low-carbon growth in multiple sectors including
electricity, transportation, industry, oil and gas, buildings, and forestry. After the
government abolished five-year plans, the National Institution for Transforming India
prepared the Three-Year Action Agenda: 2017–2018 to 2019–2020.85 Part VII of the
agenda focuses on sustainability, particularly pollution, forests, and water resources.
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E. Gogoi. 2017. In Depth: India’s State Action Plans on Climate Change: towards Meaningful Action.
Oxford: Oxford Policy Management.
Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment. 2010. Climate Change and India: A 4x4
Assessment: A Sectoral and Regional Analysis for 2030s. Delhi.
Government of India, Planning Commission. 2013. Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017): Faster,
More Inclusive and Sustainable Growth: Volume I. Delhi.
Government of India, Planning Commission. 2014. The Final Report of the Expert Group on Low
Carbon Strategies for Inclusive Growth. Delhi.
Government of India, National Institution for Transforming India. 2017. Three Year Action
Agenda, 2017–18 to 2019–20. Delhi.
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Table 4.4 summarizes India’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 4.4: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of India
The Constitution of India, 1949
Twelfth Five Year Plan 2012–2017, 2013
(Vol. I and Vol. II)
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

National Missions
implementing National
Action Plan on Climate
Change
National Action Plan on
Climate Change, 2008

Energy

National Electricity Plan
(Generation), 2012
National Electric Mobility
Mission Plan 2020, 2012
National Mission for
Enhanced Energy
Efficiency, 2010
National Policy on Biofuels,
2009
Integrated Energy Policy,
2006
Tariff Policy, 2006
(Part 2 and
Amendments)
National Electricity Policy,
2005

LULUCF and REDD+

National REDD+ Strategy,
2018

Transportation

National Auto Fuel Policy
and Auto Fuel Vision
and Policy 2025, 2003

Acts

The Finance Bill 2010-11
and the Clean Energy
Cess Rules, 2010
(Part 2 and Part 3)
Electricity Act, 2003
(Part 2 and Part 3)
Energy Conservation Act,
2001
(2010 Amendment)

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Order Creating Renewable
Purchase Obligation
Compliance Cell, 2017

Aviation Environment
Circular 2, 2013
(superseded by Civil
Aviation Requirements
Section 10, Part I Series B)
continued on next page
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Table 4.4 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Food production and
food security

National Mission for
Sustainable Agriculture,
2014 (2017 Update)
National Food Security
Mission, 2007
National Initiative on
Climate Resilient
Agriculture

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

National Water Mission,
2011 (Volumes I and II)

Cities and buildings

National Mission on
Sustainable Habitat,
2015

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Energy Conservation
Building Code, 2017
National Building Code, 2016
Ministry of Communications
and IT: Directions on
Implementing Green
Technologies in Telecom
Sector, 2012

Industry

National Environment
Policy, 2006

Other

The National Green
Tribunal Act, 2010

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
The latest data from India’s Ministry of Power note that coal is the country’s
largest energy source, providing 55.3% of total energy, followed by renewable
energy sources (biomass, wind, waste, solar) at 23.8%, and hydro at 12.3%.86
India’s renewable power capacity of 118 gigawatts (GW) is the fifth-highest in the
world, and the Indian government aims to reach 500 GW by 2030.87 In the 2019
United Nations (UN) Climate Action Summit, India announced it would aim for
450 GW of renewable energy capacity.88

86
87

88

Government of India, Ministry of Power. Power Sector at a Glance (accessed 18 September 2020).
S. Bailey and J. Defterios. 2019. ReNew Power: The Indian Unicorn Built on Green Energy. CNN.
15 July.
A. Jaiswal and S. Kwatra. 2019. India Announces Stronger Climate Action. Natural Resources
Defense Council. Expert blog. 23 September.
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1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
In 2012, India issued energy-related policies: the National Electricity Plan of 2012
(Electricity Plan)89 and the National Electric Mobility Mission Plan 2020.90 The
goal of the Electricity Plan was to ensure reliable electricity access nationwide.
Recognizing the rapid pace of economic growth, the Electricity Plan sought to
expand rural access to electric power and increase total generation while reducing
the sector’s emissions. The plan’s targets included (i) technical modifications
of power stations, (ii) thermal power plant renovations and retirements,
(iii) hydroelectric power plant renovations, (iv) energy efficiency measures,
(v) power distribution, and (vi) the improvement of coal quality.
In 2018, the government issued the new National Electricity Plan.91 The plan
reinforces the government’s commitment to transform the electricity sector and
move quickly to address climate change.92 It also supports the government’s goal
of increasing renewable energy, closing coal power plants, and preparing for a low
hydropower scenario (footnote 92).
The National Electric Mobility Mission Plan also supports low carbon growth and
focuses on the development of domestic manufacturing capabilities and electric
mobility in India. It emphasizes that transportation efficiency is intended to
mitigate the impacts of transportation on climate change.
Previous energy-related executive policies include the Integrated Energy Policy of
2006 and the National Electricity Policy of 2005.93 Earlier, the Indian legislature
passed the Electricity Act, 2003, which sought to coordinate power sector
development, efficiency, and environmentalism.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
The government has promoted renewable and alternative sources of energy
through the 2017 Order on Renewable Purchase Compliance and the 2009
Biofuels Policy.94 The 2006 Tariff Policy mandates that solar purchase obligation
targets reach 3% by 2022 and that solar power, on the whole, reaches 100 GW
by 2022.95 The Tariff Policy is aligned with the National Solar Mission, which
89

90

91
92

93
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Government of India, Ministry of Power, Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises. 2012. National
Electricity Plan. Delhi.
Government of India, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises. 2012. National Electric
Mobility Mission Plan 2020. Delhi.
Government of India, Ministry of Power. 2018. National Electricity Plan. Delhi.
T. Buckley and K. Shah. 2018. IEEFA India: New National Electricity Plan Reinforces Intent Toward
275 Gigawatts of Renewables-Generated Electricity by 2027. Institute for Energy Economics and
Financial Analysis (IEEFA). 19 April.
Government of India, Planning Commission. 2006. Integrated Energy Policy; and Government of
India. 2005. National Electricity Policy. Delhi.
Government of India. 2017. Order: Creation of Renewable Purchase Obligation. Delhi; and Government
of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. 2007. National Policy on Biofuels. Delhi.
Government of India. Ministry of Power. 2016. Tariff Policy. Delhi.
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promotes the generation of solar energy from small and large plants.96 Alongside
the National Solar Mission are local projects such as the Solar Water Heater
Program, Village Electrification Program, and Solar Photovoltaic Program.97

D. Energy Demand
In total, primary energy consumption in India reached 775 million tons of oil
equivalent (Mtoe) in 2013 (footnote 74). The government has implemented
legislation to reduce energy consumption. India’s Energy Conservation Act,
2001 allows the central government to give certificates for energy savings to
consumers who save energy relative to prescribed standards. Through this
permitting approach to energy consumption, consumers who exceed standards
can purchase such certificates.
Additionally, large consumers must adhere to consumption norms; new buildings
must align with the Energy Conservation Building Code, 2017; and appliances
must meet standards of energy performance. The Bureau of Energy Efficiency is
responsible for enforcing the code. Energy efficiency increases further avoided
15% of energy demand and 300 tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2) emissions over
2000–2018.98
Approved in 2010, the National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency
(Mission) aligns with the Energy Conservation Act, 2001 in its mandate to
implement energy efficiency measures through the Bureau of Energy Efficiency in
India.99 This Mission emerged from the responsibilities delegated by the NAPCC.
Its major initiatives are enhancing the cost-effectiveness of energy efficiency
implementation, increasing energy efficiency in appliances through improving
affordability, creating mechanisms to finance demand-side management projects,
and heightening energy efficiency through fiscal instruments.
In its 2014 amendment, the Mission emphasizes technology investments, venture
capital creation, systems of appliance ratings, and an energy conservation building
code. Most significantly, its Perform, Achieve, and Trade mechanism seeks to
decrease emissions by 25 million tons annually by 2014–2015.100 Energy efficiency
is also promoted through the Energy Conservation Building Code, 2017 and the
National Mission on Sustainable Habitat.101
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Government of India. 2010. Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. Delhi.
UNFCCC, Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 2019. PoA 8855: Solar Water Heater Program in
India; Government of India, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy. 2013. Remote Village Electrification
Program; and UNFCCC, CDM. PoA 8426 : India Small Scale Solar PV Programme of Activities.
International Energy Agency. India: Key Energy Statistics, 2018 (accessed 9 July 2020).
Government of India. 2010. National Mission for Enhanced Energy Efficiency. Delhi.
Government of India, Bureau of Energy Efficiency. Perform, Achieve, and Trade Scheme; and
Government of India, Ministry of Power. PAT Cycle. Delhi.
V. Shivaranjani. 2015. National Mission on Sustainable Habitat. Chennai, India: Centre for
Development Finance.
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E.

Carbon Pricing

The 2010 Finance Bill created the National Clean Energy Fund, a body that invests
in research and entrepreneurship in clean energy fields. This fund allows projects
from the private and public sectors to receive financing in the form of viability gap
funding or loans. It sets a tax on coal at $0.81 per ton. This tax was increased to $3.22
per ton in 2015 to finance clean energy projects and research, as well as programs for
environmental remediation.102 The interministerial group comprising heads from
different government ministries was created to approve eligible projects.

F.

LULUCF and REDD+

The National Mission for Green India (Green India) is part of the NAPCC. Green
India recognizes the impact of forests on biodiversity conservation, food, livelihood
and water security, and climate change mitigation.103 It models a participatory,
decentralized approach to sustainability by involving grassroots organizations and
communities in planning, implementing, and monitoring processes. It uses crosscutting interventions such as decentralizing forest governance, adding value through
cross-sector program convergence, and bolstering investments to manage tree cover
and protect forests. Specific objectives of the mission include increasing forest cover or
forest quality in 10 million hectares of forestlands and non-forestlands and achieving
enhanced annual CO2 sequestration by 50–60 million tons in the year 2020.104
A REDD+ national consultation was held in India in 2012, and the government
established a technical group for assessing and monitoring REDD+ activities.
Released in 2018, the National REDD+ Strategy aims to increase carbon sink up
to 3 billion tCO2 equivalent by 2030 in alignment with India’s NDC.105

G. Cities and Buildings
The National Building Code, 2016 and the Energy Conservation Building Code,
2017 contribute to India’s climate change policy approach. The National Building
Code establishes comprehensive guidelines to regulate construction. Specifically, it
includes a preference for refrigerants with low global warming potential to decrease
overall emissions of GHGs, aligning with the trend of hydrofluorocarbon phaseout.
The Bureau of Indian Standards is making revisions to incorporate sustainability
into the National Building Code. The Energy Conservation Building Code helps
decrease emissions by establishing the minimum requirements for energy
102
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International Institute for Sustainable Development. The Evolution of the Clean Energy Cess on
Coal Production in India; and Government of India, Department of Energy. 2017. National Clean
Energy and Environment Fund. Delhi.
Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests. 2014. National Mission for a Green
India. Delhi.
Footnote 103, p. 8.
Government of India, Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. 2018. National
REDD+ Strategy: India. Delhi.
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efficiency in the design and construction of buildings. It also provides two sets of
requirements so that enhanced energy efficiency incrementally raises standards
beyond minimum regulations.

H. Adaptation
Receding glaciers, declining rainfall, and increasing flooding pose threats to
water and food security in India, especially threatening natural ecosystems, rural
households, and the coasts.106 In response to these challenges, the government has
integrated adaptation efforts into its environmental policies. The National Mission
for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem concerns specifically climate change
adaptation. It aims to develop management and policy measures to sustain and
protect the Himalayan glacier and mountain ecosystem (footnote 106).
In July 2007, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) launched the Adaptation Fund to address climate change impacts and
develop resilience. The Adaptation Fund is financing six small-scale projects across
India, implemented by the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development.107

I.

Subnational Activities

All Indian states must prepare State Action Plans on Climate Change in alignment
with the goals of the NAPCC. All 7 union territories and 29 states have completed
or are currently preparing their plans.

V. Maldives
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Maldives, a low-lying island nation in the Indian Ocean, is a presidential republic
consisting of approximately 1,190 islands, with its population spread over
approximately 197 islands.108 Its economy relies on two climate-sensitive sectors:
tourism and fisheries (footnote 108). It faces climate challenges typical to small
island countries, e.g., its low-lying nature makes it vulnerable to climate change
impacts (footnote 108). Higher ocean temperatures, increased ocean acidification,
and extreme weather events threaten livelihoods and biodiversity.109 More than
60% of its inhabited islands experience severe beach erosion (footnote 109).
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Government of India, Ministry of Science and Technology. 2010. National Mission for Sustaining
the Himalayan Ecosystem. Delhi.
National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. Adaptation Fund under United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2016. Maldives’ First Nationally
Determined Contribution. Malé.
Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2016. National Biodiversity
Strategy and Action Plan, 2016–2025. Malé.
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Maldives’ vulnerability to climate change is heightened by limited socioeconomic
and technological capacities (footnote 108).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
In its nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement,
Maldives pledges an unconditional 10% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030
from business as usual (BAU) levels (footnote 108). Maldives pledges as much as
a 24% reduction by 2030, conditional upon financial support, capacity building,
and technology transfer. However, given Maldives’ minimal contribution to
global emissions, the NDC focuses on adaptation including enhancing food and
water security, increasing infrastructure resilience and coastal protection, and
addressing climate impacts on public health, tourism, and fisheries.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
In its climate action, Maldives is prioritizing adaptation and low-emission development
(footnote 108). Given Maldives’ limited financial resources, capacity, and technology,
its climate initiatives also focus on increasing access to support in these areas
(footnote 108). In 2015, the Ministry of Environment and Energy launched the
Climate Change Policy Framework (Climate Framework) to foster and guide a
national climate action.110 The Climate Framework seeks to mainstream climate change
by integrating the following principles into national lawmaking and development
planning: intergenerational equity, climate leadership, international partnership,
international commitments, climate resilience, and transfer of technology (footnote 110).
The Climate Framework includes five main policy targets: (i) increasing
sustainable financial resources; (ii) cementing a low-emissions development
strategy and energy security; (iii) developing stronger adaptation actions and
climate resilience in communities and infrastructure; (iv) establishing a lead role
in global climate change forums as an advocate for most vulnerable countries
and small island developing states; and (v) promoting sustainable development.
The Climate Framework identifies broad strategies to achieve each of the policy
targets. A progress report in its fourth year and a midterm review in its fifth year
are proposed to monitor and evaluate policy targets.
In addition to the Climate Framework, the Climate Change Bill was scheduled for
submission to Parliament in 2017. The bill will address the adverse impacts of climate
change, provide enforcement mechanisms, and facilitate Maldives’ compliance with
the international environmental conventions and protocols to which it is a party. The
Ministry of Environment and Energy, the body responsible for drafting the Climate
Change Bill, had not submitted the document at the time of writing.
110

Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2015. Climate Change Policy
Framework. Malé.
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In 2009, the Maldives Climate Change Trust Fund was established to support
a climate-resilient economy and society.111 The fund is managed by the World
Bank and supports low-carbon development through mitigation and adaptation
activities (footnote 111). The European Union and the Australian government
pledged $10.3 million to the first phase of the fund (footnote 111). Three
projects have been implemented thus far: Wetlands Conservation and Coral
Reef Monitoring for Adaptation to Climate Change, Clean Energy for Climate
Mitigation, and Ari Atoll Solid Waste Management (a pilot project) (footnote 111).
The wetlands project supports community-based wetland management,
rainwater harvesting, coral reef monitoring, and capacity building within
local government.112 The clean energy project increases solar energy, energy
conservation, and technical assistance related to renewable energy uptake.113
The waste management project supports the development of an island-level
integrated solid waste management system and residual waste transfer system for
off-island disposal on Ari Atoll.114
In 2015, the government initiated the second phase of the fund to support the Climate
Change Adaptation Project, which was funded by the European Union.115 The project
supports two southernmost atolls in undertaking an integrated approach to responding
to climate risks, particularly the measures related to flood management, wetland
management, biodiversity conservation, and integrated solid waste management.
Table 4.5 summarizes Maldives’ climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Imported petroleum fuels supply most of the energy in Maldives.116 In 2017,
Maldives imported 561,435 metric tons of fuel (footnote 116). The majority of
this fuel was diesel (80%), with petrol (10%), aviation gas (7%), and cooking gas
(3%) also contributing to the energy supply mix (footnote 116). Diesel supports
power generation and transportation by both the state power utility and private
generators throughout the outer islands. Maldives has 11 megawatts (MW) of the
total installed capacity of renewable energy (footnote 116).
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Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2014. Social Assessment and
Management Framework (Resettlement Policy Framework): Climate Change Adaptation Project.
Malé. 26 November.
World Bank. Wetlands Conservation and Coral Reef Monitoring for Adaptation to Climate
Change; and World Bank. 2015. Implementation Completion and Results Report: Wetland
Conservation and Coral Reef Monitoring for Adaptation to Climate Change Project in Maldives.
World Bank. 2015. Implementation Completion and Results Report: Clean Energy for Climate
Mitigation Project in Maldives.
World Bank. 2012. Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet: Ari Atoll Solid Waste Management Pilot
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World Bank. 2015. International Development Association Project Appraisal Document: Climate
Change Adaptation Project (CCAP) in Maldives. 7 May.
Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2018. Island Electricity Data Book
2018. Malé.
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Table 4.5: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Maldives
Constitution of the Republic of Maldives, 2008
Maldives National Strategy for Sustainable Development, 2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Climate Change Policy Framework, 2015
Climate Change Trust Fund, 2009

Energy

Maldives National Energy Policy and Strategy,
2016
Maldives National Energy Policy & Strategy, 2010

Food production and
food security

National Food Safety Policy (2017–2026), 2017

Disaster risk
management

Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster
Risk Reduction and Climate Change
Adaptation 2010–2020, 2010
National Adaptation Programme of Action, 2006

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
(2016–2025), 2015

Acts

Environmental Protection and
Preservation Act of Maldives, 1993

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
In 2010, the Ministry of Housing and Environment launched the National Energy
Policy and Strategy (2010 Energy Policy), creating a national policy framework
for energy.117 The 2010 Energy Policy explains that the goal to become carbon
neutral—including in the energy sector—by 2020 depends on three factors: the
dependence on foreign fuel; the threat of climate change; and the need to provide
reliable, sustainable, and affordable energy to all citizens. It designates (i) the
Climate Change and Energy Department within the Ministry of Housing and
Environment as the lead agency of the energy sector, and (ii) the Maldives Energy
Authority as the regulatory body.
To achieve carbon neutrality in the energy sector by 2020, the 2010 Energy Policy
outlines key strategies:

117

Government of Maldives, Ministry of Housing and Environment. 2010. Maldives National Energy
Policy and Strategy. Malé.
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(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

develop and implement energy use forecasts;
create and manage targets to reach carbon neutrality in the energy sector;
promote research and development of carbon capture and storage;
prioritize compliance of energy industries with environmental and
safety standards;
establish an environmental division in all of the energy sector utilities
to facilitate compliance with the Environmental Protection and
Preservation Act, 1993;
use disincentives and incentives to encourage demand- and
supply-side energy efficiency;
use incentives to encourage greater use of electric vehicles and
establish renewable charging stations;
promote indigenous renewable sources of energy through research
and development, technology transfer, and concessionary external
financing; and
strengthen the legal and institutional framework of the energy sector.

The 2010 Energy Policy also sets guiding principles that emphasize universal and
equitable access to electricity, energy efficiency and conservation, low-carbon
technologies and lifestyles, private sector involvement, and renewable technologies
and local resources as an alternative to foreign fossil fuel dependence.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
The Ministry of Housing and Environment revised the 2010 Energy Policy,
launching the 2016 Energy Policy and Strategy (2016 Energy Policy).118 The
2016 Energy Policy distills the nine focus areas of the 2010 policy into five:
(i) strengthening regulations and institutions in the energy sector, (ii) promoting
energy efficiency and conservation, (iii) increasing renewable energy use,
(iv) improving the sustainability and reliability of electricity provision and ensuring
electricity access, and (v) increasing energy security.
The 2016 Energy Policy acknowledges the challenges of transitioning to renewable
energy due to the projected growth of annual electricity demand (8.5% per year)
and the fragmented nature of electricity generation and distribution facilities (each
island has its own). In the short term, the 2016 Energy Policy sets a goal to produce
at least 30% of daytime peak-load of electricity from renewable energy sources on all
inhabited islands by 2018. One of the Energy Policy’s strategies for increasing energy
efficiency is the enforcement of emissions standards for point-source polluters.119
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Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2016. Maldives Energy Policy and
Strategy, 2016. Malé.
Footnote 118, p. 19, Strategy 2.07.
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D. Energy Demand
Maldives realized universal access to electricity by 2008.120 Almost 57% of all
electricity generated supplies the greater Malé region—Malé, Villingili, and
Hulhumalé (footnote 120). In 2018, the region had an installed capacity of
101 MW and consumed about 400 gigawatt-hours (GWh), the nation’s highest
electricity consumption (footnote 120). Electricity consumption in the outer
islands was 304 GWh in 2017 (footnote 120). Maldives is experiencing increased
electricity demand, with growth projected at 8.5% per annum (footnote 118). The
2016 Energy Policy includes goals to increase energy efficiency and conservation.

E.

Transportation

Transport accounts for approximately a quarter of GHG emissions.121 These emissions,
however, are rapidly increasing. For example, there was a 295% increase in vehicle
registrations from 2007 to 2014 (footnote 121). Given this context, the government
drafted the Low Carbon Strategy for the Transport Sector in 2014 (Transport Strategy)
(footnote 121). The Transport Strategy aims to mitigate GHG emissions from
transport through various measures including promoting eco-sensitive driving behavior,
fostering low-carbon technology for aircraft and other vessels, and establishing energyefficient infrastructure and reengineered roads for low-carbon transport.
The Transport Strategy also recommends that laws and regulations governing
low-carbon transport should be implemented in the short term. In the long term,
the Transport Strategy recommends establishing a sustainable financing mechanism
in conjunction with subsidies or other fiscal mechanisms to support a low-carbon
transport sector. The Transport Strategy was also made available for public comment.
.

F.

Adaptation

Maldives is highly committed to adaptation and dedicated a significant portion
of its NDC to adaptation measures (footnote 108). The NDC sets the following
adaptation priorities:
(i)
(ii)

120

121

enhancing food security through climate risk insurance for farmers,
food storage and distribution facilities, and alternative technologies to
build more resilient local agriculture;
building infrastructure resilience through coastal protection for airports,
relocating the Malé commercial port to another island, climate proofing
all critical infrastructures, and establishing the National Building
Code and the National Development Act that integrates climate- and
weather-related concerns into relevant planning;

Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2018. Island Electricity Data Book
2018. Malé. p. 10.
Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment and Energy. 2014. Low Carbon Strategy for the
Transport Sector. Malé.
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(iii) protecting public health through vector surveillance and control programs;
(iv) enhancing water security through the Integrated Water Resource
Management Schemes, which include rainwater harvesting,
desalinization, and groundwater recharging;
(v) enhancing coastal protection through shore protection and
reclamation and land elevation;
(vi) safeguarding coral reefs and their biodiversity through an ecosystem
approach to conservation and a reduction of local pollution sources;
(vii) protecting tourism through an insurance mechanism and a
“green tax” (a tax on environmentally harmful activities) to fund
environmental management;
(viii) supporting fisheries through diversification, access to financing for
agriculture, and a stronger insurance mechanism;
(ix) improving early warning systems and climate forecasting;
(x) securing sustainable financing; and
(xi) improving climate governance through national adaptation plans,
passing a climate change law, and continuing to build domestic capacity.
The government also prepared the National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) to present a comprehensive framework for adaptation.122 The NAPA
aims to enhance the resilience of natural, human, and social systems in the face
of adverse climate impacts. It also acknowledges that adaptation is a priority for
Maldives and other low-lying island states.
Recognizing the impact of climate change on national food security, the Ministry
of Health prepared the National Food Safety Policy, 2017–2026.123 The policy
contains four policy goals including strengthening the food chain to ensure
the safety, health, and quality of food. In 2016, the government released the
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, 2016–2025 to enhance climate
resilience of coral reefs, wetlands, mangroves, and other vulnerable ecosystems
(footnote 109).

G. Disaster Risk Management
The Strategic National Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate
Change Adaptation was implemented in 2010, recognizing the severe risk that
sea level rise poses to Maldives.124 It seeks to create a more integrated approach
to disaster risk reduction and management and principally aims to address four
strategic areas: good governance, empowering communities, building resilient
communities with sufficient access to resources, and risk-sensitive development.
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Government of Maldives, Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water. 2006. National Adaptation
Programme of Action (NAPA). Malé.
Government of Maldives, Ministry of Health. 2017. National Food Safety Policy (2017–2026). Malé.
Government of Maldives, National Disaster Management Authority. 2010. Strategic National
Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction and Climate Change Adaptation, 2010–2020. Malé.
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VI. Nepal
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Nepal, a landlocked country in South Asia, is a democratic multiparty federal
republic. Its mountainous geography makes it extremely vulnerable to climate
change. Rising temperatures in the Himalayas are resulting in higher volumes of
meltwater runoff, flooding natural dams and causing glacial lake outburst floods
(GLOFs).125 GLOFs endanger downstream communities and those who depend
on fresh water from rivers and streams.126 Nepal has also experienced deadly and
costly landslides and drought.127

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Nepal has actively participated in climate change negotiations under the
UNFCCC and served as chair of the 2013 and 2014 least developed countries
coordination group. Nepal’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to
the Paris Agreement includes a commitment to formulating national adaptation
plans, improving adaptation strategies, and creating the Low Carbon Economic
Development Strategy.128 By 2050, Nepal seeks to achieve 80% renewable
electricity and a 50% reduction in fossil fuel dependence. Additionally, the
government commits to clean energy quotas and aims to maintain as forest no
less than 40% of its total land area. Nepal’s NDC does not include any economywide emissions reduction targets.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Nepal has largely taken a policy-based approach in addressing climate change
and has not yet passed any binding climate legislation.129 The government has
named the Ministry of Forest and Environment as the national authority for
implementing and coordinating Climate Change Policy, 2011.130 Within this
125
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Government of Nepal, Ministry of Population and Environment. 2016. Nationally Determined
Contributions. Kathmandu; and K. Cook et al. 2018. Glacial Lake Outburst Floods as Drivers of
Fluvial Erosion in the Himalaya. Science. 362 (6410). pp. 53–57.
K. Cook et al. 2018. Glacial Lake Outburst Floods as Drivers of Fluvial Erosion in the Himalaya.
Science. 362 (6410). pp. 53–57.
R. Sapkota and K. Rijal. 2016. Climate Change and Its Impacts in Nepal. Kathmandu: Tribhuvan
University.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Population and Environment. 2016. Nationally Determined
Contributions. Kathmandu.
In 2018, the Supreme Court of Nepal directed the government to pass a national climate law.
See Advocate Padam Bahadur Shrestha vs Prime Minister and Office of Council of Ministers and
Others, Case No. 074-WO-0283, Supreme Court of Nepal, 25 December 2018 (2075/09/10 BS).
Footnote 128. The first NDC named the Ministry of Population and Environment as the responsible
ministry, but accountability has since shifted to the Ministry of Forest and Environment.
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ministry, the Climate Change Management Division was established in 2010.131
Additionally, there is the Climate Change Council—led by the Prime Minister—
and the Climate Change Initiatives Coordination Committee, which seeks to
represent national and international nongovernment organizations (NGOs),
the private sector, donors, and other institutions (footnote 128). These entities
are responsible in part for aligning climate change with development activities
(footnote 128).
The Climate Change Policy, 2011 represents Nepal’s primary climate change
document.132 Through sustainable development and environmental conservation,
this policy seeks to limit climate change impacts—including those on agriculture,
water resources, biodiversity and forests, tourism, human health, quality of life,
and infrastructure developments.
The policy’s two main goals are (i) enhancing livelihood opportunities through
mitigation and adaptation measures, and (ii) adopting low-carbon development
while adhering to national and international climate commitments. It also aims to
establish a climate change center to conduct research, provide technical and political
advice to the government, initiate local adaptation actions, and monitor outcomes.
Additionally, the policy provides for the preparation of a strategy for carbon trading
to benefit from the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) as well
as a strategy for low-carbon socioeconomic development. The National Framework
on Local Adaptation Plans for Action133 and the National Adaptation Programme of
Action (NAPA) to Climate Change134 support policy implementation.
Nepal has integrated its Climate Change Policy, 2011 into development
planning. For example, the Nature Conservation National Strategic Framework
for Sustainable Development, 2015–2030 aims to promote climate change
awareness, ecosystem services payments, and value additions for renewable
energy, and to implement the Climate Change Policy, 2011.135
Table 4.6 summarizes Nepal’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Primary energy supply in Nepal in 2014 includes biomass (80%), oil products
(12%), coal (4%), hydro (3%), and electricity (1%).136
131

132
133

134

135

136

Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Environment. Climate Change Management
Division.
Government of Nepal. 2011. Climate Change Policy, 2011. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Environment. 2011. National Framework on Local Adaptation
Plans for Action. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Environment. 2010. National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) to Climate Change. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, National Planning Commission. 2015. Nature Conservation National
Strategic Framework for Sustainable Development (2015–2030). Kathmandu.
Asian Development Bank. 2017. Nepal Energy Sector Assessment, Strategy, and Road Map. Manila;
World Bank. GDP Growth (Annual %)—Nepal (accessed 19 December 2019).
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Table 4.6: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Nepal
Constitution of Nepal, 2015
14th National Plan (2016/17–2018/19)
Nature Conservation National Strategic Framework for
Sustainable Development (2015–2030), 2015
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Climate Change Policy, 2011
National Framework on Local Adaptation Plans
for Action, 2011
National Adaptation Programme of Action
(NAPA) to Climate Change, 2010

Energy

Biomass Energy Strategy, 2017
Renewable Energy Subsidy Policy, 2016
National Rural and Renewable
Energy Programme, 2012
20-Years Hydro-Electricity Development
Agenda, 2009
Rural Energy Policy, 2006
The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001

LULUCF and REDD+

Nepal National REDD+ Strategy, 2018
Forestry Sector Strategy (2016–2025), 2016
Forest Policy, 2015
National Wetlands Policy, 2012
National Ramsar Strategy and Action Plan
(2018–2024), 2018

Transportation

Environment Friendly Vehicles and
Transportation Policy, 2013

Food production and
food security

Agriculture Development Strategy 2015 to 2035,
2014
Priority Framework for Action: Climate Change
Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management in
Agriculture 2011–2020, 2011

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

Irrigation Policy, 2013
The National Water Plan, 2005

Acts

continued on next page
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Table 4.6 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

National Urban Development Strategy,
2017 (Part A, and B)

Cities and buildings

Industrial Enterprises Act, 2020
(English Summary)

Industry
Disaster risk
management

National Disaster Response Framework, 2013
National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management
in Nepal, 2008
National Disaster Risk Reduction Strategic
Action Plan (2018–2030), 2018

Disaster Risk Mitigation and
Management Act, 2017

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
2014–2020, 2014
Environment-Friendly Local Governance
Framework, 2013

Local Government Operation
Act, 2017

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

1. Renewable Energy Policies
The current renewable energy capacity in Nepal is high. Solar grid potential has
been estimated at 2,100 megawatts (MW), and wind potential at 3,000 MW.137
The government’s policy approach encourages the uptake of renewable
and alternative energy sources. Specifically, the 20-Years Hydro-Electricity
Development Agenda of 2009 aims to develop 10,000 MW of hydropower
within 10 years to further diversify energy supply.138 This development agenda
expressly recognizes that Nepal has experienced the effects of climate change.
The Hydropower Development Policy, 2001 outlines hydropower development
and export strategies including the provision of rural electricity.139 More recent
policies include the Biomass Energy Strategy 2017 and the Renewable Energy
Subsidy Policy, 2016.140 Ultimately, all policies seek to contribute to environmental
protection by increasing alternative and renewable energy sources.
Energy policies also prioritize rural electricity access, as 80% of Nepal’s
population is rural.141 For example, the National Rural Renewable Energy Program
137

138
139

140

141

S. Ghimire and Z. Naeen. 2017. Renewable Energy: Huge Potentials. The Himalayan Times.
6 October.
Government of Nepal. 2009. 20-Years Hydro-Electricity Development Agenda. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Water Resources. 2001. The Hydropower Development Policy,
2001. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Population and Environment. 2017. Biomass Energy Strategy
2017. Kathmandu; Government of Nepal, Ministry of Population and Environment. 2016.
Renewable Energy Subsidy Policy, 2073 BS. Kathmandu.
World Bank. Rural Population (% of Total Population)—Nepal (accessed 19 December 2019).
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(NRREP) of 2012 seeks to improve living standards, increase employment and
productivity, decrease energy dependency, and attain sustainable development.142
The NRREP plans to accomplish these tasks by integrating alternative energy
sources into rural communities’ socioeconomic activities. It emphasizes poverty
reduction as well as enhancing technical support and business development to
deploy renewable energy in rural areas. The Central Renewable Energy Fund is the
NRREP’s main financial institution.
Predating the NRREP, the Rural Energy Policy, 2006 aimed to increase rural
energy security and decrease fossil fuel dependence by promoting biogas, solar
energy, wind energy, cleaner cookstoves, and better water mill technology.143

D. LULUCF and REDD+
Forest degradation and deforestation occur at high rates in Nepal due to
overharvesting, high forest dependency, poverty, challenges of effective
governance, and a desire for agricultural expansion.144 The forestry-related policy
generally emphasizes community-based, decentralized forest management
(footnote 144).
The Ministry of Forests and Environment is responsible for implementing the
National REDD+ Strategy of Nepal of 2018.145 The ministry established a specific
REDD+ department, which is responsible for forest conservation efforts, modern
farming development, and biodiversity protection. The National REDD+ Strategy
of Nepal seeks “to strengthen the resilience of forest ecosystems for emission
reductions and [increase] environmental, social, and economic benefits through
improved policies, measures and institutions with enhanced stakeholder capacity,
capability and inclusiveness.” 146
Major activities include the (i) application of community forestry, (ii) increase
in in-situ ecosystem conservation, (iii) expansion of watershed management
services and soil conservation, and (iv) implementation of awareness campaigns.
Community forestry is especially highlighted. The National REDD+ Strategy calls
for climate change vulnerability assessments in forest ecosystems as well as linkages
between land use planning and climate change. It also provides climate change
mitigation actions through payment mechanisms and an emphasis on education.

142

143
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Government of Nepal. 2012. Project Document: Renewable Energy for Rural Livelihoods (RERL).
Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Environment. 2006. Rural Energy Policy, 2006. Kathmandu.
N. Paudel et al. 2013. The Context of REDD+ in Nepal: Drivers, Agents and Institutions. Occasional
Paper. No. 81. Bogor, Indonesia: Center for International Forestry Research.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Environment. 2018. Nepal National REDD+
Strategy. Kathmandu. REDD+ means reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Environment. 2018. Nepal National REDD+
Strategy. Kathmandu. p. 15.
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Additionally, the Forestry Sector Strategy, 2016–2025 outlines forestry sector
development in Nepal to sustainably manage biodiversity, forest ecosystems,
and watersheds.147 Its principles include the promotion of a decentralized,
inclusive, well-governed, and competitive forestry sector that provides equitable
opportunities for livelihood and income. The strategy’s major thematic areas include
forest management, ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation, climate
change response (through resilience and mitigation), watershed management,
economic development, capacity enhancement, and information management.
The government issued the Forest Sector Strategy of 2016–2025 after the
Forest Policy of Nepal, 2015, which emphasizes forest protection.148 The
Forestry Sector Strategy prescribes various policies including plans to increase
local capacity to respond to climate change through resilience, adaptation, and
mitigation. It prioritizes optimum land use and technology access, and focuses on
implementing climate-friendly forest management and improving food security,
water disaster control, technological development, agenda creation, and research.

E.

Agriculture

Agriculture and food security represent a major component of Nepal’s climate
policy. Over half the population directly engages in farming, while agriculture
comprises more than one-third of the gross domestic product (GDP).149 The
Constitution of Nepal, which has provisions for environmental protection,
outlines agriculture and land reform mandates.
Most recently, the Agriculture Development Strategy (ADS) of 2015–2035
has sought to shape food- and farming-related decisions in Nepal.150 Drafted
by the Ministry of Agricultural Development in coordination with the National
Peasants’ Coalition, the ADS provides an action plan and road map toward
achieving four major targets: productivity, good governance, competitiveness,
and commercialization. In attaining these goals, the ADS promotes inclusivity,
sustainability, economic development, and infrastructure connectivity. Expected
results include increases in food security, trade competitiveness, prosperity, and
farmers’ rights.
The ADS also contains specific provisions on climate change resilience, including
(i) researching stress-tolerant crop, fish, and livestock varieties that also have high
yields; (ii) developing an early warning system specifically for food security; and
(iii) establishing weather indices and climate information systems for farmers.
147
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Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation. 2016. Forestry Sector Strategy
(2016–2025). Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation. 2015. Forest Policy of Nepal of
2015. Kathmandu.
S. Bhusal. 2019. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change and the Climate Change
Adaptations—A Nepalese Context Review. Acta Scientific Agriculture. 3 (7). pp. 234–238.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agricultural Development. 2016. Agricultural Development
Strategy (ADS) 2015 to 2035. Kathmandu.

SOUTH ASIA LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

In 2011, the Priority Framework for Action, 2011–2020 set sector-wide goals for
agricultural changes in Nepal.151
Agricultural concerns are also embedded in prominent multisector policies,
including the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, 2014–2020;152
the National Water Plan, 2005;153 and the Climate Change Policy, 2011
(footnote 132).

F.

Water

Climate change is exacerbating drought and flooding in Nepal.154 The National
Water Plan, 2005—a multisector strategic document—covers all major waterrelated sectors such as fisheries, hydroelectric power, tourism, and agriculture.
Specific goals of the plan include improving data dissemination, increasing
the number of rainfall stations, equipping the stations with telemetry systems
to assist in flood and weather forecasting, and expanding the Department of
Hydrology and Meteorology station’s network to meet the standards of the World
Meteorology Organization.
Furthermore, the 2013 Irrigation Policy specifically targets the planning and
management of seasonal rain for year-round irrigation.155 This policy advocates
for measures such as rainwater harvesting and underground water development.
It also dictates that climate change and disaster risk management must be
integrated for effective climate change adaptation and mitigation, and that all
irrigation systems must be sustainable.

G. Adaptation
Nepal has begun to integrate climate resiliency into development planning.
For example, the Climate Change Policy, 2011 and the NAPA highlight climate
resiliency as a means to decrease vulnerability to climate change (footnote 134).
The Nepal Climate Change Support Programme focused on climate change
adaptation in vulnerable communities.156 During its first phase, the program
designed local adaptation plans for 100 vulnerable villages in 14 districts and
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Government of Nepal, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 2011. Climate Change
Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management in Agriculture: Priority Framework for Action, 2011–2020.
Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation. 2014. Nepal National
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, 2014–2020. Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Water and Energy Commission. 2005. National Water Plan Nepal.
Kathmandu.
M. Karki, P. Mool, and A. Shrestha. 2009. Climate Change and Its Increasing Impacts in Nepal.
The Initiation. 3. pp. 30–37.
Government of Nepal, Water and Energy Commission. 2013. Irrigation Policy. Kathmandu.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Nepal. Nepal Climate Change Support
Programme (NCCSP).
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aimed to implement local action plans in each district.157 The government and
international donors extended the program, implementing climate resilient
development projects with 26 local governments (footnote 157). Of the
program’s 78 projects, 66 were implemented by local users’ committees
(footnote 157).

H. Disaster Risk Management
The Disaster Risk Mitigation and Management Act, 2017 is a climate changerelated piece of legislation that repealed and replaced the Natural Calamity
Relief Act, 1982. Specifically, it established the Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Council to increase cooperation among local and national
authorities. Priority areas include the protection of both private and public
property, public life, cultural and national heritages, and those at risk from
disasters such as flooding, earthquakes, and landslides. The act also addresses
issues related to land use and river control.
Examples of disaster risk management policies are the National Disaster Response
Framework of 2013158 and the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management,
2009.159 Published by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the framework facilitates
efficiency and coordination to improve large-scale disaster response. It addresses
actions taken before, during, and after the disasters; the maintenance of law
and order; the care for vulnerable people; and the protection of public property
(footnote 158). It extends to national, regional, district, and local governments.

VII. Pakistan
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Pakistan is a federal parliamentary republic in South Asia. It has faced extreme
weather events, including droughts, floods, cyclones, heat waves, and glacial lake
outbursts, weakening property, livelihoods, and economic growth.160 Climate
change projections predict average temperature warming in the region to
exceed the global mean, affecting the timing and strength of monsoon rainfall
(footnote 160). As of 2015, Pakistan ranked 135th in the world on per capita
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 31st on total GHG emissions (footnote 160).
Climate change is expected to significantly impact water-dependent sectors such
as agriculture and industry (footnote 160).
157

158

159

160

UNDP. 2019. Nepal Climate Change Support Programme 1—Transition Extension. Kathmandu:
UNDP.
Government of Nepal, Ministry of Home Affairs. 2013. National Disaster Response Framework
(NDRF). Kathmandu.
Government of Nepal, Ministry for Home Affairs. 2009. National Strategy for Disaster Risk
Management, 2009. Kathmandu.
ADB. 2017. Climate Change Profile of Pakistan. Manila.
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B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Pakistan’s first nationally determined contribution arose from its development vision
outlined in Pakistan 2025: One Nation, One Vision (Pakistan 2025).161 Pakistan
pledges to reduce as much as 20% of its projected GHG emissions by 2030,
conditional upon international grant availability. Pakistan also aims to increase forest
cover from 6% to 10% by 2030, including through large-scale tree plantation programs.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Pakistan employs a combination of legislation and policies to address climate
change. Most recently, the government passed the Climate Change Act, 2017
to meet Pakistan’s international climate obligations and ensure the adoption of
effective adaptation and mitigation policies and programs. The act created the
Pakistan Climate Change Council, led by the Prime Minister, which is responsible
for all climate-related tasks. Specifically, the council’s roles include
(i)
(ii)

supervising and coordinating enforcement;
overseeing the implementation of international agreements that
concern climate change;
(iii) facilitating the integration of climate change-related concerns into
governmental decision-making;
(iv) approving and monitoring the implementation of policies surrounding
mitigation and adaptation, including those in relation to the
Sustainable Development Goals;
(v) monitoring the implementation of Pakistan’s National Adaptation
Plan, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Framework, and
National Communication to the UNFCCC Secretariat; and
(vi) overseeing guidelines surrounding biodiversity, habitat, and resource
protection.
The Climate Change Act, 2017 also established the Pakistan Climate Change
Authority to develop climate-related policies and projects and advise the government
on how to implement Pakistan’s international climate change obligations.
Another cornerstone climate document is the National Climate Change
Policy of 2012.162 It seeks “to ensure that climate change is mainstreamed in
the economically and socially vulnerable sectors of the economy and to steer
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Government of Pakistan. 2016. Pakistan’s First Nationally Determined Contribution. Islamabad;
and Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform (Planning
Commission). 2014. Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision. Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Environment. 2012. National Climate Change Policy.
Islamabad.
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Pakistan towards climate-resilient development.” 163 The Ministry of Environment
developed the policy in collaboration with various federal institutions, provinces,
and civil society.
The policy established climate change policy implementation committees at
the federal and provincial levels to build greater cohesion in national climate
responses (footnote 160). Chaired by the federal minister of climate change, the
national committee meets biannually and is mandated to update the climate
change policy every 5 years (although the policy has not been updated since its
first iteration in 2012). The national committee reports to the Prime Minister’s
Committee on Climate Change, the overarching body for climate change
monitoring (footnote 160).
Subsequently, the government adopted the Framework for Implementation of
Climate Change Policy, 2014–2030 (Implementation Framework) to build on the
National Climate Change Policy by establishing and scheduling priority actions in
targeted sectors.164 Intended to be a catalyst for mainstreaming climate change
into government decisions, the Implementation Framework acknowledges that
Pakistan is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change, especially
extreme events. The Implementation Framework thus focuses on adaptation
across vulnerable ecosystems and various sectors including water, agriculture,
forestry, coastal areas, biodiversity, and health.
Affirming Pakistan’s role in limiting average global temperature increase—though
its contribution to GHG emissions is small—the Implementation Framework
outlines “mitigation efforts in sectors such as energy, forestry, transport,
industries, urban planning, agriculture and livestock.” 165 Finally, the framework
includes actions concerning disaster preparedness.
Development plans also address climate change as a cross-cutting issue. Created
in 2014, Pakistan 2025 is a multisector national development plan, recognizing
that climate change is a threat to development and that adaptation and mitigation
are necessary to sustain growth.166 Pakistan 2025 outlines 25 goals to meet the
Sustainable Development Goals and the Millennium Development Goals by
2030. Goals related to climate change include doubling the generation of power
to exceed 45,000 megawatts (MW), increasing electricity access from 67% to
90% of the population, increasing the generation mix to 15%, and decreasing
distribution losses to 10% (footnote 166). Additionally, Pakistan 2025 contains
targets for indigenous power generation, increasing energy efficiency in appliances
and products, increasing water storage capacity, improving agricultural water use
efficiency, providing clean drinking water, and decreasing food insecurity.
163
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Footnote 162, p. 1.
Government of Pakistan, Climate Change Division. 2013. Framework for Implementation of
Climate Change Policy (2014–2030). Islamabad.
Footnote 164, p. 1.
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform (Planning Commission).
2014. Pakistan 2025: One Nation – One Vision. Islamabad.
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The National Sustainable Development Strategy of 2012 is another development
document that addresses climate change, defining sustainable development
and the pathway to a green economy.167 It sets an overarching goal of achieving
“a vibrant and equitable economic growth” with benefits for all, especially
the vulnerable and the poor.168 Furthermore, the strategy calls for economic
growth that avoids degradation and excessive exploitation of natural resources.
Recognizing that climate change may undermine future planning for sustainable
development, the strategy created the National Climate Change Policy and the
National Climate Change Fund.
Table 4.7 summarizes Pakistan’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 4.7: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Pakistan
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
Pakistan 2025: One Nation, One Vision, 2014
National Sustainable Development Strategy: Pakistan’s
Pathway to a Sustainable and Resilient Future, 2012
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies/Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Framework for the Implementation of
Climate Change Policy, 2014-2030,
2013
National Climate Change Policy, 2012

Pakistan Climate Change Act, 2017
Global Change Impact Studies Centre
Act, 2013

Energy

National Power Policy, 2013

National Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Act, 2016
The Alternative Energy Development
Board Act, 2010
The Pakistan Council of Renewable
Technologies Act, 2016

LULUCF and REDD+

National Forest Policy, 2015
National Rangeland Policy, 2010 (draft)

Food production and
food security

National Food Security Policy, 2018
continued on next page

167

168

M. A. Khan and A. Pervaiz. 2012. National Sustainable Development Strategy: Pakistan’s Pathway
to a Sustainable and Resilient Future. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan. p. 7.
Footnote 167, p. 6.
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Table 4.7 continued

Area

Policies/Strategies

Water resources and
coastal zone management

National Water Policy, 2018

Vulnerable groups

National Policy Guidelines on
Vulnerable Groups in Disasters, 2014

Disaster risk management

Disaster Management Strategy,
2015–2020, 2015
National Disaster Risk Reduction
Policy, 2013
National Disaster Risk Management
Framework, 2007

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan, 2017–2030

Acts

The National Disaster Management
Act, 2010

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
As of 2018, Pakistan’s primary sources of energy were 33% biofuels and waste,
26% natural gas, 26% oil, 10% coal, 3% hydropower, and 2% nuclear energy.169
The household sector uses the largest share of electricity in Pakistan, consuming
51% of all electricity in 2018.170 Pakistan is a net energy importer, importing
44.2 megatons of oil equivalent in 2018.171
The National Power Policy, 2013 was developed by the Ministry of Water and
Power to establish an overarching energy policy.172 The policy identifies challenges
to power provision, such as the current and increasing gap between demand
and supply, the high price of electricity due to reliance on thermal fuel, energy
inefficiency attributable to power cuts, circular debt and subsidies caused by
energy inefficiency, high generation costs, and energy theft.
The policy aims to increase energy conservation, generate power sustainably,
supply energy affordably, and promote good governance. It sets five specific
targets: (i) eliminate the gap between demand and supply no later than 2017,
(ii) reduce generation costs through the use of indigenous resources, (iii) reduce
losses from distribution and transmission, (iv) increase the payment rate of
electricity, and (v) reduce the processing time for decision-making. The policy
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International Energy Agency (IEA). 2018. Pakistan: Total Energy Supply by Source (accessed
19 September 2020).
IEA. 2018. Pakistan: Electricity Final Consumption By Sector (accessed 19 September 2020).
IEA. 2018. Pakistan: Net Energy Imports (accessed 19 September 2020).
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water and Power. 2013. National Power Policy, 2013. Islamabad.
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also aims to cut transmission and distribution losses to 16% by 2017 from an
undated baseline of 23%–25%.
To further renewable energy promotion, the Alternative Energy Development
Board Act established the Alternative Energy Development Board (board)
in 2010. The act recognizes that increasing the adoption of alternative and
renewable energy sources will support sustainable economic growth. It also
establishes the Alternative Energy Fund to carry out board functions.
The board is an independent body with a mandate to facilitate an increase in
alternative or renewable energy by (i) developing national plans, strategies,
and policies to promote renewable and other alternative energy sources;
(ii) monitoring, certifying, and evaluating renewable and other alternative energy
products and projects; (iii) coordinating the commercialization of renewable
and other alternative energy technologies; and (iv) facilitating the generation of
energy by renewable and other alternative energy technologies.
The board partnered with the World Bank to initiate the Renewable Energy
Resource Mapping Project in 2014.173 This project contains three phases, ultimately
seeking to produce validated wind and solar resource atlases (footnote 173).
Atlases are intended to be used for renewable energy development guidance and
tariff-setting.
In 2010, the Pakistan Council of Renewable Technologies Act was passed to
establish the Pakistan Council of Renewable Energy Technologies, which aims to
build an institutional structure for renewable energy use. The act tasks the council
with the following functions related to renewable energy:
(i)

acquisition, development, and dissemination of processes and
techniques that help promote alternative and renewable energy
technology, including that of solar, photovoltaic, hydrogen, thermal,
biomass, and wind;
(ii) development of technologies needed in renewable and other
alternative energy fields;
(iii) facilitation of research and development for renewable and other
alternative energy technologies;
(iv) expansion of education and training opportunities for renewable and
other alternative energy technologies;
(v) organization of events including workshops and conferences to
facilitate renewable energy adoption; and
(vi) coordination with international and national organizations.

173

Government of Pakistan, Alternative Energy Development Board. International Cooperation:
World Bank.
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D. Energy Demand
The National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, 2016 replaces the Pakistan
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act, 2011. The act defines the federal
government’s role in facilitating energy conservation through measures such as
issuing certificates for energy saving, drafting building codes, and establishing the
Energy Conservation Fund. The act also establishes other entities: the National
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority, the National Energy Efficiency and
Conservation Board, and the Authority Fund.
Supervised by the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Board,
the National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority has various
responsibilities: (i) serving as the lead facilitator of energy conservation programs
in all economic sectors, (ii) drafting and updating the policy on national energy
conservation for the board, (iii) engaging in energy auditing, and (iv) creating
research programming and demonstrations.

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Forest cover in Pakistan is decreasing at 1.66% per year and currently measures
only 2.2% (or about 4.55 million hectares) of land.174 The National Forest Policy
of 2010 aims to restore degraded and deforested areas and improve existing
forests.175 Updated in 2015, the policy seeks to increase public awareness,
reduce Pakistan’s carbon footprint, establish protected areas, and implement
mass afforestation program.176 It also guides the implementation of international
agreements on biodiversity, climate change, and forestry.
Pakistan 2025 aims to prevent deforestation (footnote 166). Specifically, it aims
for a 6% forest cover increase by 2030 through a combination of heightened
awareness, societal pressure on law enforcement, planting campaigns, and
improved management of watersheds.

F.

Transportation

Pakistan 2025 estimates that transportation-related inefficiencies have cost
4%–6% of national gross domestic product (GDP). Major initiatives to increase
efficiency and integration of the transport system include replacing and
doubling railway tracks, constructing major new motorways, implementing new
locomotives and railway carriages, increasing efficiency in customs and port
handling, increasing the number of functional airports, modernizing truck fleets,
and implementing mass transit options in urban areas.

174
175
176

C.I. Ali. 2018. Forests (An Assets): Situation in Pakistan. Technology Times. 17 December.
Government of Pakistan. 2010. National Forest Policy. Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Climate Change. 2015. National Forest Policy, 2015.
Islamabad.
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The National Sustainable Development Strategy also aims to increase sustainability
in transportation. The Implementation Framework plans to mitigate transportcaused GHG emissions by increasing the number of vehicle maintenance service
centers, establishing vehicle emissions testing, and increasing the use of biofuels.

G. Adaptation
As water-dependent sectors are expected to become significantly impacted by
the effects of climate change, recent sector-specific policies have also prioritized
adaptation (footnote 160). The National Food Security Policy of 2018 seeks
to adapt to climate change and ensure climate resiliency in food production.177
On agriculture, the policy outlines a strategic framework with specific policy
imperatives such as promoting alternative crops and developing fortified cultivars.
The National Water Policy of 2018, to make it easier to adapt to climate change,
facilitate the expansion of water availability, enhance the quality and availability
of fresh water, improve water management in urban areas, address demands for
drinking water, advocate for behavioral change, and invest in the development of
hydropower to increase renewable energy.178
In terms of broader policies and multisector strategies, the National Climate
Change Policy maintains a focus on adaptation, with adaptation measures
for agriculture, water resources, coastal areas, forestry, and biodiversity
(footnote 162). The policy also commits to gender- and poverty-sensitive
adaptation. Given climate change vulnerability, the degradation of ecosystems,
and high rural poverty levels in Pakistan, adaptation efforts remain a major focus
of Pakistan 2025 and the Implementation Framework.

H. Disaster Risk Management
A major component of Pakistan’s approach to climate change adaptation is
disaster risk management. The National Disaster Management Act, 2010 sets the
groundwork for this approach by establishing the National Disaster Management
Commission, the National Disaster Management Authority, and the National
Disaster Response Force. The Prime Minister chairs the National Disaster
Management Commission, which institutionalizes state response to human-made
and natural disasters. The commission’s major responsibilities include
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

177

178

establishing disaster management policies,
approving the national plan,
approving subsequent plans by government divisions and ministries,
establishing guidelines for provincial authorities and the federal
government,

Government of Pakistan, Ministry of National Food Security and Research. 2018. National Food
Security Policy. Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Water Resources. 2018. National Water Policy. Islamabad.

97

98

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

(v)

providing funding and facilitating the financing of climate change
mitigation and response, and
(vi) taking additional measures deemed necessary for disaster prevention
and mitigation.
The National Disaster Management Authority was established to coordinate
disaster management, prepare the national plan, implement national policy, and
establish guidelines for ministries and provincial authorities.
Subsequently, the National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy was passed in 2013.179
Published by the Ministry of Climate Change, this policy seeks to decrease hazard
vulnerabilities and increase resilience. It provides guidelines for timely hazard
mitigation investment and preparedness in reducing disaster risk and the resulting
damages and costs. Additionally, in 2015, a five-year strategy was passed: the Disaster
Management Strategy 2015–2020, which builds on the 2007 National Disaster
Risk Management Framework.180 Its twofold approach to disaster risk management
constitutes (i) mitigation, prevention, and preparedness; and (ii) reconstruction,
response, and rehabilitation. The disaster management strategy focuses on
strengthening community response by recommending the creation of disaster
management committees and mapping community hazards and vulnerabilities.
Another key policy is the National Policy Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in
Disasters of 2014, which stresses the importance of linking climate change
and disaster preparedness.181 The policy ensures that disaster response is
nondiscriminatory and caters to the needs of vulnerable groups. Additional goals
include increasing participation in disaster management, collecting data on vulnerable
populations, improving accessibility to relief distribution, and providing medical care.

VIII. Sri Lanka
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Sri Lanka, a small island in the Indian Ocean, is a presidential republic. It is highly
vulnerable to a range of adverse climate change effects. Sea level rise threatens
Sri Lanka’s coastal region, with negative repercussions for tourism and fisheries.182
Much of the population and the country’s income from foreign sources depends
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Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Climate Change, National Disaster Management Authority.
2013. National Disaster Risk Reduction Policy. Islamabad.
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund. 2015. Disaster Management Strategy 2015–2020. Islamabad;
and Government of Pakistan, National Disaster Management Authority. 2007. National Disaster
Risk Management Framework. Islamabad.
Government of Pakistan, National Disaster Management Authority. 2014. National Policy
Guidelines on Vulnerable Groups in Disasters. Islamabad.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment. 2016.
Nationally Determined Contributions. Colombo.

SOUTH ASIA LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

on agriculture, which is undermined by extreme weather events like drought and
flood.183 Climate change could also alter critical ecosystem services. Although
Sri Lanka minimally contributes to global GHG emissions, it is committed to both
mitigation and adaptation measures (footnote 182).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
In 2016, the Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment submitted
Sri Lanka’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement
(footnote 182). Sri Lanka’s NDC sets some quantified targets in the energy, transport,
industry, forestry, and waste sectors. First, all sectors have targets to decrease GHG
emissions by 2030 compared with the 2010 business as usual (BAU) scenario: in the
energy sector by 20% (4% unconditionally and 16% conditionally); and in the transport,
industry, forest, and waste sectors by 10% (3% unconditionally and 7% conditionally).
Second, there are sector-specific targets. Sri Lanka aims to increase the share of
renewable energy from 50% to 60% by 2020 by establishing a range of power
plants: 176 megawatts (MW) of mini hydro, 105 MW of biomass, 115 MW of solar,
and 514 MW of large-scale wind. It also plans to reduce unproductive vehicles
by 25% by 2025. A 50% reduction is conditional on support. Furthermore, the
country has a series of targets to meet by 2030: (i) increase forest cover from
29% to 32%, (ii) establish energy-efficient and environmentally sustainable
transport systems, and (iii) develop and implement comprehensive waste
management strategies for 40%–60% of local authorities.
In 2017, the government released its short-term Readiness Plan for Implementation
of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, 2017–2019 to implement its
NDC and meet its emissions targets by 2030.184

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Sri Lanka has taken steps to strengthen its national climate change policy. It
established the Climate Change Secretariat in 2008 to institute government
action on climate change. In 2012, the government launched the country’s key
climate policy—the National Climate Change Policy (Climate Policy).185 The
Climate Policy enacts mitigation and adaptation measures through
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R. Eeswaran. 2018. Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation in the Agriculture Sector of Sri Lanka:
What We Learnt and Way Forward. In W. Leal Filho et al., eds. Handbook of Climate Change
Communication: Vol. 2: Practice of Climate Change Communication. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment, Climate
Change Secretariat. 2016. Readiness Plan for Implementation of Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions (INDCs), 2017–2019. Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Environment and Wildlife Resources, Climate Change
Secretariat. 2012. The National Climate Change Policy of Sri Lanka. Colombo.
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sustainable development. It includes 25 policy statements to address areas of
climate change for Sri Lanka. The core objectives of the Climate Policy are to
(i)

raise awareness of Sri Lanka’s vulnerability to climate change and
build capacity for effective choices;
(ii) improve adaptation measures to minimize adverse impacts on
ecosystems, people, and their livelihoods;
(iii) mitigate GHG emissions;
(iv) encourage sustainable production and consumption;
(v) improve domestic capacity to address climate change impacts; and
(vi) mainstream climate change issues into national development.
The Climate Policy also highlights the need to address climate change in disaster
management, protect human health, encourage resilient food production
technologies, manage water resources effectively, and incorporate low-emission
strategies in land use planning and urban development.
Another climate-related policy, the National Action Plan for Haritha (or Green)
Lanka Programme, 2015–2020, ultimately aims to ensure clean air.186 The
program sets out plans for countering the adverse effects of climate change and
expanding efficient and sustainable energy and power generation. Other targets
include achieving integrated waste management, and water and food security.
The program encourages the use of economically viable renewable energy
resources, carbon sequestration, and land use zoning practices to reach these
goals and reduce vulnerability to climate impacts.
The government has also prepared some documents related to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the
National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change Impacts in Sri Lanka, 2016–2025,187
and the Readiness Plan for Implementation of Intended Nationally Determined
Contributions, 2017–2019 (footnote 184). In 2010, Sri Lanka also conducted
vulnerability assessments on water, health, agriculture, fisheries, urban
development, human settlements, and economic structure.
Table 4.8 summarizes Sri Lanka’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Sri Lanka relies heavily on imported fossil fuels and seeks to provide electricity to
a greater share of its population.188 In 2016, Sri Lanka’s total primary energy supply
186
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188

Government of Sri Lanka, National Council for Sustainable Development. 2009. National Action
Plan for Haritha Lanka Programme. Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment, Climate Change
Secretariat. 2016. National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change Impacts in Sri Lanka, 2016–2025.
Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Power and Energy. 2008. National Energy Policy and
Strategies of Sri Lanka. Colombo.
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Table 4.8: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Sri Lanka
Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka, 1978
Vision 2025, 2017
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Readiness Plan for Implementation of Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions 2017–2019,
2016
Technology Needs Assessment and Technology
Action Plans for Climate Change Mitigation, 2014
National Climate Change Policy of Sri Lanka, 2012
National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for
Sri Lanka, 2011 to 2016, 2010
National Action Plan for Haritha Lanka Program, 2009

Energy

Long Term Generation Expansion Plan 2018–2037, 2018
Sri Lanka Energy Sector Development Plan for a
Knowledge-Based Economy, 2015–2025, 2015
National Energy Policy and Strategies of Sri Lanka, 2008

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

Sri Lanka Coastal Zone and Coastal Resource
Management Plan, 2018
National Rainwater Harvesting Policy and Strategies,
2005
National Wetland Policy and Strategy, 2005

Cities and
buildings

National Physical Planning Policy and Plan 2011–2013,
2010

Waste

National Policy on Solid Waste Management, 2002

Disaster risk
management

Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster
Management Programme, 2014–2018, 2014
National Policy on Disaster Management, 2010

Sri Lanka Disaster
Management Act, No. 13 of
2005

Other

Clean Air 2025, 2016
National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan 2016–2022,
2016
National Environmental Policy and Strategies, 2003

National Insurance Trust Fund
Act, No. 28 of 2006

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy
Authority Act, No. 35 of
2007

Urban Development Authority
(Amendment) Act No. 41
of 1988
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was 11,670 kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe), consisting of oil (45%), biofuel and
waste (40%), coal (12%), and hydro (3%).189 The government has adopted laws
and policies to address the key challenges facing the energy sector—reducing
reliance on imported fossil fuels and decreasing the cost of electricity.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
In 2007, the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority Act was passed. It established
the Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority to develop renewable energy resources,
build energy development areas, advocate for energy security, and improve energy
delivery reliability and affordability. It also aims to establish energy efficiency,
and conservation programs and measures. The Sustainable Energy Authority is
mandated to draft a national energy policy that expands renewable energy use to
improve energy security. It must review applications for on- and off-grid renewable
energy projects, prepare policies and plans to promote renewable resources, and
conduct preliminary investigations and studies to determine renewable potential.
Following the establishment of the energy authority, the government launched
the National Energy Policy and Strategies of Sri Lanka (NEPS) in 2008
(footnote 188). NEPS sets a target of sourcing 38% of electrical energy supply
from renewables and hydro by 2015. Its main goal is to achieve the Millennium
Development Goals by transforming the energy sector. To that end, NEPS seeks
to promote affordable and sustainable renewable energy. Specific initiatives
include expanding access to affordable energy, improving planning in the energy
sector, carrying out regulation and management tasks, and revitalizing biomass for
energy generation. NEPS does not explicitly reference climate change.
The Sri Lanka Energy Sector Development Plan for a Knowledge-Based Economy,
2015–2025 builds on NEPS and recognizes the importance of achieving a cleaner
future through green energy.190 It aims to achieve energy security and independence
by 2030 in a sustainable manner. Accordingly, it aims to produce 60% of the
electricity supply from renewable energy by 2020 and 100% from renewable and
domestic sources by 2030. It also sets the target to reduce electricity network
losses to 8% by 2020 and reduce the energy sector’s carbon footprint by 5%
by 2025 compared with a 2014 baseline. Other energy sector targets include
providing affordable electricity coverage to all people in Sri Lanka and producing
the total petroleum product demand of the country domestically by 2025.
Within the plan’s eight priority areas, two address climate change and sustainability.
First, to expand green energy, the plan highlights (i) maximizing the development
of renewable energy, (ii) establishing a competitive bidding process for large-scale
wind and solar power, (iii) using net metering to promote small renewables,
(iv) integrating climate change and environmental protection into energy
189
190

International Energy Agency. Total Primary Energy Supply by Source Sri Lanka 1990–2016.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Power and Energy. 2015. Sri Lanka Energy Sector
Development Plan for a Knowledge-Based Economy, 2015–2025. Colombo.
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sector development plans, (v) promoting off-grid renewables and biomass, and
(vi) reducing the energy sector’s carbon footprints. Second, the plan promotes
conservation and efficient energy use on demand and supply sides within buildings,
transport, and electricity.

D. Energy Demand
Sri Lanka’s key energy policies also address energy efficiency and conservation.
NEPS, for example, called for the establishment of specific benchmarks for energy
consumption of domestic, transport, and commercial sectors by the end of 2008.
The Sri Lanka Energy Sector Development Plan for a Knowledge-Based Economy,
2015–2025 sets two energy demand goals: (i) reduce petroleum fuel use in
transportation by 5% through efficient modes of transportation and transport
electrification by 2020, and (ii) reduce annual growth in energy demand by 2%
through efficient use and conservation (footnote 190). Clean Air 2025 seeks to
minimize the emission of harmful pollutants.191 To manage air emissions from
the transport sector, the plan creates strategies such as establishing customerfriendly public transport systems, e.g., mass public transportation and green
freight transport system.

E.

Adaptation

The National Adaptation Plan for Climate Change Impacts in Sri Lanka, 2016–2025
was created in line with the guidelines for the development of national adaptation
plans from the UNFCCC (footnote 187). It describes climate change impacts in
Sri Lanka, such as altered rainfall distribution pattern, an increase in severity and
frequency of extreme weather events, and sea level rise. Given these impacts, the
plan aims to build adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability to climate change. It
addresses the adaptation needs of the following nine important sectors and areas:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

water;
coastal and marine sector;
health;
food security in fisheries, agriculture, and livestock;
biodiversity and ecosystems;
tourism and recreation;
infrastructure and human settlements;
export agriculture; and
industry, energy, and transportation.

Priority actions include developing climate-change-resilient crops and breeds
to promote food security, implementing a surveillance program to detect and
monitor climate-induced diseases, and conducting trainings on climate-resilient
buildings for industry stakeholders.
191

Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment. 2016. Clean Air
2025: An Action Plan for Air Quality Management. Kotte, Sri Lanka.
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The National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka (Adaptation
Strategy) serves as an earlier key climate change policy.192 Adopted in 2010 and
applicable to 2011–2016, it provides a framework “aimed at systematically moving
Sri Lanka and its people towards a climate change-resilient future.” 193 It recognizes
the vulnerability of Sri Lanka to climate change, citing the increases in natural
disasters, changes in rainfall, increases in temperature, and rise of sea level.
The Adaptation Strategy contains five strategic goals: (i) mainstreaming climate
change adaptation into national planning and development, (ii) enabling climateresilient and healthy human settlements, (iii) minimizing climate change impacts
on food security, (iv) improving climate resilience of key economic drivers, and
(v) safeguarding natural resources and biodiversity from climate change impacts.
It identifies a broad range of interventions across multiple sectors to address
these goals, but does not put forward specific action plans or mechanisms to
monitor progress. An additional Sri Lanka rupees (SLRs) 47.7 billion is needed to
implement its goals over its 6-year duration.
Relevant to adaptation is the National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan
2016–2022.194 Mapping the legislative and policy framework for biodiversity
conservation, the plan sets 12 national targets for 2022. Target 2 seeks to
conserve habitats and envisages that this action will help manage climate
change‑driven impacts.
Finally, the Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy prepared the Technology
Needs Assessment and Technology Action Plans for Climate Change Mitigation in
2014 to identify and evaluate technologies that can contribute to climate mitigation
and adaptation while advancing national development objectives.195

F.

Disaster Risk Management

The government has developed two policies on reducing disaster risk. The
National Disaster Management Policy of 2010 calls for integrating adaptation
into disaster risk reduction activities.196 The Sri Lanka Comprehensive Disaster
Management Programme, 2014–2018 focuses on mainstreaming disaster risk
reduction and climate change adaptation into the development process.197
192
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Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Environment and Wildlife Resources, Climate Change
Secretariat. 2010. National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Sri Lanka, 2011–2016.
Colombo.
Footnote 192, p. 11 (Executive Summary).
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Mahaweli Development and Environment. 2016. National
Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan 2016–2022. Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Environment and Renewable Energy, Climate Change
Secretariat. 2014. Technology Needs Assessment and Technology Action Plans for Climate Change
Mitigation. Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, National Council for Disaster Management. 2010. National Policy on
Disaster Management. Colombo.
Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Disaster Management. 2014. Sri Lanka Comprehensive
Disaster Management Programme, 2014–2018. Colombo.
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DROUGHT.
Young girls fetching water during a very
dry season in Myanmar.

Farmers transplanting rice in Ban Bom Village,
Louang Prabang. Rice, a staple in Southeast Asia,
is vulnerable to heat stress, causing lower yields.
Rising temperatures in Southeast Asia are reaching
critical levels for this essential crop (photo by
Xaykhame Manilasit/ADB).

PART FIVE

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
SUMMARIES
I. Cambodia
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Kingdom of Cambodia is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy that has
become more vulnerable to climate change impacts such as floods, drought,
and saltwater intrusion.1 Significant rainfall results in almost annual floods,
particularly in the lower Tonlé Sap basin and the lower Mekong River provinces.2
Given that Cambodia faces significant flooding and typhoons, climate change will
potentially disrupt infrastructure, including road systems, ports, railways, and oil
supply.3 Typhoon Ketsana disrupted the oil supply in 2009, causing flooding on
underdeveloped road systems (footnote 3). Climate change can also upset the
monsoons and the hydrological function of the Mekong–Tonle Sap River drainage
system, thereby impacting agriculture, the main livelihood of rural households.4

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Cambodia’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) sets a target to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 27% by 2030 compared with the
business as usual (BAU) scenario (footnote 1). By signing the Paris Agreement,
Cambodia also committed to increasing forest cover to 60% of its national land

1
2
3

4

Government of Cambodia. 2017. Cambodia’s First Nationally Determined Contribution. Phnom Penh.
C. Berdik. 2014. Cambodia: The Giving Flood. Pulitzer Center. 11 June.
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). 2019. Cambodia Basic Energy
Plan. Jakarta.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Reducing the Vulnerability of Cambodian
Rural Livelihoods through Enhanced Sub-National Climate Change Planning and Execution of
Priority Actions.
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area and maintaining that level from 2030 onward. Its land use, land-use change,
and forestry (LULUCF) estimates emission reductions by about 4.7 tons of
carbon dioxide (tCO2) equivalent per hectare per year (footnote 1).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
To achieve its climate objectives, Cambodia formed the National Climate
Change Committee (NCCC), an interministerial mechanism mandated to
prepare, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of policies, strategies, legal
instruments, and plans to address climate change issues.5 The NCCC secretariat
is the Climate Change Department of the Ministry of Environment.
The NCCC was established under Cambodia’s National Strategic Development
Plan (NSDP) 2014–2018, which outlines Cambodia’s plan to become an upper
middle-income country and discusses the threats that climate change poses to
infrastructure, agriculture, fishing, and other industries (footnote 5). The NSDP
was formulated as part of the Rectangular Strategy Phase III (2013–2018),
designed to strengthen sustainable development goals such as promoting
economic growth, creating jobs, distributing the fruits of growth equitably, and
ensuring effective public institutions and management of resources.6
The government updated the NSDP 2014–2018 with the NSDP 2019–2023.7 The
new NSDP reaffirmed the government’s plan to become an upper middle-income
country by 2030 and a high-income country by 2050, with a sustainable growth
of around 7% per year and a reduction in the poverty rate to below 10%.
Cambodia’s Climate Change Strategic Plan 2014–2023 created a national
framework for responding to climate change and supporting sustainable
development.8 It outlined eight strategic objectives:
(i)

promoting climate resilience by improving food, water and energy
security;
(ii) reducing sectoral, regional, and gender vulnerability to climate change
impacts and their associated health risks;
(iii) building the resilience of critical ecosystems, biodiversity, protected
areas, and cultural heritage sites to climate change;
(iv) achieving sustainable development by promoting low-carbon
planning and technologies;

5

6

7

8

Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning. 2014. National Strategic Development Plan
2014−2018. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia. 2013. “Rectangular Strategy” for Growth, Employment, Equity and
Efficiency Phase III. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Planning. 2019. National Strategic Development Plan
2019−2023. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, National Climate Change Committee. 2013. Cambodia Climate
Change Strategic Plan 2014−2023. Phnom Penh.
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(v)

improving climate change responses with capacity building and
awareness raising;
(vi) enhancing the adaptive capacity of social protection programs and
improving participatory approaches to minimize loss and damage
resulting from climate change;
(vii) strengthening national institutions and coordination to boost national
responses to climate change; and
(viii) participating collaboratively and actively in regional and global climate
change processes.9
During 2014–2016, Cambodia developed 17 short-term ministry-specific
interventions as laid down in the Climate Change Action Plan 2016–2018.10 These
plans present sector-specific climate-related risks, implementation measures to
address those risks, and a budgeting and monitoring plan for the implementation
measures. The government has prepared action plans that cover mitigation and
climate change adaptation for the following sectors:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
(xii)
(xiii)
(xiv)

environment;
mining and energy;
tourism;
education;
rural development;
public work and transportation;
water resources and meteorology;
land management, urbanization planning, and construction;
information;
industry and handicraft;
agriculture, fisheries, and forestry;
gender;
health; and
disaster management.

The Gender and Climate Change Action Plan, 2014–2018 seeks to reduce the
vulnerability of women and other groups susceptible to climate change.11 It
aims to increase women’s participation in climate change planning and boost
the national capacity to plan, implement, and monitor gender-sensitive climate
change adaptation and mitigation activities.
Table 5.1 summarizes Cambodia’s climate change legal and policy framework.

9
10

11

Footnote 8, p. xvii.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Environment. 2016. Climate Change Action Plan
2016−2018. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 2014. Gender and Climate Change Action
Plan (GCCAP) 2014–2018. Phnom Penh.
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Table 5.1: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Cambodia
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia, 1993
National Strategic Development Plan 2019−2023, 2019
National Strategic Plan on Green Growth 2013−2030,
2013
Rectangular Strategy Phase III (2013−2018), 2013
The National Green Growth Roadmap, 2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2017 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies
Cambodia National Adaptation
Plan Financing Framework and
Implementation Plan, 2017
Climate Change Action Plan of
the Ministry of Environment
(2016–2018), 2016
Climate Change Financing
Framework, 2015
Climate Change Action Plan
of the Ministry of Land
Management, Urban Planning
and Construction (2015–2018),
2015
Climate Change Action Plan
for Ministry of Information
(2015–2018), 2015
Climate Change Action Plan for
the Education, 2014
National Climate Change Action
Plan for Public Health
(2014–2018), 2014
Climate Change Action Plan for
Rural Development Sector
(2014–2018), 2014

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Sub-Decree No. 35 on
the Establishment of
the National Climate
Change Committee,
2006

continued on next page
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Table 5.1 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Cambodia Climate Change
Strategic Plan (2014–2023), 2013
National Policy on Green Growth,
2013
National Adaptation Programme
of Action to Climate Change,
2006
Energy

Cambodia Basic Energy Plan, 2019
Climate Change Action Plan for
Mines and Energy Sectors, 2015
Climate Change Strategic Plan
for Manufacturing Industry and
Energy, 2013

LULUCF and REDD+

National REDD+ Strategy
(2017–2026), 2017
National Protected Area Strategic
Management Plan
(2017–2031), 2017
National Forest Programme
(2010–2029), 2010

Transportation

Climate Change Action Plan for
Transport Sector (2014–2018),
2014

Food production and
food security

Climate Change Priorities Action
Plan for Agriculture, Forestry
and Fisheries Sector
(2014–2018), 2014
The Strategic Planning Framework
for Fisheries (2010–2019), 2010

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

Climate Change Action Plan
for Water Resources and
Meteorology (2014–2018), 2014
Guidelines for
Integrating
Climate Change
Considerations
into Commune
Development
Planning - General,
2014

Cities and buildings

Vulnerable groups

Prakas No. 470 on
Establishment of
General Requirement
of Electric Power
Technical Standards,
2004

Gender and Climate Change
Action Plan (2014–2018), 2014
continued on next page
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Table 5.1 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Industry

Climate Change Action Plan in
Tourism Sector (2015–2018),
2015
Climate Change Action Plan for
Industry and Handicraft Sectors
(2015–2018), 2015

Disaster risk
management

Climate Change Strategic Plan for
Disaster Management Sector,
2013

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan, 2016

Acts

Law on Disaster
Management, 2015

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Royal Decree on the
Organization and
Functioning of the
National Committee
for Disaster
Management, 2015

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
Cambodia’s total primary energy supply (TPES) comes mainly from fuelwood and
other biomass (44.4%), followed by oil (38.5%), coal (10.7%), hydropower (3.6%),
and electricity imports (2.8%).12 During 2010–2015, Cambodia’s energy use grew
annually by an average of 6.9% (footnote 12). During this time, the supply of coal
increased from 0.7% to 10.7%, while the supply of hydropower increased from
0.1% to 3.6% (footnote 12).
The TPES is projected to increase from 7 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe)
in 2015 to almost 13 Mtoe in 2030 at an average rate of almost 4% per year
(footnote 3). Under the BAU scenario, fossil fuels would represent 60% of
Cambodia’s TPES by 2030 due to the rapidly increasing coal consumption for
power generation as well as oil consumption for cars and motorbikes (footnote 3).
According to the generation development plan for 2017–2030 created by
the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Cambodia is projected to have more than
4,700 megawatts (MW) in new total energy capacity by 2030, with coal (11 coal
projects) and gas to make up the largest portion at 2,373 MW (footnote 3).
12

Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2018. Cambodia Energy Sector Assessment, Strategy, and Road
Map. Manila.
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Hydropower is slated to reach 1,602 MW, also with 11 planned projects (footnote 3).
Solar and wind powers are projected to reach 305 MW, oil 251 MW, and biomass
185 MW (footnote 3).
The government also plans to expand hydropower and solar electricity generation.
In 2006, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Cambodian National Mekong
Committee identified 60 possible sites for hydropower development in Cambodia
with around 10,000 MW of power generation (footnote 3). Furthermore, the
2016 Mekong Strategic Partners report indicates that Cambodia has a solar
photovoltaic potential of 700 MW (footnote 3).

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
To satisfy its growing electricity demand from rapid urbanization, Cambodia can
harness non-hydro renewable energy, including biomass, solar power, and wind
power. However, the government has not yet set a national target for renewable
energy usage (footnote 3).
The Climate Change Action Plan for Mines and Energy Sectors (2016–2018)
acknowledges that Cambodia’s increasing energy demand will contribute to
global GHG emissions, thereby outlining measures to increase the efficiency of
energy consumption and production.13
The Climate Change Strategic Plan for Manufacturing Industry and Energy, released in
2013, states that Cambodia must engage in efficient resource consumption and make
use of available environmental technology.14 The plan focuses on small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs), aiming to reduce their GHG emissions and improve their
energy efficiency. These measures will produce environmental benefits and allow
SMEs to reduce costs and increase their access to international markets. The plan also
aims to diversify energy sources to include solar, wind, hydro, biomass, and bioenergy.

D. Energy Demand
Energy consumption in Cambodia has grown over time. From 2010 to 2015, total
final energy consumption (TFEC) increased from 2.449 Mtoe to 3.413 Mtoe
(footnote 3). In the same period, total electricity consumption increased from
2,283 gigawatt-hours (GWh) to 5,398 GWh (footnote 3). Demand for petroleum
products grew by 7.2% annually during 2012–2016 and will continue to grow.15
By 2040, the total demand for petroleum products will likely reach 4.65 Mtoe
(footnote 3). The upward trend in Cambodia’s energy consumption will also
continue. According to government projections, TFEC should reach around
13

14

15

Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Mines and Energy. 2015. Climate Change Action Plan for
Mines and Energy Sectors. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (now Ministry of Mines and
Energy). 2013. Climate Change Strategic Plan for Manufacturing Industry and Energy. Phnom Penh.
Footnote 3, p. 2.
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9 Mtoe by 2030 (footnote 3). Energy consumption in the commercial and
residential sectors will likely have the highest growth rate, with strong growth in
the transport sector also (footnote 3). Electricity consumption is projected to
increase by nearly 9% per year by 2030 (footnote 3).

E.

Climate Finance

Following the Cambodia Climate Change Strategic Plan, the government developed its
Climate Change Financing Framework in 2015.16 This document provides a rationale
for taking action against climate change based on its estimated socioeconomic
impacts, including (i) less agricultural productivity due to drought and floods, (ii) more
climate-sensitive diseases, (iii) rapid degradation of infrastructure, and (iv) flood
damage to urban infrastructure. The Climate Change Financing Framework helps in
establishing a transparent, reliable, and attractive climate change financing framework.

F.

LULUCF and REDD+

Cambodia’s National REDD+ Strategy seeks “to contribute to national and global
climate change mitigation by improving the management of its natural resources
and forest lands.” 17 The REDD+ Strategy identifies the threats to forest lands and
the drivers of those threats. Its objectives include (i) improving management
and monitoring of forest resources and forest land use; (ii) strengthening
implementation of sustainable forest management; and (iii) mainstreaming
approaches to reduce deforestation, build capacity, and engage stakeholders.
Aimed at promoting sustainable forest management, Cambodia’s National
Forest Programme 2010–2029 sets a goal of 60% forest cover by 2015.18 The
program acknowledges the threat that climate change poses to sustainable forest
management and discusses sustainable forest financing and the need to adapt
forestry plans to climate change.

G. Transportation
Cambodia’s Climate Change Action Plan for Transport Sector 2014–2018 recognizes
that the transport sector is vulnerable—and a contributor—to climate change.19 The
action plan identifies measures to promote climate-resilient transport infrastructure
and low-carbon consumption. Strategies include developing road construction and
maintenance design standards that account for climate change impacts—e.g., when
16

17

18
19

Government of Cambodia, National Council for Sustainable Development. 2015. Climate
Change Financing Framework. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia. 2017. National REDD+ Strategy 2017–2026. May. Phnom Penh. p. i.
REDD+ stands for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation
of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks.
Government of Cambodia. 2010. National Forest Programme 2010−2029. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Public Works and Transport. 2014. Climate Change Action
Plan for Transport Sector 2014−2018. Phnom Penh.
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repairing and rehabilitating road infrastructure. The action plan also aims to build
capacity and institutional strength to address climate change impacts. Strategies
for promoting low-carbon consumption include enhancing the inspection and
maintenance of vehicles, promoting integrated public transport in major cities, and
establishing green belts along major roads.

H. Adaptation
Given Cambodia’s vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, the government,
recognizing that adaptation is important to protect its citizens, submitted its
National Adaptation Programme of Action to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat in 2006.20 In 2014, the
government released its Climate Change Priorities Action Plan for Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries Sector 2014–2018, which contains strategies to build the
capacity of its agriculture, forestry, and fisheries sectors to adapt to climate change.21
In 2017, the government developed the Cambodia National Adaptation Plan
Financing Framework and Implementation Plan to bring the National Adaptation
Plan closer to execution.22 The framework acknowledges that financing is critical
to implementing adaptation action. It was developed by analyzing demand and
gaps in the climate change action plans and national stakeholder consultations,
as well as by evaluating the international climate finance landscape. It also states
that the actions identified under the line ministries’ climate change action plans
are considered key inputs to the National Adaptation Plan. It provides short-term
suggestions for 40 priority climate change actions and medium- and long-term
recommendations such as pursuing sector-wide approaches; strengthening
project and budgeting capabilities; and further developing a national repository
on climate science, knowledge, and development.

I.

Disaster Risk Management

Implemented in 2013, the Climate Change Strategic Plan for Disaster Management
Sector seeks to create resilience for Cambodia’s large agrarian community.23 It
builds on the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015, which emphasizes the
interconnected relationship between adaptation and disaster risk reduction.24 It
also focuses on educating community leaders on disaster risk management and
integrating these concerns into school curricula.
20

21

22

23

24

Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Environment. 2006. National Adaptation Programme of
Action to Climate Change (NAPA). Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2014. Climate Change
Priorities Action Plan for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Sector 2014−2018. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, National Council for Sustainable Development. 2017. Cambodia
National Adaptation Plan Financing Framework and Implementation Plan. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia, National Committee for Disaster Management. 2013. Climate
Change Strategic Plan for Disaster Management Sector. Phnom Penh.
World Conference on Disaster Reduction. 2005. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015:
Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. Hyogo, Japan. 18–22 January.
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The Royal Decree on the Organization and Functioning of the National
Committee for Disaster Management of 2015 defines the scope and function
of the National Committee for Disaster Management, which is mandated to
meet annually with technical advisers to issue disaster management plans
and programs.25 The Law on Disaster Management was also passed in 2015 to
formally establish the National Committee for Disaster Management.26

II. Indonesia
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Indonesia is a presidential republic that has passed meaningful legislation on
climate change, but continues to be vulnerable to its effects.27 Sea level rise poses
challenges for Indonesia, which has 81,000 kilometers (km) of coastline and
42 million people living on land less than 10 meters above sea level.28 Indonesia
faces threats from other climate change impacts, including more frequent intense
drought, forest fires, landslides, and severe storms (footnote 28).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Indonesia’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) sets a target to reduce
GHG emissions by 26% by 2020 compared with the BAU scenario.29 The country
sets a 29% unconditional reduction by 2030 and a 41% conditional reduction
(upon international financing mechanisms) by 2030 (footnote 29). It also aims to
reduce deforestation and forest degradation.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Indonesia’s approach to managing climate change has involved a combination of
policy initiatives, and decrees and regulations. In 2007, the Ministry of Environment
launched the National Action Plan Addressing Climate Change (Climate Change
Action Plan), which guides the approach of the organizations that address climate
change, integrating and coordinating multisector efforts.30
25

26
27

28

29
30

Government of Cambodia. 2015. Royal Decree on the Organization and Functioning of the National
Committee for Disaster Management. Phnom Penh.
Government of Cambodia. 2015. Law on Disaster Management. Phnom Penh.
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Climate Change Laws of
the World. Indonesia: Overview and Context.
United States Agency for International Development. 2017. Climate Risk Profile: Indonesia.
Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, State Ministry of Environment. 2007. National Action Plan Addressing
Climate Change. Jakarta.
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In terms of mitigation, the Climate Change Action Plan includes guidelines to
establish sector regulations for LULUCF and energy, including the creation of the
National Commission on Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The Climate
Change Action Plan includes a strong focus on the LULUCF sector and seeks to
reduce emissions and increase carbon absorption capacity. It also contains targets
for policies on spatial planning, poverty reduction, law enforcement, research and
development, and engineering.
The planning agency, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry of
National Development Planning), launched Indonesia Climate Change Sectoral
Roadmap in 2010.31 The Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund was also established in
2010 to scale up financing by linking international finance and domestic investment.32
Presidential Decree No. 61 of 2011 established the National Action Plan for
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction to implement Indonesia’s emissions
reduction goals across various sectors, including agriculture, forestry, industry,
energy, and infrastructure. A guiding document for developing nationally
appropriate mitigation actions, the national action plan works alongside the
gubernatorial regulations on provincial action plans to reduce GHG emissions.33
In the National Medium Term Development Plan 2015–2019 (Development
Plan),34 the green economy is the foundation of the country’s development
program, emphasizing on “inclusive and sustainable growth, increasing value
added of natural resources with the sustainable approach, increasing quality
of the environment, disaster mitigation and tackling climate change.”35 The
Development Plan further establishes GHG emissions reduction for five priority
sectors—forestry and peatlands, agriculture, energy and transportation, industry,
and waste—to meet a 26% reduction in 2019, in line with the National Action
Plan for Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction (footnote 35).
The Development Plan also sets qualitative goals such as (i) supporting the
development of green cities; (ii) developing rural and remote areas, with special
attention to border areas, disadvantaged regions, transmigration areas, and
small islands; (iii) eradicating illegal logging, fishing, and mining; (iv) improving
governance in natural resources and increasing community participation in forest
management; and (v) increasing community resilience to climate change impacts
in 15 vulnerable regions defined in the National Action Plan for Climate Change

31
32
33

34

35

Government of Indonesia. 2009. Indonesia Climate Change Sectoral Roadmap (ICCSR). Jakarta.
Climate Funds Update. Indonesia Climate Change Trust Fund.
Government of Indonesia. 2013. Indonesia’s Framework for Nationally Appropriate Mitigation
Actions. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia. 2014. Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional 2015–2019
(National Medium Term Development Plan 2015–2019). Jakarta.
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Climate Change Laws of
the World. National Medium Term Development Plan 2015-2019 (RPJMN 2015-2019).
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Adaptation.36 The Development Plan also contains regional initiatives.
The Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MOEF) has promulgated some
climate-relevant regulations. For example, MOEF Regulation No. 7 of 2018 guides
national assessments of climate risks, vulnerability, and impacts.37 It advises the
public and the government on how to determine the methodology, analytical
scope, data, and indicators for climate change risk, vulnerability, and impact
studies. It also provides specific criteria for these studies. Study components
include sensitivity, exposure, adaptation capacity, and climate-related harms.
The regulation dictates that climate impact analysis should provide impact
information such as frequency, location, duration, and extent. It further outlines
study indicators based on the type of hazard and socioeconomic circumstances.
MOEF Regulation No. 71 of 2017 provides the legal basis for establishing
Indonesia’s National Registry System of its GHG inventory.38 The registry system
was developed to comply with article 13 of the Paris Agreement, which mandates
that parties maintain transparency in meeting their GHG emissions reduction
targets. It is a web-based inventory of the country’s actions and resources relating
to adaptation, mitigation, and other activities.
MOEF Regulation No. 72 of 2017 implements a system for measurement, reporting,
and verification (MRV) and related resources for managing climate change. 39 The
regulation dictates that individuals, the private sector, local government, and the
central government implement resources and establish agencies to address climate
change. All actions that mitigate climate change must be carried out through the
MRV system for REDD+ and reported to the MOEF.40
Table 5.2 summarizes Indonesia’s climate change legal and policy framework.

36

37

38
39
40

Government of Indonesia. 2014. National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation (RAN-API).
Jakarta. These 15 regions are as follows: Bali Province, Semarang City, Pekalongan City, West
Java Province, Blitar City, Bandar Lampung City, East Java Province, Malang District, Batu City,
Malang City, West Nusa Tenggara Province, Lombok Island, Tarakan District, South Sumatra
Province, and North Sumatra Province.
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Environment and Forestry (MOEF). 2018. Regulation No. 7
of 2018. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, MOEF. Regulation No. 71 of 2017. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, MOEF. 2017. Regulation No. 72 of 2017. Jakarta.
REDD+ means reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing
countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.
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Table 5.2: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Indonesia
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, 1945
National Medium Term Development Plan 2015−2019,
2014
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative Instruments

National Action Plan
for Climate Change
Adaptation, 2012
National Action Plan to
Reduce Greenhouse
Gas Emissions,
Presidential Regulation
No. 61 of 2011
National Action Plan
Addressing Climate
Change, 2007

Law on Meteorology,
Climatology, and
Geophysics, Law
No. 31 of 2009

Guidelines for Assessing Climate
Change Vulnerability, Risk, and
Impact, Ministry of Environment
and Forestry (MOEF) Regulation
No. 7 of 2018
National Registry System for
Climate Change, MOEF
Regulation No. 71 of 2017
Guidelines for Measurement,
Reporting, and Verification,
MOEF Regulation No. 72 of 2017
Guidance on Adaptation Program
Implementation and Integration,
MOEF Regulation No. 33 of 2016
Regulation Establishing the MOEF,
Presidential Regulation No. 16
of 2015
National Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Regulations,
Presidential Regulation No. 71
of 2011
National Committee for the Clean
Development Mechanism
(CDM), Ministry of Energy
(MOE) Decree No. 522 of 2009
(replacing MOE Decree No. 206
of 2005)
Regulation Establishing the
National Council for Climate
Change, Presidential Regulation
No. 46 of 2008
Regulations on the Implementation
of CDM Projects in the Forestry
Sector, MOF Regulation No. 14
of 2004
continued on next page
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Table 5.2 continued

Area
Energy

LULUCF and
REDD+

Policies and Strategies
National Energy
Policy, Government
Regulation No. 79 of
2014
Policy on Renewable
Energy Development
and Energy
Conservation, Ministry
of Energy and Mineral
Resources (MOEMR)
Decree No. 2 of 2004

Acts

Non-Legislative Instruments

Geothermal Law,
Law No. 21 of
2014
Law on Energy, Law
No. 30 of 2007

Renewable Energy Regulations,
MOEMR Regulation No. 12 of
2017
Renewable Energy Regulations,
MOEMR Regulation No. 50 of
2017
List of Projects Under the Fast
Track Program on Renewable
Energy, Coal, and Gas Power,
MOEMR Regulation No. 40
of 2014 (amending MOEMR
Regulation No. 15 of 2010)
Regulations for the Geothermal
Mining Natural Resources
Revenue Sharing Fund, Minister
of Finance Regulation No. 216
of 2012
Regulation on Energy Conservation,
Presidential Regulation No. 70 of
2009
Instruction on Energy and
Water Efficiency, Presidential
Instruction No. 2 of 2008
Instruction on Biofuel Production
and Use, Presidential Instruction
No. 1 of 2006
Government Energy Efficiency
Obligations, Presidential
Instruction No. 10 of 2005

Law on Prevention
and Eradication of
Forest Destruction,
Law No. 18 of
2013
Law on Plantations,
Law No. 18 of
2004

Extension to the Moratorium on
Issuing New Peatland and Forest
Utilization Licenses, Presidential
Instruction No. 6 of 2017
Procedures for Conducting an
Inventory and Determining Peat
Ecosystem Function, MOEF
Regulation No. 14 of 2017
Groundwater Measurement
Procedures at Peat Ecosystem
Point, MOEF Regulation No. 15
of 2017
Technical Guidelines for Recovery
of Peat Ecosystem Functions,
MOEF Regulation No. 16 of 2017
continued on next page
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Table 5.2 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative Instruments
Regulation Amending MOEF
Regulation No. 12 of 2015,
MOEF Regulation No. 17 of 2017
REDD+ Regulations, MOEF
Regulation No. 70 of 2017
Prohibition of Land Clearing Pending
Peatland Zoning, Government
Regulation No. 57 of 2016
Extension to the Moratorium on
Issuing New Peatland and Forest
Utilization Licenses, Presidential
Instruction No. 8 of 2015
Regulation Establishing the MOEF,
Presidential Regulation No. 16
of 2015
Extension to the Moratorium on
Issuing New Peatland and Forest
Utilization Licenses, Presidential
Instruction No. 6 of 2013
Procedures for Financial
Regulation, Ministry of Finance
Regulation No. 11 of 2013
Decree Establishing a REDD+
Agency, Presidential Decree No. 62
of 2013 (dissolved by Presidential
Regulation No. 16 of 2015)
Creation of Forest Carbon
Licenses, Ministry of Forestry
(MOF) Regulation No. 20
of 2012 (replacing MOF
Regulation No. 68 of 2008)
Moratorium on Issuing New
Peatland and Forest Utilization
Licenses, Presidential
Instruction No. 10 of 2011
Creation of a REDD+ Taskforce,
Presidential Decree No. 19 of
2010
REDD Procedures, Minister of
Forestry Regulation No. 30 of 2009
Regulations on Forest Planning
and Forest Management Plans,
and the Utilization of Forest
and Forest Areas, Government
Regulation No. 6 of 2007
continued on next page
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Table 5.2 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative Instruments

LULUCF and
REDD+ a

Regulations on the Implementation
of CDM Projects in the Forestry
Sector, MOF Regulation No. 14
of 2004
Forest Protection Regulations,
Government Regulation No. 45
of 2004

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

Instruction on Energy and
Water Efficiency, Presidential
Instruction No. 2 of 2008

(continued)

Waste

Law on Waste
Management, Law
No. 18 of 2008

Other

Law on Environmental
Protection and
Management, Law
No. 32 of 2009

Regulation on Damage Control
and Environmental Pollution
from Forest Fires, Government
Regulation No. 4 of 2001

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
Indonesia’s total primary energy supply (TPES) is projected to increase to 332 million
tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) by 2025 and to more than 1,041 Mtoe by 2050.41 Under
the BAU scenario, fossil fuels will drive much of this growth. There were significant
increases in the consumption of coal as a percentage of the country’s total primary
energy consumption—from 24% in 2008 to 33% in 2018.42 “Wind and solar power
generation remain negligible in Indonesia.” 43

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
Indonesia’s energy strategy is outlined in the National Energy Policy (NEP),
Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2006, which “emphasizes diversification,
environmental sustainability, and maximum use of domestic energy resources.” 44
In 2014, the NEP was updated to include new target energy mixes—(i) oil (25%),
natural gas (22%), coal (30%), and new and renewable energy (23%) for 2025;
41
42
43
44

Secretariate General of National Energy Council. 2016. Indonesia Energy Outlook 2016. Jakarta.
BP. 2019. BP Statistical Review — 2019. Indonesia’s Energy Market in 2018.
Footnote 42, p. 1.
Government of Indonesia. 2006. Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2006, National Energy Policy.
25 January. Jakarta; ADB. 2016. Indonesia Energy Sector Assessment, Strategy, and Road Map.
Manila. p. 3.
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and (ii) oil (20%), natural gas (24%), coal (25%), and new and renewable energy
(31%) for 2050.45
The NEP also provides for government subsidies. For example, the NEP stipulates
that subsidies can be used when renewable energy is more expensive than the
energy from nonsubsidized fossil fuel. Electricity and fuel subsidies are also
available for certain populations experiencing poverty.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MOEMR) Regulation No. 50 of 2017
(Regulation 50) mandates that Perusahaan Listrik Negara, the state-owned
electricity company, must buy electricity from power plants that use renewable
energy.46 Regulation 50 defines renewable energy sources as including wind, solar,
biogas, biomass, hydropower, geothermal, solid waste incineration, and temperature
and motion differences in sea layers. The regulation also specifies that Perusahaan
Listrik Negara must purchase electricity through a direct selection mechanism.
Regulation 50 replaced MOEMR Regulation No. 12 of 2017 (Regulation 12), which
established electricity tariffs. Regulation 12 imposed caps on tariffs: (i) at 85% of the
region’s electricity generation costs for solar photovoltaic, wind, hydro, biomass, and
biogas; and (ii) at 100% of the region’s electricity generation costs for city waste-toenergy and geothermal plants, unless agreed upon otherwise.47 Regulation 50 increased
the tariff for hydropower to 100% of the region’s electricity generation cost and imposed
a tariff cap for seawater energy at 100% of the region’s electricity generation cost.

D. Energy Demand
Energy consumption in Indonesia has increased over time from 133 Mtoe in 2008
to 186 Mtoe in 2018 (footnote 42). Likewise, total electricity generation increased
from 149 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2008 to 267 TWh in 2018 (footnote 42).
During 2007–2017, the demand for coal increased by 4.7% per year, for oil by 2.1%,
and for natural gas by 1.1% (footnote 42). In 2018, primary energy consumption
came from oil (45%), coal (33%), natural gas (18%), hydropower (2%), and
biomass and geothermal power (1.8%) (footnote 42).
Indonesia’s energy demand is expected to continue to increase. Current projections
indicate that total final energy consumption (TFEC) will reach 238.8 Mtoe by 2025
and 682.3 Mtoe by 2050 (footnote 41). Energy demand is projected to grow on
average by 4.9% per year during 2015–2050 and will be driven by the transportation
and industry sectors as well as the commercial and household sectors (footnote 41).
45
46

47

Government of Indonesia. 2014. Government Regulation No. 79 of 2014, National Energy Policy. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (MOEMR). 2017.
Regulation No. 50 of 2017 on Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for Power Supply. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, MOEMR. 2017. Regulation No. 12 of 2017 on Utilization of Renewable
Energy Sources for Power Supply. Jakarta.
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1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
Indonesia is shifting its energy strategy to a focus on demand-side versus
supply-side management, indicating that Indonesia is making substantial efforts
toward efficient sectoral energy demand (footnote 41). The Energy Law, 2007
primarily regulates energy demand and mandates the establishment of the
National Energy Council. The council oversees the development of the Rencana
Induk Konservasi Energi Nasional (National Master Plan for Energy Conservation)
and other energy management policies.48
Indonesia has set three main energy efficiency targets. The first aims to reduce
energy intensity by 1% per year until 2025, as established by the National Master
Plan for Energy Conservation (footnote 48). The second seeks to achieve a
41% reduction of TPES in 2025 against a BAU scenario by implementing energy
efficiency and conservation measures, as established by the Blueprint of National
Energy Management (2005–2025).49 The third plans to achieve an energy
elasticity of less than 1 in 2025, as established in the 2006 National Energy Policy.50
There are also some energy efficiency initiatives, including mandatory energy
conservation of government office buildings, a government-funded energy audit
program for private sector buildings, and an energy labeling program.

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Deforestation and forest degradation are critical issues in Indonesia due to
significant financial incentives for capitalizing on forest resources.51 Forest
industries contribute approximately 3.5% of Indonesia’s gross domestic product
(GDP) ($21 billion) to the economy (footnote 51). Indonesia has one of the
highest rates of deforestation and degradation in the world. During 1990–2005,
about 28 million hectares of its forests had been cleared.52
Up to 84% of Indonesia’s GHG emissions arise from land-use change and
deforestation, and about half of these from carbon-rich peatlands.53 Indonesia is
the world’s fourth-largest GHG emitter due primarily to land-use change and fires
on peatland.54
48
49

50

51

52
53

54

International Energy Agency. 2017. National Master Plan for Energy Conservation. Paris.
Government of Indonesia, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. 2006. Blueprint of National
Energy Management (2005–2025). Jakarta.
Footnote 49. Energy elasticity is the rate of change in energy consumption over the rate of
change in the gross domestic product (GDP). A country’s GDP growth should be faster than its
increase in energy consumption for the country to achieve an energy elasticity of less than 1. In
other words, its economic activities should not be so heavily dependent on energy consumption.
Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification. 2014. Indonesian Forests to Benefit
from PEFC Certification. PEFC system news. 9 October.
World Resources Institute. Forest Cover, 1990–2005, Indonesia (accessed 15 December 2019).
World Resources Institute. Forest Cover Loss in Indonesia, 2000–2005: The Starting Point for the
Norwegian Billion to Reduce Deforestation (accessed 15 December 2019).
D. Dunne. 2019. The Carbon Brief Profile: Indonesia. CarbonBrief. 27 March.
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Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2013 sets an overall goal to “resolve ongoing
various efforts to improve governance of forest and peat land . . . to reduce
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” 55 It seeks to improve
the governance of peatland and forest to reduce emissions related to forest
degradation and deforestation. To reach this goal, it instructs ministers and other
officials to suspend certain licensing activities and improve permitting policies.
Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2015 integrated the Ministry of Environment
with the Ministry of Forestry to create the Ministry of Environment and Forestry
(MOEF), which became the sole drafter and implementer of Indonesia’s climate
change policies.56 The regulation also created the Directorate General of Climate
Change, responsible for creating and implementing standards, policies, norms,
and criteria for the following areas:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

adaptation;
mitigation;
ozone-depleting substances;
GHG inventories;
resource mobilization;
climate change monitoring, reporting, and verification; and
forest and peatland control.

MOEF Regulation No. 70 of 2017 establishes REDD+ regulations and mandates that
REDD+ sites must undergo measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV).57 It
establishes MRV as the foundation of a results-based system of payment awarded to
achievements in emissions reductions. It dictates that the MOEF’s Director General
of Climate Change will serve as the national focal point of REDD+ implementation.
The director general will also communicate REDD+ activities to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Secretariat. The regulation
also addresses results-based payments, Forest Reference Emissions Level/Forest
Reference Level, the National Registry System, and the Safeguards Information System.

F.

Transportation

Transportation is expected to drive a significant part of rising energy demand, as
Indonesia experiences more urbanization and motorization.58 Transportation is
the third-largest source of energy-related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Road
transport emissions are predicted to increase from 105.8 metric tons of CO2 (tCO2)
in 2010 to 261 tCO2 by 2030 under a BAU scenario.59
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Government of Indonesia. 2013. Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 2013. Jakarta. p. 1.
Government of Indonesia. 2015. Presidential Regulation No. 16 of 2015. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, MOEF. 2017. Regulation No. 70 of 2017. Jakarta.
M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in Indonesia: An Excerpt from the 2015
Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
S. Gota et al. 2015. Emission Reduction Potential in the Transport Sector by 2030: Key Findings. Paris
Process on Mobility and Climate.
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In response to these challenges, the Ministry of Transport developed the Sustainable
Urban Transport Programme Indonesia in 2012, which is divided into two phases:
piloting (2015–2019) and full-scale implementation (2020–2030) (footnote 58). It
is expected to mitigate 0.7–1.8 tCO2 in 2030 in each city in which the program is
piloted, with cumulative reduction until 2030 estimated at 7.2–14.1 tCO2.

G. Adaptation
The Ministry of National Development Planning and the National Development
Planning Agency developed the National Action Plan for Climate Change
Adaptation in 2012.60 The plan seeks to build resilience in three key areas: the
economy, livelihoods, and environmental services. These three areas are broken
down further into subsectors with an action plan for achieving targets. The plan
also identifies climate challenges, including sea level rise, rainfall variability, and
changing interannual patterns, and it maps the sectors likely to be affected by
these risks. It works together with the National Medium Term Development Plan
2015–2019.
MOEF Regulation No. 33 of 2016 guides climate change adaptation projects
and integrates them into development plans.61 The regulation specifies a
process for adaptation that includes identifying targeted sectors, regions,
and impacts; studying climate vulnerability; formulating adaptation opinions;
selecting prioritized adaptation action; and integrating adaptation actions into
development plans, policies, and programs. The regulation also outlines indicators
for studies on climate vulnerability and impacts.

III. Lao People’s Democratic Republic
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), which is a one-party
socialist republic, faces threats from numerous climate change impacts,
especially increasingly frequent and intense floods and droughts, and increased
temperatures.62 These impacts threaten both agricultural and hydropower
production, which are critical to the country’s food and energy security. In 2018,
the agriculture and industry sectors accounted for 53.2% of total gross domestic
product (GDP), with the industry sector contributing 46.8%.63 While the
agriculture sector is shrinking as a percentage of GDP, it employs approximately
60
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Government of Indonesia, Ministry of National Development Planning and National
Development Planning Agency. 2012. National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation
(RAN-API): Synthesis Report. Jakarta.
Government of Indonesia, MOEF. 2016. Regulation No. 33 of 2016. Jakarta.
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Building Resilience to Climate
Change in Laos.
ADB. Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Key Indicators (accessed 26 June 2020).
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70% of the population.64 Hence, climate change impacts in rural areas have
widespread impacts on the Lao people.
Extreme weather events such as typhoons threaten lives and food security. During
2009–2011, the Lao PDR was struck by several typhoons, which resulted in many
deaths, rendered thousands of people homeless, and caused major destruction to crops
and livestock.65 Floods in 2018 affected almost 750,000 people and destroyed over
100,000 hectares of crops.66 The Lao PDR’s “contribution to global GHG emissions is
negligible.”67 However, the country still plans to take mitigation measures while building
resilience to adverse climate impacts, especially in the agriculture sector.68

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Lao PDR’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) aims to increase
the share of renewable energy to 30% of total energy consumption by 2025.69
Additionally, the NDC targets to increase forest cover to 70% of total land area by
2020 (footnote 69). In the transport sector, the government aims to increase the
share of biofuels to 10% of total transport fuels by 2025 (footnote 69).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
In 2010, the Lao PDR published its Strategy on Climate Change (Climate Strategy),
which recommends implementing adaptation measures to promote sustainable
economic development and increase economic resilience to climate change
impacts.70 The Climate Strategy sets some goals, including (i) reinforcing
the Sustainable Development Goals of Lao PDR, such as actions to achieve
low-carbon economic growth; (ii) increasing the resilience of key sectors of the
national economy and natural resources; (iii) creating national and international
partnerships to achieve national development goals; and (iv) educating the public
about climate change impacts to build stakeholder buy-in.
The Climate Strategy sets a quantified target of 65% reforestation for carbon
sequestration by 2015 and 70% by 2020 (footnote 70). It also details strategic
priorities and possible mitigation and adaptation measures by sector, including
agriculture, forestry and land use, energy, and transport.
64
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ADB. 2020. Asian Development Outlook 2020: What Drives Innovation in Asia? Manila.
P. Thevongsa. 2012. Climate Change and Its Impact on the Lao and Cambodian People.
Vientiane Times. 3 May.
Government of the Lao PDR. 2018. Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2018 Floods, Lao PDR.
Vientiane.
United Nations, Lao PDR. 2017. What Does the international Climate Conference COP 23
Mean for Lao PDR? Press release. 11 December.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Lao PDR Project Document. New York.
Government of the Lao PDR. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Vientiane.
Government of the Lao PDR. 2010. Strategy on Climate Change of the Lao PDR. Vientiane.
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The Lao PDR has also emphasized the importance of addressing climate change
in its development plans. One major directive in the Seventh Five-Year National
Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011–2015) is to protect and sustain the
environment, as well as pursue climate change mitigation.71 Proposals to achieve
this directive include water conservation, preservation and enhancement of forest
cover, and improvements in evaluating and monitoring environmental impacts
arising from new industrial and investment projects.
The Eighth Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016–2020)
outlines the Lao PDR’s goal to become an upper middle-income country by
2030 and integrates climate concerns into development planning.72 The plan
discusses climate change’s impact on food production, the role of environmental
protection in alleviating poverty, the impact of climate change on women, and
the importance of resilience initiatives. It also highlights how climate change has
increased the frequency and severity of natural disasters.
The Lao PDR is updating its climate change strategy and strategy for disaster risk
management.
Outside of the policy realm, the Lao PDR enacted its Environmental Protection
Law, 2013, which defines principles, regulations, and measures related to
environmental management, and emphasizes mitigating anthropogenic impacts
and pollution. The law aims to balance social and natural environments, sustain
natural resources and public health, and combat climate change. Article 19
requires strategic environmental assessments that consider climate change effects.
Article 20 stipulates that preventative measures against natural disasters should
be undertaken, such as planting trees and constructing dikes and drainage
canals. The law also acknowledges the effect of climate change on biodiversity
and establishes the Initial Environment Examination.73 The Initial Environment
Examination analyzes data that anticipate minor environmental impacts from
investment projects or activities, including those related to climate change.
In 2019, the Lao PDR enacted its Decree No. 321/Govt, Decree on Climate Change
to govern the management, monitoring, and inspection of climate mitigation and
adaptation efforts in the country. The decree functions as an umbrella law to
build institutional frameworks to enable climate action in the Lao PDR. It seeks to
mainstream climate change into the Lao PDR’s national and local planning and to
promote unified and collaborative government action on climate change.
A central feature of the decree is its creation of a national data and information
system on climate change, managed by the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment. All ministries in the Lao PDR must provide information on sectoral
71
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Government of the Lao PDR, Ministry of Planning and Investment. 2011. The Seventh Five-Year
National Socio-Economic Development Plan (2011–2015). Vientiane.
Government of the Lao PDR, Ministry of Planning and Investment. 2016. 8th Five-Year National
Socio-Economic Development Plan (2016-2020). Vientiane.
Law No. 29/NA, Environmental Protection Law, 2013, art. 21.
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climate change impacts to the information system. The decree establishes a
framework for undertaking climate vulnerability assessments in adaptation
planning. It also amends the Environmental Protection Fund, allowing it to receive
international climate change funding. Ministerial rights and duties are also set out
in the decree to promote greater government collaboration on climate mitigation
or adaptation in the Lao PDR.
The Lao PDR also passed the Disaster Management Law in 2019, which creates
a risk information system and ensures that all disaster information and data
are readily accessible. It also establishes national rights and responsibilities for
disaster management in the Lao PDR.
Table 5.3 summarizes the Lao PDR’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 5.3: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
The Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
2015
8th Five-Year National Socio-Economic Development Plan
(2016–2020), 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Strategy on Climate Change of the
Lao PDR, 2010
Climate Change Action Plan of Lao
PDR 2013–2020, 2013

Government Decree No. 321 of 2019,
Decree on Climate Change, 2019

Energy

Renewable Energy Development
Strategy in Lao PDR, 2011

LULUCF and REDD+

Forest Strategy to the Year 2020 of the
Lao PDR, 2005

Disaster risk management

Plan of Action for Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management in
Agriculture 2014–2016, 2014

Law on Disaster Management, 2019

Other

National Biodiversity Strategy and
Action Plan 2016–2025, 2016

Environmental Protection Law, 2013

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.
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C. Energy Supply
In 2015, the Lao PDR’s total primary energy supply (TPES) came from biomass
(34%), coal (33%), petroleum (20%), and hydropower (9%).74 The TPES
increased from 1.618 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 2000 to 4.765 Mtoe
in 2015, at an average annual growth rate of 7.5% (footnote 74). During 2000–2015,
coal saw the largest increase at an annual average rate of 42.2% (footnote 74).
Hydropower and petroleum also grew rapidly during this period, with average
growth rates of 9.8% for hydropower and 8.5% for petroleum (footnote 74).
The Lao PDR’s TPES is projected to annually increase by an average of 5.1%
through 2040.75 Coal is projected to grow at the highest rate, representing 38.4%
of energy supply by 2040 (footnote 75). Hydropower production is expected to
increase at an annual average of 4.5%, reaching 4.35 Mtoe by 2040 (footnote 75).
Oil is also projected to experience significant growth, comprising 31.7% of energy
supply by 2040 (footnote 75). Biomass is projected to grow at an annual average
of only 1.1% and produce 1.69 Mtoe by 2040 (footnote 75).

1. Renewable Energy Policies
In 2011, the Lao PDR released the Renewable Energy Development Strategy,
which calls for increasing renewable energy production to maintain consistent
energy supply, address climate change, and encourage economic development.76
The strategy aims to increase the share of renewable sources to 30% by 2025 and
the share of biofuels to 10% of total transport energy consumption (footnote 76).

D. Energy Demand
The Lao PDR’s total final energy consumption (TFEC) has grown radically since
2000, when it was 1.509 Mtoe (footnote 74). Before 2013, hydropower was the
country’s only source of power (footnote 74). In 2015, the Lao PDR’s TFEC had
grown to approximately 9 Mtoe and the Hongsa thermal power plant started
operations.77 Coal has grown to dominate the fuel mix, providing 71.1% of the total
final energy demand in 2015 (footnote 77).
The TFEC is expected to continue to increase to just over 15 Mtoe by 2030
and nearly 30 Mtoe by 2040, with coal representing 85.3% of TFEC in 2040
74
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Government of the Lao PDR, Ministry of Energy and Mines. 2018. Lao PDR Energy Statistics 2018.
Jakarta: ERIA.
K. Kouphokham. 2016. Lao PDR Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook
and Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2016. ERIA Research Project Report 2015-5. Jakarta:
ERIA. pp. 193–213.
Government of the Lao PDR, Ministry of Energy and Mines. 2011. Renewable Energy Development
Strategy in Lao PDR. October. Vientiane.
K. Kouphokham. 2019. Chapter 10. Lao PDR Country Report. In S. Kimura and H. Phoumin, eds.
Energy Outlook and Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2019. Jakarta: ERIA. pp. 185–186 and
Figures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3.
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(footnote 77). The industry sector is projected to have the highest growth rate,
consuming over 75% of TFEC in 2030 and 2040, followed by transport and other
sectors—residential, agriculture, services, and commerce (footnote 77). The
Lao PDR has not yet issued any energy conservation policies.

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

With 80% of the population heavily dependent on forest resources, the Lao PDR
has encountered problems associated with rapid deforestation.78 In 2005, the
Lao PDR released the Forest Strategy to the Year 2020 to preserve its forests,
aiming to achieve targets established in the national socioeconomic plans, such as
naturally regenerating 6 million hectares of forest and planting 500,000 hectares
of trees on highly degraded forestland by 2020.79 Protecting forests entails
formulating a national tree plantation development plan and forest harvesting
management plans, as well as monitoring the effectiveness of these initiatives.
Other objectives of the strategy include sustainably managing natural resources
and eradicating poverty.

F.

Adaptation

The Lao PDR’s Climate Strategy includes recommendations for implementing
adaptation measures to promote sustainable economic development and increase
economic resilience to climate change (footnote 70). The strategy sets goals for
(i)

increasing the resilience of strategic economic sectors and natural
resources to climate impacts;
(ii) strengthening cooperation with national stakeholders and
international partners to achieve Lao PDR’s national development
goals; and
(iii) raising awareness about climate change, vulnerability, and impacts to
improve the public’s and stakeholder readiness to act.
In 2009, the Lao PDR issued its National Adaptation Programme of Action,
which outlines the country’s plan to undertake adaptation measures focused
on agriculture, forestry, water resources, and public health.80 The program was
expanded within the Climate Strategy to target the main sectors of the economy—
agriculture and food security, land-use change and forestry, water, energy and
transport, urban development, industry, and public health. The Lao PDR aims
to promote climate resilience in farming systems and agricultural infrastructure
and increase the resilience of urban development and infrastructure. These
adaptation measures are scheduled to be implemented by 2020.
78
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World Bank. 2011. Government of Lao PDR Makes Progress in Combating Illegal Logging and
Corruption in the Forestry Sector. Press release. 24 March.
Government of the Lao PDR. 2005. Forest Strategy to the Year 2020 of the Lao PDR. Vientiane.
Government of the Lao PDR. 2009. National Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change.
Vientiane.
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G. Disaster Risk Management
The Plan of Action for Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in Agriculture
(2014–2016) is a key adaptation-related policy, recommending that the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry integrate risk prevention and mitigation
into agricultural activities.81 It seeks to promote quicker agricultural recovery for
fisheries, livestock, forests, and crops after natural disasters. It has five priority
areas such as adapting to climate change in agriculture; monitoring and assessing
risks and vulnerabilities posed by climate change; and raising awareness on
climate change-related impacts, disaster risk reduction and management, and
adaptation to climate change.
The Law on Disaster Management establishes an institutional framework for
disaster prevention in the Lao PDR. It enables the government to collect data
about disaster risk and populate a risk information system. Each sector within the
Lao PDR is responsible for evaluating potential risks and reporting to the National
Disaster Management Committee. The law incorporates measures for disaster
risk reduction and early warning. The act defines the national and subnational
responsibilities for disaster management and outlines the rights of disaster
victims. The newly established Disaster Management Fund should finance
emergency aid, repair of necessary infrastructure, and search and rescue.

IV. Malaysia
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Malaysia is a federal constitutional monarchy at risk from climate change impacts,
including sea level rise, severe floods, and water shortages due to extreme rainfall
variability.82 Increasingly unpredictable weather has led to a 10%–15% decrease in
annual farming yields, undermining food security (footnote 82). Greater rainfall
intensity has led to severe monsoonal floods.83 Seasonal monsoon floods result
in an annual direct loss of Malaysian ringgit (RM)915 million (about $220 million
in late 2020) (footnote 83). Extreme floods in 2014 caused RM2.9 billion (about
$701 million in late 2020) in damages to public infrastructure (footnote 83).
Malaysia has also recorded higher surface temperatures over the past 5 decades
(footnote 83). In 2011, its total GHG emissions represented approximately
0.6% of global emissions (footnote 83). Nevertheless, Malaysia has undertaken
mitigation measures. Climate change mitigation and adaptation remain a priority,
alongside poverty eradication and development (footnote 83).
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Government of the Lao PDR, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. 2014. Plan of Action for
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in Agriculture (2014–2016). Vientiane.
S. Norshidi. 2018. Climate Change in Malaysia: Floods, Less Food, and Water Shortages—Yet Its
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B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
As part of the Paris Agreement, Malaysia’s NDC sets a target for reducing GHG
emissions by 45% by 2030, compared with 2005 emissions intensity of the gross
domestic product (GDP) (footnote 83). Although this includes an unconditional
reduction by 35%, the remaining 10% in emissions reduction is conditional upon
receiving financing, technology, and capacity building assistance from developed
countries (footnote 83). Malaysia also intends to reduce flood risks, prioritize
water and food security, protect coastlines, and address climate-related public
health issues like increased vector-borne diseases (footnote 83).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), along with its
subsidiary Department of Environment, is mandated to deal with climate change,
including all matters related to the UNFCCC.84 The MONRE is responsible for
sustainable forest management nationwide, except in Sabah and Sarawak, where
separate ministries are responsible for forestry-related policies (footnote 84). It
also manages the National Water Resources Policy.85
The Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water (KeTTHA) enacts other
climate change-related policies such as renewable energy policies and the feed-in
tariff regime (footnote 84). The Malaysian Meteorological Department within the
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation monitors the climate and creates
future climate change projection scenarios (footnote 84).
Malaysia launched the National Policy on Climate Change to mainstream
and organize its various activities on climate change.86 This policy articulates
5 principles, 10 strategic thrusts or policy goals, and 43 key actions, all centered
on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and capacity building. The National
Green Technology and Climate Change Council and Malaysian Green Technology
Corporation (GreenTech Malaysia) provide institutional support for the policy.
(footnote 84). GreenTech Malaysia promotes and coordinates programs that
help realize the country’s potential for green technology (footnote 84).
Table 5.4 summarizes Malaysia’s climate change legal and policy framework.
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M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in Malaysia: An Excerpt from the 2015
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Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
Government of Malaysia. 2012. National Water Resources Policy. Kuala Lumpur. More
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Kuala Lumpur.
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Table 5.4: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Malaysia
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963 and
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 2019
Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 2016–2020, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

National Policy on Climate
Change, 2010
Green Technology Financing
Scheme, 2010

Energy

National Energy Efficiency
Action Plan, 2015
National Renewable Energy
Policy and Action Plan,
2008
National Biofuel Policy of
Malaysia, 2006

Renewable Energy Act 2011
(2015 amendments)
Sustainable Energy
Development Authority
Act 2011
Malaysian Biofuel Industry
Act 2007
Electricity Supply Act 1990
(2015 amendments)

LULUCF and REDD+

National REDD Plus Strategy,
2016–2025, 2016

Forest Research Institute
Malaysia Act 2016

Disaster risk
management

Policy and Mechanism
of National Disaster
Management and Relief
(National Security Council
Directive No. 20 of 1997)

Other

National Policy on Biological
Diversity 2016–2025, 2016
National Green Technology
Policy, 2009

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Efficient Management
of Electrical Energy
Regulations 2008

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.
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Malaysia’s climate legislation and policies demonstrate a strong focus on the
energy sector. Promoting renewable energy development was identified as a
priority area in the Eighth Development Plan 2001–2005, Ninth Development
Plan 2006–2010, and Tenth Development Plan 2011–2015.87 The Eleventh
Development Plan 2016–2020 continues the country’s focus on renewable
energy. It emphasizes reducing Malaysia’s carbon footprint, protecting the
country from climate change impacts, improving ecological conservation, and
strengthening resilience against climate change and associated natural disasters.88
In 2016, Malaysia introduced the National Policy on Biological Diversity
(2016–2025), which highlights the need for continued conservation, sustainable
utilization, and the sharing of benefits from biodiversity fairly and equitably.89 The
policy calls for improving forest management and rehabilitation to help carbon
sequestration, as well as increasing biodiversity conservation.

C. Energy Supply
In 2016, Malaysia’s total primary energy supply (TPES) was 93.396 million tonnes
of oil equivalent (Mtoe), which came from natural gas (40.7%), crude oil and
petroleum (33.5%), coal and coke (fuel) (20.2%), hydropower (4.8%), biodiesel
(0.4%), biomass (0.2%), and solar power (0.1%).90 Biogas production was
negligible (footnote 90). Since 1996, increases in the TPES have been primarily
driven by natural gas, followed by crude oil and petroleum, as well as coal and
coke, and hydropower (footnote 90).
Malaysia’s TPES is projected to increase to more than 200 Mtoe by 2040.91 The
projected energy supply mix is composed of oil (38.3%), natural gas (35.4%), coal
(24.7%), and hydropower (1.3%) (footnote 91). Natural gas is expected to increase
to 76.55 Mtoe by 2040 at an average annual growth rate of 4.1%, hydropower to
2.75 Mtoe in 2040 at 4.2%, coal at 4.9%, and oil at 3.5% (footnote 91).
In 2015, KeTTHA released the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan to reduce
electricity demand growth by 8% over 10 years.92 The plan forecasts a total
reduction of 88 million tons of CO2 (tCO2) equivalent over the lifetime of energyefficient technologies adopted (footnote 92). The Electricity Supply Act 1990
provides a legislative foundation for the plan’s energy conservation goals.
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Government of Malaysia. 2001. Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001–2005. Kuala Lumpur; Government of
Malaysia. 2006. Ninth Malaysia Plan, 2006–2010. Kuala Lumpur; and Government of Malaysia.
2010. Tenth Malaysia Plan, 2011–2015. Kuala Lumpur.
Government of Malaysia. 2015. Eleventh Malaysia Plan, 2016–2020: Anchoring Growth on People.
Kuala Lumpur.
Government of Malaysia, MONRE. 2016. National Policy on Biological Diversity (2016–2025).
Kuala Lumpur.
Suruhanjaya Tenaga (Energy Commission). 2018. Malaysia Energy Statistics Handbook 2018. Putrajaya.
Z. Zulkifli. 2016. Malaysia Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook and Energy
Saving Potential in East Asia 2016. ERIA Research Project Report 2015-5. Jakarta: ERIA. pp. 215–236.
Government of Malaysia, Kementerian Tenaga Teknologi, Hijau Dan Air (KeTTHA). 2015.
National Energy Efficiency Action Plan. Kuala Lumpur. p. 21.
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1. Renewable Energy Policies
Beginning with the Eighth Malaysia Plan, 2001–2005, developing the renewable
energy sector has been a priority. The Eleventh Development Plan, 2016–2020
includes policy objectives and initiatives aimed at scaling up renewable energy
projects by 2020, such as 2,080 megawatts (MW) of renewable energy capacity
and net metering (footnote 88). KeTTHA is responsible for promoting the uptake
of renewable energy, green technology, and energy efficiency standards under the
National Green Technology Strategy in 2009.93
Malaysia created a system of feed-in tariffs under the Renewable Energy Act 2011,
which guarantees fixed tariff rates for solar, biomass, biogas, and hydropower for
16–21 years. The government expects the feed-in tariff system to reach a capacity
of 2,080 MW by 2020 (approximately 11% of peak electricity demand), avoiding
42.2 million tCO2 equivalent (footnote 93).
Other initiatives include the Small Renewable Energy Power, Sarawak Corridor
of Renewable Energy, and Biomass for Generation and Co-Generation programs
(footnote 84). Established in 2001, the Small Renewable Energy Power program aimed
to supply small power plants with electricity from renewable resources—biomass,
biogas, municipal waste, solar, mini-hydro, and wind—that access the distribution
grid system (footnote 84). However, the program was mostly unsuccessful. Of the
50 projects approved in 2001–2008 (with a total capacity of 288 MW), 40% were
canceled and 25% were issued with licenses, but never started operating.94
Sarawak Corridor of Renewable Energy, on the other hand, has attracted about
RM79.3 billion (or $19.1 billion in late 2020) of investment as of August 2018.95
The 2,400 MW Bakun dam, a major hydro project completed in 2011, will have
an additional turbine, expanding its power generation capacity to 2,700 MW.96
Ongoing projects include the 1,285 MW Baleh dam and the 944 MW Murum dam
(footnote 95). The Biomass for Generation and Co-Generation Project was
initiated in 2002 with support from the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the private sector.
“It focuses on palm oil industries and the use of waste material in generating”
and supplying electricity to the grid.97 The 14 MW power plant in Tawau, Sabah,
is a major biomass project. In 2004, it used oil palm residues to mitigate up to
50,000 tCO2.98

93
94

95
96

97
98

Footnote 84, p. 3.
B. Sovacool and I.M. Drupady. 2016. Energy Access, Poverty, and Development: The Governance of
Small-Scale Renewable Energy in Developing Asia. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge.
J. Wong. 2018. Sarawak Corridor Attracts RM79.3bil in Investments. The Star. 13 August.
S. Tawie. 2018. Sarawak to Raise Bakun Dam Power Capacity with New Turbine. Malay Mail.
12 October.
UNDP. 2007. Malaysia Generating Renewable Energy from Palm Oil Wastes. Kuala Lumpur. p. iii.
World Bank and Australian Agency for International Development. 2013. Green Infrastructure
Finance: Green Investment Climate Country Profile—Malaysia. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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D. Energy Demand
In 2016, Malaysia’s total final energy consumption (TFEC) was 57.218 Mtoe,
which came from petroleum products (53.0%), electricity (21.7%), natural gas
(21.5%), coal and coke (3.1%), and biodiesel (0.7%) (footnote 90). Since 1996,
increases in the TFEC have been primarily driven by petroleum products, followed
by electricity, natural gas, and coal and coke (footnote 90). Energy consumption
in 2016 was divided among the following sectors: transportation (42.0%),
industry (28.0%), non-energy use (15.3%), residential and commercial (14.1%),
and agriculture (0.7%) (footnote 90).
Malaysia’s TFEC is projected to increase to 157.37 Mtoe by 2040 (footnote 91).
The projected energy consumption mix is composed of oil (51.4%), natural
gas (22.5%), electricity (22.5%), and coal (3.5%) (footnote 91). Oil demand is
expected to increase to 80.83 Mtoe by 2040 at an average annual growth rate of
3.7% (footnote 91). Coal is expected to grow annually at 4.8% and electricity at
4.4% (footnote 91).

1. Sector-Wide Strategies
The Electricity Supply Act 1990, which was amended in 2015, creates the
legislative basis for regulating the electricity sector, specifically the electricity
supply industry, the supply of electricity at reasonable prices, the licensing and
control of any electrical installation, plant and equipment safety, and the efficient
use of electricity.
The government has issued two regulations to support the implementation of
the Electricity Supply Act. First, the Electricity (Amendment) Regulations 2013
introduce minimum energy performance standards for household appliances
and lighting. These regulations create an energy efficiency rating system for
electrical appliances and set a required minimum energy efficiency level for
certain appliances. Second, the Efficient Management of Electrical Energy
Regulations 2008 require all installations with consumption exceeding 3 million
kilowatt-hours (kWh) over 6 consecutive months to engage an electrical energy
manager.99 The manager must assess electrical energy consumption and advise
on and monitor energy efficiency measures.
The government has also launched a series of fiscal incentives for energy
efficiency, e.g., a 100% tax exemption of statutory income for 10 years for
companies who provide energy conservation services.100 An import duty
and sales tax exemption is also available for companies that import energyefficient equipment or purchase secondhand or locally produced equipment
99
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Government of Malaysia. 2008. Efficient Management of Electrical Energy Regulations 2008.
Kuala Lumpur.
Kementerian Tenaga, KeTTHA. 2010. Incentives for Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency & Green
Buildings in Malaysia.
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(footnote 100). Finally, the Green Technology Financing Scheme provides soft
loans to companies to develop green technology.101

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Malaysia has one of the highest deforestation rates in the world, which is
increasing more rapidly than any other tropical country.102 The country lost
14.4% or 47,278 square kilometers (km2) of its forest cover from 2000 to 2012,
an area larger than Denmark (footnote 102). The National Forestry Act 1984 is
the main law on forest management. The act, amended in 1993, establishes a
comprehensive approach to sustainable forestry management and conservation.
It also imposes fines for illegal logging.
Malaysia’s National REDD Plus Strategy (2016–2025) provides a framework
to conserve forests as carbon sinks and their biodiversity in the face of climate
change.103 It first outlines actions to build synergies and coherence between
the federal government—which will lead to implementing the strategy—and
state governments. State governments have jurisdiction over land, water, and
forests. The strategy then outlines actions to reduce emissions and deforestation,
including expanding the terrestrial protected areas network, and identifying and
rehabilitating vulnerable ecosystems. It concludes by outlining actions to develop
a sustainable financing mechanism by coordinating with the private sector and
accessing international REDD+ funding.
The Forest Research Institute Malaysia Act 2016 provides for the continued
existence of the Forest Research Institute and dissolves the Malaysian Forestry
Research and Development Board. The act delineates the functions of the
Forest Research Institute, including the responsibilities to implement policies
on research and development programs. The goals are to ensure the growth
and sustainability of the forest and forest-based industries and to conduct and
promote forestry research.

F.

Transportation

Malaysia launched the National Biofuel Policy in 2006 to promote the production
and consumption of biodiesel from palm oil.104 The policy aims to reduce the use
of and dependency on fossil fuels, decrease imports of petroleum diesel, stimulate
new demand for palm oil, lessen GHG emissions, and promote more efficient
use of raw materials (footnote 104). In 2004–2006, the government provided
$26.8 million in subsidies to promote this policy (footnote 84). The policy is
101
102

103
104
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supplemented by the Malaysian Biofuel Industry Act 2007, which regulates the
blending of biofuel as well as its export, import, transport, and storage.
In 2010, the Government Transformation Programme was launched to promote
an effective, accountable, advanced, united, and just government.105 Improving
urban public transport, especially in the Klang Valley, is one of the six pillars of the
program.

G. Adaptation
Malaysia takes part in various initiatives related to climate change adaptation,
such as the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security.
Goal 4 of the Malaysia Draft National Plan of Action focuses on climate change
adaptation.106
Malaysia spent RM51 billion ($12.3 billion in late 2020) to build climate change
resilience under its Tenth Malaysia Plan (footnote 83). The Second National
Physical Plan (2010–2020) identifies measures to deal with climate change. The
National Water Resources Policy specifies the need to determine measures to aid
the adaptation of water resources to threats and emerging threats.107 In addition,
in its Second National Communication to the UNFCCC, the government
highlights seven sectors where vulnerability assessments have identified
“no-regret” actions, which “will prove useful regardless of whether future climate
change impacts do indeed occur.” 108

H. Disaster Risk Management
The Policy and Mechanism of National Disaster Management and Relief was
implemented in 1997 to respond to the high number of disasters in Malaysia.109
It creates a classification system for disasters and establishes the Disaster
Management and Relief Committee to coordinate disaster responses.
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V. Myanmar
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is a unitary parliamentary republic, which is
vulnerable to climate change. The largest city, Yangon, is one of the world’s five most
vulnerable cities to climate change.110 Myanmar has been ranked as the world’s second
most vulnerable country to extreme weather events.111 It faces adverse climate impacts,
including flooding and sea level rise, drought, heat waves, and seasonal changes that
affect agriculture, water resources, public health, forestry, and biodiversity.112
A large proportion of the population lives in low-lying areas that are particularly
vulnerable to climate-related risks like flooding (footnote 112). Saltwater intrusion
is already compromising freshwater supplies and undermining agriculture and
freshwater fisheries (footnote 112). Climate change is also projected to worsen
existing development issues like food and water insecurity (footnote 112).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Myanmar’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) establishes mitigation
goals, including targets to reach by 2030: (i) producing 9.4 gigawatts (GW)
of hydroelectric power, (ii) generating 30% of rural electricity from renewable
energy, and (iii) reducing electricity consumption by 20% through enhanced
energy efficiency. Another goal is to distribute approximately 260,000 energyefficient cookstoves during 2016–2031.113 These mitigation actions are conditional
on Myanmar receiving international financial support (footnote 113).
The NDC also notes the importance of adaptation and disaster risk reduction. For
adaptation, it prioritizes building resilience in the agriculture sector, developing
early warning systems, and preserving forests (footnote 113).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Myanmar has established an institutional structure for addressing climate-related
challenges—i.e., the National Environmental Conservation Committee, which guides
all national climate measures and serves as the focal point for various international
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V. Thomas. 2017. Climate Change and Natural Disasters: Transforming Economies and Policies for a
Sustainable Future. New York: Routledge.
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environmental conventions, including the UNFCCC in Myanmar.114 The committee
is responsible for developing climate change policies and action plans. It collaborates
with the Environmental Conservation Department to achieve its goals.115
The Environmental Conservation Department is a subunit of the Ministry of
Environmental Conservation and Forestry (MOECAF) responsible for all national
environmental policy. The MOECAF’s environmental performance assessment
monitors and evaluates the success of environmental policies, including those related
to climate change, deforestation, water resource management, and air pollution.
To respond to climate change, Myanmar released its Climate Change Strategy
and Action Plan, 2016–2030 in 2017.116 It identifies six key social and economic
development sectors:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

“agriculture, fisheries, and livestock;
natural resource management;
energy, transport, and industrial systems;
towns and cities;
disasters, risks, and health impacts; and
education, awareness, and technological systems.”117

The principled action plan supports development that is inclusive, resourceefficient, integrated, and results-oriented (footnote 116). The ultimate objectives
are to “increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable communities and sectors so
that they are resilient to the adverse impacts of climate change, and create and
maximise opportunities for sectors to pursue a low-carbon growth pathway . . .” 118
Myanmar produced policy guidance briefs with a sectoral action plan.119 Each
sectoral action plan addresses key objectives and strategies such as (i) integrating
climate change considerations into environmental management, (ii) establishing and
reinforcing institutional arrangements for climate change responses, (iii) improving
resilience and low-carbon initiatives, (iv) establishing financial mechanisms for
climate change responses, and (v) promoting multi-stakeholder partnerships.
Myanmar’s Sustainable Development Plan, 2018–2030 serves as another
guiding climate-related policy with five goals, each with clear strategies with
action plans.120 Goal 5 (Natural Resources & the Environment for Posterity of the
114
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Nation) calls for (i) ensuring a clean environment with a healthy and functioning
ecosystem; (ii) increasing climate change resilience; (iii) enabling safe and
equitable access to water and sanitation; (iv) providing affordable and reliable
energy through diverse sources of generation; (v) promoting sustainable land use;
and (vi) managing cities, towns, and historical and cultural centers efficiently and
sustainably (footnote 120).
Given that food insecurity is one of Myanmar’s key climate-related challenges,
the government launched in 2015 the Myanmar Climate-Smart Agriculture
Strategy, an agricultural policy that aims to build resilience in response to climaterelated threats to agriculture.121 These threats include water scarcity, drought,
rising temperatures, floods, land degradation, deforestation, and increased rates
of natural disasters (footnote 121).
The Myanmar Climate-Smart Agriculture Strategy seeks to ensure Myanmar’s
food security by using various measures such as carbon sequestration,
increased agricultural productivity and resilience, and proper land management
(footnote 121). Adaptation target outcomes identified under the strategy include
“(1) new varieties [of] and improved farming systems resilient to drought and
water stress, (2) diversified rural income and improved household economic
resilience, and (3) increased prevention and protection against disasters.”122
Table 5.5 summarizes Myanmar’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
In 2016, Myanmar’s total primary energy supply (TPES) was 14.484 million tonnes of
oil equivalent (Mtoe), which came from biomass (49%), oil (24%), natural gas (20%),
hydropower (5%), and coal (2%).123 Other renewable energy production was negligible
(footnote 123). Since 2000, Myanmar’s TPES has increased by an annual average
of 3.7% (footnote 123). The highest growth rates during this time have been from
coal (12.8%), hydropower (12.3%), natural gas (6.4%), and oil (6%) (footnote 123).
The TPES is projected to increase to 32.7 Mtoe by 2040.124 Myanmar’s projected
energy supply mix is composed of biomass (36.1%), oil (28.7%), natural gas (13.5%),
hydropower (11.2%), and coal (8.8) (footnote 124). Coal is expected to annually
grow by an average rate of 7.9%, hydropower by 6.0%, oil by 4.6%, and natural gas by
3.5% (footnote 124). Biomass is expected to grow more slowly (footnote 124).
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Table 5.5: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Myanmar
The Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar,
2008
Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018−2030),
2018
National Sustainable Development Strategy for Myanmar,
2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2017 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Myanmar Climate Change
Strategy and Action
Plan (2016−2030), 2017

Energy

Policy Guidance Brief 3:
Resilient and Low-Carbon
Energy, Transport and
Industrial Systems for
Sustainable Growth, 2017

LULUCF and REDD+

Policy Guidance Brief 2:
Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources for
Healthy Ecosystems, 2017

Environmental
assessment

Environmental Impact
Assessment Procedure,
Ministry of Environmental
Conservation and Forestry
Notification No. 616 of 2015

Food production and
food security

Cities and buildings

Myanmar Climate-Smart
Agriculture Strategy,
2015

Policy Guidance Brief 1:
Climate-Smart Agriculture,
Fisheries and Livestock for
Food Security, 2017
Policy Guidance Brief 4:
Building Resilient,
Inclusive, and Sustainable
Cities and Towns in
Myanmar, continued
2017 on next page
continued on next page
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Table 5.5 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Disaster risk
management

Myanmar Action Plan on
Disaster Risk Reduction,
2017
Myanmar National
Framework for
Community Disaster
Resilience, 2017

Law No. 21 (Natural
Disaster Management
Law), 2013

Other

National Biodiversity
Strategy and Action
Plan (2015−2020), 2015

Law No. 9/2012
(The Environmental
Conservation Law),
2012

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Policy Guidance Brief 5:
Managing Climate Risks
for People’s Health and
Well-Being, 2017
Policy Guidance Brief 6:
Building a Resilient
Myanmar Society through
Education, Science and
Technology, 2017
Environmental Conservation
Rules, 2014

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

Relevant agencies within the Ministry of Energy have assumed the responsibilities
of the Energy Planning Department, which was abolished in 2015.125 These
functions include coordinating the activities of the three energy enterprises that
are central to the country’s economic development strategy: (i) Myanma Oil
and Gas Enterprise, which operates oil and gas fields both onshore and offshore;
(ii) Myanma Petrochemical Enterprise, which operates liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG), methanol, and urea fertilizer plants, and transports crude oil and
petroleum products; and (iii) Myanma Petroleum Products Enterprise, which
distributes petroleum products (footnote 125).
The oil and gas industry accounts for approximately 85% of reported revenues
from the extractive sector or nearly 25% of government revenues in 2017.126
Myanmar has also been converting vehicles to natural gas since 1986.127
The sectoral action plan for the energy, transportation, and industry sectors
addresses Myanmar’s inadequate power supply infrastructure, general dependency
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2 January.
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on wood fuel in rural areas, and low electrification rates.128 The action plan
provides policy recommendations—such as increasing renewable energy
production and diversifying the country’s energy mix—to help Myanmar realize its
full energy potential in a climate-resilient and low-carbon fashion (footnote 128).

D. Energy Demand
In 2016, Myanmar’s total final energy consumption (TFEC) was 15.292 Mtoe,
increasing at an average annual growth rate of 3.2% (footnote 123). Energy
consumption came from biomass (58%), petroleum (27%), electricity (9%),
natural gas (3%), and coal (3%) (footnote 123). Energy consumption in 2016
was divided among the following sectors: industry (37.6%), residential (28.4%),
service (19.1%), transportation (14.6%), and others (0.3%) (footnote 123).
Myanmar’s TFEC is projected to increase to 29.84 Mtoe by 2040 (footnote 124).
The largest source of energy consumption by 2040 is expected to be oil (31.1%)
(footnote 124). Natural gas consumption is projected to have an average annual
increase of 5.0% and coal consumption of 4.8% (footnote 124).
In 2013, the National Energy Management Committee and the Energy Development
Committee (both ministerial) were established to oversee the energy sector.129
The National Energy Management Committee was tasked with (i) formulating
the national energy policy, (ii) privatizing state-owned sectors, (iii) developing
the electricity sector with short- and long-term plans, and (iv) inviting foreign and
domestic investments in energy development (footnote 129).
Myanmar aims to reduce TFEC by 5% by 2020 and 8% by 2030 (footnote 124). It also
intends to improve energy efficiency by 16% in all sectors by 2030.130 These targets can
be achieved by implementing the following strategies by 2020: (i) improving energy
efficiency in the industry sector by 10% against business as usual (BAU) and reducing
energy-related GHGs, (ii) replacing at least 8% of the energy in the transport sector with
biofuels, (iii) increasing the proportion of renewable energy to 15%, and (iv) improving
energy efficiency in the commercial and residential sectors by 8% (footnote 124).

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

GHG emissions from the forestry sector (caused by biomass burning following
land clearing) were estimated at 40,405 gigagrams CO2 equivalent in 2000.131
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Government of Myanmar, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation. 2017.
Resilient and Low-Carbon Energy, Transport and Industrial Systems for Sustainable Growth.
Policy Guidance Brief 3. Nay Pyi Taw.
World Economic Forum, ADB, and Accenture. 2013. New Energy Architecture: Myanmar.
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Land-use changes, deforestation, shifting cultivation, and land clearance also
result in significant GHG emissions (footnote 131).
In 2000, the Ministry of Forestry approved and implemented the National Forest
Master Plan, a 30-year plan aiming for 919,000 hectares of community forests
by 2030–2031.132 In 2011, Myanmar became a partner country of the United
Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation. In July 2013, it approved the REDD+ Readiness Roadmap outlining
the country’s activities aimed at reducing emissions due to deforestation and
forest degradation.133 The inclusive but streamlined REDD+ Task Force, guided by
the National Environmental Conservation Committee and chaired by the Forestry
Department of MOECAF, is in charge of managing and coordinating the readiness
activities (footnote 133).
The sectoral action plan for the natural resources sector addresses Myanmar’s
deforestation and forest degradation.134 It seeks to bolster the resilience of
Myanmar’s biodiversity and ecosystem services to support social and economic
development and preserve the country’s forests as a major carbon sink
(footnote 134). The plan also includes recommendations such as (i) enforcing
laws and regulations against illegal commercial logging, (ii) converting forest
to agricultural land, and (iii) strengthening ecosystem-based adaptation and
management of biodiversity-rich areas (footnote 134).

F.

Transportation

The transport sector consumed 51.5% of total final energy in 2010.135 By 2035, the
sector’s energy demand is expected to increase to 57% total final consumption
(footnote 135). Although the government has yet to promulgate a transport
sector strategy, it has expressed concerns about air pollution and air quality
management in the Ministerial Statement on Global Environment and Energy
in Transport.136

G. Adaptation
In 2012, Myanmar issued its National Adaptation Programme of Action to
Climate Change, following Cyclone Nargis in 2008, the most devastating
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cyclone the country had experienced (footnote 114). Based on official figures,
Cyclone Nargis killed 84,500 people, left 53,800 missing, and affected at least
2.4 million people.137 Identified climate hazards include cyclones, heavy rains,
floods, extreme temperatures, drought, and sea level rise (footnote 114). Together
with deforestation and diminishing water resources, climate-related hazards
and extreme weather events impact agriculture, water resources, energy, public
health, and natural resources (footnote 114).
The National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, first issued in 2011, outlines
the country’s approach to biodiversity conservation.138 It notes that existing
protected areas, such as the mangrove ecosystem in the Meinmahla Kyun
Wildlife Sanctuary, have been subjected to extensive encroachment and
overexploitation of biological resources (footnote 138). The updated National
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan, 2015–2020 takes note of new information
and emphasizes the importance of adopting the precautionary approach to
protecting biological diversity from the risks posed by living modified organisms
and increasing the potential for adaptation.139

H. Disaster Risk Management
In 2013, the Assembly of the Union enacted the Disaster Management Law.
One of its principal objectives is to establish the national committee and local
bodies on disaster management and risk reduction. The Myanmar Action Plan
on Disaster Risk Reduction, implemented in 2017, recognizes the specific risks
faced by Myanmar, including sea level rise, extreme heat waves, and changing
rainfall patterns.140 The plan seeks to increase disaster preparedness through a
multi-hazard early warning system, a methodology for risk assessment, and foster
community-based disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
The Myanmar National Framework for Community Disaster Resilience (2017)
builds on this approach by articulating three objectives: (i) promoting a common
understanding among stakeholders of the need to strengthen community
disaster resilience, (ii) proposing coherent approaches and lessons for building
community-level disaster resilience, and (iii) identifying opportunities to
strengthen community disaster resilience through development.141
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VI. People’s Republic of China
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Rapid economic growth and a population of nearly 1.4 billion people mean significant
climate challenges for the People’s Republic of China (PRC).142 As the world’s biggest
total emitter of carbon, the PRC will need unprecedented declines in emissions.143
Deep emission reductions will also be vital for supporting global efforts to secure a
stable climate (footnote 143). Recognizing the need to contribute to global emissions
reductions, the PRC has now committed to reach carbon neutrality before 2060.
The PRC has experienced increasingly frequent extreme weather events in recent
years.144 Since the 1960s, the PRC’s annual mean surface air temperature has risen
by 1.1ºC (footnote 144). The south is a particularly vulnerable region to climate
change. Many areas in the south have suffered extremely high temperatures and
increased flooding, landslides, and mudslides.145 In Yunnan Province, for example,
moderate to severe droughts have impacted agriculture and livelihoods.146
Adaptation, therefore, forms a key part of the PRC’s response to climate change.

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The PRC’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement
sets ambitious quantified targets for economy-wide emissions reductions in the
energy, forestry, transport, building, and agriculture sectors.147 The PRC pledges
to “lower carbon dioxide [CO2] emissions per unit of GDP by 60% to 65% from
the 2005 level” and to “increase the share of non-fossil-fuels in primary energy
consumption to around 20%” by 2030.148 Natural gas consumption will constitute
10% of primary energy consumption by 2020 (footnote 147).
The NDC commits the PRC to expand renewable energy capacity—100 gigawatts
(GW) of solar power and 200 GW of wind power by 2020 (footnote 147). The
142
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PRC sets two quantified goals for the forestry sector: (i) “increase the forested
area by 40 million hectares and the forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters
compared to the 2005 levels” by 2020; and (ii) “increase the forest stock volume
by around 4.5 billion cubic meters on the 2005 level” by 2030.149 Finally, by
2020, the PRC pledges to achieve a 30% share of public transport in motorized
travel in big- and medium-sized cities, a 50% share of green buildings in newly
built buildings of cities and towns, and zero growth of fertilizer and pesticide use
(footnote 147).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The PRC considers climate action an integral part of achieving sustainable
development and ensuring energy, ecological, and food security. The 13th
Five-Year Plan outlines the country’s development pathway, including its targets
for efficiency and the environment.150 The plan, published in 2016, aims for peak
targets of energy consumption, water use, and carbon emissions. It also contains
goals such as increasing renewable energy production, eliminating inefficient
production facilities, and implementing green infrastructure.
Specific targets of the plan include (i) an 18% reduction in CO2 emissions per
unit of GDP by 2020 compared with 2015 levels, (ii) a 15% reduction in energy
consumption per unit of GDP by 2020 compared with 2015 levels, (iii) an
expansion of the market for electric vehicles, and (iv) an increase to 23% forest
coverage over 5 years (footnote 150).
In addition to integrating climate change into its development planning, the PRC
has also created climate policies that focus on energy, forestry, transport, and
building sectors. In 2014, the government launched the National Plan for Tackling
Climate Change 2014–2020 (Climate Change Plan) to provide a comprehensive
strategy on mitigation, adaptation, public awareness, and scientific research.151
The Climate Change Plan includes targets, tasks, and safeguarding measures,
and sets three main goals: (i) decreasing carbon emissions per unit of GDP by
40%–45% from a 2005 baseline, (ii) increasing the share of nonfossil fuels in
primary energy consumption up to 15%, and (iii) increasing proportions of stock
volume by 1.3 million cubic meters and forest area by 40 million hectares.
The Climate Change Plan also sets some quantified targets across the energy,
transportation, and building sectors. In the energy sector, the Climate Change
Plan describes measures to limit coal consumption and increase nonfossil-fuel
consumption. To this end, the Climate Change Plan describes efforts to increase
renewable energy capacity. In 2020, the installed capacity of biomass power
149
150
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Footnote 147, pp. 3 and 5.
Government of the PRC, National Development and Reform Commission. 2016. The 13th
Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016−2020).
Beijing.
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law. National Plan for Tackling Climate Change 2014–2020.
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generation will reach 30 million kilowatts (footnote 151). Consumption of biomass
fuel will reach 50 million tons annually, with biogas use reaching 44 billion cubic
meters (footnote 151). The government also plans for biological liquid fuel use to
reach 130 billion cubic meters annually in 2020 (footnote 151).
The PRC is also supporting solar energy use. The installed capacity of solar power
generation will reach 100 million kilowatts in 2020, with solar farms covering 800
million square meters (footnote 151). The government will also build 80 millionkilowatt-class wind power bases and develop offshore wind power projects to
reach an installed grid-connected wind power of 200 million kilowatts by 2020
(footnote 151). According to the Climate Change Plan, the annual generation
capacity of hydropower will reach 1.2 trillion kilowatt-hours by 2020, and the
government will safely develop nuclear power (footnote 151).
The Climate Change Plan includes two transportation-related goals: (i) reducing
carbon emissions from railway transportation by 15% compared with 2010, and
(ii) achieving a 30% share of public transportation use in cities by 2020 against
a 2014 baseline (footnote 151). Finally, the Climate Change Plan notes that “the
percentage of green buildings in new towns will reach 50% by 2020 against a 2014
baseline” (footnote 151). Although the plan provides a national guiding framework
for climate action, provinces and municipalities must also develop their locally
informed plans. Many provinces and municipalities have already done so.
The government also launched the comprehensive National Strategy for
Climate Change Adaptation in 2013 (Adaptation Strategy) to respond to the
PRC’s climate change vulnerability.152 The Adaptation Strategy, published by the
National Development and Reform Commission, aims to minimize soil erosion,
protect water resources, strengthen disaster prevention, develop monitoring
systems for ocean disasters, develop new farming techniques, and restore the
coastline. Additionally, it contains weather-based financing mechanisms, which
include weather index-based insurance and catastrophe bonds.
The Adaptation Strategy also sets quantified targets for the forestry and
agriculture sectors. “By 2020, the forest coverage will reach 23%, and the forest
reserves will exceed 15 billion cubic meters” (footnote 152). Second, “more than
95% of the state’s key protected wild animals and over 90% of the minimum
wild plant species will be effectively protected against desertification by 2020”
(footnote 152). Third, new farming practices, including controlling plant-eating
pests and improving crop adaptability, will be developed to reduce climate impacts
on agriculture. Lastly, “the penetration rate of practical adaptive technical training
for rural labor will reach 70% by 2020 against a 2013 baseline” (footnote 152).
Table 5.6 summarizes the PRC’s climate change legal and policy framework.

152

Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law. National Strategy for Climate Change Adaptation.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF C
 HINA LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARIES

Table 5.6: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of the People’s Republic of China
The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1982
13th Five-Year Plan (2016−2020), 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

National Plan for Tackling
Climate Change
2014−2020, 2014
The National Strategy
for Climate Change
Adaptation, 2013

Energy

Energy Development
Strategy Action Plan
(2014−2020), 2014

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Energy Conservation
Law, 2007
Renewable Energy
Law of the People’s
Republic of China,
2005

LULUCF and REDD+

Forestry Law of the
People’s Republic of
China, 1984

Other

Law on the Prevention
and Control of Air
Pollution, 2015

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.
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C. Energy Supply
The PRC’s rapid industrialization and urbanization have been carbon intensive.153
The PRC is endowed with coal, oil, and gas reserves, and has significant
hydropower potential.154 It is the world’s largest coal producer and has the
third-largest coal reserves (footnote 154). However, the government has aimed
to reduce GHG emissions even as it continues to pursue economic growth.
In September 2020, the government announced its plan to achieve carbon
neutrality before 2060.155
In 2013, the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP had fallen by 28.5% since 2005.156
That same year, nonfossil fuels made up 9.8% of primary energy consumption.157
Coal’s share in total primary energy supply (TPES) is expected to decrease by 0.1%
a year on average, although it will continue to serve as the largest source of energy in
2040 under a BAU scenario.158 In 2015, TPES consisted of coal (66.7%), oil (18.0%),
natural gas (5.3%), hydropower (3.2%), nuclear and other sources (6.8%)
(footnote 158).
The PRC’s power is primarily generated from coal-fired power plants, whose
electricity generation accounted for 78.2% in 2015 (footnote 158). The share
of hydro was 16.4% in 2015, with gas, oil, and nuclear energy generation making
up the balance (5.4%) (footnote 158). The PRC set a goal of carbon emissions
peaking by 2030 in its NDC. To reach this ambitious target, the PRC has
implemented a range of policies to promote fuel-switching and energy efficiency.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
The PRC plans to reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 18% by 2020
compared with 2015 levels (footnote 150). The Energy Development Strategy
Action Plan (2014–2020) plays a large role in achieving this target by
implementing measures and mandatory targets, and encouraging efficient energy
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C. Wojcik. 2017. Chinese Industrialization & Subsequent Environmental Degradation. Dickinson
College Honors Theses. Paper 256.
Y. Hao and R. Han. 2016. China Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook and
Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2016. ERIA Research Project Report 2015-5. Jakarta: ERIA.
pp. 109–125.
L. Myllyvirta and L. Yedan. 2020. Analysis: China’s Covid Stimulus Plans for Fossil Fuels Three
Times Larger Than Low-Carbon. Carbon Brief. News release. 23 September.
L. Zhu et al. 2015. Climate Policy: Steps to China’s Carbon Peak. Nature. 522 (7,556). pp. 279–281.
17 June.
H. Jian-Kun. 2015. China’s INDC and Non-Fossil Energy Development. Advances in Climate
Change Research. 6 (3−4). pp. 210–215.
H. Yu and Z. Mingyuan. 2019. China Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook
and Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2019. ERIA. pp. 97–111.
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consumption and production practices.159 Critically, the plan aims to cap the
annual coal consumption at 4.2 billion tons by 2020 and reduce coal’s share in
the PRC’s TPES to less than 62% by that year.
Other targets include (i) increasing the share of nonfossil fuel resources in
the primary energy mix from 9.8% in 2013 to 15% in 2020 and 20% in 2030;
(ii) increasing the natural gas share in the energy mix to over 10% and decreasing
the coal share to below 62%; (iii) installing 58 GW of nuclear capacity by 2020;
(iv) reaching 350 GW of hydro capacity, 200 GW of wind capacity, and 100 GW
of solar capacity by 2020; and (v) achieving 85% energy self-sufficiency through
these measures (footnote 159).
The Law on the Prevention and Control of Air Pollution, 2015 seeks to limit air
pollutants, including GHGs, authorizing the government to promote clean energy.
It requires the efficient and clean use of coal and bans the use of low-quality coal.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
In 2005, the PRC passed the Renewable Energy Law, 2005, which requires the
government to promote renewable energy and sets a goal of 15% renewable
energy share by 2020. The law provides descriptions of duties pertaining to
renewable energy use and development for businesses, the government, and
other users. It stipulates specific goals and measures about regulation, grid
connection, tax reliefs and special funds, and differentiated pricing. Additionally,
it mandates the establishment of a renewable energy development fund and
requires that the government manage renewable energy resources and coordinate
national surveys.
Under this law, the Government Offices Administration of the State Council must
set and publish targets for national renewable energy volumes. The PRC ranks
first in the world in several areas: installed and under-construction renewable
energy capacity and generation of hydropower, installed capacity of solar
photovoltaic power, and under-construction nuclear power.160

D. Energy Demand
The PRC can reduce its primary energy supply and consumption by about
734.6 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) or approximately 16% by 2040 if it
implements effective energy efficiency and conservation policies (footnote 154).
159
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Government of the PRC, State Council of China. 2014. Energy Development Strategy Action Plan
(2014−2020). Beijing. For a summary of the plan, see Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. Energy Development
Strategy Action Plan (2014–2020).
C. Campbell. 2019. China Is Bankrolling Green Energy Projects around the World. Time.
1 November; D. Roberts. 2019. The Global Transition to Clean Energy, Explained in 12 Charts.
Vox. 26 June; and L. Gil. 2017. How China Has Become the World’s Fastest Expanding Nuclear
Power Producer. International Atomic Energy Agency. 25 October.
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The 13th Five-Year Plan stipulates that energy consumption per unit of GDP will
drop by 15% by 2020 compared with 2015 levels (footnote 150). The government
has implemented various administrative, market-based, and legal measures to
achieve this goal.
The Energy Conservation Law, 2007 seeks to improve energy conservation by
promoting technology and efficient energy use and requires the government
to advocate for renewable energy implementation. It specifically includes the
importance of renewables such as solar, wind, and biomass in rural areas, and of
building energy plants on nonarable land and developing firewood forests. The
National People’s Congress is mandated to monitor these priorities.

E.

Carbon Pricing

The PRC deploys market-based measures to reduce emissions as part of its
development planning. For example, the 12th Five-Year Plan encourages the
use of market mechanisms to promote emissions reductions.161 Similarly, the
13th Five-Year Plan calls on the government to develop rules and regulations to
manage the national carbon trading program. The China Carbon Market program
was launched in 2017, after several years of regional pilot projects.162 Seven cities
and provinces—Beijing, Chongqing, Guangdong, Hubei, Shanghai, Shenzhen,
and Tianjin—participated, and their pilot emissions trading systems informed
the design of the national carbon trading program.163 The PRC’s national carbon
trading program is being developed by establishing and amending regulations,
developing market infrastructure, promoting reporting and verification, and
strengthening capacity.

F.

LULUCF and REDD+

The PRC treats forests as a key part of its effort to mitigate GHG emissions. The
PRC’s Climate Change Plan, for example, commits the government to cultivate
40 million hectares of forested land to reduce GHG emissions (footnote 151).
According to government reports, forest coverage increased from 18.21% in
2005 to 21.6% in 2013.164 The Forestry Law of the People’s Republic of China,
1984 serves as the pillar of forestry legislation in the country. It aims to cultivate,
protect, and encourage responsible use of forest resources through afforestation
measures, climate regulation, environmental improvement, and the use of forests
for soil conservation and water storage.
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Government of the PRC, National People’s Congress. 2011. 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) for
National Economic and Social Development. Beijing.
H. Harvey and M. Hu. 2017. The China Carbon Market Just Launched, And It’s The World’s
Largest. Here’s How It Can Succeed. Forbes. 19 December.
D. Stanway. 2012. China Orders 7 Pilot Cities and Provinces to set CO2 Caps. Reuters. 13 January.
M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in China: An Excerpt from the 2015 Global
Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
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Chapter IV of the forestry law specifically discusses tree planting efforts and
requires that local governments determine appropriate forest coverage levels in
consideration of local conditions. From 2012 to the first half of 2013, 10.25 million
hectares were afforested in afforestation drives and 4.96 billion trees planted
through volunteer tree planting drives.165

G. Adaptation
The Adaptation Strategy serves as the key document in guiding adaptation policy
(footnote 152). It seeks to build coastal resilience, minimize soil erosion, ensure
water security, and promote resilient agriculture. Some provinces have also
developed their regional strategic studies to address climate change.

H. Managing Water Resources
Water security is a significant issue for the PRC and climate change is aggravating it.
Rainfall patterns have changed since the early 1900s, declining by 20 mm–40 mm
per decade in northern provinces of the PRC and rising by 20 mm–60 mm
per decade in southern provinces of the PRC.166 Water stream flows have also
declined in the Hai River, Huang River, Huai River, and Liao River basins.167 Rising
temperatures will exacerbate water scarcity in the PRC. Current projections
suggest that average national temperatures will increase by 1.3ºC–2.1°C by 2020,
1.5ºC–2.8°C by 2030, and 2.3°C–3.3°C by 2050 (footnote 167). Increased
temperatures will cause higher evaporation rates, compounding water scarcity.
The PRC’s water shortage prompted the Ministry of Water Resources to create
research programs on water management, which considered the impact of
climate change on water resources. The government also stressed the critical
nature of strengthening water security in its 13th Five-Year Plan (footnote 150).
Chapter 31 of the plan commits to conducting feasibility studies on water
resource allocation and strengthening projects on flood control and mitigation
systems.

165

166

167

Information Office of the State Council. 2016. China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing
Climate Change. In D. Shambaugh, ed. The China Reader. 6th ed. New York, NY: Oxford
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VII. Philippines
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
A unitary state of more than 7,000 islands, the Republic of the Philippines has
a population of more than 106 million people.168 The Philippines faces some
climate-related threats, including coral reef bleaching and flooding due to sea
level rise, which will cause extensive damage to infrastructure and heritage
structures.169 It will also experience an increase in the rate and intensity of natural
disasters due to climate change (footnote 169).
The Philippines is already prone to extreme weather events, with 8–9 tropical
cyclones crossing the country every year.170 Considering that climate change will
only aggravate this threat, the Philippines has a strong interest in mitigating and
adapting to the effects of climate change.171

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Philippines’ first nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledges to
reduce GHG emissions by 70% by 2030 compared with a BAU scenario.172
To meet this target, the Philippines will reduce GHG emissions in the energy,
transport, waste, forestry, and industry sectors (footnote 172). The commitment
is conditional on external financial support, including technology development
and transfer, and capacity building (footnote 172). The NDC also identifies the
following areas for adaptation action: agriculture; coastal zone; disaster risk
management; education; energy; environment; heath; land use, land-use change,
and forestry (LULUCF); social development; tourism; transport; and water.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The Philippines has a strong legal basis for enacting mitigation and adaptation
measures and has been taking climate action since the early 1990s. First, the
Philippine Constitution grants a right “to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.” 173 As early as 1991, the Inter168
169
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ADB Data Library. Philippines: By the Numbers (accessed 3 January 2020).
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Agency Committee on Climate Change was formed.174 In 1999, the Clean Air Act
(Republic Act [RA] No. 8749) called for the regulation of GHGs. Following the
Clean Air Act, the government began tracking its GHG emissions and the loss of
its carbon sinks.
More recently, the Climate Change Act, 2009 (RA No. 9279) established a legal
framework through which climate change is mainstreamed into all decisionmaking levels, including disaster risk reduction, development planning, and poverty
reduction.175 The Climate Change Act establishes key principles of climate change
policy: the precautionary principle, common but differentiated responsibilities, the
Hyogo Framework for Action on disaster risk reduction, and the UNFCCC’s ultimate
objective of stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” 176
Additionally, the Climate Change Act establishes the Climate Change
Commission, which spearheads climate change policy and prepares the
Framework Strategy on Climate Change and the National Climate Change Action
Plan.177 The act also requires that local governments draft local climate change
action plans that align with the national climate change strategy and action plan.178
The Climate Change Act is carried out through two key policy documents:
the National Framework Strategy on Climate Change 2010–2022 (Climate
Strategy)179 and the National Climate Change Action Plan 2011–2028.180 The
Climate Strategy outlines a path toward clean development and aims “to build
the adaptive capacity of communities and increase the resilience of natural
ecosystems to climate change, and optimize mitigation opportunities towards
sustainable development.” 181 To this end, the Climate Strategy guides investment,
development, and land use on subnational and national levels.
The Climate Strategy also emphasizes energy issues, aiming to double renewable
energy capacity to 9,000 megawatts (MW) over 20 years (footnote 179).
It further outlines energy efficiency and conservation programs, identifies
renewable and low-carbon energy resources, and recommends using low-carbon
modes of transportation and energy-saving infrastructure (footnote 179). On the
adaptation side, the Climate Strategy seeks to improve ecosystem management
(river basins, coastlines, biodiversity), water management, and disaster risk
174
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Climate Change.
Republic Act No. 9729, Climate Change Act of 2009, sec. 2.
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reduction, as well as improve the climate resilience of infrastructure, agriculture,
and health (footnote 179). The Climate Strategy treats mitigation and adaptation
as synergistic.
In 2011, the National Climate Change Action Plan built on the Climate Strategy
by assessing climate change risks in the Philippines. It outlines mitigation and
adaptation targets for 2011–2028 in response to these projected impacts. Based
on the risk assessment, it identifies the following priorities: food security, water
sufficiency, ecological and environmental stability, human security, climatefriendly industries and services, sustainable energy, and knowledge and capacity
development (footnote 180).
For food security, the plan seeks to ensure the availability, stability, accessibility,
and affordability of safe and healthy food in the wake of climate change. For
water sufficiency, the Philippines plans to assess and restructure the water sector
to determine the resilience of its infrastructure; manage supply, demand, and
quality; and promote conservation. For ecological and environmental stability, the
Philippines is focused on protecting vital ecosystems and restoring ecosystem
services. Human security involves reducing people’s risk of exposure to climate
change disasters. Climate-friendly industries and services include the creation
of green jobs and sustainable consumption and production. Sustainable energy
involves prioritizing the expansion of energy efficiency and conservation, and
developing and implementing renewable energy. Knowledge and capacity
development involves enhancing knowledge of climate change science, increasing
capacity to respond to climate change, and establishing gendered climate change
knowledge management accessible to all sectors at the national and local levels
(footnote 180).
In 2012, the People’s Survival Fund was established via Republic Act No. 10174
(or the People’s Survival Fund Act of 2012) to finance climate change measures.
The fund supports (i) adaptation actions in land management, water resources
management, fisheries and agriculture, infrastructure development, health,
and other natural ecosystems; (ii) the monitoring of diseases exacerbated by
climate change to improve disease control and prevention; (iii) early warning
and forecasting systems for climate-associated hazards; (iv) institutional
development for local governments; and (v) the establishment of regional centers
and information networks for climate change adaptation projects.182 The People’s
Survival Fund Act created the People’s Survival Fund Board, a body that oversees
strategy and policy on funding.183
The Philippines is also integrating climate change into its development planning.
The Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022, for example, recognizes climate
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change as a threat to which the nation must respond.184 It is the Philippines’
first medium-term plan anchored on a long-term vision, i.e., AmBisyon Natin
2040, that represents the collective aspirations of Filipinos for themselves and
the country. The plan highlights that coral bleaching and sea level rise could
undermine the Philippines’ development, thus seeking to mitigate climate impacts
through mapping, improving science and technology, and adaptation measures.
It also recognizes the threat that climate change poses to heritage structures.
Table 5.7 summarizes the Philippines’ climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 5.7: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of the Philippines
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987
Philippine Development Plan 2017–2022, 2017
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2015 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Cabinet Cluster
on Climate Change
Adaptation, Mitigation
and Disaster Risk
Reduction Performance
and Projects Roadmap
2018–2022, 2018
National Climate Change
Action Plan 2011–2028,
2011
National Framework
Strategy on Climate
Change 2010–2022,
2010
Philippine Strategy
on Climate Change
Adaptation, 2009

Philippine Green
Jobs Act of 2016,
Republic Act (RA)
10771 of 2016
The People’s Survival
Fund Act of 2012,
RA 10174 of 2012
Climate Change Act
of 2009, RA 9729 of
2009

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Creation of the Climate
Change Adaptation,
Mitigation and Disaster
Risk Reduction Cabinet
Cluster, Executive Order
No. 24 of 2017
Establishment of the
Climate Change
Service, Department of
Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)
Administrative Order
No. 13 of 2016
Institutionalizing the
Philippine Greenhouse Gas
Inventory Management
and Reporting System,
Executive Order No. 174
of 2014
continued on next page
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Government of the Philippines, National Economic and Development Authority. 2017. Philippine
Development Plan 2017−2022. Manila.
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Table 5.7 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Climate
Change Act, Climate Change
Commission Administrative
Order No. 01 of 2010
Climate Change Office,
DENR Administrative
Order No. 04 of 2009
Mandating the Presidential
Taskforce on Climate
Change to Develop the
National Climate Change
Framework, Executive
Order No. 785 of 2009
Reorganizing the Presidential
Task Force on Climate
Change, Executive Order
No. 774 of 2008
Rules and Regulations for
the National Authority for
the Clean Development
Mechanism, DENR
Administrative Order
No. 17 of 2005
Designating the DENR as
the National Authority for
the Clean Development
Mechanism, Executive
Order No. 320 of 2004
Creation of an Inter-Agency
Committee on Climate
Change, Administrative
Order No. 220 of 1991

Energy

Philippine Energy Plan
2016–2030, 2016
Philippines Energy
Efficiency and
Conservation Action
Plan 2016–2020, 2015
An Energy Efficiency
Roadmap for
the Philippines
2014–30, 2013

Renewable Energy Act
of 2008, RA 9513 of
2008
Biofuels Act of 2006,
RA 9367 of 2007 and
2015 amendment
to the Biofuels Act,
RA 10745 of 2015
Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001,
RA 9136 of 2001

Rules and Guidelines for
the Renewable Portfolio
Standards for On-Grid
Areas, Department of
Energy (DOE) Department
Circular No. DC 2017-120015 of 2017
Amended Implementing
Rules and Regulations for
the Biofuels Act of 2006,
DOE Department Circular
No. DC 2016-07-0012 of
2016
continued on next page
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Table 5.7 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts
Mini-Hydroelectric
Power Incentive Act,
RA 7156 of 1991

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Framework Circular for
Dispatch of Renewable
Energy Resources in the
Wholesale Electricity Spot
Market, DOE Department
Circular No. DC 2015-030001 of 2015
Circular on the Share of
Renewable Energy in
Installed Capacity, DOE
Department Circular No.
DC 2015-07-0014 of 2015
Guidelines for the Selection
Process of Renewable
Energy Projects, DOE
Department Circular No.
DC 2013-05-0009 of 2013
Mandatory Use of Biofuel
Blend, DOE Department
Circular No. DC 2011-020001 of 2011
Fuel Mix Circular, DOE
Department Circular No.
DC 2009-02-0002 of
2009
Circular on Awarding
Renewable Energy
Contracts and Developer
Registration, DOE
Department Circular No.
DC 2009-07-0011 of 2009
Rules and Regulations
Implementing the
Renewable Energy Act,
DOE Department Circular
No. DC 2009-05-0008 of
2009
Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Biofuels
Act, DOE Department
Circular No. DC 2007-050006 of 2007
Government Energy
Management Program,
Presidential Administrative
Order No. 110 of 2006
continued on next page
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Table 5.7 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Committee on Power
Conservation and Demand
Management, Executive
Order No. 123 of 1993
Institutionalizing the
Committee on Power
Conservation and Demand
Management, Executive
Order No. 123 of 1993

LULUCF and REDD+

Update of the Philippine
National REDD-Plus
Strategy, 2017
Philippine National
REDD-Plus Strategy,
2010

Authorizing the Climate
Change Commission
to Coordinate REDD+
Mechanisms, Executive
Order No. 881 of 2010

Transportation

National Environmentally
Sustainable Transport
Strategy for the
Philippines, 2011

Natural Gas Vehicle Program
for Public Transport,
Executive Order No. 290
of 2004
Institutionalizing the
Committee on Fuel
Conservation and
Efficiency in Road
Transport, Executive Order
No. 472 of 1998

Environmental
assessment

Philippine
Environmental Impact
Statement System,
Presidential Decree
No. 1586 of 1978

Cities and buildings

The Philippine Green
Building Code, 2015

Disaster risk
management

Philippine Disaster
Risk Reduction and
Management Act
of 2010, RA 10121 of
2010
continued on next page
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Table 5.7 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Other

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

National Environmental
Awareness and
Education Act of
2008, RA 9512 of
2008
Philippine Clean Air
Act of 1999, RA
8749 of 1999

DENR = Department of Natural Resources and Environment; DOE = Department of Energy; LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and
forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; RA = Republic Act; REDD+ = reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
As of 2018, approximately 40% of the Philippines’ energy supply came from
renewable sources, with the other 60% from fossil fuels.185 The country’s total
primary energy supply (TPES) reached 44.5 Mtoe in 2013.186 Oil accounted for the
largest share of TPES at 31.6% in 2013, followed by coal (22.5%) and geothermal
(18.6%).187 Coal is projected to account for the largest share of TPES from the
next decade onward, reaching 38.6% share in 2040 (footnote 186). Although fossil
fuels contribute significantly to the primary energy supply, the government is trying
to promote sustainable energy sources in its long-term strategy.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
The Philippine Energy Plan 2016–2030 was introduced in 2016 to achieve energy
security, promote access to energy, and move toward a low-carbon future in the
face of climate change.188 It resolves to triple the amount of energy generated
from renewable sources by 2030 (footnote 188). Specifically, it seeks to increase
renewable energy deployment by creating a supportive business environment,
building efficient infrastructure, and engaging in research and development. It
builds on a strong foundation of energy legislation.
In 2008, Congress enacted the Renewable Energy Act of 2008, which aims to
accelerate the development and increase the use of renewable energy. The act
185
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M.A.H. Mondal et al. 2018. The Philippines Energy Future and Low-Carbon Development
Strategies. Energy. 147. pp. 142–154.
D. Vivar. 2016. Philippines Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook and
Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2016. ERIA Research Project Report 2015-5. Jakarta: ERIA.
pp. 273–296.
Footnote 186, Annex 4, p. 414.
Government of the Philippines, Department of Energy. 2016. Philippine Energy Plan 2016−2030.
Manila.
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establishes the Renewable Portfolio Standard for generating electricity from
renewable sources, as well as a minimum share of renewable energy supply for
all electricity suppliers.189 Additionally, the act introduces a feed-in tariff system,
including a priority grid connection for all renewable energy sources.190
The act also offers incentives to suppliers and manufacturers for developing
renewable energy.191 For example, the 7-year income tax holiday and tax exemptions
for the carbon credits generated from renewable energy sources reduce the regular
30% corporate income tax to 10% once that tax holiday expires and puts a 1.5%
realty tax cap on the original cost of the equipment and facilities needed to produce
renewable energy. Other incentives include duty-free equipment import for 10 years,
tax caps for renewable energy machinery, an accelerated depreciation scheme,
cash-based incentives for electrification projects, and capital equipment tax credits.
The Mini-Hydroelectric Power Incentive Act (RA No. 7156 of 1991) was passed
in 1991 to increase energy independence by promoting the use of, and
entrepreneurship in, mini-hydroelectric power.
The Biofuels Act of 2006 (RA No. 9367) introduced sales targets for biofuels and
biodiesels. By 2009, all oil companies had to ensure that bioethanol comprised at
least 5% of their total sales.192 The target increased to 10% in 2011.193 Additionally,
1% biodiesel must be blended into all diesel engine fuels sold by 2007 and 2% by
2009.194 The Biofuels Act aims to decrease reliance on imported fuels and mitigate
GHG emissions. Natural gas-fired power plants were exempted from the Biofuels
Act in 2015 in response to reliability and cost issues in the supply of electricity.

D. Energy Demand
The energy demand growth outlook for the Philippines points to continued
reliance on fossil fuels. According to the Economic Research Institute for
ASEAN and East Asia, demand for natural gas is projected to grow at an average
annual rate of 3.8% and oil at 3.9% largely to meet growth in the transport sector
(footnote 186). Demand for coal will show the fastest growth at an annual average
of 7.8%, mainly to meet the cement industry’s needs (footnote 186). Electricity is
projected to see the second-fastest growth rate at 4.8% (footnote 186).
In 2004, the Department of Energy (DOE) initiated its National Energy Efficiency
and Conservation Program to promote energy efficiency and conservation. The
DOE has generally taken a more prominent role in the Philippine government in
recent years, ensuring access to sustainable, secure, and environmentally friendly
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Republic Act No. 9513, Renewable Energy Act of 2008, sec. 6.
Footnote 189, sec. 7.
Footnote 189, sec. 15.
Republic Act No. 9367, Biofuels Act of 2006, sec. 5.1.
Footnote 192, sec. 5.2.
Footnote 192, sec. 5.3.
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energy. Its approach includes encouraging private sector participation in energy
development and ensuring that relevant stakeholders are aware of energy issues.
In 2004, the DOE launched the Philippines Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Action Plan 2016–2020 and the Energy Efficiency Roadmap for the Philippines
2014–2030.195 The Energy Efficiency and Conservation Action Plan provides
sector-specific strategies for the transport, industry, commercial, and residential
sectors. Developed as part of the action plan, the Energy Efficiency Roadmap
outlines efficiency targets by sector, with an economy-wide goal of 1.6% annual
energy savings.
In addition to its renewable energy targets, the Philippine Energy Plan 2016–2030
contains an energy demand–supply outlook for 15 years and sector-specific
road maps (footnote 188). These sectors include oil and gas, coal, renewable
energy, power, electricity, downstream oil and natural gas, alternative fuels and
technology, and energy efficiency and conservation. The energy plan recognizes
the global effort to decrease the impacts of climate change and aims to achieve
reductions in energy intensity toward a low-carbon future.

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Deforestation is a major challenge in the Philippines. In 2010, the Philippines had
around 6.8 million hectares of total forest cover—around 23% of the country’s total
land area.196 The country loses around 47,000 hectares of forest cover annually.197
In 2009, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) drafted
the Philippine National REDD-plus Strategy in collaboration with nongovernment
organizations.198 The government later incorporated the strategy into the National
Climate Change Action Plan.
In 2010, the Climate Change Commission of the Philippines took over
coordination of REDD+ actions following the issuance of Executive Order
No. 881.199 The order also requires government agencies to provide necessary
resources and information for REDD+ monitoring. It stipulates that the DENR
take primary responsibility for REDD+ plan implementation and the management
and utilization of international support for REDD+. The REDD+ Strategy was
updated in 2017.200
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The 2017 REDD+ Strategy aims to address the drivers of deforestation and forest
degradation. It recognizes that a results-based climate change mitigation strategy
includes conservation, sustainable management of forests, enhancement of
forest carbon stocks, and reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation. The 2017 REDD+ Strategy affirms the following objectives:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)

ensure sustainable forest management to reduce carbon emissions
and conserve biodiversity;
enhance national carbon stocks to secure social and ecological benefits;
provide a research-based enabling environment from REDD+ programs;
leverage REDD+ resources and projects to deliver social benefits and
help alleviate poverty;
establish sustainable financing mechanisms to support REDD+
programs;
enhance the capacity of forest managers to implement REDD+
programs; and
develop and implement a forest carbon emissions reduction measure,
reporting, and verification system.201

The Philippines has made progress in reducing deforestation and forest
degradation. The Proposed National REDD-plus Safeguards Framework and
Guidelines was developed after the Forest Land Boundary Delineation project
was carried out in 2017.202 Formal and permanent forest boundaries were set—“a
total of 89,091.95 kilometers of forest land boundary lines were delineated.” 203 The
government also developed the National Forest Protection Program (2015–2019)
Menu of Options for Effective Forest Protection and Law Enforcement, which
protects the country’s forests from further destruction and degradation by reducing
illegal logging.204 The program also assists forest managers in the environmental
monitoring of forest health and biodiversity in high conservation areas.

F.

Transportation

The transport sector is the Philippines’ most energy-intensive sector and will
continue to be until 2023 (footnote 186). However, the government has taken
steps to make the transport sector more sustainable. In 1998, the national
government created the Committee on Fuel Conservation and Efficiency in Road
Transport.205 This committee facilitates the fuel conservation campaign that
institutes road transport efficiency measures by encouraging the private sector
201
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Footnote 200, p. 13.
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to conserve fuel, monitor consumption, and follow other measures the new
committee may see as appropriate.
In 2004, the DOE initiated the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport
under Executive Order No. 290.206 This program reduced import duties on
compressed natural gas vehicles and natural gas vehicle‑related equipment,
parts, and components. The DOE launched the program to promote vehicles that
would be less emissions-intensive than existing vehicles.

G. Adaptation
On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Haiyan tore through the Visayas, killing more
than 6,300 people and injuring another 28,000.207 This disaster shocked the
nation and spurred some climate change adaptation measures.208 Pursuant
to Executive Order No. 24, issued in 2017, the Climate Change Adaptation,
Mitigation and Disaster Risk Reduction Cabinet Cluster recognized some
anti-corruption measures to ensure good governance in the realm of climate
change adaptation.209 The regulation created a cabinet cluster responsible for
implementing climate change resilience and adaptation measures. The cabinet
cluster is also tasked with facilitating discussions on disaster risk management,
increasing rural resiliency to climate change impacts, strengthening natural
resource management, improving emergency response, and promoting adherence
to international climate change commitments.
Executive measures build on the Philippine Strategy on Climate Change
Adaptation (Adaptation Strategy).210 Launched in 2009, the Adaptation Strategy
sets up a collaborative framework for adaptation action in the Philippines. It
seeks to coordinate action among national agencies, the legislative branch,
the academe, business, and civil society in eight major sectors: agriculture,
biodiversity, coastal and marine, forestry, water, health, energy, and infrastructure
(footnote 210). The Adaptation Strategy sets out the climate change-related
risks and challenges these major sectors face. It further identifies a multisector,
collaborative working group to lead efforts to deal with those risks and challenges.
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H. Disaster Risk Management
The Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act of 2010 (RA No. 10121
of 2010) authorizes the development of the National Disaster Risk Reduction
and Management Framework. The act also adopts planning procedures and
seeks to improve gender responsiveness of disaster risk reduction. Facilitating
discussions on disaster risk management, with emphasis on rural resiliency and
improving emergency response, is also within the purview of the Climate Change
Adaptation, Mitigation and Disaster Risk Reduction Cabinet Cluster.

VIII. Singapore
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
A parliamentary representative democratic republic, the Republic of Singapore
is vulnerable to climate change impacts, including sea level rise, coastal erosion,
loss of biodiversity, and greater frequency and intensity of extreme weather
events such as heavy rain, floods, and drought.211 Sea level rise poses an imminent
threat to Singapore because it is a small island city-state with relatively flat land
(footnote 211). Most land lies 15 meters above mean sea level, and 30% of the
island is less than 5 meters above mean sea level.212
Higher temperatures and more extreme rainfall are also critical climate
challenges. During 1972–2014, the annual mean temperature increased from
26.6°C to 27.7°C (footnote 212). Annual average rainfall increased from 2,192 mm
in 1980 to 2,727 mm in 2014 (footnote 212). Higher annual temperatures can
lead to heat stress, especially given Singapore’s high levels of urban density.
Variable rainfall can also place pressure on water resources, overwhelming
drainage systems and causing flash floods.

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Singapore is a party to all treaties under the UNFCCC. It ratified the Kyoto
Protocol in 2006 (as a non-Annex I country), along with the Doha Amendment
to the Kyoto Protocol in September 2014. Singapore has submitted three national
communications under the UNFCCC, the first in 2000, the second in 2010, and
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Government of Singapore, National Climate Change Secretariat. 2012. National Climate Change
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the third in 2014, along with its first biennial update report.213 The country’s first
nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledges to reduce national emissions
intensity by 36% from 2005 levels by 2030 and to stabilize its emissions to peak
around 2030.214

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The government established the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change in
2007 to facilitate interagency coordination on climate change. Its executive committee
oversees working groups for long-term emissions and mitigation, international
negotiations, and resilience. These working groups are composed of permanent
secretaries and chief executives of ministries and national agencies (footnote 213).
In 2010, Singapore created a dedicated unit within the Prime Minister’s Office—the
National Climate Change Secretariat—to develop and coordinate climate change
policies. The secretariat released the National Climate Change Strategy in 2012,
which adopts a whole-of-nation approach to addressing climate change (footnote 213).
The strategy articulates three guiding principles for climate responses: (i) long-term
and integrated planning, (ii) pragmatically and economically sound measures, and
(iii) developing innovative solutions for Singapore and global markets.215 Singapore’s
main goals in addressing climate change are to (i) reduce carbon emissions in
all sectors, (ii) adapt readily to climate change effects, (iii) harness green growth
opportunities, and (iv) forge partnerships with both international and regional bodies.216
In 2016, Singapore unveiled its Climate Action Plan, which established the
climate change-related challenges that the country faces and set some guidelines
and quantified goals for various sectors.217 To meet Singapore’s emissions
reduction goals in its first NDC, the action plan sets out four strategies: improve
energy efficiency; reduce carbon emissions from power stations; develop and
demonstrate cutting-edge low-carbon technologies; and implement action
through the collective efforts of government agencies, individuals, businesses, and
the community.218 The action plan identifies six key areas of concern for resilience:
(i)
(ii)
213
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216
217

218

protecting coasts,
managing water and minimizing floods,

M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in Singapore: An Excerpt from the 2015
Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. p. 2.
Government of Singapore. 2016. Singapore’s First Nationally Determined Contribution. Singapore.
p. 7. This part focuses on Singapore’s 2016 NDC. However, Singapore submitted an updated
NDC in March 2020. See Government of Singapore. 2020. Singapore’s Update of Its First
Nationally Determined Contribution. Singapore.
Footnote 211, pp. 12–13.
Footnote 211, pp. 13–14.
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Footnote 217, p. 2.
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(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

protecting biodiversity and greenery,
strengthening resilience in public health and food supply,
keeping essential services running well, and
keeping buildings and infrastructure safe.219

Singapore has also taken action on climate change by instituting a carbon tax.
The Carbon Pricing Act, 2018 requires GHG emitters to report and pay tax on
their emissions. Emitters that release more than a certain threshold of carbon
dioxide (CO2) equivalent must register with the National Environment Agency.
Singapore’s 2018 budget also mandates that facilities emitting 25,000 metric tons
or more of GHGs a year must pay a carbon tax of $5 per metric ton of emissions
from 2019 to 2023.220 The government plans to review the carbon tax rate by
2023 and increase it to $10–$15 per metric ton by 2030 (footnote 220).
The Sustainable Singapore Blueprint 2015—published by the Ministry of the
Environment and Water Resources and the Ministry of National Development—
serves as another key climate document outlining strategies for sustainable
development.221
Table 5.8 summarizes Singapore’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
In 2017, Singapore imported 189.3 metric tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) of energy,
representing a 7.4% increase from 2016.222 Singapore’s energy imports included
petroleum products (120.5 Mtoe), crude oil (58.0 Mtoe), natural gas (9.9 Mtoe), coal
and peat (0.9 Mtoe), and other energy products (0.1 Mtoe) (footnote 222). Singapore’s
total energy exports grew by 3.3% from 99.3 Mtoe in 2016 to 102.6 Mtoe in 2017,
primarily petroleum products as well as crude oil and coal and peat (footnote 222).
Singapore’s total primary energy supply (TPES) was 28.73 Mtoe in 2013 and is
projected to increase to more than 50 Mtoe by 2040.223 Singapore’s energy supply
mix is expected to include oil (69.2%), natural gas (28.5%), and other sources
(2.3%) such as solar power (footnote 223). Solar power has a projected average
annual growth rate of 22.8% and oil 2.7%, while natural gas is expected to increase
depending on the expansion of new gas-fired power plants (footnote 223).
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Table 5.8: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Singapore
The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, 1965
Sustainable Singapore Blueprint 2015, 2015
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (updated in 2020)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies
Climate Action Plan, 2016
National Climate Change
Strategy, 2012

Acts
Carbon Pricing Act, 2018

Energy

Budget 2018 (carbon tax
at Section C), 2018
Energy Conservation Act
(Chapter 92C), 2012
Electricity Act (Chapter
89A), 2001
Energy Market Authority
of Singapore Act
(Chapter 92B), 2001
Gas Act (Chapter 116A),
2001

Cities and buildings

Building Control Act
(Chapter 29), 1989

Other

Public Sector Sustainability
Plan, 2017–2020, 2017

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

Non-Legislative
Instruments

National Environment
Agency Act
(Chapter 195), 2002

Building Control
(Environmental
Sustainability)
Regulations, 2008
Building Control
Regulations, 2003
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Singapore has limited access to alternative energy sources.224 Because Singapore
is a small island city-state with flat land, low wind speeds, and no geothermal
potential, its access to alternative energy options—such as hydroelectric, wind, or
geothermal power—is limited (footnote 224). Nuclear power does not present
a viable option because of Singapore’s small land area and high population
density.225 Harnessing solar energy is also difficult because of its small size and
dense urban landscape.226
Nevertheless, Singapore is attempting to promote solar photovoltaic deployment
by creating an enabling environment that (i) “facilitates system integration of
intermittent sources to ensure grid stability and security”; (ii) “addresses non-market
barriers to entry without subsidizing the consumption of any form of energy”; and
(iii) “supports continued investment in research, development, and demonstration”
to reduce solar costs and increase efficiency.227 The government predicts that
renewable energy could contribute to 8% of peak electricity demand by 2030.228
In 2001, Singapore enacted the Energy Market Authority of Singapore Act, which
created a market framework for the supply of electricity and gas. The framework
promotes fair and competitive market conduct and prevents the creation of
monopoly powers in the market. The Electricity Act, 2001 stipulates that the
Energy Market Authority should establish a competitive marketplace for the
electricity industry and promote energy-efficiency practices. The Gas Act, 2001
created a competitive market framework for the gas industry, setting out technical
and economic regulations for gas supply for the retail and transport sectors.

D. Energy Demand
In 2016, Singapore’s total final energy consumption (TFEC) was 15.2464 Mtoe,
a decrease of 3.5% from 2015 (footnote 222). Singapore’s energy consumption in
2016 was divided among the following sectors: industry (65.7%), transportation
(17.6%), commerce and services (11.5%), and residential (5.0%) (footnote 222).
The industry and transport sectors mostly consumed petroleum products, while
the commerce and services and residential sectors mostly consumed electricity
(footnote 222).
Singapore’s TFEC is projected to increase to more than 45 Mtoe by 2040
(footnote 223). In 2040, Singapore’s projected energy consumption mix will
include oil (76.9%), electricity (14.8%), and natural gas (8.1%) (footnote 223).
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24 October.
Footnote 214, Annex.
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Alternative Energy.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF C
 HINA LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARIES

Singapore’s energy consumption by sector is expected to include non-energy
consumption (50.7%), industry (33.3%), transportation (8.5%), and others (7.5%)
(footnote 223).
Energy efficiency is a key strategy in reaching Singapore’s emissions reduction
goals. The government established the Energy Efficiency Programme Office
(E2PO) in 2007 to lead energy efficiency initiatives.229 The E2PO’s Design for
Efficiency Scheme provides financial support to “new industrial facility owners
who plan to integrate energy and resource efficiency improvements into
manufacturing development plans at an early stage.” 230 The Energy Efficiency
Improvement Assistance Scheme provides grant funding to “owners and
operators of existing commercial and industrial facilities undertaking energy
assessments” (footnote 230). Finally, the Grant for Energy Efficient Technologies
provides financial support to “owners and operators of industrial facilities
investing in energy efficient equipment or technologies” (footnote 230).
These energy initiatives are especially important since Singapore is a leading
manufacturing hub, with manufacturing contributing about 20% to its GDP.231
Singapore is also the world’s 14th-largest export economy.232
The Building and Construction Authority serves on the committee of the
E2PO and coordinates energy efficiency initiatives.233 The authority focuses
on promoting green building development to help achieve a national target of
granting a Green Mark Certified rating to at least 80% of buildings by 2030.234
The Building Control (Environmental Sustainability) Regulations, 2008 require
a minimum environmental sustainability standard for new buildings and existing
ones that have undergone major retrofitting since 2008.
The Energy Conservation Act, 2012 also aims to regulate energy demand by
requiring energy-intensive companies in industry and transport to follow energy
management practices. The act also imposes energy efficiency requirements.
Energy users in the industry and transport sectors consuming at least
54 terajoules of energy per year in at least two of three of the preceding years
must appoint at least one energy manager.235 The act sets out minimum energy
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performance standards for household appliances. It also mandates that motor
vehicles have their fuel economy evaluated.
Finally, the Public Sector Sustainability Plan (2017–2020) aims to improve energy
efficiency in the public sector by reducing electricity consumption by more than
15% from fiscal year 2013 levels by 2020.236

E.

Transportation

Transportation is a significant contributor to Singapore’s GHG emissions.
Singapore’s carbon emissions from transportation represented 15.2% of the
country’s total fuel combustion in 2014.237 To reduce emissions from the transport
sector, the government is promoting public transportation use.238 Singapore
aims that “75% of trips during both the morning and evening peak hours will
be made by public transport by 2030.” 239 It is doubling its rail network by 2030
and increasing its bus fleet by about 20% (footnote 238). Furthermore, the
Walk2Ride program is adding more walkways, and off-road cycling paths are
being expanded (footnote 238).
To encourage the purchase of low-emission vehicles and thus curb emissions in
the transport sector, the government has implemented various vehicle emission
schemes since 2013.240 The schemes provide a rebate or impose a surcharge on
registration fees according to the emissions levels of the car or taxi (footnote 240).

F.

Adaptation

Singapore has begun the process of adaptation planning. The Climate Action Plan
includes adaptation-related goals that focus on key vulnerabilities such as sea
level rise and flooding (footnote 217). The plan resolves to do the following:
(i)

safeguard public transport stations, airports, seaports, power stations,
cellular towers, and other key infrastructure against floods and
elevated temperatures;
(ii) build seawalls or use large geobags (sandbags) to harden coastlines
against coastal erosion and sea level rise;
(iii) restore and protect mangroves;
(iv) increase connectivity between green areas;
(v) advance scientific understanding of climate change and its impacts
on Singapore; and
(vi) promote innovative local farming solutions (footnote 219).
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Climate change may also worsen Singapore’s urban heat island effect, i.e., the
tendency of urban areas to be warmer because natural land cover has been
replaced by buildings and infrastructure that retain or produce heat.241 The
Sustainable Singapore Blueprint outlines efforts to increase urban greenery.
These efforts are managed by the Urban Redevelopment Authority, the National
Parks Board, and the Housing and Development Board (footnote 221).

IX. Thailand
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Thailand is a unitary parliamentary constitutional monarchy, which, like other
Southeast Asian countries, is vulnerable to climate change impacts. It ranked
as the 11th most affected by climate change in the world during 1994–2013,
and is one of the 16 countries facing “extreme risk” over the next 30 years.242
The most significant adverse climate impacts facing the country include higher
temperatures, flooding, and drought (footnote 242). During 1955–2005,
Thailand saw increases of 0.95°C for mean temperature, 0.86°C for maximum
temperature, and 1.45°C for minimum temperature (footnote 242).
Heavy rainfall is expected in the southern peninsula, causing flooding, while
drought is expected in the arid inland northeastern region (footnote 242). The
government reports that severe flooding on par with the 2011 flood in Thailand
could cost $40 billion to the economy (footnote 242). A recent drought cost
about 0.52% of the country’s GDP in 2015, severely impacting the agriculture
sector and subsistent farmers (footnote 242).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Thailand pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 20% from business as usual
(BAU) projections by the year 2030 in its NDC to the Paris Agreement
(footnote 242). Thailand also committed to increasing national forest cover to
40% through local community participation (footnote 242). The NDC targets
a 20% share of power generation from renewable energy by 2036, a 30% share
of renewable energy in the total final energy consumption (TFEC) by 2036, and
a 30% reduction in energy intensity by 2036 compared with a 2010 baseline

241

242

D. Ng. 2019. Why Singapore Is Heating Up Twice as Fast as the Rest of the World. CNA.
13 January.
Government of Thailand. 2016. Thailand's First Nationally Determined Contribution. Bangkok.
This part focuses on Thailand’s 2016 NDC. However, Thailand submitted an updated NDC in
October 2020. See Government of Thailand. 2020. Thailand’s Updated Nationally Determined
Contribution. Bangkok.

175

176

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

(footnote 242). The NDC identifies the challenges that Thailand faces in
implementing its pledges, including financial barriers and access to technology.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Thailand’s approach to climate change management hinges on integrating climate
change into development planning. Thailand’s Twelfth National Economic
and Social Development Plan, 2017–2021 acknowledges the burden of the
consequences of climate change, and thus sets the nation on a course to mitigate
and adapt to climate change.243 The plan discusses the importance of good land
use practices, improves the nation’s capacity to mitigate GHG emissions, and
establishes natural resources conservation practices.
Thailand’s targeted climate policy also focuses on development. The Climate Change
Master Plan 2015–2050 outlines an overall climate change strategy and resolves
to integrate climate resilience into national development policy.244 The integration
will occur across all sectors and at the national and subnational levels to promote
climate change adaptation. Furthermore, the Climate Master Plan prioritizes
(i) reducing GHG emissions; (ii) pursuing low-carbon sustainable growth; (iii) building
stakeholder capacity and awareness to ensure the successful implementation of
the plan; and (iv) “developing a database, knowledge, and technology to support
climate change adaptation and sustainable low-carbon growth.” 245
To manage the nation’s GHG emissions, Thailand established the Greenhouse
Gas Management Organization through a royal decree issued in 2007.246 The
organization’s central mandate is to serve as the designated authority for Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. It also provides technical assistance
on sustainable development practices, administers a GHG database, and provides
technical assistance regarding GHG emissions reduction. In 2017, the government
designated the Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and
Planning as the entity responsible for climate change issues.247
Thailand’s National Strategic Plan on Climate Change, 2008 sets overarching
strategic goals to guide the country’s climate change policy.248 These strategic
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247
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Government of Thailand, National Economic and Social Development Board. 2017. The Twelfth
National Economic and Social Development Plan (2017−2021). Bangkok.
Government of Thailand. 2015. Climate Change Master Plan 2015−2050. Bangkok.
PreventionWeb. Thailand: Climate Change Master Plan (CCMP).
Government of Thailand. 2007. Royal Decree on Establishment of Thailand Greenhouse Gas
Management Organization (Public Organization), BE 2550 (2007). Bangkok.
Government of Thailand. 2017. Ministerial Regulation Organizing the Office of Natural
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment. Bangkok.
Government of Thailand. 2008. National Strategic Plan on Climate Change, BE 2551−2555
(2008−2012). Bangkok. See Government of Thailand, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment, Thailand Greenhouse Gas Management Organization. 2013. Thailand’s Policies
on Climate Change and Establishment of the Climate Change International Technical and Training
Center (CITC). 17 May.
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goals are to (i) build capacity to adapt and reduce vulnerabilities to climate
change impacts, (ii) promote GHG mitigation activities, (iii) support research
and development to better understand climate change, (iv) raise awareness
and public participation in climate change issues, and (v) foster international
cooperation in climate change mitigation efforts.
Although Thailand has yet to pass concrete climate change legislation, it has
demonstrated thorough plans to take aggressive action against climate change.
The next step for Thailand is to move past the strategic and target-setting phase
and to implement the policies that will realize its climate goals.
Table 5.9 summarizes Thailand’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 5.9: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Thailand
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 2017
Twelfth National Economic and Social Development Plan
2017−2021, 2017
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (updated in 2020)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies
Thailand Greenhouse
Gas Management
Organization Strategy
Plan 2019−2023, 2019
Thailand Greenhouse
Gas Management
Organization Operation
Plan 2018−2021, 2018
Climate Change Master
Plan 2015−2050, 2015
National Strategic Plan
on Climate Change
2008−2012, 2008

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Ministerial Regulation
Organizing the Office of
Natural Resources and
Environmental Policy
and Planning, Ministry of
Natural Resources and
Environment, 2017
Rules, Procedures, and
Conditions of Greenhouse
Gas Validation and
Verification, National
Standardization Council
Notification No. 2, 2016
Specifications for
Quantifying and Reporting
on Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and Removals
(Part 1), Ministry of
Industry Notification
No. 3987, 2009
continued on next page
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Table 5.9 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Specifications for
Quantifying, Monitoring,
and Reporting on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Removals (Part 2),
Ministry of Industry
Notification No. 3988,
2009
Specifications for Validation
and Verification of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Removals (Part 3),
Ministry of Industry
Notification No. 3989,
2009
Accreditation Requirements
for Greenhouse Gas
Validation and Verification
Bodies, Ministry of Industry
Notification No. 3990,
2009
Royal Decree Establishing the
Thailand Greenhouse Gas
Management Organization
(Public Organization),
2007
Regulations on Responding
to Climate Change,
Regulations of the Office
of the Prime Minister, 2007

Energy

Alternative Energy
Development Plan
2015–2036, 2015
Thailand Energy Efficiency
Development Plan
2015−2036, 2015
Oil Plan 2015−2036, 2015
Thailand Power
Development Plan
2015−2036, 2015
Renewable and
Alternative Energy
Development Plan for
25 Percent in 10 Years
2012–2021, 2012

Energy Industry Act BE
2550, 2007
Energy Conservation
Promotion Act BE
2535 and BE 2550,
1992 (Part I) and
(Part II) 2007

continued on next page
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Table 5.9 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

LULUCF and REDD+

Master Plan for
Integrated Biodiversity
Management,
(2015–2021), 2015
National Forest Policy,
1985

Transportation

Climate Change Master
Plan 2015−2050, 2015
Alternative Energy
Development Plan
2015-2036, 2015
Renewable and
Alternative Energy
Development Plan for
25 Percent in 10 Years
2012−2021, 2012
Thailand National Master
Plan 2011−2020, 2011

Disaster risk
management

National Disaster Risk
Management Plan, 2015

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Forest Act BE 2484,
1941

BE = Buddhist Era; LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
Thailand is a rapidly developing nation, resulting in an extreme increase in
energy consumption and emissions.249 Thailand’s total final energy consumption
(TFEC) almost tripled from during 1990–2018, and its total carbon dioxide
(CO2) emissions doubled during that same period (footnote 249). As of 2013, oil
accounted for 38.5% of Thailand’s total primary energy supply (TPES), followed
by natural gas (28.6%), and coal (12.9%).250 Thailand has limited indigenous
oil resources and has historically relied on imported oil for power generation
(footnote 250). Thus energy security is a concern, and the government has
designed policies to balance security, climate change, and economic priorities.

249
250

International Energy Agency. Thailand (accessed 21 January 2020).
S. Padprem. 2016. Thailand Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook and
Energy Saving Potential in East Asia 2016. ERIA Research Project Report 2015-5. Jakarta: ERIA.
pp. 323–335.
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1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
In 2013, the National Energy Policy Commission of Thailand implemented feed-in
tariffs to support rooftop and ground-mounted solar installations.251 Through
the tariff system, the government pays producers of solar energy a set price for
each unit of energy. Thailand was one of the first Asian countries to adopt such a
comprehensive feed-in tariff policy (footnote 251).
In 2015, the Thailand Oil Plan resolved to promote sustainable fuel management.
It aims to support fuel conservation measures in the transport sector; encourage
the use of fuel types that optimally fit particular energy needs; restructure fuel
prices to reflect the costs of pollution, road damage, and other externalities
resulting from fuel use; promote ethanol and biodiesel consumption; and
encourage investment in fuel infrastructure.252

2. Renewable Energy Policies
The Alternative Energy Development Plan, 2015–2036, launched in 2015 by the
Ministry of Energy, promotes developing alternative energy sources. It focuses
on three key areas: (i) energy security—ensuring that supply keeps pace with
growing demand; (ii) economy—keeping energy costs reasonable so that they
do not hinder economic growth; and (iii) ecology—increasing renewable energy
production to reduce the impact on environment and communities.253
Table 5.10 highlights the Alternative Energy Development Plan’s targets of
renewable energy production compared with 2014 levels.

D. Energy Demand
Currently, Thailand does not produce as much energy as it consumes. Despite
not consuming as much energy per capita as European nations, Thailand relies
on energy imports to fully meet demand, of which 76% is met by fossil fuels.254
To cope with this demand for energy while also meeting its climate change
commitments, Thailand has strongly promoted energy conservation to reduce the
burden of supplying a rapidly developing nation with more energy.
Central to Thailand’s energy conservation efforts is the Energy Conservation
Promotion Act, 1992 (BE 2535). The act requires factories with high consumption
rates or particular energy uses to have their energy usage audited. It also creates
251

252
253

254

R. Pacudan. 2014. Electricity Price Impacts of Feed-in Tariff Policies: The Cases of Malaysia, the
Philippines, and Thailand. In F. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Market Integration in East Asia:
Energy Trade, Cross Border Electricity, and Price Mechanism. ERIA Research Project Report FY 2013
No. 29. Jakarta: ERIA.
Government of Thailand. 2015. Oil Plan 2015–2036. Bangkok.
Government of Thailand, Ministry of Energy. 2015. Alternative Energy Development Plan: AEDP2015.
Bangkok.
World Data. Energy Consumption in Thailand (accessed 21 January 2020).
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Table 5.10: Renewable Energy Production Targets
(megawatt)
Source of Renewable Energy
Waste-to-energy

2014 Levels

Target

65.72

500.00

2,451.82

5,570.00

311.50

600.00

0.00

680.00

Wind energy

224.47

3,002.00

Solar energy

1,298.51

6,000.00

Hydropower (small)

142.01

376.00

Hydropower (large)

0.00

2,906.40

Biomass
Biogas from waste and wastewater
Biogas from plants

Source: Government of Thailand, Ministry of Energy. 2015. Alternative Energy Development Plan: AEDP2015.
Bangkok. p. 9.

a voluntary program for small- to medium-sized companies to undertake energy
conservation projects and research via the Energy Fund (ECON) Fund.
The Energy Industry Act, 2007 (BE 2550) further regulates demand for energy by
creating the Energy Regulatory Commission, which regulates industrial energy use.
The Thailand Power Development Plan, 2015–2036 was implemented to achieve
a 30% reduction in energy intensity in 2036 compared with a 2010 baseline by
(i) imposing fees on factories and buildings that use excessive electricity, and
(ii) mandating reports on energy use per area for new buildings.255

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

One of Thailand’s main sources of regulation in the forestry sector is the Forest
Act, BE 2484, 1941, which regulates logging, lumber, and forest clearing to ensure
the sustainable harvesting of forest resources. Thailand also created a national
committee to develop the National Forest Policy in 1985.256 The policy required
that 40% of Thailand’s total land area remain forested, of which 25% was reserved
for economic use and 15% for conservation. The Seventh National Economic and
Social Development Plan, 1992–1996 altered these allocations so that 25% of
forests would be for conservation and 15% for economic use.257
In 2011, Thailand began receiving funding from the World Bank’s Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility to raise its capacity to reduce harmful emissions from forest
255

256
257

Government of Thailand, Ministry of Energy. 2015. Thailand Power Development Plan 2015−2036.
Bangkok. p. 3-2.
Government of Thailand. 1985. National Forest Policy. Bangkok.
Government of Thailand, National Economic and Social Development Board. 1992. The Seventh
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1992-1996). Bangkok. p. 188.
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degradation and deforestation.258 In 2016, Thailand received a $3.6 million grant
to improve its capabilities for REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable
forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks) (footnote 258).
In 2015, Thailand passed the Master Plan for Integrated Biodiversity Management
to recognize the importance of natural biodiversity to Thailand’s economy,
as biodiversity fuels the country’s production of food, medicine, and tools.259
These resources are a major source of Thailand’s exports, culture, and customs.
To protect Thailand’s rich ecosystems, the master plan will increase budget
allocations for biodiversity preservation and generally address the sources of
stress on the country’s natural resources, including forests.
These laws demonstrate that the Government of Thailand is strongly committed
to preserving forests and acknowledges that forests and land are vital to the
country’s economy.
In 2018, to further reduce GHG emissions, Thailand joined the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in its REDD+ program,
which helps countries reduce their emissions from the forestry sector.260

F.

Transportation

As of 2008, Bangkok emitted 7.1 tons of CO2 per capita, higher than other
major cities.261 About 84% of Bangkok’s GHG emissions come from energy use
and transportation (footnote 261). Although Thailand’s government has taken
significant steps to reduce emissions from the transport sector, Bangkok remains
a significant emitter.
To reduce these emissions, Thailand has promoted greater energy efficiency,
including the use of biofuels over traditional fossil fuels.262 The Renewable
and Alternative Energy Development Plan for 25 Percent in 10 Years (AEDP
2012–2021) resolved to increase ethanol consumption to 9 million liters per day
and biodiesel use to 5.97 million liters per day by 2022.263 The Alternative Energy
Development Plan included gasoline replacement targets for 2036—ethanol
production at 11.3 million liters per day and biofuel production at 14 million liters
per day (footnote 253). To meet these targets, the government grants subsidies
258

259

260
261

262

263

World Bank. 2016. Thailand to Reduce Harmful Emissions from Deforestation with World Bank
Support. News. 14 September.
Government of Thailand. 2015. Master Plan for Integrated Biodiversity Management, BE 2558–2564
(2015–2021). Bangkok.
FAO. 2018. FAO Joins Hands with Thai Government on its REDD+ Program. News. 23 November.
C. Kisner. 2008. Climate Change in Thailand: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies. Climate
Institute. July.
Y. Achawangkul. 2017. Thailand’s Alternative Energy Development Plan. Presentation at the
National Dialogue on the Urban Nexus in Thailand. 2 March.
Government of Thailand. 2012. The Renewable and Alternative Energy Development Plan for
25 Percent in 10 Years (AEDP 2012−2021). Bangkok.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF C
 HINA LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARIES

for biofuels, requiring biodiesel fuel to be blended into other traditional fuels, and
provides tax incentives to promote the purchase of low-emission vehicles.
The Ministry of Transport has also developed the Thailand National Transport
Master Plan 2011–2020 with the vision “Towards Sustainable Transport.” 264 The
plan promotes alternative energy use in the transport sector and the use of the
public transportation system by improving its quality and increasing multimodal
transportation (combined transport).265 This plan reduces GHG emissions by
acknowledging that to combat climate change, individuals must begin making
greater use of public transportation, which is far more efficient in terms of GHG
emissions than individualized transport such as cars. The plan also acknowledges
that to minimize the amount of transport needed within a city, that city should
aim to consolidate development into a few dense urban centers, rather than
allowing the city to sprawl out in all directions.
In addition, the Climate Master Plan includes targets to reduce the GHG
emissions coming from the transport sector by 7%–20% by 2021 compared with
2005, supply at least 25% of energy demand from renewable sources by 2021,
and reduce energy intensity by 25% by 2030 (footnote 244).

G. Adaptation
Although Thailand consistently mentions climate change adaptation as one
of its central goals in some strategic documents, including its Twelfth National
Economic and Social Development Plan, 2017–2021 and its Climate Master Plan,
the country has not yet developed a dedicated adaptation strategic document.

H. Disaster Risk Management
The National Disaster Risk Management Plan was passed in 2015.266 It seeks to
establish an operational framework to enable effective and efficient responses
to disasters, integrate internationally recognized guidelines for disaster risk
management, and build the government’s capacity to manage disaster risks.
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265
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S. Jaensirisak et al. 2017. Development of National Transport Master Plan in Thailand. Amsterdam:
Elsevier B.V.
Government of Thailand, Ministry of Transport. Thailand National Transport Master Plan
2011−2020. Bangkok.
Government of Thailand. 2015. National Disaster Risk Management Plan. Bangkok.
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X. Viet Nam
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam faces some adverse climate change impacts,
including sea level rise; increased average temperature; and more frequent and
intense extreme events like storms, floods, and droughts.267 The government
reports that the average temperature in Viet Nam has increased by 0.5°C–0.7°C,
and the sea level has risen by about 20 centimeters (cm) over the past 50 years.268
The average temperature in Viet Nam could increase by 3.36°C by 2080–2100.269
More than 70% of Viet Nam’s population depends on agriculture for their
livelihood, making Viet Nam particularly susceptible to food insecurity and other
climate-related impacts on the agriculture sector.270
Sea level rise is expected to result in the submergence of 39% of the Mekong River
Delta, one of the world’s three most vulnerable deltas to sea level rise, and put 20%
of the Ho Chi Minh City area underwater.271 Inundation will directly affect 10%–12%
of the nation’s population and cost the equivalent of 10% of Viet Nam’s gross
domestic product (GDP).272 Although Viet Nam’s GHG emissions only accounted
for approximately 0.5% of the global total and emissions per capita were relatively
low at 2.84 metric tons of CO2 (tCO2) equivalent in 2010, Viet Nam is nonetheless
implementing climate change mitigation and adaptation measures.273

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Viet Nam’s first nationally determined contribution (NDC) pledges an unconditional
8% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 compared with business as usual (BAU)
(footnote 273). However, the government aims to reduce GHG emissions by
25% by 2030 compared with BAU subject to receiving international support.
Reductions in emission intensity per unit of GDP also have unconditional and
conditional targets—20% by 2030 compared with 2010 levels (unconditional)
and 30% compared with 2010 levels, conditional upon receiving financial support
(footnote 273). Viet Nam also intends to increase forest cover to 45% (footnote 273).
267
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270
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273

See World Bank Group. Vietnam: Impacts: Agriculture.
Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE). 2009.
Climate Change, Sea Level Rise Scenarios for Viet Nam. Hanoi.
World Bank Group. Vietnam: Climate Data: Projections.
New Agriculturist. 2008. Country Profile—Vietnam; and Vietnamnet Bridge. 2015. The
Challenges of Vietnam Agriculture. 13 October.
P. Schmidt-Thomé et al. 2015. Climate Change Adaptation Measures in Vietnam: Development and
Implementation. Cham, United Kingdom: Springer International Publishing.
Viet Nam Government Portal. National Strategy on Climate Change.
Government of Viet Nam. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution of Viet Nam. Ha Noi. This
part focuses on Viet Nam’s 2016 NDC. However, Viet Nam submitted an updated NDC in November
2020. See Government of Viet Nam. 2020. Updated Nationally Determined Contribution. Hanoi.
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The NDC aims to integrate disaster risk management and climate change
adaptation into 90% of socioeconomic development plans by 2030 (footnote 273).
The NDC includes a range of targets related to social development: (i) reduce the
national poverty rate by 2% each year, (ii) provide 100% of the population with
access to health care, and (iii) ensure that 90% of city dwellers and 80% of rural
inhabitants have access to clean water by 2030 (footnote 273).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Viet Nam has issued more climate change policies than most other countries
in Asia and the Pacific. Most of these policies were formally launched through
a prime ministerial decision. The government’s climate change efforts focus on
developing a low-carbon economy; mitigating emissions in the energy, industry,
transport, agriculture, and waste sectors; and adapting the most vulnerable areas,
namely agriculture, natural ecosystems, biodiversity, water resources, public health,
and infrastructure. Both the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and
the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development handle climate policy.
In 2016, the Prime Minister approved an implementation plan to fulfill Viet Nam’s
commitments under the Paris Agreement.274 The implementation plan outlines
key tasks and identifies responsible actors, a timeline, and a budget for carrying
out these activities. By creating a work plan to implement the NDC, the
government aims to mitigate GHGs, encourage renewable energy development,
and promote adaptation. The implementation plan will also allow Viet Nam
to establish its institutional climate response and a monitoring, reporting, and
verification system for mitigation and adaptation measures.
In 2017, the Government of Viet Nam issued Decision No. 1670/QD-TTg,
launching a climate change and green growth program covering 2016–2020.275 The
program aims to strengthen Viet Nam’s adaptation to the consequences of climate
change, mitigate GHG emissions through green growth and a low-carbon economy,
restructure economic institutions to encourage efficient energy and resource use,
and promote international cooperation and climate change finance. It also builds
on Viet Nam’s National Green Growth Strategy of 2012.276 Since then, the Ministry
of Natural Resources and Environment and the Ministry of Transport have issued
action plans to implement green growth strategies within their sectors.277
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Government of Viet Nam. 2016. Prime Minister's Decision No. 2053/QD-TTg, the Paris Agreement
Implementation Plan. Ha Noi.
Open Development Mekong. Decision No. 1670/QD-TTg: Approve the Target Program to
Respond to the Climate Change and Green Growth for the Period of 2016—2020.
Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1393/QD-TTg, the National Green
Growth Strategy. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam, MONRE. 2015. MONRE Decision No. 965/QD-BTNMT, the Natural
Resources and Environment Action Program for Implementing the National Green Growth Strategy
for 2015–2020, with Vision to 2030. Ha Noi; and Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Transport
and Communications (MOTC). 2016. MOTC Decision No. 1456/QD-BGTVT, MOTC Climate
Change and Green Growth Action Plan for 2016–2020. Ha Noi.
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Viet Nam’s National Target Program for Responding to Climate Change, first
promulgated in 2008, guides the government in mainstreaming climate change
across all sectors and fields.278 In 2012, the Prime Minister extended the program
to the 2012–2015 period to (i) raise awareness of and capacity for climate
change adaptation, (ii) reduce GHG emissions, and (iii) strengthen the economy
through green growth strategies.279 In 2013, the Ministry of Natural Resources
and Environment approved three projects under the target program’s 2012–2015
period: (i) assessment of climate change and sea level rise; (ii) development
and implementation of action plans to respond to climate change; and
(iii) capacity building, communication, monitoring, and evaluation of program
implementation.280
The 2011 National Strategy for Climate Change and the 2012 National Action
Plan on Climate Change are two other guiding climate change policies. The
2011 National Strategy for Climate Change aims to (i) mitigate GHG emissions,
(ii) enhance adaptation capacity to climate change, (iii) develop a low-carbon
economy to improve quality of life, (iv) support national security and sustainable
development, and (v) protect the climate system.281 To achieve these goals, the
strategy seeks to increase the government’s regulatory and managerial roles. It
plans to develop systematic, holistic, multidisciplinary, interregional solutions
based on scientific evidence while taking into account the nation’s ambition to
promote socioeconomic benefits and cope with the risks of climate change.
The 2012 National Action Plan on Climate Change focuses on natural disasters.282
It aims to monitor climate, predict and respond to natural disasters, draw maps
of areas that will be impacted by floods and rising sea levels, and ensure food and
water security. It also aims to develop resilience against natural disasters, mitigate
GHG emissions, enhance management and policy capacity to cope with climate
change, mobilize the participation of various economic sectors, raise awareness
of the threats of climate change, promote international cooperation on climate
change, and mobilize economic resources to respond to climate change.
By 2020, Viet Nam intends to launch a national carbon emissions trading
scheme.283 The scheme aims to reduce GHG emissions (compared with 2005
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Government of Viet Nam. 2008. Prime Minister's Decision No. 158/2008/QD-TTg, the National
Target Program on Response to Climate Change. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1183/QD-TTg, the National Target
Program to Respond to Climate Change in 2012–2015. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam, MONRE. 2013. MONRE Decision No. 1651/QD-BTNMT approving
Initiative Projects Under the National Target Program to Respond to Climate Change in 2012–2015.
Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2011. Prime Minister’s Decision No. 2139/QD-TTg approving the National
Strategy on Climate Change. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1474/QD-TTg approving the
National Action Plan on Climate Change During 2012–2020. Ha Noi.
The Climate Group. 2012. Vietnam Plans National Carbon Market from 2020. 26 November.
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levels) in the energy and transport sectors by 8%, in the agriculture sector by 20%,
in the forestry sector by 20%, and in waste management by 5%.284
The majority of Viet Nam’s population depends on agriculture for its livelihood.
Thus, the government has focused on reducing climate change risk in the agriculture
sector.285 The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development has issued policies
that seek to reduce emissions from the agriculture sector, promote resilience, and
ensure food security. The Climate Change Adaptation Framework, for example,
was adopted by the ministry in 2008 to ensure stability and safety, maintain food
security, and protect the nation’s dike system, particularly in the Mekong River Delta,
the Red River Delta, the central region, and mountainous areas.286
Beyond its policy initiatives, the government passed the Law on Environmental
Protection in 2014, which covers environmental protection broadly but contains
some climate-related provisions.287 The law promotes the development and use
of clean energy to reduce GHG emissions and protect the ozone layer. It also
recommends developing an emissions reduction road map in line with Viet Nam’s
socioeconomic development and in light of its international commitments.
The law also provides for the promulgation of regulations related to climate
change response, including the management of GHG emissions and ozonedepleting substances, renewable energy development, eco-friendly production
and consumption, waste-to-energy processes, the rights and responsibilities of
the human community for the response to climate change, and technological
advances for the response to climate change. The law mandates the government
to develop a national environmental protection plan to assess the current state
of environmental protection and forecast environmental and climate changerelated impacts.
Table 5.11 summarizes Viet Nam’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Viet Nam’s total primary energy supply (TPES) reached 70.1 million tons of oil
equivalent (Mtoe) in 2015.288 Coal represents the largest share of the country’s
TPES (35.9%), followed by oil (22.2%), natural gas (13.7%), and hydro (7.8%),
and others (20.3%) (footnote 288). A net exporter of crude oil and coal,
284
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288

M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in Vietnam: An Excerpt from the 2015
Global Climate Legislation Study: A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
See the table below for a listing of the different executive issuances relating to food production
and food security.
Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). 2008.
MARD Decision No. 2730/QD-BNN-KHCN, the Climate Change Adaptation Framework Action
Program for All Bodies Involved in Agriculture and Rural Development in 2008–2020. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2014. Law No. 55/2014/QH13, Law on Environmental Protection. Ha Noi.
N. Bao. 2019. Viet Nam Country Report. In S. Kimura and P. Han, eds. Energy Outlook and Energy
Saving Potential in East Asia 2019. ERIA. Jakarta: ERIA. pp. 316–333.
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Table 5.11: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Viet Nam
The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 2013
The Five-Year Socio−Economic Development Plan
2016−2020, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (updated in 2020)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate Change and Green
Growth Response Program
2016–2020, Prime
Minister (PM) Decision
No. 1670/QD-TTg, 2017
Supplemental Policy
Framework on Climate
Change 2016–2020,
PM Decision No. 2044/
QD-TTg, 2016
Paris Agreement
Implementation Plan,
PM Decision No. 2053/
QD-TTg, 2016
National Greenhouse
Gas Inventory System,
PM Decision No. 2359/
QD-TTg, 2015
National Action Plan on
Green Growth in Viet
Nam 2014–2020, PM
Decision No. 403/
QD-TTg, 2014
Climate Change Support
Policy Framework for
2013, PM Decision No.
1628/QD-TTg, 2013

Law on Environmental
Protection, No. 55/
2014/QH13, 2014

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Rules on Climate Change
Impact Assessments,
Ministry of Natural
Resources and
Environment (MONRE)
Circular No. 08/2016/
TTBTNMT, 2016
MONRE Action Program for
Implementing the National
Green Growth Strategy
2015–2020, with Vision to
2030, MONRE Decision
No. 965/QD-BTNMT, 2015
Information and
Communication Project
for Raising Awareness
about Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Reduction
for 2013–2020, Ministry
of Training and Education
Decision No. 329/
QD-BGDDT, 2014
Approved Projects Under the
National Target Program
on Climate Change
2012–2015, MONRE
Decision No. 1651/
QD-BTNMT, 2013
continued on next page
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Table 5.11 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Circular Amending MONRE
Circular No. 12/2010/
TT-BTNMT, MONRE
Circular No. 12/2011/
TT-BTNMT, 2011
MONRE Climate Change
Action Plan 2011–2015,
MONRE Decision No.
2418/QD-BTNMT, 2010

Resolution Supporting Active
Responses to Climate
Change and Strengthened
Natural Resource
Management and
Environmental Protection,
Central Executive
Committee Resolution
No. 24-NQ/TW, 2013
Program to Manage
Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Via Carbon Trading,
PM Decision No. 1775/
QD-TTg, 2012
National Green Growth
Strategy, PM Decision No.
1393/QD-TTg, 2012
National Target Program
to Respond to Climate
Change in 2012–2015,
PM Decision No. 1183/
QD-TTg, 2012
National Action Plan
on Climate Change
2012–2020, PM Decision
No. 1474/QD-TTg, 2012
National Strategy on Climate
Change, PM Decision No.
2139/QD-TTg, 2011
National Target Program
on Climate Change,
PM Decision No. 158/
QD-TTg, 2008
Financial Mechanisms
and Policies for Clean
Development Mechanism
Investment Projects, PM
Decision No. 130/2007/
QD-TTg, 2007
Energy

National Targeted Program
on Energy Efficiency and
Conservation 2012–2015,
PM Decision No. 1427/
QD-TTg, 2012

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Law on Economical
and Efficient Use
of Energy, Part I,
2010 (No. 50/2010/
QH12) and Part II,
2011 (Decree No.
21/2011/ND-CP)

Amendments to the
Mechanism Supporting
the Development of
Wind Power Projects, PM
Decision No. 39/2018/
QD-TTg, 2018
continued on next page
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Table 5.11 continued

Area

LULUCF and REDD+

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Biofuels Development
Scheme up to 2015, with
a Vision to 2025, PM
Decision No. 177/2007/
QDTTg, 2007
National Energy
Development Strategy
up to 2020, with 2050
Vision, PM Decision No.
1855/QDTTg, 2007
National Strategic Energy
Efficiency 2006–2015, PM
Decision No. 79/2006/
QD-TTg, 2006

Solar Power Development
Program, PM Decision No.
11/2017/QD-TTg, 2017
Regulations on Solar Power
Project Development
and Standardized Power
Purchase Agreements
for Solar Power Projects,
Ministry of Industry
and Trade Circular No.
16/2017/TT-BCT, 2017
Mechanism Supporting
the Development of
Wind Power Projects, PM
Decision No. 37/2011/
QD-TTg, 2011

National REDD+ Action
Programme to 2030, 2017
PM Decision No. 419/QD
-TTg, 2017
National REDD+ Program
2011–2020, 2012 PM
Decision No. 799/
QD-TTg, 2012

Regulations on Forest
Management, 2006 PM
Decision No. 186/2006/
QD-TTg, 2006

Transportation

Ministry of Transport and
Communications (MOTC)
Climate Change and
Green Growth Action
Plan 2016–2020, MOTC
Decision No. 1456/
QD-BGTVT, 2016
MOTC Climate Change
Action Plan 2011–2015,
2011 MOTC Decision No.
199/QD-BGTVT, 2011

Food production and
food security

Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Reduction Plan for the
Agriculture and Rural
Development Sector
to 2020, Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural
Development (MARD)
Decision No. 3119/
QD-BNN-KHCN, 2011
continued on next page
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Table 5.11 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Directive to Integrate
Climate Change into
Agriculture and Rural
Development Sector
Strategies, Plans, Programs,
and Projects 2011–2015,
MARD Directive No. 809/
CT-BNN-KHCN, 2011
MARD Climate Change
Action Plan 2011–2015 and
Vision to 2050, MARD
Decision No. 543/QDBNN-KHCN, 2011
Climate Change Adaptation
Framework Action Program
for the Agriculture and
Rural Development Sector
2008–2020, MARD
Decision No. 2730/QDBNN-KHCN, 2008

Water resources
and coastal zone
management

Project to Protect Coastal
Forests and Enhance Their
Resilience to Climate
Change 2014–2020,
PM Decision No. 120/
QD-TTg, 2015

Cities and buildings

Climate Change Action
Plan for the Construction
Industry 2016–2020,
Ministry of Construction
Decision No. 11/QD-BXD,
2016
Urban Resilience to
Climate Change Project
2013–2020, PM Decision
No. 2623/QD-TTg, 2013

Vulnerable groups

Ministry of Labour, Invalids
and Social Affairs Climate
Change Action Plan
2011–2015, Ministry of
Labour, Invalids and Social
Affairs Decision No. 403/
QD-LDTBXH, 2011
continued on next page
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Table 5.11 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Ministry of Industry and
Trade Climate Change
Action Plan, Ministry
of Industry and Trade
Decision No. 4103/
QD-BCT, 2010

Industry

Disaster risk
reduction

National Strategy for Natural
Disaster Prevention,
Response and Mitigation,
PM Decision No.
172/2007/QD-TTg, 2007
Scheme for Improving
Community Awareness
and Community-Based
Management of Natural
Disaster Risks, PM
Decision No. 1002/
QD-TTG, 2009

Law on Natural
Disaster
Prevention
and Control,
No. 33/2013/
QH13, 2013

Other

National Environmental
Protection Strategy
Implementation Plan
to 2020, with Vision to
2030, PM Decision No.
166/QD-TTg, 2014

Code of Civil
Procedure,
No. 92/2015/
QH13, 2015

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; MARD = Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; MONRE = Ministry of
Natural Resources and Environment; MOTC = Ministry of Transport and Communications; NDC = nationally determined contribution;
PM = Prime Minister; REDD+ = reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon
stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

Viet Nam uses coal domestically for the industry sector and natural gas to generate
electricity (footnote 288). The government plans to phase out fossil fuel subsidies
by 2020 to make renewable energy sources more competitive. This and other
measures will help shift Viet Nam away from its dependence on fossil fuels.

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
Viet Nam’s National Energy Development Strategy (Energy Strategy) was
launched in 2007 to guide energy policy up to 2020 and set an outlook to 2050.289
The Energy Strategy articulates a set of qualitative goals, including (i) ensuring
national energy security, (ii) supplying adequate high-quality energy in a way
that promotes socioeconomic development and supports environmental
289

Government of Viet Nam. 2007. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1855/QD-TTg Approving Vietnam's
National Energy Development Strategy up to 2020. Ha Noi.
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protection, (iii) using national energy resources efficiently, and (iv) developing a
strong energy market conducive to fair competition. It states that Viet Nam has
not adequately assessed its renewable energy potential and mandates further
research on renewable energy development and deployment.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
Many of Viet Nam’s key strategy documents set a goal of increasing renewable
energy deployment (footnote 288). The National Green Growth Strategy of
2012, for example, focuses partly on increasing new and renewable energy
sources (footnote 276). The 2014 Law on Environmental Protection promotes
clean and renewable energy in response to climate change (footnote 287). The
Energy Strategy translates these goals into quantitative targets, aiming to increase
the proportion of new and renewable energies to approximately 3% of total
commercial primary energy by 2010, 5% by 2020, and 11% by 2050.290
The Prime Minister has also approved some renewable energy policies. Prime
Minister’s Decision No. 11/2017/QD-TTg created regulations to support the
development of solar power projects in Viet Nam.291 The regulations articulate the
requirements for investments in solar power, the connection of solar power projects
to existing power grids, the purchase of solar power, and feed-in tariffs. Circular
No. 16 for the Implementation of the Prime Minister’s Decision also establishes
guidelines on national and provincial solar power development and deployment.292
Made in 2011, the Decision of the Prime Minister on the Mechanism Supporting
the Development of Wind Power Project in Vietnam seeks to increase the use of
wind power in the country by establishing a mechanism that includes incentives
such as preferential taxing practices for wind power developments and a mandate
to buy electricity from wind power projects.293 The decision also stipulates that
wind power development will be integrated into national and provincial electricity
development planning. In September 2018, the government raised the level of
feed-in tariffs for wind energy projects.294
Finally, the Decision Approving the Scheme on Development of Biofuels up to
2015, with a Vision to 2025 was launched to promote the development and use
of biofuels as a renewable energy source.295 This decision sets a quantitative
290
291

292

293

294

295

Footnote 289, art. 2(b).
Government of Viet Nam. 2017. Prime Minister's Decision No. 11/2017/QD-TTg Regulating the
Mechanisms for the Development of Solar Power in Viet Nam. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2017. Ministry of Industry and Trade Circular No. 16/2017/TT-BCT
Regulating Solar Power Project Development and Standardized Power Purchase Agreement for Solar
Power Projects. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2011. Prime Minister's Decision No. 37/2011/QD-TTg on the Mechanism
Supporting the Development of Wind Power Project in Vietnam. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2018. Prime Minister's Decision No. 39/2018/QD-TTg Amending Decision
No. 37/2011/QD-TTg on Support Mechanism to Develop Wind Power Projects in Vietnam. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2007. Prime Minister's Decision No. 177/2007/QD-TTg approving the
Scheme on Development of Biofuels up to 2015, With a Vision to 2025. Ha Noi.
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target of increasing the output of ethanol and vegetable oil to 250,000 tons to
satisfy 1% of the nation’s gasoline and oil demand by 2015. By 2025, ethanol and
vegetable output will ideally satisfy 5% of gasoline and oil demand. The scheme
includes financial incentives like tax benefits and concessional loans to create a
favorable environment for biofuel investment.

D. Energy Demand
Viet Nam’s energy demand is expected to grow. As living standards and incomes
increase, so will total primary energy consumption per capita. The nation’s
primary energy per capita increased from 0.27 tons of oil equivalent (toe) per
person in 1990 to 0.76 toe per person in 2015 and is expected continue increasing
to 2.06 toe per person by 2040.296 Given this context, Viet Nam has designed
laws and policies to promote energy efficiency and conservation.
In 2006, the Prime Minister approved the National Strategic Program on Energy
Saving and Effective Use (Energy Target Program).297 The Energy Target Program
covers a series of initiatives that promote energy efficiency and conservation,
including augmenting state administration of energy efficiency and conservation;
raising awareness; developing energy-efficient products; and promoting energy
efficiency and conservation in the industry, building, and transport sectors.
The Energy Target Program also strives to implement a 3%–5% reduction in the
nation’s total energy consumption during 2006–2010 and a 5%–8% reduction
during 2011–2015 compared with energy use projections. Other major targets
include establishing an energy efficiency and conservation model for business
enterprises and requiring energy efficiency and conservation standards for 100%
of buildings constructed after 2006.
The National Assembly passed the Law on Economical and Efficient Use of Energy in
2010, which aims to promote economical and efficient use of energy, development
of education and consultancy services in the energy sector, and scientific and
technological development related to energy efficiency and conservation.298 The
law is economy-wide and specifically targets the industry, transport, agriculture, and
service sectors. It also sets state responsibilities for, and calls for the development of a
national target program on, economic and efficient use of energy.
To better reflect the changes resulting from the energy efficiency law, the
government updated the 2006 Energy Target Program. In 2012, the Prime Minister
approved the National Targeted Program on Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Phase 2012–2015, which affirms the energy goal of reducing total energy

296
297

298

Footnote 288, p. 324.
Government of Viet Nam. 2006. Prime Minister's Decision No. 79/2006/QD-TTg approving the
National Strategic Program on Energy Saving and Effective Use. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2010. Law No. 50/2010/QH12 on Economical and Efficient Use of
Energy. 17 June. Ha Noi.
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consumption by 5%–8% by 2015.299 The updated program also implements
mandatory energy efficiency management practices and sets a target of
increasing public transport use to 10%–15% of travel demand in urban areas by 2015
(footnote 299). The total capital required for the program is dong (D) 930 billion
(about $40 million in late 2020).
According to the Energy Target Program, nuclear electricity will account for
approximately 15%–20% of total commercial energy consumption by 2050
(footnote 297).

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

Viet Nam treated forest management and climate change as overlapping issues as
early as 2006. The Prime Minister’s Decision on the Regulation of Forest Management
in 2006 clarifies that the government will protect forests to regulate climate.300
In 2012, the Prime Minister approved a national action program for REDD+ for
2011–2020.301 The program focuses on managing forest resources sustainably
and reducing GHG emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. It also
seeks to improve the nation’s capacity to sequester carbon by conserving forests
and preserving biodiversity. The program identifies two actions critical to its
successful implementation: (i) improving the legal framework, and (ii) building
the technical and human resource capacity of institutions.
In 2017, the government approved the national REDD+ program of action
through to 2030.302 Deforestation and forest degradation are combatted by
conserving and enhancing natural forests, expanding forest areas, and improving
plantation forests. Forest protection also aligns closely with Viet Nam’s goals to
reduce GHG emissions, promote green growth and sustainable development,
mobilize international support, and enter the carbon market.

F.

Transportation

Sea level rise poses a significant threat to the transport network. The government
reports that 11,000 kilometers (km) of roads could be submerged by 1 meter (m)
of sea level rise (footnote 284). However, GHG emissions from the transport

299

300

301

302

Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1427/QD-TTg approving the
National Targeted Program on Energy Efficiency and Conservation Phase 2012–2015. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2006. Prime Minister's Decision No. 186/2006/QD-TTg promulgating
Forest Management Regulations. Chapter III, sec. 1, art. 25(4)(a).
Government of Viet Nam. 2012. Prime Minister's Decision No. 799/QD-TTg approving the National
Action Program on Reduction of Green-House Gas Emissions through REDD+ in 2011–2020. Ha Noi.
REDD+ means reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation
of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks.
Government of Viet Nam. 2017. Prime Minister's Decision No. 419/QD-TTg approving the National
REDD+ Programme up to 2030. Ha Noi.
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sector are expected to triple during 2010–2030 (footnote 284). To build
resilience in and reduce emissions from the transport sector, the Ministry of
Transport launched the Action Plan on Climate Change to cover 2011–2015.303
In 2016, the Action Plan on Climate Change was updated to integrate green
growth by the Decision of the Minister of Transportation and Communications
Promulgating Action Plan on Climate Change and Green Growth of the Ministry
of Transportation and Transport in the 2016–2020 Period.304 The updated action
plan sets out to make Viet Nam’s transportation uniformly sustainable and
environmentally friendly and to mitigate GHG emissions from transportation. To
achieve these goals, the Ministry of Transport, under this updated action plan, will
(i)

develop the transport infrastructure system to build climate change
resilience and reduce environmental pollution,
(ii) manage low-emission transport operations using energy saving and
efficiency,
(iii) promote the application of environmentally friendly technologies and
encourage the use of renewable energy sources,
(iv) perform synchronization solutions for emission control traffic,
(v) raise awareness for organizations and individuals of climate change
and green growth in transportation, and
(vi) increase international cooperation and diversification of resources to
implement activities in response to climate change and green growth
in transport.
Transportation targets are also integrated into other climate strategy documents.
For example, the 2012 Green Growth Strategy aims to increase the share of public
transportation in large and medium cities to 35%–45% by 2020 (footnote 276).

G. Adaptation
While Viet Nam has not developed a national adaptation strategy, adaptation
commitments are expressed in other climate documents. For example, the
National Action Plan on Climate Change for 2012–2020 identifies specific
programs, some of which are adaptation specific (footnote 282). Relevant
actions include (i) identifying areas vulnerable to flash flooding, (ii) researching
impacts to plants and animals, (iii) creating mechanisms to strengthen
agricultural insurance, (iv) conserving coastal mangrove forests, (v) managing
water resources, and (vi) reviewing construction regulations and construction
techniques in disaster-prone areas.305
303

304

305

Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Transport and Communication. 2011. Decision No. 199/
QD-BGTVT, Ministry of Transport and Communications Climate Change Action Plan For 2011–2015.
Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Transport and Communication. 2016. Decision No. 1456/
QD-BGTVT, Ministry of Transport and Communications Climate Change and Green Growth Action
Plan for 2016–2020. Ha Noi.
Footnote 282, Part II, Specific Programs, Schemes and Projects.
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Government Resolution No. 24-NQ/TW of 2013 details specific climate
responses for adaptation to the year 2020.306 It identifies the need to address
inundation, flooding, and saline intrusion due to sea level rise, particularly in
coastal cities and the Mekong Delta, Red River Delta, and Central Coast. The
plan aims to build national capacity for early warning systems and educating the
community about climate change risks.
In 2017 the Prime Minister approved the Climate Change and Green Growth
Strategy for 2016–2020, which aims to strengthen Viet Nam’s adaptation to
the consequences of climate change (footnote 275). Similarly, Prime Minister’s
Decision No. 2053/QD-TTg, outlining the government’s Paris Agreement
implementation plan, makes adaptation an essential component of Viet Nam’s
responses to climate change (footnote 274). The National Target Program
to Respond to Climate Change in 2012–2015 also aims to enhance adaptive
capacity in Viet Nam (footnote 279).

H. Disaster Risk Management
Over 70% of Viet Nam’s citizens are at risk from natural hazards.307 Since 1998,
extreme weather events have killed more than 13,000 people and cost the
economy more than $6.4 billion.
Viet Nam’s national strategy for disaster risk reduction runs to 2020.308 A
solution-oriented document, the strategy articulates the need to consolidate
the system of laws on disaster risk management and strengthen organizational
structures. It identifies programs to enhance disaster risk management and plans
for the modernization of early warning systems and improved search and rescue
capacities.
In 2009, the Prime Minister approved the National Scheme for Improving
Community Awareness and Community-Based Management of Natural Disaster
Risks.309 The scheme aims to (i) develop central and local mechanisms and
policies for community-based management of natural disaster risks, (ii) improve
the government’s capacity to manage disaster risks and responses, and
(iii) implement disaster prevention plans for high-risk communities.
The 2013 Law on Natural Disaster Prevention and Control clarifies institutional
responsibilities for disaster prevention and management and establishes
306

307

308

309

Government of Viet Nam. 2013. Resolution No. 24-NQ/TW, Active Responses to Climate Change
and Improvement of Natural Resource Management and Environmental Protection. Ha Noi.
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. 2018. Mainstreaming Disaster Resilience in
Viet Nam: Engaging with Communities to Build Resilience.
Government of Viet Nam. 2007. Prime Minister’s Decision No. 172/2007/QD-TTg, approving the
National Strategy for Natural Disaster Prevention, Response and Mitigation. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam. 2009. Prime Minister's Decision No. 1002/QD-TTG, the Scheme for
Improving Community Awareness and Community-Based Management of Natural Disaster Risks.
Ha Noi.
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guidelines for disaster risk reduction and responses.310 It mandates the Ministry
of Agriculture and Rural Development to prepare 10-yearly national strategies on
natural disaster prevention in consultation with other ministries and provincial
officials. Local natural disaster prevention and control plans supplement
the national plan. The law, recognizing the importance of community-based
approaches to disaster risk management, creates natural disaster prevention
and control funds for provincial governments.311 Disaster planning should also be
integrated into national and local socioeconomic and sector development plans.
The minister of education also established a project to improve national awareness
about climate education and disaster risk prevention during 2013–2020.312 The
project sets targets for awareness raising. For example, by 2020, 95% of educators
should have enhanced awareness of and capacity to teach about climate change
responses and natural disaster prevention and control.

I.

Vulnerable Groups

Viet Nam is one of the few countries in Asia and the Pacific to adopt a climate
change policy with gender-specific considerations. The Climate Change Action
Plan 2011–2015 for the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs addresses
climate change impacts on vulnerable groups, including women.313 The plan seeks
to assess the risks that these groups face and create impact forecasting models.
These impact forecasts should then be integrated into disaster preparedness plans.

310

311

312

313

Government of Viet Nam. 2013. Law No. 33/2013/QH13 on Natural Disaster Prevention and
Control. Ha Noi.
Decree No. 94/2014/ND-CP establishes the fund. See Government of Viet Nam. 2014. Decree
No. 94/2014/ND-CP Establishing the Natural Disaster Prevention and Control Fund. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Education and Training. 2014. Ministry of Training and
Education Decision No. 329/QD-BGDDT approving the Information and Communication Project for
Raising Awareness about Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction for 2013–2020. Ha Noi.
Government of Viet Nam, Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs. 2011. Ministry of Labour,
Invalids and Social Affairs Decision No. 403/QD-LDTBXH, Climate Change Action Plan 2011–2015.
Ha Noi.

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.

Solar power in the Cook Islands. ADB’s Renewable
Energy Project aims to reduce the Cook Islands’ heavy
reliance upon diesel fuel for electricity generation by
funding solar power plants on six islands. The transition
to solar energy should reduce diesel-fuel consumption
by 1 million liters per year (photo by Eric Sales/ADB).

PART SIX

THE PACIFIC COUNTRIES
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
I. Cook Islands
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Cook Islands is a developing state composed of 15 atolls spread across nearly
2 million square kilometers (km2) in the South Pacific Ocean.1 Rarotonga, the
nation’s largest island, has the highest elevation at 658 meters above sea level.2
The Cook Islands has a self-governing unicameral Parliament in free association
with New Zealand.3 It is intensely vulnerable to sea level rise, cyclones, ocean
acidification, droughts, and increasing temperatures, even though its greenhouse
gas emissions are a sliver of the global total (0.00012%).4
Climate change threatens to upset infrastructure, ecosystems, and the economy
(footnote 1). With no large rivers and limited fresh water, the islanders rely on
wells and rainwater harvesting.5 Local sea levels have risen by 4 millimeters (mm)
annually since 1993 and may rise up to 58 centimeters (cm) by 2090 (footnote 2).
Tropical cyclones have typically struck with destructive force once or twice
per decade.6 In 2005, the Cook Islands was hit by five cyclones over 2 months,
causing damage estimated at $20 million.7 The Cook Islands is pursuing
“low carbon development to strengthen climate resilience and further reduce its
carbon footprint” (footnote 1).

1
2

3
4

5

6

7

Government of the Cook Islands. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contributions. Avarua. p. 1.
Secretariat of the Twenty-Third Session, Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 23). The Cook Islands.
Government of New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Cook Islands.
Footnote 1; and P. Fuller. 2013. Cook Islands Struggle to Adapt to Creeping Climate Change.
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. News release. 23 July.
Government of the Cook Islands, National Environment Service. 2011. Cook Islands 4th National
Report to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Tu’anga Taporoporo. p. 20; and A. Mirti and
S. Davies. 2005. Drinking Water Quality in the Pacific Island Countries: Situation Analysis and
Needs Assessment. SOPAC Joint Contribution Report 181. pp. 2−6.
F.A. de Scally. 2008. Historical Tropical Cyclone Activity and Impacts in the Cook Islands. Pacific
Science. 62 (4). pp. 443–459.
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2007. Cook Islands: Strengthening Disaster Management and
Mitigation. Consultant’s report. Manila (TA 4605-COO).
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B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of the Cook Islands submitted its first nationally determined
contribution (NDC) on 1 September 2016, committing to transition half of its
islands from diesel-based electricity to renewable sources by 2015, and the other
half by 2020. “The Cook Islands has achieved its 50% target and is on track to
achieving the 2020 target. Using 2006 as the base year, emissions from electricity
generation will be reduced by 38% by 2020.” 8
The Cook Islands also aims to construct additional grid storage, improve energy
efficiency, integrate new technologies, promote transfer technology, and
strengthen capacities for overall sustainability benefits that are economically and
environmentally advantageous (footnote 8). This would result in an additional
43% reduction of emissions from electricity generation, totaling an 81% emissions
reduction by 2030, compared with the 2006 baseline (footnote 8). External
support will be needed to achieve the additional 43% reduction (footnote 8). The
Cook Islands also intends to embrace low-carbon transportation technologies
and various adaptation actions that are conditional on external support.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The Cook Islands has embedded climate resilience in Te Kaveinga Nui: National
Sustainable Development Plan 2016–2020.9 The plan contains a range of
sustainable development goals, including Goal 13—to “strengthen resilience to
combat the impacts of climate change and natural disasters.” 10 This goal includes
three areas of focus: (i) promote resilient communities, (ii) enhance protection
from cyclones, and (iii) build resilient infrastructure.11 Prior to the plan, the Cook
Islands issued Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate & Disaster Compatible Development
Policy 2013–2016.12
The Cook Islands Second Joint National Action Plan for Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Management (JNAP II) lays out a five-year implementation plan for
Goal 13 of the National Sustainable Development Plan.13 This document records
all current and planned activities related to (i) climate change and disaster risk
management, and (ii) strengthening the nation’s resilience.
8
9

10
11
12

13

Footnote 1, p. 2.
Government of the Cook Islands, Office of the Prime Minister. 2016. Te Kaveinga Nui: National
Sustainable Development Plan 2016–2020. Avarua.
Footnote 9, p. 44.
Footnote 9, p. 45.
Government of the Cook Islands, Office of the Prime Minister. 2013. Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate &
Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013–2016. Avarua.
Government of the Cook Islands. 2016. JNAP II − Are We Resilient? The Cook Islands 2nd Joint
National Action Plan: A Sectoral Approach to Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management
2016−2020. Avarua.
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JNAP II seeks to promote a sectoral, collaborative approach that addresses
the cross-cutting nature of climate change and disaster risk management. It is
organized around nine strategies: (i) good governance; (ii) water and food security;
(iii) environmental sustainability; (iv) research, monitoring, and information
management; (v) Cook Islands’ culture and identity; (vi) energy and transport;
(vii) infrastructure; (viii) climate and disaster risk; and (ix) health and welfare.14
The Cook Islands Environment Act 2003 guides sustainable development. In
addition, the renewable energy policy—Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura: Renewable
Energy Chart, issued in 2012 and updated in 2016—sets out the nation’s plans
to develop renewable energy and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.15 The chart is
accompanied by island-specific implementation plans.
The Environment Act 2003 established the National Environment Service,
whose tasks include monitoring the implementation of international instruments
signed by the Cook Islands and related to climate change, such as the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).16 The act also
provides environmental impact assessments, which can help guide sustainable
development and preparations to protect the environment from changing
weather conditions and emerging new hazards.17
Table 6.1 summarizes the Cook Islands’ climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
As of 2007, the total primary energy supply (TPES) of the Cook Islands was
21.34 kilotons of oil equivalent (ktoe), with 90% of the gross energy coming from
fossil fuels.18 The remaining 10% came from biomass used primarily for cooking
(footnote 18). Historically, the Cook Islands has relied almost entirely on imported
fossil fuels, which accounted for over 99% of the country’s energy consumption
(footnote 18). All petroleum fuel for land transport, aviation, and electricity
continue to be imported (footnote 18).
Since setting a target for 50% renewable energy by 2015 and 100% renewable
energy by 2020, the Cook Islands has increased its renewable energy supply
considerably (footnote 1). As of 2018, the Cook Islands had added 4.2 megawatts
(MW) of solar photovoltaic and new high-speed biodiesel engines to the previous
11.75 MW diesel system.19 The Northern Group Islands are now powered by

14
15

16
17
18
19

Footnote 13, p. 9.
Government of the Cook Islands. 2012. Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura no te Pa-Enua Takitai E
Tumutevarovaro: Cook Islands Renewable Energy Chart Implementation Plan: Island Specific. Avarua.
Environment Act 2003, secs. 5 and 9(m).
Footnote 16, sec. 36.
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2013. Cook Islands (2012). 11 October.
ADB. 2018. Pacific Energy Update 2018. Manila. p. 8.
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Table 6.1: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of the Cook Islands
The Constitution of the Cook Islands, 1964
Te Kaveinga Nui: National Sustainable Development Plan
2016–2020, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Kaveinga Tapapa: Climate
and Disaster Compatible
Development Policy 2013−2016,
2013

Energy

Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura: The
Cook Islands Renewable Energy
Chart, 2016
Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura: Cook
Islands Renewable Energy Chart
Implementation Plan, 2012

Disaster risk
management

Second Joint National Action
Plan for Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Management
2016–2020, 2016

Other

Acts

Environment Act
2003

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

renewable sources (solar photovoltaic).20 As of early 2016, efforts were underway
to transition the Southern Group Islands to renewable generation (footnote 20).
The state-owned utility, Te Aponga Uira, provides the power supply for the island
of Rarotonga, which constitutes 90% of the total country demand.21 All inhabited
islands of the Cook Islands have centralized power supplies, providing electricity
“through a distribution grid to most residential[,] commercial and industrial
customers.” 22 As of 2012, approximately 97% of households in the Cook Islands
were connected to electricity, with 100% grid connection in Rarotonga (footnote 18).
20

21

22

Government of the Cook Islands. 2016. Updated Summary of Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura: The
Cook Islands Renewable Energy Chart. Avarua. p. 5.
Government of the Cook Islands, Office of the Prime Minister. 2012. Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura:
The Cook Islands Renewable Energy Chart Implementation Plan. Avarua. p. 24.
Footnote 20, p. 4.
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Affordability has been identified as a concern in increasing the electricity
generation to 100% renewable, but the government intends to address the issue.23

1. Renewable Energy Policy
The Te Atamoa o te Uira Natura: Renewable Energy Chart is accompanied
by implementation plans specific to each island, including costs, technology,
time lines, and processes. The 2016 update discusses progress on reaching
100% renewable energy by 2020 and charts further steps to obtain this goal.
It affirms, “The renewable energy policy goal is focused on measuring progress
on the accessibility, use and composition of energy and transport.”24 Energy and
transport accessibility, use, and composition are also considered throughout the
report, as progress of other Pacific islands toward developing renewable energy
and reducing fossil fuel dependence is also discussed.

D. Energy Demand
Rarotonga’s electricity consumption is about 2,200 kilowatt-hours (kWh) per
person; consumption is less on the other islands (footnote 22). The cost of
electricity relative to income influences electricity demand (footnote 22).
Residents of the outer islands, for example, have lower incomes, resulting in lower
per-capita consumption (footnote 22). However, central government subsidies
to outer islands have rendered electricity prices comparable across the islands
(footnote 22). Currently electricity generation capacity on all islands far exceeds
demand (footnote 22).

E.

Adaptation

The Climate & Disaster Compatible Development Policy 2013–2016 is the
leading policy document for both climate change and disaster risk management
(footnote 12). In line with this policy, JNAP II identifies various strategies for
promoting climate change adaptation, such as (i) strengthening livelihoods
and capacity for climate adaptation in agriculture and fisheries, (ii) promoting
sustainable land use practices, and (iii) safeguarding the country’s sovereignty
from climate change impacts (footnote 13).

F.

Disaster Risk Management

JNAP II seeks to increase resilience against natural disasters and ensure
sustainable livelihoods (footnote 13). Importantly, it articulates the various
responsibilities and roles of government institutions with respect to disaster risk
management.

23
24

Footnote 20, p. 10.
Footnote 20, p. 2.
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II. Federated States of Micronesia
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
A federal republic in free association with the United States, the Federated States
of Micronesia (FSM) spans more than 600 islands and islets in the Caroline
Islands archipelago in the Pacific Ocean.25 Some of the islands are volcanic and
support a large variety of plant forms, while others are low-lying coral atolls with
poorer soil.26 The FSM has four states: Yap, Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Chuuk. The
main economic activities are fishing and subsistence farming.27 Settlements are
predominantly located along the coast.28
The FSM is vulnerable to droughts, typhoons, storm waves, flooding, and
landslides.29 El Niño events, which are associated with a climate cycle in the
Pacific Ocean affecting global weather patterns, can result in drier conditions and
consequently fires.30 Water and food shortages have happened during extremely
dry events (footnote 29). The FSM is at risk from an above-average number of
tropical storms during La Niña events, which are associated with cooler than
usual ocean surface temperatures in the Pacific Ocean (footnote 29).
The FSM has been experiencing sea level rise at a rate faster than the global
average—by over 10 millimeters (mm) per year since 1993 compared with the
global average of 2.8–3.6 mm.31 Data show a decreasing trend in annual and
wet season rainfall since 1950, as well as rising average temperatures and ocean
acidification (footnote 31). The FSM also expects higher temperatures, more hot
days, changing rainfall patterns, more extreme rainfall days, continued sea level
rise, ocean acidification, and less frequent but more intense typhoons.32

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of the FSM submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 15 September 2016.33 It pledged to unconditionally reduce its greenhouse

25
26
27

28

29

30
31
32
33

BBC. 2018. Micronesia Country Profile. 9 January.
D. Lorence. Flora of Micronesia. Smithsonian Institution.
Government of the FSM, Department of Resources and Development. 2012. Federated States of
Micronesia Agriculture Policy, 2012−2016. Palikir. pp. 11, 43−44.
C. Fletcher and B. Richmond. 2010. Climate Change in the Federated States of Micronesia: Food
and Water Security, Climate Risk Management, and Adaptive Strategies. Report of Findings 2010. p. 4.
Pacific Climate Change Science Program partners. 2011. Current and Future Climate of the
Federated States of Micronesia. Palikir. p. 3.
Footnote 29, pp. 2–3.
Footnote 29, p. 4.
Footnote 29, pp. 6–7.
Government of the FSM. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Palikir.
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gas emissions by 28% from 2000 levels by 2025.34 It also set a conditional
commitment to increase that reduction to 35%, subject to the availability of financial,
technical, and capacity building support from the international community.
In 2000, the FSM’s total GHG emissions were only around 0.0004% of total
global GHG emissions.35 Electricity generation accounted for 42% of those
emissions.36 The FSM plans to achieve its emissions reductions in the energy
sector (electricity generation and transport), but has not provided details. It notes
its efforts to assess adaptation needs, but its NDC does not discuss adaptation
in detail.

2. Overview of Climate Change Laws and Policy
The FSM combines sustainable development with climate change plans. For
example, its Strategic Development Plan 2004−2023 aims for a 50% reduction
in imported petroleum fuels by 2020 by improving energy efficiency, eliminating
energy subsidies, and expanding public transportation.37 It also plans to generate
10% of electricity in urban centers from renewable sources and 50% in rural areas
by 2020 (footnote 37). In 2004, it had aimed to apply the United States (US)
standards for energy efficiency to all new public buildings and 50% of private
buildings by 2006 (footnote 37). However, there is no publicly available data on
whether it was able to meet this target.
In 2013, the Nation Wide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate
Change Policy (Climate Change Policy) set out guiding principles to minimize
the risk of anthropogenic climate change.38 The principles promote sustainable
development to bolster the FSM’s ability to respond to natural and humaninduced disasters. The policy includes a multi-hazard risk management approach
that integrates disaster risk management, climate change adaptation, and GHG
emissions reduction.39 It also sets climate change adaptation as a strategic
objective of the plan.40
To implement the Climate Change Policy, Congress passed the Climate
Change Act in late 2013. The law set an October 2014 deadline for government
agencies to prepare plans and policies consistent with the Climate Change
Policy.41 It requires the President to issue progress reports to Congress on the
34
35

36
37
38

39
40
41

Footnote 33, p. 1.
In 2000, the FSM’s total GHG emissions were 150,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2)
equivalent, while global emissions exceeded 40.6 billion tCO2 equivalent. See footnote 33
and World Bank. Total Greenhouse Gas Emissions (kt of CO2 Equivalent) (accessed 25 March
2020).
Footnote 33, p. 2.
Government of the FSM. 2004. Strategic Development Plan (2004–2023). Palikir. p. 300.
Government of the FSM. 2013. Nation Wide Integrated Disaster Risk Management and Climate
Change Policy. Palikir. pp. 1−2.
Footnote 38, p. 1.
Footnote 38, p. 3.
Federated States of Micronesia Climate Change Act, sec. 4.
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implementation of the policy and authorizes the President to include in the
annual national budget request one or more lines on said implementation.42
Table 6.2 summarizes the FSM’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 6.2: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of
the Federated States of Micronesia
The Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia,
1978
Strategic Development Plan (2004−2023), 2004
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Nation Wide Integrated Disaster
Risk Management and Climate
Change Policy, 2013

Energy

Energy Policy, 2012 (Volume I)
(Volume II)

Acts
Federated States of
Micronesia Climate
Change Act, 2013

Environmental Protection
Act, 2014

Other
NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

C.

Energy Supply

Petroleum is the primary energy source for transportation and electricity
generation in the FSM.43 In 2009, 95.7% of energy generation was met by
petroleum and only 4.3% by renewables (small hydro and solar) (footnote 43).
Electricity rates for residential customers are expensive, exceeding $0.48 per
kilowatt-hour (kWh).44 In 2011, the total installed generation capacity was
6.6 megawatts (MW) in Yap, 4.6 MW in Kosrae, 13.4 MW in Pohnpei, and 5.2 MW
in Chuuk (footnote 43).

42
43

44

Footnote 41, sec. 5.
National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 2015. Energy Transition Initiative: Islands. Energy
Snapshot: Federated States of Micronesia. p. 2.
Footnote 43, p. 1.
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The national electrification rate in 2018 was around 76%, with access rates
varying sharply across the country.45 For example, while electrification rates in
Kosrae and Pohnpei were 95%, only 27% of Chuuk’s residents had access to
electricity (footnote 45). The FSM’s 2018 National Energy Master Plan set to
achieve 100% electrification in Kosrae by 2019, Chuuk by 2023, and Pohnpei and
Yap by 2025.46
Households without electricity rely on (i) kerosene lamps or solar panels for
lighting; and (ii) firewood, kerosene, and biogas for cooking.47 In Pohnpei, 400
solar home systems were installed in the 1990s.48 According to the 2000 census,
300 more were installed on outer islands in Yap and another 402 in Chuuk
(footnote 48). The FSM energy master plans anticipate that diesel will remain
critical for electricity production, especially to support the introduction of
renewable energy sources.49

1. Renewable Energy Policies
The 2012 Energy Policy seeks to help the FSM become less dependent on
imported sources of energy by increasing its share of renewable energy sources.50
It aims to have at least 30% of the FSM’s energy production come from renewable
sources by 2020 by (i) promoting renewable energy technologies, (ii) effectively
managing renewable-based power systems, (iii) fostering partnerships between
the private and public sectors, (iv) promoting the availability of renewable energy
in remote areas, (v) encouraging the creation of markets for clean technologies,
and (vi) establishing opportunities for better access to renewable energy.51
The FSM’s National Energy Master Plan has set more ambitious renewable energy
targets: to generate 44% of electricity from renewable energy by 2020, 63% by
2027, and 84% by 2037.52 With reduced diesel use and higher renewable energy
generation rates, the FSM intends to reduce electricity emissions to 15,769 metric
tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2) equivalent by 2037.53

D. Energy Demand
Increased rural electrification will increase energy demand, making energy
efficiency and conservation critical. The Energy Policy seeks to increase

45
46

47
48

49
50
51
52
53

World Bank. 2018. Greener, More Reliable Energy for Micronesia. Press release. 7 December.
Castalia Limited. 2018. Energy Master Plans for the Federated States of Micronesia: Final Report to
the Department of Resources and Development. Washington, DC. p. 17.
Footnote 46, pp. 26, 31, 35, 45, and 57.
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2013. Federated States of Micronesia
(2012). 11 October.
Footnote 46, Appendices, p. 33.
Government of the FSM, Department of Resources and Development. 2012. Energy Policy. Palikir.
Footnote 50, pp. 10 and 34.
Footnote 46, p. 16.
Footnote 46, pp. 16 and 19.
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energy efficiency by 50% by 2020.54 To achieve this, it anticipates (i) an energy
conservation plan applied to government facilities, (ii) building and construction
code regulations, (iii) a public awareness campaign, and (iv) a training and
capacity building program.
The Energy Policy also aimed to enhance the supply-side energy efficiency
of utilities by 20% by 2015 (footnote 54). This objective, however, was not
achieved.55 As such, the National Energy Master Plan states the importance of
securing additional funding and improved policies to meet its targets.56

E.

Adaptation

As a nation of 600 islands, the FSM is highly vulnerable to climate change,
particularly sea level rise and more frequent, intense, or long-lasting weather
events created by El Niño and La Niña (footnote 29). The Climate Change Policy
steers the country toward a sustainable development pathway that seeks to
minimize natural and human-induced hazards—both slow- and rapid-onset—
including those associated with climate change (footnote 38). As such, the
Climate Change Policy sets adaptation as one of its strategic objectives.

F.

Disaster Risk Management

The Climate Change Policy further develops the FSM’s commitment to climateresponsive sustainable development through various principles, including the
use of multi-hazard risk management. This approach integrates disaster risk
management, climate change adaptation, and GHG emissions reduction. The
policy also recognizes that the assessment and treatment of existing risks is the
starting point for reducing and managing future risks.

III. Fiji
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Republic of Fiji is a unitary constitutional democracy with common law
jurisdiction. Its islands occupy 18,333 km2 encompassed by an exclusive economic
zone of 1.3 million km2.57 About one-third of the 332 islands are inhabited
(footnote 57). The islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu contain about 87% of Fiji’s
land area (footnote 57). Fiji has a tropical climate (footnote 57). It is relatively
richer in natural resources than its Polynesian and Micronesian neighbors, with
vast timber resources, rich soils, mineral deposits, and fish (footnote 57).
54
55
56
57

Footnote 50, p. 10.
Footnote 46, p. 19.
Footnote 46, p. 20.
Government of Fiji. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Suva. p. 2.
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Fiji is vulnerable to earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, flooding, and storm
surges (footnote 57). Natural disasters have contributed to the volatility of Fiji’s
growth—for instance, the cyclones in 1985, 1992, 1993, 2009, 2010, and 2012;
and the severe flooding in the Western Division and Northern Division in January
2012 and late March 2012 (footnote 57).
Fiji contributes only 0.04% of global GHG emissions, but it is intensely vulnerable
to climate change impacts (footnote 57). These impacts include eroded
shorelines and riverbanks, water scarcity, depleted fisheries stock, reduced food
production, increased outbreaks of vector-borne diseases, large-scale flooding,
and rising sea levels (footnote 57).
Climate change threatens Fiji’s marine and coastal resources as well as its
economy and primary industries—fisheries, forestry, and agriculture.58 For
example, on 20−21 February 2016, Tropical Cyclone Winston tore through Fiji,
killing 42 people and displacing up to 350,000 people.59 Sustained winds of 300
kilometers (km) per hour made Winston the second strongest landfalling cyclone
in recorded history.60

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Fiji submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 22 April 2016. It pledged to reduce GHG emissions from the energy
sector by 30% by 2030, compared with 2030 emissions under a business as
usual (BAU) scenario.61 Fiji notes that 10% of the BAU scenario reduction will
be achieved by implementing the Green Growth Framework, the country’s
unconditional commitment and blueprint for sustainable development.62 The
remaining 20% is conditional on the availability of external funding amounting
to $500 million.63 The target is based on increasing renewable energy and energy
efficiency in electricity generation. Fiji intends to achieve 20% of the reductions
by increasing the renewable energy share of electricity generation to almost 100%
by 2020 (from around 60% in 2013) (footnote 61). The other 10% is expected
from energy efficiency (footnote 61).

58
59

60

61
62

63

Footnote 57, p. 3.
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2016. Fiji: Severe
Tropical Cyclone Winston. Situation Report No. 9. pp. 1, 3, and 9.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Observatory. 2016. Tropical Cyclone
Winston Slams Fiji.
Footnote 57, p. 4.
Footnote 57, p. 5; and Government of Fiji, Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development
and Statistics. 2014. A Green Growth Framework for Fiji: Restoring the Balance in Development That
Is Sustainable for Our Future. Suva.
Footnote 57, p. 5.

211

212

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

The NDC also discusses adaptation challenges and corresponding actions in the
short-, medium-, and long-term.64 The challenges include the need to (i) further
develop an integrated policy and approach to address climate change, (ii) ensure
that buildings are cyclone-resistant, (iii) strengthen the role of local governments
in building resilience, (iv) gather more information on climate impacts, (v) build
partnerships at all government levels, and (vi) ensure that climate change
mitigation and adaptation become part of the national and subnational
development planning and budgetary process.
Most of the corresponding actions concern (i) issuing new approaches;
(ii) reviewing existing laws, regulations, and policies; and (iii) undertaking
assessments.65 Other actions include developing hazard maps and models for
all potential hazards (including sea level rise, storm surge, flood, and tsunami)
by 2020, and building the capacity of communities for which relocation is the
long-term adaptation strategy.

2. Overview of Climate Change Laws and Policy
Fiji was the first country to ratify the Paris Agreement. It led negotiations at the
United Nations (UN) climate talks in 2017, which focused on taking steps to
implement the Paris Agreement. In its National Development Plan (NDP), Fiji
states its commitment to climate leadership at the local, regional, and global
scales, with the plight of small island developing states central to its work.66
It seeks to mobilize public and private sector resources for adaptation and
mitigation, including community-based adaptation planning (footnote 66).
In 2014, Fiji released the Green Growth Framework, intended to support the
(i) [People’s] Charter for Change, Peace and Progress, and (ii) Roadmap for
Democracy and Sustainable Socio-Economic Development 2010–2014.67 The
Green Growth Framework builds on three pillars of sustainable development—
environment, economic, and social—and includes climate targets.68 The
framework sets targets for (i) reducing dependence on imported fossil fuel for
transportation from 42% of final energy consumption (a baseline established
in 2010) to around 32% by 2020, and 22% by 2030; (ii) transitioning the
tourism and manufacturing industries to 100% renewable energy by 2030; and
(iii) generating 99% of electricity from renewable energy by 2030 (up from 61%

64
65
66

67

68

Footnote 57, p. 7 and pp. 9–10.
Footnote 57, p. 3 and pp. 9–10.
Government of Fiji, Ministry of Economy. 2017. 5-Year & 20-Year National Development Plan:
Transforming Fiji. Suva. p. 16.
Government of Fiji, National Council for Building a Better Fiji. 2008. [People’s] Charter for
Change, Peace & Progress. Suva; and Government of Fiji, Ministry of National Planning. 2009.
Roadmap for Democracy and Sustainable Socio-Economic Development 2010–2014: A Better Fiji for
All. Suva.
Government of Fiji, Ministry of Strategic Planning, National Development and Statistics. 2014.
A Green Growth Framework for Fiji: Restoring the Balance in Development That Is Sustainable for Our
Future. Suva.
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in 2013).69 These renewable energy targets serve as the basis for Fiji’s first NDC.
After signing the Paris Agreement, Fiji issued its NDP with a short-term plan
(2017−2021) and a long-term plan (2017−2036).70 The short-term plan provides
a detailed action agenda with specific targets and policies that help advance
the long-term plan, which in turn is designed to achieve deeper transformation,
including major decarbonization by 2050. The NDP is intended to be consistent
with commitments under the Paris Agreement and its goal to achieve climate
neutrality and a low-emission world. Strategies to address climate change and
impacts are mentioned throughout the report including in sections on the energy
sector, food and agriculture, public health, transportation, youth development,
and safe and efficient shipping.
The Fiji Low Emission Development Strategy 2018–2050 is a living document
compiled in 2018 that defines pathways to achieve low-emission development
in Fiji until 2050.71 It considers four different emissions scenarios, including one
of “very high ambition,” which seeks to achieve net-zero emissions in 2041 and
net negative emission thereafter.72 The greatest emissions reduction would
come from shifting Fiji’s energy sector to renewable energy generation. The
strategy also notes the significance of electrifying land transport using organic
waste and recycling programs while avoiding the release of methane due to
its decomposition. It aims to achieve net negative emissions due to extensive
tree replanting, reduced deforestation, and increased use of sustainable forest
plantations.
Supporting the broader climate policy agenda are additional constitutional
and legislative measures. Fiji’s constitution, for example, establishes the right
to a clean and healthy environment.73 The Environmental Management Act
2005 requires environmental assessments for significant development projects
affecting the environment.74 The COP 23 Presidency Trust Fund Act 2017
helped finance Fiji’s presidency of the 23rd session of the Conference of the
Parties and other climate change activities.75 The Environmental Levy Act 2015
(as amended) helps fund environmental and biodiversity conservation projects
and climate mitigation and adaptation measures.76 In 2019, Fiji passed the
Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund Act 2019 to support research
and assessments of circumstances requiring planned relocation, assessments
of communities that might be at risk of being displaced due to climate change
69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76

Footnote 68, pp. 80, 87, and 99.
Footnote 66, pp. 2–10 and 18–132.
Government of Fiji, Ministry of Economy. 2018. Fiji Low Emission Development Strategy
2018−2050. Suva.
Footnote 71, pp. 5 and 35.
The Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, sec. 40(1).
Environment Management Act 2005, secs. 28–34.
COP 23 Presidency Trust Fund Act 2017 (Act No. 6 of 2017), sec. 4.
Environmental Levy Act 2015 (Act No. 20 of 2015); Environmental Levy (Budget Amendment)
Act 2017, sec. 13; and Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy (Budget Amendment) Act
2018. The Environment and Climate Adaptation Levy (Budget Amendment) Act 2018 amended
the two prior acts. But the purposes of the fund are best enumerated in the 2017 legislation.
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impacts, scouting of viable locations for displaced communities, and provision
of needed infrastructure.77 In 2019, Fiji introduced the Climate Change Bill
2019, which focuses on establishing the institutional arrangements required to
implement Fiji’s climate change commitments and activities.78
Table 6.3 summarizes Fiji’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Like other Pacific Islands nations, Fiji relies heavily on imported petroleum-based
fuels.79 However, it also has significant hydropower resources. As of 2015, over
60% of Fiji’s total petroleum consumption came from the transport sector.80 The
primary fuels imported by Fiji are diesel (over 50% of total imports), aviation fuel
(30%), and motor spirit (10%).81
Fiji’s total capacity of installed power generation is 269 megawatts (MW).82
The Fiji Electricity Authority provided 94% of that capacity and delivered
857 gigawatt-hours (GWh) in 2013 (footnote 82). Its current power generation
mix is approximately 55% hydro, 40% diesel and heavy fuel oil, 1% wind, with the
remaining 4% provided by two co-generators, Tropik Woods Limited and Fiji Sugar
Corporation (footnote 82). Additional power comes from a few diesel mini-grids
that use a coconut oil and diesel blend (20/80) and over 3,000 solar home
systems.83
In rural areas, 70% of households use wood for cooking purposes.84 It is a challenge
for Fiji to provide isolated islands with sustainable access to electricity. As of 2013,
approximately 10% of the population still had no access to electricity (footnote 79).
In 2017, the total supply of primary energy produced from renewable sources was
approximately 5,911 terajoules, of which almost 30% came from hydropower, 68%
from biofuels, with small contributions from wind, solar, and liquid biofuels.85

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
The Fiji Low Emission Development Strategy 2018–2050 synthesizes sector-wide
targets under existing policies.86 While strategies are discussed for various sectors,
explicit targets are laid out for the energy, transport, and forestry sectors (Table 6.4).
77
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79
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82
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Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund Act 2019 (Act No. 21 of 2019), sec. 4(b).
Fiji One TV. 2019. Government Introduces Climate Change Bill 2019. 1 October.
Economic Consulting Associates and SMEC (New Zealand). 2013. Review of the Fiji National
Energy Policy: Draft Energy Policy. London. p. 2.
Footnote 79, p. 14.
Footnote 79, p. 15.
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 2015. Fiji Renewables Readiness Assessment.
Abu Dhabi. p. XI.
Footnote 79, p. 13.
Footnote 82, pp. 9 and 13.
IRENA. Renewable Energy Balances: Overview Tables (accessed 23 March 2020).
Footnote 71, pp. 31–32.
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Table 6.3: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Fiji
The Constitution of the Republic of Fiji, 2013
5-Year & 20-Year National Development Plan:
Transforming Fiji, 2017
A Green Growth Framework for Fiji: Restoring the Balance in
Development That Is Sustainable for Our Future, 2014
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Republic of Fiji National
Climate Change Policy
2018–2030, 2019
Fiji Low Emission
Development Strategy
2018–2050, 2018
Republic of Fiji National
Adaptation Plan: A
Pathway Towards Climate
Resilience, 2018
Fiji NDC Implementation
Roadmap 2017−2030:
Setting a Pathway for
Emissions Reduction
Target Under the Paris
Agreement, 2017
Republic of Fiji National
Climate Change Policy,
2012

Climate Relocation of
Communities Trust
Fund Act 2019
Climate Change Bill 2019

Energy

Draft National Energy Policy,
2013

Other

Roadmap for Democracy
and Sustainable SocioEconomic Development
2010−2014: A Better Fiji
for All, 2009
[People’s] Charter for Change,
Peace & Progress, 2008

COP 23 Presidency Trust
Fund Act 2017
Environmental Levy
Act, 2015 and 2017;
Environment and
Climate Adaptation
Levy Act 2018

Environment Management
Act 2005

COP = Conference of the Parties, NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

Non-Legislative
Instruments
Environment and
Climate Adaptation
Levy (Plastic Bags)
Regulations 2017
(Legal Notice No. 61)

215

216

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Table 6.4: Emission Targets for Energy, Transport, and Forestry Sectors in Fiji, 2021–2036
Targets
Sector

By 2021

By 2031

By 2036

Energy

• Increase household solar
systems to 1,100
• Increase mini-hydro
systems to 10

• Reduce consumption of
imported fuel per unit of
GDP to 2.73 MJ/F$
• Reduce power
consumption per unit of
GDP to 0.209 kWh/F$
• Increase total renewable
energy share in total
energy consumption
to 25%

• Eliminate wood-fired
cooking in all households
• Increase renewable
electricity generation
to 100%

Transport

• Reduce vehicle emission
levels by 40%
• Install biogas facilities
and biofuel plants

• Reduce dependence on
imported fossil fuel/km
traveled by 32%
• Reduce energy
consumption
dependence on imported
fossil fuel by 32%

Forestry

• Put 5% of forest area
under protection
• Reforest 5,300 hectares
of degraded forest

• Put 16% of forest area
under protection

F$ = Fiji dollar, GDP = gross domestic product, km = kilometer, kWh = kilowatt-hour, MJ = megajoule.
Source: Government of Fiji, Ministry of Economy. 2018. Fiji Low Emission Development Strategy 2018−2050. Suva. pp. 31–32.

D. Energy Demand
Energy demand in Fiji is expected to grow. Under its 5-Year & 20-Year National
Development Plan, 2017, Fiji sets out to achieve a fourfold increase in per capita
income, an annual real GDP growth rate of 4%–5%, and an unemployment rate of
under 4% over the next 3 decades.87
Achieving these development targets will necessitate an increase in available
energy, particularly renewable generation. Three important energy objectives
in Fiji’s NDP, its Low Emission Development Strategy 2018−2050, and its
NDC Implementation Roadmap 2017–2030 are (i) ensuring that 100% of the
population has access to electricity by 2021, (ii) achieving 100% renewable
electricity generation by 2036, and (iii) eliminating all primary wood-fueled

87

Footnote 66, pp. 2 and 55.
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cooking by 2036.88 Household demand for refrigeration and air-conditioning is
also projected to grow.
More ambitious development targets include introducing electric vehicles and
growing Fiji’s mining industry.89 Both targets will escalate energy demand. In its
Low Emission Development Strategy 2018−2050, Fiji projects the growth of
this demand over a range of scenarios and the renewable generation required to
meet it.90 Fiji has also expressed an interest in adopting smart grid technologies to
enable customer demand management.91 It has discussed plans to update codes
for buildings and industry to require minimum standards for energy use, such as
for ventilation, cooling, and lighting.92

E.

Adaptation

The National Climate Change Policy 2018−2030 is the central policy document
on protecting the country’s development priorities from present, future, and
intergenerational climate vulnerabilities.93 It hinges on eight guiding principles:
(i) enabling sustainable well-being, (ii) enhancing social cohesion, (iii) increasing
inclusivity, (iv) fostering new partnerships, (v) fostering agility in the face of
complex and changing threats, (vi) recognizing urgency given the scale of the
climate crisis and the nature of Fiji’s climate vulnerability, (vii) improving data
transparency and communication, and (viii) promoting integrated learning to
boost the efficiency and effectiveness of Fiji’s efforts to reduce risk and build
national resilience (footnote 93).
The National Adaptation Plan identifies 160 priority measures for 2018–2023,
which are based on community consensus rather than cost-benefit or least-cost
analysis.94 They span 10 sector and system categories. The system categories
are intended to shift financing streams and create an enabling environment
for climate-resilient development. They include goals for climate information
services and management, horizontal integration, vertical integration, climate
change awareness and knowledge, and resource mobilization (footnote 94).
The sector goals span food and nutrition security, health, human settlements,
infrastructure, biodiversity, and natural environment.95 These sectors
88

89
90
91
92
93

94

95

Footnote 66, p. 10; footnote 71, p. 31; and Government of Fiji. 2017. Fiji NDC Implementation
Roadmap 2017−2030: Setting a Pathway for Emissions Reduction Target under the Paris Agreement.
Suva. pp. 20 and 22. The NDC Implementation Roadmap excludes energy used in non-electric
cooking.
Footnote 66, pp. 7 and 119.
Footnote 71, pp. 51–69.
Footnote 71, p. 6.
Footnote 71, pp. 72 and 189.
Government of Fiji, Ministry of Economy. 2019. Republic of Fiji National Climate Change Policy
2018–2030. Suva. p. 8.
Government of Fiji. 2018. Republic of Fiji National Adaptation Plan: A Pathway Towards Climate
Resilience. Suva. p. vii.
Footnote 94, p. viii.
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correspond with vulnerability to climate hazards as identified in the plan. Other
documents will be developed to support the National Adaptation Plan, including
financing and communication strategies. The Low-Emission Development
Strategy 2018–2050 sets out long-term mitigation actions that are in line
with, and complement, the National Adaptation Plan in six sectors: (i) energy
infrastructure; (ii) land, maritime, and air transport; (iii) waste infrastructure;
(iv) food security; (v) forestry and coastal wetlands; and (vi) tourism.96
Recognizing the need for planned relocation as an adaptation measure, the
government passed the Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund Act 2019,
which establishes the Climate Relocation of Communities Trust Fund. Among
others, the fund may allocate money to initiatives designed to guarantee an
adequate standard of living and safeguard Fijians’ constitutional rights and freedoms.

IV. Kiribati
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Republic of Kiribati comprises 33 atolls and reef islands with a total land area
of 810 km2, dispersed over 3.5 million km2.97 The geography and size of Kiribati
make it one of the most vulnerable countries globally to the adverse impacts of
climate change.98 The entire population and most infrastructure are clustered
along the coast.99 Many islands are merely 2 meters—or even less—above
sea level.100 Climate change is already causing higher temperatures, increased
precipitation, extreme rainfall and heat, rising sea levels, and increased ocean
acidification.101 In addition, Kiribati continues to suffer from loss of biodiversity,
increased waste, pollution, and the unsustainable use of natural resources.102
Kiribati is categorized by the United Nations (UN) as a small island developing
state and least developed country (LDC). About 80% of the population lives a
subsistence lifestyle.103 Its parliamentary system is a blend of British and American
government systems.104
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99
100
101
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Footnote 71, pp. 184 and 186–190.
Government of Kiribati. 2014. Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster
Risk Management (KJIP) 2014–2023. Tarawa. p. 8.
Footnote 97, p. 9.
Government of Kiribati. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Tarawa. p. 4.
Footnote 99, p. 2.
Footnote 97, pp. 9, 24, and 26.
Footnote 97, pp. 26 and 28.
Government of Kiribati, Ministry of Environment, Lands and Agriculture Development. 2012.
Kiribati Integrated Environment Policy. Tarawa. p. 11.
House of Assembly (Parliament) of Kiribati. Welcome to the Maneaba ni Maungatabu.
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B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Kiribati submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 21 September 2016, pledging to reduce its emissions by 13.7% by 2025
and 12.8% by 2030, compared with a business as usual (BAU) projection.105 With
international assistance, Kiribati believes it could further lower its emissions by
48.8% by 2025 and 49.0% by 2030 (footnote 105).
Kiribati’s contribution to total global carbon emissions is minimal, at 0.0002%.106
Kiribati notes that it is in “no position to make dramatic changes to the global
total.”107 Notwithstanding, Kiribati’s government is undertaking a whole-of-nation
approach, including targets to increase renewable energy and energy efficiency by
2025 (Table 6.5).

Table 6.5: Kiribati’s Planned Increase in Renewable Energy
and Energy Efficiency by 2025
(%)
Renewable
Energy

Energy
Efficiency

Total

South Tarawa (capital)

23

22

45

Kiritimati Island

40

20

60

Outer Islands
(rural public infrastructure)

40

20

60

Outer Islands
(rural public and private
institutions)

100

Area

100

Source: Government of Kiribati. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Tarawa. p. 8.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Kiribati has launched a number of climate initiatives within the last few years.
For example, the 2018 Kiribati Climate Change Policy sets priorities for climate
action, based on seven principles:
(i)

105
106
107

safeguarding communities and the country as a whole from the
adverse impacts of climate change and disasters, and ensuring a safe
and resilient Kiribati with a healthy environment for all;

Footnote 99, p. 6.
Footnote 99, p. 7.
Government of Kiribati. 2018. Kiribati Climate Change Policy. Tarawa. p. 15.
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(ii)
(iii)

(iv)
(v)

(vi)

(vii)

mainstreaming climate change and disaster risk reduction into
development planning, policies, strategies, sector plans, and decisionmaking and budgeting processes at both national and local levels;
emphasizing that adaptation, mitigation, and disaster risk
management are shared responsibilities that require coordinated,
integrated, multi-partner, multi-sectoral, and whole-of-government
or whole-of-island approaches;
strengthening key institutions and capacities as a basis for enhanced
action, and ensuring measures to secure implementation are
conducted efficiently;
focusing on actions that will strengthen the long-term resilience of
Kiribati communities through sustainable environmental, social, and
economic benefits that combine the use of modern technologies with
the preservation of traditional knowledge;
ensuring that adaptation, mitigation, and disaster risk management
are equitable, inclusive, gender-sensitive, community-driven,
participatory, and reflect the commitments that Kiribati has agreed to
under various multilateral frameworks; and
strengthening and maintaining strategic partnerships, both internally
and externally.108

The policy also aims to better manage coastal zones, natural resources, and food
and water supply; incentivize renewable energy and energy efficiency; strengthen
ecosystem conservation; improve public awareness of the health effects of
climate change; implement the government’s national disaster risk management
plan; and improve climate finance.109
In 2013, Kiribati created the National Framework for Climate Change and Climate
Change Adaptation (Climate Framework), which requires that climate change
and adaptation assume a prominent role in the national development planning
process.110 The Climate Framework identifies population resettlement and
relocation as a priority.
Consistent with the Climate Framework’s objectives, the Kiribati Development
Plan 2016–19 emphasized integrating climate change into development
planning.111 A key goal is to facilitate sustainable development by protecting
biodiversity, reducing environmental degradation, and adapting to and mitigating
the effects of climate change.

108
109
110

111

Footnote 107, pp. 3 and 11–22.
Footnote 107, pp. 11–18 and 21.
Government of Kiribati, Office of Te Beretitenti. 2013. National Framework for Climate Change and
Climate Change Adaptation. Tarawa.
Government of Kiribati, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 2016. Kiribati
Development Plan 2016–19. Tarawa.
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In September 2019, the government unveiled its Joint Implementation Plan for
Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2019–2028.112 The plan aligns
with the Kiribati Development Plan 2016–19 and the Kiribati 20-Year Vision
2016–2036.113 It identifies 12 major strategies to reduce Kiribati’s vulnerability to
climate change and disasters, such as “strengthening good governance, policies,
strategies and legislation.” 114 Key priorities include enhancing coordination
between climate change adaptation and disaster risk management programs;
boosting institutional capacity to ensure sustainable use of natural resources;
managing food, water, and health security; building coastal resilience; and
fostering climate awareness.115
The Kiribati Climate Change and Climate Risk Communications Strategy
2014–2018 sets communications priorities for the country.116 The government
aims to promote climate literacy by raising awareness; considering appropriate
branding; and engaging with stakeholders, communities, and media. The strategy
also outlines the specific audiences, messages, and outlets the government
intends to target in its climate change communications, as well as the
government’s plan for implementing the strategy.
Table 6.6 summarizes Kiribati’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Kiribati depends on a mix of imported fossil fuels and indigenous renewable energy
sources to meet its energy needs.117 In 2014, 63% of the national energy supply
came from imported petroleum products, and 37% from indigenous renewable
energy sources (primarily bioenergy followed by solar).118 The government has
introduced several initiatives to reduce fossil fuel imports and increase domestic
renewable energy use. For example, the Kiribati Solar Energy Company provides
solar lighting on rural islands and markets solar appliances.119 Coconut oil-based
biofuel has been trialed, as has on-grid solar photovoltaic on urban islands.120

112

113
114
115
116

117

118
119
120

Government of Kiribati, Office of Te Beretitenti. 2019. Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for
Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (KJIP) 2019–2028. Tarawa.
Government of Kiribati. 2016. Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016-2036. Tarawa.
Footnote 112, p. 11.
Footnote 112, pp. 69–73.
Government of Kiribati, Office of Beretitenti. 2013. Kiribati Climate Change and Climate Risk
Communications Strategy 2014–2018. Tarawa.
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Pacific Community (SPC), and Pacific Power
Association (PPA). 2017. Kiribati Integrated Energy Roadmap: 2017−2025. Tarawa. p. 8.
Footnote 117, pp. 8 and 22.
Footnote 117, p. 48.
Footnote 117, p. 101.
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Table 6.6: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Kiribati
The Constitution of the Republic of Kiribati, 1979; and
Constitution (Amendment) Act 2013
Kiribati Development Plan 2016−19, 2016
Kiribati 20-Year Vision 2016–2036, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Kiribati Joint Implementation
Plan for Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Management
2019–2028, 2019
Kiribati Climate Change Policy,
2018
Kiribati Joint Implementation
Plan for Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Management
2014–2023, 2014
National Framework for
Climate Change and Climate
Change Adaptation, 2013
Kiribati Climate Change and
Climate Risk Communications
Strategy 2014–2018, 2013

Energy

Kiribati Integrated Energy
Roadmap 2017−2025, 2017
Kiribati National Energy Policy,
2009
Building Act 2006

Cities and buildings
Other

Acts

Kiribati Integrated Environment
Policy, 2012
Kiribati Development Plan:
2008–2011, 2008

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

Environment (Amendment)
Act 2007
Environment Act 1999
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1. Sector-Wide Strategies
The National Energy Policy of 2009 incorporates measures to mitigate carbon
emissions by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency.121 It responds
to the call to strengthen Kiribati’s energy sector, as outlined in the Kiribati
Development Plan of 2008–2011.122 The policy provides a framework within
which public and private energy sector participants can make informed planning
and investment decisions.

2. Renewable Energy Policies
To expand the supply of renewable energy and improve energy efficiency, the
infrastructure component of Kiribati’s Development Plan 2016–19 develops
minimum standards and energy labeling regulations.123 The development plan is in
line with the National Energy Policy, which aims to promote renewable energy.
The Kiribati Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk
Management 2014–2023 seeks to increase the share of the grid connected to
renewable energy. Against a 2013 baseline of no solar energy, the government
aims to increase the share of intermittent solar energy to 60% by 2025.124
The 2019 Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk
Management maintains this target.125

D. Energy Demand
The National Energy Policy, 2009 acknowledges the importance of addressing
Kiribati’s heavy reliance on imported fuel, increasing energy demand, and
inefficient appliances and equipment.126 The policy seeks to
(i)

introduce and encourage implementation of energy efficiency and
conservation programs;
(ii) promote public awareness of energy efficiency and conservation
measures;
(iii) introduce and enforce the use of energy-efficient appliances and
equipment; and
(iv) introduce appropriate incentives, including taxes, duties, and tariffs,
to encourage efficient energy use (footnote 126).

121

122

123
124
125
126

Government of Kiribati, Ministry of Public Works and Utilities. 2009. Kiribati National Energy
Policy. Tarawa.
Government of Kiribati, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 2008. Kiribati
Development Plan: 2008–2011. Tarawa.
Footnote 111, p. 64.
Footnote 97, p. 103.
Footnote 112, p. 156.
Footnote 121, p. 24.
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E.

Adaptation

The Joint Implementation Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management
2019–2028 identifies 12 major strategies and 104 priorities for climate adaptation
and disaster risk reduction.127 Overall, the plan seeks to coordinate and access the
financial and technical support needed to implement the priorities. As such, the
plan targets strengthening governance and institutional capacity, and improving
public awareness of climate change. The plan identifies the importance of promoting
environmentally friendly practices in the private sector; ensuring environmental
resilience; and building adaptive capacity for the health, food, and water sectors.
The plan also focuses on maintaining sovereignty and Kiribati’s unique identity,
and enhancing resilience through community participation. To facilitate a
cohesive approach to climate responses, the plan clarifies implementation roles
and responsibilities.

V. Marshall Islands
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
With an average elevation of just under 2 meters above sea level, the Republic of the
Marshall Islands (RMI) is one of the world’s lowest-lying countries and, as a result, is
one of the most vulnerable to climate change.128 Spread across almost 2 million km2
of the Pacific Ocean, it is a coral atoll nation made up of 1,156 individual islands and
29 different atolls, with a population of approximately 53,000 (footnote 128).
The gross domestic product (GDP) is around $180 million, largely supported
by remittances and by external assistance from the country’s Compact of
Free Association relationship with the United States (footnote 128). Industry,
agriculture, and fisheries (particularly tuna) are responsible for less than 15% of
economic activity (footnote 128).
The RMI championed the 2013 Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership,
which aimed to show the Pacific’s adoption of some of the world’s most ambitious
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets.129 “Adapting to climate
impacts is an increasingly pressing national priority,” especially for people “in
rural communities who have limited access to resources and services, and so are
particularly vulnerable” (footnote 128). The RMI “is experiencing increasingly
damaging effects from climate change and seeing more frequent and intense events,
such as drought, floods and swells, and tropical cyclones and storms” (footnote 128).
The RMI declared a state of disaster in 2013 and again in 2016 due to lengthy
127
128
129

Footnote 112, pp. 9 and 11.
Government of the RMI. 2018. Second Nationally Determined Contribution. Majuro. p. 6.
Footnote 128; and Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership, Majuro, RMI, 5 September 2013.
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and unseasonal droughts (footnote 128). The Post Disaster Needs Assessment
created after the 2016 drought estimated the total economic losses to be about
$4.9 million, with agriculture being the most affected sector.130 “In 2015, Typhoon
Nangka cost RMI more than 3% of its GDP in a single night.” 131 There remains
substantial work to be done to raise support for adaptation efforts (footnote 131).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of the RMI submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 22 April 2016. On 22 November 2018, it became the first country to
submit its second NDC. The NDC commits to reducing GHG emissions by 32%
below 2010 levels by 2025 and by 45% by 2030 (footnote 131). The RMI also aims
to reduce GHG emissions by at least 58% below 2010 levels by 2035, and reaffirms
its aspiration to achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050.132
The NDC includes commitments to produce a national adaptation plan by the end
of 2019, submit an adaptation communication to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) by 2020, adopt a gender-responsive
and human-rights-based approach in NDC planning, and use the latest guidelines
for national GHG inventories from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) (footnote 132).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The RMI has developed a range of climate laws and policies, integrating climate
considerations into environmental protection law and environmental impact
assessment regulations.133 In 2018, the RMI issued the Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate
Strategy, which outlines the country’s goal to achieve net-zero emissions by
2050.134 It became the 10th country in the world—and first in Asia and the
Pacific—to communicate its long-term, mid-century climate change strategy. The
RMI will reach this net-zero target by switching to 100% renewable energy while
adapting to climate change impacts to ensure future protection and prosperity
(footnote 134). The strategy makes recommendations to
(i)
(ii)

130
131
132
133

134

submit a new NDC under the Paris Agreement by 2020;
focus on the nation’s electricity sector in the short- and medium-term
to implement GHG reductions consistent with achieving its
NDC targets;

Footnote 128, pp. 6–7.
Footnote 128, p. 7.
Footnote 128, p. 8.
For example, National Environmental Protection Act 1984 and Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulations 1994.
Government of the RMI. 2018. Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate Strategy: “Lighting the Way”. Majuro. p. 7.
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(iii) reduce the nation’s growing waste problem by minimizing organic material
in collected waste and consider possibilities to generate energy from waste;
(iv) develop policies to encourage greater use of public transport, cycling
and walking, and electric vehicles;
(v) explore options to reduce GHG emissions from domestic
ocean-based transport, including improved regulatory control;
(vi) continue efforts to phase out the use of kerosene for lighting and
strengthen existing institutional arrangements to reduce GHGs from
cooking and lighting;
(vii) establish a long-term financial strategy to implement the 2050
Strategy and its recommendations, and identify and consider options
for a more coordinated and centralized approach to applying for and
monitoring related overseas aid and investment;
(viii) ensure due diligence is fulfilled before making significant investments
to implement the 2050 Climate Strategy and its recommendations;
(ix) prioritize capacity building in all areas relevant to the implementation
of the 2050 Climate Strategy and its recommendations;
(x) mainstream gender and human rights, including in relation to developing,
adopting, reviewing, and implementing laws, policies, and projects related
to climate change, and commission further analysis to design a strategy
to improve related data collection, monitoring, and evaluation;
(xi) include health considerations as part of the nation’s forthcoming
national adaptation plan;
(xii) include education, training, and public awareness considerations as
part of the nation’s forthcoming national development plan;
(xiii) review and update the 2050 Climate Strategy at least every 5 years—
to recommend targets for inclusion in future NDCs—and at least
1 year before the nation submits future NDCs; and
(xiv) establish a domestic process to oversee reviews and updates to the
2050 Climate Strategy and monitor its implementation.135
Launched in 2011, the National Climate Change Policy Framework established
five strategic goals—(i) creating an environment conducive to climate change
adaptation and mitigation, (ii) working toward a climate-resilient future, (iii) securing
energy security, (iv) boosting disaster preparedness, and (v) building education
and awareness.136 The framework is implemented through the Joint National
Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management
2014−2018, as well as through the Climate Change Roadmap.137 The framework
created the National Climate Change Committee, which is responsible for
monitoring implementation and reporting to the President and the cabinet at
least once per year.138
135
136
137

138

Footnote 134, pp. 8−9.
Government of the RMI. 2011. National Climate Change Policy Framework. Majuro. p. 8.
Footnote 136, p. 26; Government of the RMI. 2014. Joint National Action Plan for Climate Change
Adaptation & Disaster Risk Management 2014−2018. Majuro; and Government of the RMI. 2010.
National Climate Change Roadmap. Majuro.
Footnote 136, p. 25.
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The RMI has also enacted other policies, laws, and regulations with implications
for the climate. The National Strategic Plan 2015–2017 covers five sectors,
including the environment, climate change, and resiliency sectors.139 The plan
recognizes climate change and resiliency as two of the most important national
issues. It categorizes the country’s climate change policy into four implementation
clusters: (i) energy security and low-carbon future; (ii) adaptation for a climateresilient future; (iii) disaster preparedness, risk reduction, and response capacity;
and (iv) education, awareness, community mobilization, culture, and gender.140
In 2003, the RMI established the Office of Environmental Planning and Policy
Coordination. As the leading body on biodiversity and climate change projects,
the office works “in partnership with other government ministries and agencies,
and the international community to prepare strategies to mitigate the negative
impacts of climate change and prepare adaptation plans.” 141 It advises the
executive branch on environmental policy—including adaptation efforts—and
implements programs and projects related to the environment.
The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2015 mandates that the government
consider the needs and rights of individuals with disabilities when planning for
climate change and disasters. It specifically requires barrier-free emergency
exits, shelters, and facilities, as well as disability-inclusive training and disaster
responses.142
Table 6.7 summarizes the RMI’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Energy supply in the RMI has historically been challenging. Remote islands,
limited grid access in rural areas, lack of space and transport, limited access to
technicians, and little opportunity for economies of scale have left the RMI reliant
upon diesel-fueled energy.143 Petroleum fuels around 90% of energy in the RMI,
with biomass—used in cooking—making up the balance.144
Efforts to boost electrification meant that around 93% of the population had
access to electricity in 2016.145 Off-grid electricity has been the primary source of
power in rural areas.146 Some outer islands have central power plants, and other
remote populations receive electricity services from solar photovoltaic battery
139
140
141
142
143

144
145
146

Government of the RMI. 2014. National Strategic Plan 2015–2017. Majuro. p. 14.
Footnote 139, p. 36.
Government of the RMI, Office of Environmental Planning and Policy Coordination. Structure.
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2015, sec. 23(4)(b).
Government of the RMI. 2018. Navigating our Energy Future: Marshall Islands Electricity Roadmap.
Majuro. p. 20.
IRENA. 2015. The Republic of Marshall Islands: Renewables Readiness Assessment. Abu Dhabi. p. 3.
ADB. Marshall Islands and ADB (accessed 11 April 2020).
Government of the RMI, Ministry of Resources and Development. 2016. National Energy
Policy and Energy Action Plan. Majuro. p. 16. In 2014, 93% of households had access to off-grid
electricity.
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Table 6.7: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of the Republic of the Marshall Islands
The Constitution of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 1979
National Strategic Plan 2015−2017, 2014
Paris Agreement Second NDC, 2018 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate
Strategy: “Lighting the Way”,
2018
Joint National Action Plan
for Climate Change
Adaptation & Disaster Risk
Management 2014–2018,
2014
National Climate Change
Policy Framework, 2011

Office of Environmental
Planning and Policy
Coordination Act 2003

Energy

Navigating Our Energy Future:
Marshall Islands Electricity
Roadmap, 2018
National Energy Policy and
Energy Action Plan, 2016
National Environmental
Protection Act 1984

Environmental
assessment
Disaster risk
management

Joint National Action Plan
for Climate Change
Adaptation & Disaster Risk
Management 2014–2018,
2014

Water resources
and coastal zone
management
NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Environmental
Impact Assessment
Regulations 1994

Rights of Persons with
Disabilities Act 2015

Coast Conservation Act
1988

Marine Water Quality
Regulations 1992
Public Water Supply
Regulations 1994
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systems. In 2018, the RMI electrified almost all households on outer islands,
installing at least 3,000 solar home systems.147
The RMI’s two utility companies—Marshalls Energy Company (MEC) and
Kwajalein Atoll Joint Utilities Resources—are state-owned enterprises, functioning
with boards appointed by the President’s cabinet.148 The RMI’s challenges with
electricity supply have meant high electricity costs. Current tariffs are set at
$0.416/kilowatt-hour (kWh) for government, $0.406/kWh for commercial, and
$0.346/kWh for residential customers.149 “Outer-island homes with off-grid
solar systems pay a $5/month lease to MEC for maintenance.” 150 Even with
full collection, the total of $5 monthly maintenance fee and $7 government
top-up per system is not enough to compensate for MEC’s $19 estimated cost of
maintaining and replacing each system.151
Accessing recent data regarding the RMI’s energy supply and consumption
is difficult. As of 2009, the RMI’s total primary energy supply (TPES) was
1.4 petajoules.152
In 2016, the RMI put out the National Energy Policy, which emphasizes the need
to boost renewable energy.153 More specifically, the RMI aims to provide 20% of
power generation through indigenous renewable resources by 2020, reducing
dependence on imported fossil fuel.154

D. Energy Demand
The National Energy Policy seeks to make households and businesses 50% more
energy efficient, and government buildings 75% more efficient, by 2020.155 The
policy also sets to achieve a 20% efficiency improvement in transport sector fuel
use by 2020.156

E.

Adaptation

In 2014, the RMI issued the Joint National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation
& Disaster Risk Management 2014–2018, which outlines a strategy for effectively
addressing climate change and disaster risk.157 This plan contains six major goals:
147
148

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Footnote 143, p. 49.
Government of RMI, National Renewable Energy Laboratory. 2015. Republic of the Marshall Islands
Energy Project Development Options and Technical Assessment (2013). Consultant’s report. Majuro.
Marshalls Energy Company, Inc. Tariffs (accessed 6 October 2020).
Footnote 148, p. 8.
Footnote 143, p. 50.
IRENA. 2012. Renewable Energy Country Profiles: Pacific. Abu Dhabi. p. 13.
Footnote 146, pp. 11 and 14.
Footnote 146, pp. 22−23.
Footnote 146, pp. vi and 20.
Footnote 146, p. 17.
Government of Marshall Islands. 2014. Joint National Action Plan for Climate Change Adaptation
& Disaster Risk Management 2014–2018. Majuro.
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(i)

improving disaster risk management coordination and climate change
adaptation,
(ii) increasing public awareness and education,
(iii) enhancing emergency preparedness and response,
(iv) improving energy security and aiming for a low-carbon future,
(v) enhancing community resilience and local livelihoods, and
(vi) integrating disaster risks and climate change considerations into
development planning.158
The implementation strategy for these goals is governed by four major principles:
(i) a holistic approach to risk reduction, (ii) building on existing partnerships and
mechanisms, (iii) inclusivity and partnership approach, and (iv) clearly defined
roles and responsibilities.159 The plan also includes a communication strategy and
a road map for monitoring and evaluation.160
In the Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate Strategy, the government states its intention to
develop a national adaptation plan by the end of 2019.161 The plan will focus on
adaptation and climate resilience milestones to be achieved periodically (e.g., by
2020, 2025, 2030, and 2050), gender-responsive actions and investments in
2019–2023, and a plan for adaptation and resilience investments.162
The RMI also intends to send an adaptation communication to the UNFCCC that
is consistent with the Paris Agreement’s enhanced transparency framework.163 As
explained in the Tile Til Eo 2050 Climate Strategy, the RMI will need predictable
financing to implement its adaptation and resilience measures. The adaptation
communication and subsequent NDCs will enable the RMI to outline its
financing needs.

VI. Nauru
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Nauru is an independent democratic state with a population of approximately
10,000.164 Its constitution establishes a system of government with a president,
parliament, and judicature.165 Nauru has historically suffered from environmental
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159
160
161
162
163

164
165

Footnote 157, p. 7.
Footnote 157, p. 28.
Footnote 157, pp. 31–32.
Footnote 134, pp. 8 and 14.
Footnote 134, p. 14.
Footnote 134, p. 15. Article 13 of the Paris Agreement provides that all parties should, as
appropriate, report on climate change impacts and adaptation. Developing country parties
should also report on financial, technology transfer, and capacity-building support needed.
Government of Nauru. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Yaren. pp. 1−2.
The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru, Parts III–V.
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degradation due to deforestation and intense mining for phosphate.166 Achieving
sustainable development has been difficult because of Nauru’s scarce arable land
and freshwater resources, geographic isolation, and subsequent dependence on
imports to meet basic food and energy needs (footnote 166). These factors have
also made Nauru vulnerable to climate change, as pointed out by the Framework
for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction.167
The small island nation is particularly vulnerable to drought and the risks to
marine resources posed by rising temperatures (footnote 166). Sea level rise
poses an existential threat.168 Nauru is committed to adapting to climate change
and participating in reducing GHGs by tapping into its potential for renewable
energy, particularly solar power.169

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Nauru submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 7 April 2016. While its NDC does not contain numerical GHG targets,
Nauru has pledged to replace a substantial portion of its electricity generation with
a large-scale grid-connected solar photovoltaic system (footnote 169). This
pledge is conditional on receipt of $50 million and substantial technical, capacity
building, and logistical assistance.170 Nauru has unconditionally committed to
implementing a 0.6 megawatt (MW) solar photovoltaic system, which will be used
as a model project for the larger solar power plant (footnote 170).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Nauru has set forth a number of policies addressing energy issues and has prioritized
adapting to climate change and improving disaster preparedness. It has also
set ambitious renewable energy targets, which will assist it in meeting its GHG
reduction goals and reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels.
Nauru’s National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–2025, as revised in 2009,
articulates the imperative of building resilience to climate change and the need for a
comprehensive law on environmental management.171 This imperative would require
new projects to be assessed for their environmental impact. The strategy envisions “[a]
future where individual, community, business and government partnerships contribute
to a sustainable quality of life for all Nauruans.” 172 It further states that urgent
166
167

168
169
170
171
172

Footnote 164, p. 3.
Government of Nauru, Ministry of Commerce, Industry & Environment. 2015. Republic of Nauru
Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (RONAdapt). Yaren. p. 8.
Footnote 164, p. 1.
Footnote 164, p. 2.
Footnote 164, p. 8.
Government of Nauru. 2009. National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–2025. Yaren.
Footnote 171, p. 4.
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measures are needed to improve energy efficiency and increase renewable energy.
Nauru has also prioritized developing locally tailored responses to climate change.
Table 6.8 summarizes Nauru’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 6.8: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Nauru
The Constitution of the Republic of Nauru, 1968;
and Constitution (Amendment) Act 2018
National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005−2025,
revised 2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Framework for Climate Change
Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2015

Energy

Nauru Energy Road Map 2018
to 2020, 2018
Nauru Energy Road Map
2014–2020, 2014
Energy Policy Framework, 2009

Disaster risk
management

Framework for Climate Change
Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2015

Other

Nauru’s Biodiversity Strategy
and Action Plan, 2010
National Sustainable
Development Strategy
2005−2025, revised 2009

Acts

National Disaster Risk
Management Act 2016

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply and Demand
As indicated in Nauru’s Energy Road Map for 2014−2020 (Road Map), with
100% electrification, Nauru’s average electricity tariffs are comparatively low at
$0.14 per kilowatt-hour (kWh).173 Nauru relies mostly on imported petroleum
173

Government of Nauru, Technical Working Group on Energy. 2014. Nauru Energy Road Map
2014–2020: An Implementation Plan for Energy Sector Development. Yaren. p. 22.
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fuels for its energy. Diesel generators provide 99% of the electricity supply, with
renewable energy accounting for only 1% (footnote 173). There is currently no
national energy database or energy balance. With irregular data reporting, energy
datasets are fragmented. The Nauru Utilities Corporation supplies electricity with
one power station. Maximum demand is approximately 3.3 MW (footnote 173).
The National Sustainable Development Strategy 2005–2025 sets the country’s
goal for the energy sector: to “provide a reliable, affordable, secure and sustainable
energy supply to meet socio-economic development needs.” 174 Both the Energy
Policy Framework and the Road Map adopted this goal as the country’s energy
vision.175 Both also set a target of meeting 50% of Nauru’s energy needs through
renewable energy by 2015 and focused on the potential for solar expansion.
The Road Map further targets a 30% improvement in energy efficiency in the
residential, commercial, and government sectors by 2020.176 It states that
only solar energy appears to be suitable to replace fossil fuels in the country.177
Additionally, it assesses how energy developments will affect the environment
and, conversely, how climate change will affect the energy sector. Early planning is
needed to manage the impact of sea level rise and increasing salinity and acidity
on energy infrastructure.
In 2018, the government released the updated Nauru Energy Road Map
2018–2020.178 The updated Road Map reconfirms a commitment to “improving
the sustainability of energy use through renewable energy and energy
efficiency.” 179 It acknowledges that building institutional capacity is needed to
transition 50% of grid electricity supply to renewable energy and boost energy
efficiency and reliability.

D. Adaptation
Nauru recognizes its vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and has thus
prioritized adaptation. The 2015 Framework for Climate Change Adaptation and
Disaster Risk Reduction identifies immediate priorities for boosting resilience.
Improving water, energy, and food security works toward a healthy environment
and people, with productive and secure land resources.180
The framework encompasses a broad range of socioeconomic and environmental
areas, such as water, health, agriculture, fisheries, disaster response, energy, land
174
175

176
177
178

179
180

Footnote 171, pp. 11 and 45.
Footnote 173, p. 12; and Government of Nauru, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and
Environment. 2009. Energy Policy Framework. Yaren. pp. 6 and 14.
Footnote 173, pp. 9 and 13.
Footnote 173, p. 42.
Government of Nauru, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Environment. 2018. Nauru Energy
Road Map 2018 to 2020. Yaren.
Footnote 178, p. 3.
Footnote 167, p. 18.
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use, infrastructure, biodiversity, as well as community, education, and human
development.181 It also provides more long-term planning for adaptation and
disaster risk reduction activities.
In addition, the framework stresses the need to incorporate gender into these
activities. Considering gender would enable “equal and meaningful participation
by men, women and youth in planning and decision making.”182 The framework
identifies priority actions to facilitate diversity and “empower individuals to be
able to plan and respond to different situations” (footnote 182).
Nauru issued its Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan in 2010 as part of its
ecosystem management strategy.183 The plan identifies the potentially serious
impacts of increased temperatures and sea level rise on the country’s biodiversity,
committing to protecting and conserving 30% of Nauru’s total land area by 2025.184
The adaptation framework acknowledges that implementing Nauru’s biodiversity
strategy and improving environmental health are critical for climate resilience.
Nauru’s National Disaster Risk Management Act 2016 seeks to coordinate
disaster response for, among others, natural events induced by climate change.

VII. Palau
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Republic of Palau comprises an executive branch led by the President, a
bicameral legislature called the Olbiil Era Kelulau, and a judiciary.185 As an island nation,
Palau is susceptible to the effects of climate change, primarily sea level rise and an
increase in extreme weather events such as droughts, flooding, and typhoons.186
Sea level rise puts critical infrastructure and facilities that island communities
depend on at risk. Water resources and agriculture—both subsistence and
commercial—will be adversely affected by climate change.187 For example, ocean
warming and acidification will impact coral reefs, fisheries, and other marine-based
resources that form the backbone of Palau’s economy and culture (footnote 187).

181
182
183

184
185
186
187

Footnote 167, pp. 6–7.
Footnote 167, p. 51.
Government of Nauru, Department of Commerce Industries and Environment. 2010. Nauru’s
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. Yaren.
Footnote 183, p. 23.
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau, arts. VIII, IX, and X.
Government of Palau. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Koror. pp. 3–4.
Footnote 186, p. 4.
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B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Palau submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) on 22 April 2016.
The NDC provides three unconditional targets by 2025: 22% emissions reduction
from 2005 levels in the energy sector, 45% renewables share in total energy
generated, and 35% energy efficiency improvement.188 The NDC does not include
any adaptation commitments.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Palau does not have a framework climate change law, but it has enacted various
policies and laws addressing environmental and energy issues. It has prioritized
adapting to climate change and improving disaster preparedness. It has also set
ambitious renewable energy targets, which serve the dual goals of combating
climate change and reducing reliance on imported fossil fuels.
Palau’s 2015 Climate Change Policy and Action Plan for Climate and Disaster
Resilient Low Emissions Development (Climate Policy) is primarily aimed
at bolstering the country’s resilience to climate change and disasters.189 It
forms the basis of Palau’s National Adaptation Plan, National Appropriate
Mitigation Actions, and its NDC.190 It builds on existing efforts to protect carbon
sinks, improve energy efficiency, and increase low emission development
(footnote 190). This includes commitments to increase renewable energy share
in total energy supply to at least 20% and decrease electrical energy consumption
by 30% by 2020.191
By 2020, Palau hopes to establish frameworks to develop climate resilience;
build safe, resilient, and disaster-prepared communities; and sustainably manage
carbon sinks to reduce GHG emissions by at least 20% from 2005 levels.192 The
Climate Policy also sets the goal of creating a framework to make governance
more effective, transparent, accountable, responsive, and well-coordinated to
build climate resilience and transform Palau to a low-carbon economy.193
Climate change and its impacts are addressed directly or indirectly in multiple
policies, including those for Palau’s energy sectors, and the country’s national
disaster preparedness framework. Additionally, Palau’s Medium-Term
Development Strategy for 2009–2014 sets out the Environmental Management

188
189

190
191
192
193

Footnote 186, p. 1.
Government of Palau. 2015. Palau Climate Change Policy: For Climate and Disaster Resilient Low
Emissions Development. Koror.
Footnote 189, p. 9.
Footnote 189, p. 23.
Footnote 189, p. 24.
Footnote 189, p. 27.
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Action Plan.194 The action plan aims to (i) strengthen environmental legislation
by addressing new risks such as climate change, and (ii) develop an energy policy
linked with climate policy.195
Table 6.9 summarizes Palau’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 6.9 Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Palau
The Constitution of the Republic of Palau, 1980
Actions for Palau’s Future: The Medium-Term
Development Strategy 2009−2014, 2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Palau Climate Change Policy,
2015

Energy

National Energy Policy, 2010
Strategic Action Plan Energy
Sector, 2009

Disaster risk
management

National Disaster & Risk
Management Framework,
2010 (amended in 2016)

Other

Acts

Palau Energy Act of 2015
Palau Net Metering Act of
2009

Environmental Quality
Protection Act of 1981

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
Palau is highly dependent on imported fossil fuels. Of its total energy capacity
of 40.1 megawatts (MW), 96.8% comes from diesel and only 3.2% from solar
photovoltaic.196 Its average electricity demand is 8.9 MW, and peak demand is
13.5 MW (footnote 196). Palau is investing heavily in renewable energy and hopes

194

195
196

Government of Palau. 2009. Actions for Palau’s Future: The Medium-Term Development Strategy:
2009 to 2014. Koror.
Footnote 194, pp. 132–137.
Government of the United States of America, Department of Energy, National Renewable
Energy Laboratory. 2015. The Republic of Palau: Pursuing a Sustainable and Resilient Energy Future.
Golden, Colorado.
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to generate 20% of its electrical energy domestically through renewables by the
end of 2020 (footnote 191).

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
In 2009, Palau put out the Strategic Action Plan Energy Sector, whose goals
include (i) conserving energy, and (ii) maximizing cost-effective energy efficiency
and renewable resources while safeguarding the environment.197 The plan also
aims to promote sustainable energy technologies to substitute for imported fossil
fuels (footnote 197). Palau also enacted the Palau Net Metering Act of 2009,
establishing a net metering system that allows residents to generate their own
electricity and encourage renewable energy use.
Palau’s National Energy Policy of 2010 (Energy Policy) created the Energy
Administration with a mandate to oversee national energy policy implementation.198
The Energy Administration was tasked with ensuring Palau’s participation in
climate change initiatives within the UNFCCC framework. The Energy Policy
also promotes energy efficiency and targets “a 30% reduction in overall national
energy consumption by 2020.” 199 It advocates for investment in renewable energy,
which furthers Palau’s climate goals and reduces its reliance on imported energy.
The legislature enacted the Palau Energy Act of 2015 “in order to promote energy
security by diversifying the supply of affordable electrical energy within Palau, including
renewable energy.” 200 The act incorporates the National Energy Policy into law.

D. Energy Demand
Palau has made some steps toward promoting energy efficiency. The Energy
Administration must set efficiency benchmarks for public utilities such as
the Palau Public Utilities Corporation, under the Energy Act of 2015.201 The
act further instructs the Energy Administration to update Palau’s targets
for renewable energy and energy efficiency, energy security indicators, and
government green fleet efficiency standards, among other metrics.202 In part to
track progress toward energy efficiency goals, the Energy Administration must
prepare the Palau Annual Energy Report for lawmakers.203

197

198
199
200
201

202

203

Government of Palau, Palau Energy Office. 2009. Republic of Palau Strategic Action Plan Energy
Sector: A Framework for the Implementation of Palau’s National Energy Policy. Koror. p. 5.
Government of Palau. 2010. Palau National Energy Policy. Koror.
Footnote 198, p. 13.
Palau Energy Act of 2015, sec. 1.
Footnote 200, sec. 2 (amending Title 37 of the Palau National Code by inserting a new
Chapter 7), and sec. 704(d) of Chapter 7, which states the Energy Administration’s duty to set
efficiency benchmarks.
Footnote 200, sec. 703(g) of Chapter 7 defines “government green fleet efficiency standards”
as “the fuel emissions standards that the Energy Administration establishes for the fleets of
relevant government agencies.”
Footnote 200, secs. 704(b)(1) and 706 of Chapter 7.
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E.

Adaptation

Palau is keenly aware of its vulnerability to climate change and is building
resilience to disasters, including through its National Disaster Risk Management
Framework.204 A major goal is improving mechanisms to integrate climate change
adaptation and disaster risk management. The Energy Administration is tasked
with updating the energy policy to deliver “clean, secure, and affordable energy
within Palau, and to respond to the risks of climate change through adaptation
and mitigation measures that enhance social and economic resilience and reduce
GHG emissions from the energy sector.” 205

VIII. Papua New Guinea
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Located 4° south of the equator in the West Pacific, Papua New Guinea (PNG) has
been described as remote, pristine, and rich in biodiversity.206 Shared by PNG and
Indonesia, the island of New Guinea is home to the largest tropical rainforest in Asia
and the Pacific, the world’s third largest after the Amazon and Congo basins.207
Despite its rich natural resources, PNG has relatively low per-capita incomes
and serious health and social problems. In 2017, 37.5% of PNG’s population
lived below the poverty line.208 Around 87% of PNG’s 9 million people “live in
rural communities, engaging in traditional subsistence and semi-subsistence
agriculture in the informal sector.” 209
Most Papua New Guineans have traditionally lived a lifestyle with extremely low
use of fossil fuels, and thus a low level of GHG emissions.210 However, over the last
2 decades, this has begun to change. For instance, earnings from the mining and
sale of the country’s rich natural resources, such as minerals, oil, and gas, have
been used to fund infrastructure development in the main urban areas (footnote 210).
Managing these natural resources sustainably to meet the needs of the present
without compromising the needs of future generations has been challenging for
PNG (footnote 210). Moreover, in the context of climate change, the economy’s
growth has resulted in a parallel rise in GHG emissions (footnote 210).
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205
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207
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209
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Government of Palau. 2010. National Disaster & Risk Management Framework 2010 (Amended
2016). Koror.
Footnote 200, sec. 705(a) of Chapter 7.
WWF. The Area: Forests of New Guinea.
WWF. Biodiversity Hotspot. Rainforest Information. Country Profile: Papua New Guinea.
ADB. Poverty Data: Papua New Guinea (accessed 8 October 2020); and ADB. 2019. Basic 2019
Statistics. Manila.
World Bank. 2018. Project Information Sheet: Energy Utility Performance and Reliability
Improvement Project. Washington, DC. p. 3.
Government of PNG. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Port Moresby. p. 2.
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Like other Pacific island countries, PNG sees climate change as an existential
threat due to sea level rise, and commits to adapting to climate change and
reducing GHG emissions.211 PNG’s potential to contribute to this effort stems
largely from land use, although the country is also striving to tap into renewable
energy such as hydroelectric power.212

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
PNG submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) on 24 March 2016.
It aims to achieve a carbon-free electricity sector by 2030, conditional on
external funding. Although the NDC does not include any quantitative adaptation
commitments, it emphasizes the need for adaptation in PNG.

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
PNG has a number of policies expressly aimed at addressing climate change.
Forest management and energy use are governed by numerous other policies,
laws, and regulations.
The 2014 National Climate Change Compatible Development Management
Policy outlines the national government’s guide to building climate resiliency
and achieving carbon neutrality through sustainable development.213 It aims for
“a low carbon growth pathway by 2030 and [to] become climate compatible by
2050.”214 It names the Climate Change Institutional Authority and the National
Climate Fund as key institutions that must be created, and highlights the need
for provincial governments and local governments to play a role in implementing
climate change activities.215
The policy also articulates the need for new legislation to address climate
change and calls on the government to enforce current climate change policies
(footnote 215). It focuses on reducing emissions in agriculture, and land use,
land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) (footnote 214). The policy further
instructs the government to consider climate change in surface transportation
programs, promote economic incentives for fuel-efficient vehicles, and take
other steps to reform the nation’s transportation system to combat and prepare
for climate change.216 Finally, the policy discusses the need for investment in
renewable energy, particularly geothermal and hydropower.217
211
212
213
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Footnote 210, pp. 1 and 7.
Footnote 210, pp. 1 and 4.
Government of PNG, Office of Climate Change & Development. 2014. National Climate
Compatible Development Management Policy. Port Moresby.
Footnote 213, p. 3.
Footnote 213, p. 13.
Footnote 213, pp. 18–19.
Footnote 213, p. 19.
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The Forestry and Climate Change Framework for Action 2009–2015 establishes
the medium-term vision for climate change and forestry.218 It follows the Fourth
National Goal and Directive Principle of the Constitution, seeking to ensure
the responsible use of forest resources for present and future generations.219
The framework’s specific objectives include managing and protecting forests,
implementing adaptation measures, and contributing to mitigation efforts.
Furthermore, the framework articulates the desire to prioritize benefit sharing in
carbon trading schemes as they may arise.220
The United Nations Paris Agreement (Implementation) Act 2016 makes the
Paris Agreement law in PNG. It clarifies that implementing the Paris Agreement
will occur in accordance with it and the Climate Change (Management) Act 2015.
Furthermore, it identifies the Climate Change and Development Authority as
responsible for implementation by
(i)

determining the benefits and levies of the Organic Law on Provincial
Governments and Local-level Governments 1998 with respect to
GHG emissions and carbon capture and storage;
(ii) determining the rates, management, sharing arrangements, and
application of related benefits and levies; and
(iii) establishing and administering trust funds provided by the Organic Law.221
The act further
(i) establishes the principles for sharing revenues generated from
economic regulatory regimes for emitting and sequestering carbon;
(ii) establishes the consultation process on the consequences of GHG
emissions on local development; and
(iii) defines the legal framework necessary to adopt regulations on GHG
emissions, as well as organizational and financial implications.222
The Climate Change (Management) Act 2015 established the Climate Change
and Development Authority.223 The authority (i) promotes and manages
climate-compatible development through mitigation and adaptation activities;
(ii) implements obligations under international rules and agreements;
(iii) represents PNG at the UNFCCC; and (iv) administers international funding
to assist in climate change initiatives.224 The law also established the National
Climate Change Board, which provides general control over, and guidance to, the
Climate Change and Development Authority.225
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Government of PNG, Forest Authority. 2009. Forestry and Climate Change Framework for Action
2009–2015. Port Moresby.
Footnote 218, p. 7.
Footnote 218, p. 9.
United Nations Paris Agreement (Implementation) Act 2016, sec. 7(2) in relation to sec. 2(2).
Footnote 221, secs. 2(3), 2(4), and 12.
Climate Change (Management) Act 2015, sec. 8(1).
Footnote 223, sec. 10.
Footnote 223, secs. 12 and 13(1).
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The act further requires measuring GHG emissions and the removal of targeted
GHGs.226 The National Climate Change Board recommends the reference level
and targets for national net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other GHGs
each year.227 Additionally, each person, organization, group, or any other such
body participating in an activity in a regulated sector must prepare an annual
adaptation plan and a mitigation plan to reduce its GHG emissions and increase
carbon capture in a sink.228 Finally, the act provides for the promulgation of
regulations on fuel and building standards.229
Additionally, PNG’s multiple development strategies contain some discussion of
climate change and energy. Developed in 2009, Papua New Guinea Vision 2050
includes environmental sustainability and climate change as one of its seven
strategic focus areas.230 The Medium Term Development Plan 2 2016–2017
articulates the goals of heightening climate resilience, protecting PNG’s important
rainforests, and reducing fossil fuel use in energy systems.231
Under its Medium Term Development Plan III 2018–2022, the government links
mitigation and adaptation with its responsible sustainable development goals
and strategies.232 It plans to improve resilience to climate change and support
global efforts to abate GHG emissions.233 It specifically targets the need to
improve legislative frameworks and negotiate improved funding and “technical,
institutional and technology support for climate change mitigation.” 234
The National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable Development aims to redirect
the socioeconomic growth of PNG away from present unsustainable strategies
and toward sustainable and responsible methods of growth.235 It encourages
investment in, among other things, renewable energy, green agriculture, and
sustainable cities.
The Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030 stresses that PNG must understand
how and where climate change is likely to impact the country, and that PNG must
make a significant contribution to reducing GHGs through forest management
and the development of its hydroelectric potential.236 Moreover, PNG can “further
its interests and those of other Pacific island states by engaging effectively in
226
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Footnote 223, sec. 54(1).
Footnote 223, sec. 56(1)(l).
Footnote 223, secs. 65(1) and 74(1).
Footnote 223, secs. 67–68.
Government of PNG. 2009. Papua New Guinea Vision 2050. Port Moresby. pp. xiv, 31–32.
Government of PNG, Department of National Planning and Monitoring. 2015. Medium Term
Development Plan 2 2016–2017. Port Moresby.
Government of PNG, Department of National Planning and Monitoring. 2018. Medium Term
Development Plan III 2018–2022. Port Moresby.
Footnote 232, p. 47.
Footnote 232, p. 50.
Government of PNG, Department of National Planning and Monitoring. 2014. National Strategy
for Responsible Sustainable Development for Papua New Guinea. 2nd ed. Port Moresby.
Government of PNG, Department of National Planning and Monitoring. 2010. Development
Strategic Plan 2010–2030. Port Moresby.
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global climate change negotiations.” 237 The plan recognizes that strategies for
the extractive and energy sectors will need to take climate considerations into
account.238
Finally, PNG’s constitution establishes five overarching goals and directives,
the fourth of which is the conservation of the environment’s natural resources.
Under this directive, the country strives for PNG’s “natural resources and
environment…be conserved and used for the collective benefit of us all, and be
replenished for the benefit of future generations.” 239
Table 6.10 summarizes PNG’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Although approximately 59% of the population had access to electricity in
2018, rates of access to grid electricity are low in PNG.240 Rural electrification
is challenging due to PNG’s mountainous terrain and dispersed population.241
In 2017, ADB estimated that grid penetration was less than 4% in rural areas
(footnote 241). ADB’s Power Sector Development Investment Program aims to
boost household electrification to 70% by 2030.242
PNG has one of the world’s lowest consumption of electricity per capita.243 In
2014, its total primary energy supply (TPES) was 2.479 million metric tons of
oil equivalent (Mtoe).244 Oil remained its major energy source, accounting for
44% of TPES (Figure 1) (footnote 244). PNG’s TPES is projected to grow at 4.5%
annually in 2010−2035.245 The total final energy consumption was 1.194 Mtoe in
2014 (footnote 244).
Low rates of electrification have made PNG reliant on imported fuels. Rural
populations use kerosene, biomass, and candles for energy.246 Further, 95% of
the rural population use biomass—wood, dung, and burnt agricultural waste—as
cooking fuel (footnote 246). PNG has commercial reserves of liquefied natural
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Footnote 236, p. 120.
Footnote 236, p. 5.
The Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Preamble, art. 4.
World Bank. Access to Electricity (% of Population) - Papua New Guinea (accessed 8 October 2020).
ADB. 2017. Concept Paper: Proposed Multitranche Financing Facility to Papua New Guinea for the
Power Sector Development Investment Program. Manila. p. 1.
Footnote 241, p. 2.
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited (ANZ). 2015. ANZ Insight: Powering PNG into
the Asian Century. (6). Sydney. p. 5.
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 2017. Peer Review on Low Carbon Energy Policies in
Papua New Guinea: Final Report. Singapore. p. 3.
APEC. 2013. Papua New Guinea. In APEC. APEC Energy Demand and Supply Outlook. 5th ed.
Tokyo: Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre. p. 136.
Footnote 243, p. 7.
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Table 6.10: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Papua New Guinea
The Constitution of the Independent State of
Papua New Guinea, 1975
Medium Term Development Plan III 2018–2022, 2018
National Strategy for Responsible Sustainable Development for
Papua New Guinea, 2014
PNG Vision 2050, 2009
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

National Climate Compatible
Development Management
Policy, 2014
Forestry and Climate Change
Framework for Action
2009–2015, 2009

Energy

National Energy Policy
2016–2020, 2015

LULUCF and
REDD+

National REDD+ Strategy
2017–2027 (National
Executive Council decision
No. 126/2017), 2017
National Forest Plan, 1996
(amended in 2010)

Environmental
assessment
Disaster risk
management
Coastal and
water resources
management

National Disaster Risk
Reduction Framework
2017−2030, 2017

Acts

Non-Legislative
Instruments

United Nations
Paris Agreement
(Implementation) Act
2016
Climate Change
(Management) Act
2015
Oil and Gas Regulation
2002 (amended as of
2006)
Forestry Act 1991

Forestry Regulation 1998

Environment Act 2000

Environment (Prescribed
Activities) Regulation
2002

Disaster Management Act
1984
Water Resources
Regulation 1982
(amended in 2006)
continued on next page
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Table 6.10 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Other

Medium Term Development
Plan 2 2016–2017, 2015
National Strategy for
Responsible Sustainable
Development for PNG, 2014
Development Strategic Plan
2010–2030, 2010

Conservation and
Environment Protection
Authority Act 2014
Environmental
Contaminants Act 1978

Non-Legislative
Instruments

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

gas and decreasing reserves of oil.247 As of 2013, PNG’s proven hydrocarbon
reserves consisted “primarily of natural gas (440 billion cubic meters), followed
by oil (0.660 billion barrels) and gas condensates (0.262 billion barrels).” 248
The government has ambitious plans for improving electricity supply. The
Development Strategic Plan 2010–2030 outlines the government’s intention to
connect 70% of the population to electricity by 2030.249 In 2016, the government
released the PNG National Energy Policy 2016–2020, envisioning that 70% of
the population will have access to electricity.250 The government intends to power
100% of its energy supply from renewable and sustainable energy sources by
2050 (footnote 250).
Despite PNG’s commitment to transitioning to renewables, the National Energy
Policy indicates the government’s intention to fast-track the exploration and
development of indigenous coal reserves for power generation.251 The policy
identifies coal’s capacity to enable the government to reliably and cheaply meet
its electrification targets.252
PNG also has significant hydroelectric potential, which the government intends
to explore. Total capacity of around 15,000 MW sits across nine large hydrological
basins, of which less than 1% is utilized.253

247

248
249
250

251
252
253

Footnote 245; and Government of PNG, Department of Public Enterprises and Department of
Petroleum and Energy. 2015. National Energy Policy 2016–2020. Port Moresby. p. xii.
Footnote 245; and p. 134.
Footnote 236, p. 15.
Government of PNG, Department of Public Enterprises and Department of Petroleum and
Energy. 2015. National Energy Policy 2016–2020. Port Moresby. p. 2.
Footnote 250, p. 26.
Footnote 250, p. 38.
Footnote 245, p. 134; and footnote 250, p. 43.
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Figure 1: Papua New Guinea’s Total Primary Energy Supply, 2014
Natural gas

6%

Hydro

3%

Geothermal and solar

15%

Oil

44%

Petroleum products

32%

Source: Source: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 2017. Peer Review on Low Carbon Energy Policies in
Papua New Guinea. Singapore. p. 3.

D. LULUCF and REDD+
PNG’s pristine rainforests are under threat. During 2002–2014, industrial logging
cleared 11,457 square kilometers (km2) of pristine forest.254 By 2014, around
one-third of PNG’s commercial forests had been logged.255
PNG has a number of policies governing forest management. The National
REDD+ Strategy 2017–2027 aims to address climate change and align with
PNG’s green growth development agenda.256 The strategy seeks to encourage
forest sustainability to ultimately decrease emissions of GHGs as well as climate
change vulnerability. It has two components: (i) policies and measures and
(ii) coordination and reporting.257
The 1996 National Forest Plan, amended in 2010, contains several guidelines and
plans, including (i) the National Forest Development Programme, (ii) an annual
statement of cut volumes, (iii) provincial forest plans, and (iv) the National Forest

254
255

256

257

J. Garrett. 2016. Losing Papua New Guinea’s Rainforest. ABC. 10 March.
J. Gabbatiss. 2018. Alarming Photos Reveal Devastating Scale of Rainforest Destruction in
Papua New Guinea. Independent. 21 March.
Government of PNG, Climate Change and Development Authority. 2017. Papua New Guinea
National REDD+ Strategy 2017–2027. Port Moresby. p. 7.
Footnote 256, p. 23.
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Development Guidelines.258 The guidelines encourage developing a focus on
future carbon-based schemes to combat climate change.259
The National Forest Plan also sets targets for reforestation and protection, and
mentions carbon trading as a means of financial environmental action.260 The
PNG Forest Authority has established a branch for REDD+ and climate change
activities.261 According to the plan, the Forest Authority must do the following to
address climate change:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)

continue to be active participants in climate change issues, especially
land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF);
maintain and upgrade an information database on issues related to
climate change;
conduct training and awareness on climate change and REDD+;
identify geographical areas for initiating REDD+, afforestation
and reforestation (or other clean development mechanisms), and
watershed management projects;
incentivize landowners and timber industries to undertake
afforestation and reforestation activities on grassland and degraded
sites;
continue research and support for other research initiatives into the
science of climate change and mitigation;
help develop and implement a national climate change policy;
help develop and implement a national REDD+ strategy;
implement the Climate Compatible Development Plan with the
Office of Climate Change and Development (now the Climate
Change and Development Authority);
implement five REDD+ pilot projects; and
maintain dialogue on REDD+ and climate change issues with all
stakeholders at the local, national, regional, and international levels.262

Finally, the Forestry Act 1991 authorizes the head of state to declare any
government land as a national forest.263 The Forestry Regulation 1998 requires
permits for burning forests, harvesting timber, and other uses.264

E.

Adaptation

As mentioned, the Climate Change and Development Authority is responsible for
promoting and managing climate-compatible development through mitigation
258

259
260
261
262
263
264

Government of PNG, PNG Forest Authority. 1996. National Forest Plan (amended in 2010).
Port Moresby. p. 1.
Footnote 258, p. 3.
Footnote 258, p. 8.
Footnote 258, p. 17.
Footnote 258, pp. 17–18.
Forestry Act 1991, sec. 3.
Forestry Regulation 1998, secs. 77, 118, 159, 161, 163, 165, and 167.
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and adaptation activities (footnote 224). The Development Strategic Plan
2010–2030 also stresses that PNG must assess how and where climate change
is likely to impact the country (footnote 236). PNG has stated that it will need
financial support, capacity building, and technical support to face the threats
posed by climate change.265

F.

Disaster Risk Management

PNG’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (NDRRF) 2017–2030 seeks
to integrate into domestic policy the international best practices for disaster risk
reduction as articulated in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015–2030.266 It aims to harmonize PNG’s policies with the Framework for
Resilient Development in the Pacific 2017–2030 and the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Disaster Risk Reduction Plan (footnote 266). It specifies the
functions and relationships between different government departments and
agencies with respect to disaster risk management and reduction.267
The NDRRF is anchored on the Disaster Management Act 1984. The act established
a framework for the efficient and effective response and management of natural
disasters in PNG. The act also established the National Disaster Committee and the
National Disaster Centre at both the national and provincial levels.268

IX. Samoa
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Independent State of Samoa is a small island developing state in the
southern Pacific Ocean with a parliamentary democracy.269 It has a population
of about 195,000 and consists of nine volcanic islands, only four of which are
inhabited (footnote 269).
It is very vulnerable to climate change impacts because at least 70% of its
population and infrastructure are in low-lying coastal areas on two main islands:
Savaii and Upolu.270 As of 2017, Samoa ranked 124th in the Global Climate

265
266

267
268
269
270

Footnote 210, p. 7.
Government of PNG, National Disaster Centre. 2017. Papua New Guinea National Disaster Risk
Reduction Framework 2017−2030. Port Moresby. p. 11.
Footnote 266, pp. 17 and 30.
Disaster Management Act 1984, secs. 3 and 15.
Pacific Trade Invest Australia. Country Profile - Samoa: Treasured Islands of the South Pacific.
X. Flores-Palacios. 2015. Samoa: Local Knowledge, Climate Change and Population Movements.
In M. Couldrey and M. Herson, eds. Disasters and Displacement in a Changing Climate. Forced
Migration Review. (49). p. 59.
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Risk Index.271 Samoa suffers from increased frequency and intensity in extreme
weather and other climate events, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and cyclones.272

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
Samoa submitted its first nationally determined contribution (NDC) on 22 April 2016,
committing to a 100% renewable energy target by 2025.273 The commitment is
conditional on receiving international assistance to reach the 100% target in 2017,
and maintain it through to 2025 (footnote 273). Achieving economy-wide
emissions reductions is also conditional on international aid (footnote 273).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Samoa has adopted two major climate policies—the Strategic Programme for
Climate Resilience and the National Policy of Combating Climate Change.
The strategic program, launched in 2011, explores ways to increase Samoa’s
climate resilience through various sectors.274 It identifies critical climate change
vulnerabilities, including damage caused by high seas, strong winds, droughts, and
flooding.275 It also identifies highways and roads, agriculture, forestry and fishing,
flood protection, and civic engagement as key sectors for climate intervention
(footnote 275). It outlines two investment projects: enhancing the West Coast
Road’s climate resilience and improving the resilience of coastal resources and
communities (footnote 275). For financial assistance, the program states an
intent to establish a trust fund for adaptation to climate change.
In 2007, the government launched the National Policy of Combating Climate
Change.276 The policy articulates the overall goal of enhancing “Samoa’s response
to the impacts of climate change in support of national sustainable development
efforts.” 277 It includes the following specific objectives:
(i)

raising stakeholder understanding and overall public awareness of
climate change causes and impacts,
(ii) bettering climate change information and data management,
(iii) strengthening effective national climate change responses,
(iv) implementing measures toward mitigating GHG emissions,
271

272
273
274
275
276

277

D. Eckstein, M. Hutfils, and M. Winges. 2018. Global Climate Risk Index 2019: Who Suffers Most
from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2017 and 1998 to 2017. Briefing
Paper. Bonn: Germanwatch e.V. p. 31.
Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. Samoa.
Government of Samoa. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Apia. p. 2.
Government of Samoa. 2011. Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience (SPCR). Apia.
Footnote 274, p. iv.
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Natural Resources & Environment. 2007. National Policy of
Combating Climate Change. Apia.
Footnote 276, p. 3.
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(v) implementing measures toward climate change adaptation, and
(vi) establishing a regulatory framework to bolster the national climate
change response.278
In addition to the Strategic Programme for Climate Resilience and the National Policy
of Combating Climate Change, the government developed the National Adaptation
Programme of Action in 2005.279 The program guides the country’s response to
its most urgent adaptation needs.
Understanding the need to clarify its longer-term aspirations, Samoa is developing
Samoa 2040 as part of its national development agenda.280 Thematic areas will
include ensuring resilient development and aiming for a safe and secure Samoa.
Table 6.11 summarizes Samoa’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Samoa meets its energy needs primarily by importing fuels and petroleum
products.281 These fuels include (i) unleaded petrol, widely used for terrestrial and
marine transport; and (ii) automotive diesel, used for electricity generation, heavy
machinery, and land and marine transport.282
As of 2018, 100% of the population had access to electricity.283 In 2016 (the latest
year for which data is available), electricity consumption by the commercial and
industrial sector accounted for 39% of total consumption, while the residential
sector accounted for 31%. Other sectors accounted for the remaining 30% (Figure 2).

1. Sector-Wide Strategies
Samoa has produced plans to guide the energy sector. The Energy Sector Plan
2012−2016 has an overarching goal of increasing energy self-sufficiency by shifting
to renewable energy and reducing “the growth rate in the volume of imported fossil
fuels by 10% by 2016.” 284 In the Energy Sector Plan 2017–2022, the government
adopted the theme of “Sustainable and Affordable Energy for All.” 285 The
2017–2022 plan seeks to align with the Strategy for the Development of Samoa
2016/17–2019/20, which focuses on “Accelerating Sustainable Development and

278
279

280

281
282
283
284
285

Footnote 276, pp. 3–5.
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment & Meteorology. 2005.
National Adaptation Programme of Action: Samoa. Apia.
Government of Samoa, Public Service Commission. "Samoa 2040" Looks at Transforming
Samoa to Higher Growth Path in the Next 20 Years.
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2007. Samoa National Energy Policy. Apia. p. 11.
Footnote 281, p. 20.
World Bank. Access to Electricity (% of Population) (accessed 10 October 2020).
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2012. Samoa Energy Sector Plan 2012−2016. Apia. p. 18.
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2017. Samoa Energy Sector Plan 2017–2022. Apia. p. 4.
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Table 6.11: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Samoa
The Constitution of the Independent State of Samoa, 1960;
Constitution Amendment Act 2019; Constitution Amendment
Act (No. 2) 2019; and
Constitution Amendment Act (No. 3) 2019
Strategy for the Development of Samoa 2016/17–2019/20,
2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

Strategic Programme for
Climate Resilience, 2011
National Greenhouse Gas
Abatement Strategy
2008–2018, 2008
National Policy of Combating
Climate Change, 2007
National Adaptation
Programme of Action, 2005

Energy

Samoa Energy Sector Plans
2012–2016 and 2017–2022
Samoa National Energy Policy
2007

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Electricity Act 2010

Forestry Management Act
2011

LULUCF and REDD+
Other

Acts

National Environment and
Development Sector Plan
2013–2016, 2013

Lands, Surveys and
Environment Act 1989

Ozone Layer Protection
Regulations 2006

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.
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Figure 2: Electricity Consumption in Samoa by Sector, 2016
Hotels, government departments,
schools, and religious groups

30%

Commercial and
industrial sector

39%

Residential sector

31%
Source: Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2017. Samoa Energy Review 2016. Apia. p. 22.

Broadening Opportunities for All.” 286 In addition, the government formulated an
ambitious target of 100% renewable energy capacity to further drive its vision for
sustainable energy supply in the country.287 This target was formalized in Samoa’s
first NDC (footnote 273).
The NDC further notes electricity sector reforms that improved the country’s
energy mix. “The Electricity Act 2010 introduces key regulatory changes which
have allowed the private sector to be involved in generating electricity and selling it
back to the utility. This has allowed independent power producers (IPPs) to build
and operate renewable energy power plants and sell electricity to the grid.” 288
Other key policy drivers include the National Greenhouse Gas Abatement
Strategy 2008–2018 and the National Policy of Combating Climate Change
2007.289 The abatement strategy acknowledges the importance of committing to
mitigation strategies as a global responsibility. The national policy identifies the
286

287

288

289

Footnote 285; and Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2016. Strategy for the
Development of Samoa 2016/17–2019/20. Apia. p. ii.
Government of Samoa, Ministry of Finance. 2016. Strategy for the Development of Samoa
2016/17–2019/20. Apia. p. 13.
Footnote 273, p. 7. In 2016, the Samoa Electric Power Corporation had power purchase
agreements with six IPPs. UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 2016.
Asia-Pacific Countries with Special Needs Development Report 2016: Adapting the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development at the National Level. Bangkok. p. 28.
Samoa Environment Data Portal. National Greenhouse Gas Abatement Strategy 2008–2018
(accessed 10 October 2020); and footnote 276.
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need to develop renewable energy sources—solar, wind, and ocean energy—to
reduce GHG emissions. It further recognizes the need for strategies to promote
energy efficiency in energy supply, industry, buildings, and transportation. The NDC
thus includes the following targets:
(i)

achieve a total installed capacity of 6 megawatts (MW) by September 2015
through projects initiated by the public utility or by independent power
producers, with total capacity expected to increase over the next 2 years;
(ii) achieve 550 kilowatts (kW) of installed wind power capacity;
(iii) rehabilitate 3.5 MW of hydropower by restoring hydropower plants
destroyed by Cyclone Evan in 2012 and through small run-of-river schemes;
(iv) incentivize IPPs to generate 12 MW of bioenergy from various
biomass, biogas, or alternative bioenergy sources; and
(v) regulate the importation of energy-inefficient appliances, establish
product and labeling standards, replace older and less efficient light
bulbs with more efficient alternatives, and implement other demand
side management programs.290

2. Renewable Energy Policies
Under the Energy Sector Plan 2017–2022, Samoa continues its path to energy
self-sufficiency by promoting renewable energy, energy efficiency, and energy
conservation.291 Aiming for 100% renewable energy share in total energy generation,
Samoa plans to (i) develop an overarching energy sector legislation and supporting
regulations, (ii) form and strengthen partnerships among stakeholders, (iii) foster
private sector investment in renewable energy, (iv) monitor the development and
implementation of renewable energy projects, (v) integrate renewable energy education
into the school curriculum, and (vi) disseminate information on renewable energy.292

D. LULUCF and REDD+
Approximately 58.3% of Samoa’s land area is covered by what the government
has officially designated as forest.293 However, the definition of forest excludes
small woodlots, small reserves, small patches of mangrove forests, seawall
plantings, agroforestry, and other young tree plantings (footnote 293). There has
been a decrease of 1.7% in forest cover due to Cyclone Evan in 2012, agricultural
developments, and expansion of residential and industrial areas (footnote 293).
According to the Forestry Management Act 2011, the ministry responsible for
forest management must formulate and implement policies and programs in
support of international climate change conventions and protocols.294 The
290
291
292
293

294

Footnote 273, p. 7.
Footnote 285, p. 9.
Footnote 285, pp. 24 and 27−28.
Government of Samoa. 2014. Voluntary National Report to the 11th Session of the United Nations
Forum on Forests. Apia. p. 9.
Forestry Management Act 2011, sec. 32(1).

THE PACIFIC COUNTRIES LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

act also provides for harvesting licenses and permits for forestry resource
management, encourages lands to be declared protected, and authorizes forestry
resource inventories in support of carbon trading.295

E.

Adaptation

In strategic documents, Samoa consistently identifies climate change adaptation
as a central goal. The National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA), for
example, identifies key sectors with immediate adaptation needs.296 It “aims to
communicate urgent and immediate adaptation needs and the activities to address
these needs to deal with the adverse impacts of climate change; and to develop the
strategies for capacity building amongst stakeholders and village communities.” 297
NAPA’s objectives include implementing project-based actions for climate change
adaptation; protecting people, infrastructure, and the environment; incorporating
measures for adaptation into policy and development goals; and increasing climate
change awareness (footnote 297). NAPA also set out priority actions for a range
of areas, such as water security, forest development, climate health, early warning
systems, food security and sustainability, zoning and planning, coastal infrastructure
management, conservation program establishment, and sustainable tourism.298

X. Solomon Islands
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Covering 28,000 square kilometers (km2) of land, Solomon Islands is an
archipelago of 994 islands.299 Some islands have a mountainous landscape of
volcanic origin, while others are coral atolls (footnote 299). There are six main
islands—Choiseul, New Georgia, Santa Isabel, Malaita, Guadalcanal, and Makira.
The country has almost 670,000 inhabitants as of 2019, with around 80% of the
national population living in low-lying coastal areas.300 Currently considered a
least developed country (LDC), Solomon Islands is scheduled to graduate to a
developing country in 2024.301 It is a parliamentary democracy and follows the
English common law system.

295
296
297
298
299
300

301

Footnote 294, secs. 37, 32(3), and 58.
Footnote 279, p. 7.
Footnote 279, p. 16.
Footnote 279, pp. 23–24.
Government of Solomon Islands. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Honiara. p. 3.
World Bank. Population, Total - Solomon Islands (accessed 10 October 2020); and
footnote 299, pp. 4 and 8.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Least Developed Country
Category: Solomon Islands Profile.
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Solomon Islands is highly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change,
including droughts, extreme rainfall, floods, exceptionally high tides, and sea
level rise.302 GHG emissions from Solomon Islands are minimal, and per capita
emissions are already less than the estimated level required to stay below 1.5 ºC
(as compared with 2ºC) of warming.303

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Solomon Islands submitted its first nationally determined
contribution (NDC) on 21 September 2016. While Solomon Islands is an LDC
and a small island nation, it commits nonetheless in its first NDC to reduce its
emissions by 12% below the 2015 level by 2025, and 30% below by 2030.304 It
seeks a 27% reduction in GHG emissions by 2025 and a 45% reduction by 2030,
compared with a business as usual (BAU) projection (footnote 304). With
international assistance, Solomon Islands can reduce its emissions by more than
50% by 2050 (footnote 304).

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
The Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster Management and
Meteorology is primarily responsible for climate change measures.305 It has
issued one major climate policy, the National Climate Change Policy 2012–2017,
which sets goals for 5 years. These goals include (i) implementing adaptation
and mitigation efforts, (ii) integrating climate change into national development,
(iii) improving governance structures, (iv) promoting renewable energy and
energy efficiency, and (v) fortifying citizen resilience.306 Furthermore, the policy
discusses financing and disaster risk management.307
The National Development Strategy 2016–2035 also provides climate-related
guidance, setting a long-term target of responding effectively to climate change
and natural disasters.308
Table 6.12 summarizes Solomon Islands’ climate change legal and policy framework.

302
303
304
305

306

307
308

Footnote 299, p. 12.
Footnote 299, p. 8.
Footnote 299, p. 7.
Footnote 299, p. 14; and Government of Solomon Islands. 2011. Assignment of Responsibility to
the Minister for Environment[,] Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology. Honiara.
Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Environment, Climate Change, Disaster
Management and Meteorology. 2012. National Climate Change Policy 2012–2017. Honiara.
pp. 13–14.
Footnote 306, pp. 19–22 and 27–28.
Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Development Planning and Aid Coordination.
2016. National Development Strategy 2016–2035. Honiara. p. 11.
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Table 6.12: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Solomon Islands
The Constitution of the Solomon Islands, 1978
National Development Strategy 2016–2035, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Climate change

National Climate Change
Policy 2012–2017, 2012
National Adaptation
Programmes of Action,
2008

Energy

Solomon Islands National
Energy Policy, 2014
Petroleum and Alternative
Liquid Fuels Strategies
and Investment Plan
2014−2019, 2014

Assignment of Responsibility
to the Minister for
Environment[,] Climate
Change, Disaster
Management and
Meteorology, 2011

National Disaster Council
Act, 1990

Disaster risk
management
Other

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Acts

National Development
Strategy 2011−2020, 2011
National Biodiversity
Strategic Action Plan, 2009

Town and Country
Planning (Amendment)
Act, 2017
Environment Act, 1998

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

C. Energy Supply
Sustainable energy development is challenging in Solomon Islands due to widely
scattered populations on islands separated by substantial expanses of sea, resulting
in small communities and isolated population centers.309 Approximately 20% of the
population has access to electricity.310 Almost all electricity generation, which relies
on imported diesel fuel, takes place in Honiara (the capital city) and the provincial
centers (footnote 310). Electricity is supplied and regulated by the Solomon Islands
Electricity Authority, the country’s only power utility (footnote 310).
309
310

Government of Solomon Islands. 2017. Second National Communication. Honiara. pp. 25 and 99.
Footnote 309, p. 99.
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Only about 5% of the rural population has access to electricity through a few
off-grid and individual household systems (footnote 310). Furthermore, about
85% of the country’s population lives in rural areas and frequently use biomass
(fuelwood) for cooking and other activities (footnote 310).

1. Sector-Wide Strategies
Solomon Islands National Energy Policy 2014 aims to increase the use of power
generated from renewables to 79% by 2030, and improve energy efficiency
and conservation in all sectors by 10.7% by 2019 against a 2012 baseline.311 In
addition, the policy outlines the following goals, as detailed in the Petroleum and
Alternative Liquid Fuels Strategies and Investment Plan 2014–2019:
(i)

improve capacity for integrated energy sector planning and policy
implementation; ensure wider consultations on policy issues,
legislation, and regulations; and disseminate energy-related
information through school curricula and community training;
(ii) provide reliable and affordable power supply in all urban areas by
promoting renewable energy, opening the market to independent power
producers, establishing appropriate tariffs, and ensuring Solomon Islands
Electricity Authority has sound technical and managerial expertise;
(iii) increase the supply and coverage of electricity in rural areas using
renewable energy resources—focusing on hydropower in larger islands
and solar power on water-short atolls and outer islands—while evaluating
other renewable resources and adopting both appropriate technologies
and institutional arrangements, including community management; and
(iv) reduce energy costs by promoting energy conservation and
efficiency—e.g., by (a) introducing product standards for appliances
(such as appliance labeling) and energy efficiency ratings, and
(b) promoting energy-efficient technology—and ensure minimal
negative environmental impacts of energy production, distribution,
and consumption on the environment.312

D. Energy Demand
Most rural communities in Solomon Islands have inadequate access to, or cannot
afford, basic energy services, including lighting, heating, and transportation, so
they are forced to rely on wood and crop residue (biomass).313 More people are now
using solar power, kerosene, and lanterns, and many low-income earners allocate a
large portion of their funds to obtaining energy supplies (footnote 313). Over 95% of
rural households and 63% of urban households use wood for cooking (footnote 313).
311

312

313

Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification. 2014.
Solomon Islands National Energy Policy. Honiara. p. 2.
Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification. 2014.
Petroleum and Alternative Liquid Fuels Strategies and Investment Plan (2014–2019). pp. 10–11.
Footnote 308, p. 24.
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Moving to cleaner cooking fuels has two main benefits: (i) it has a positive impact on
child and maternal health; and (ii) the availability of electricity extends people’s
working hours, thereby helping to boost incomes (footnote 313).
The National Development Strategy 2016–2035 aims to reduce the proportion
of homes with no electricity supply from 50% in 2010 to less than 20% by 2035
(footnote 313). It also seeks to increase the proportion of homes using solar
power from 15% to 50% by 2035 (footnote 313).

E.

LULUCF and REDD+

The National Climate Change Policy 2012–2017 considers that minimizing
the loss of carbon and carbon dioxide (CO2) due to land use, land-use change,
and forestry (LULUCF) activities is urgent and crucial for both sustainable
development and climate action in Solomon Islands.314 The policy clarifies that
the energy, forestry (logging), and waste management sectors produce the most
GHG emissions.315
In 2007–2011, logging, fisheries, agriculture, and aid were the main sources of
income for Solomon Islands.316 However, commercial logging for export exceeds
the allowable sustainable cut of 30,000 cubic meters, presenting the biggest
threat to terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services (footnote 314). The
National Climate Change Policy 2012–2017 therefore identifies the need for
low-impact logging strategies.317
The policy further identifies land clearing for subsistence agriculture as the major
cause of deforestation in Solomon Islands (footnote 314). As such, while subsistence
agriculture forms the country’s foundation of food security, the policy acknowledges
the need to adopt more sustainable farming practices (footnote 314).

F.

Adaptation

Mindful of its vulnerability to climate change, Solomon Island released in 2008
the National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA), which stresses that
climate change threatens the country’s capacity for sustainable development.318
The NAPA identifies the need to enhance the resilience to climate change of
agriculture, water, human settlements, and health.319 The NAPA also outlines
adaptation priorities for waste management, coastal and fisheries protection,
infrastructure development, and tourism resilience.320
314
315
316
317
318
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Footnote 306, p. 38.
Footnote 306, p. 22.
Footnote 306, p. 3.
Footnote 306, p. 21.
Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology.
2008. National Adaptation Programmes of Action. Honiara. p. 5.
Footnote 318, pp. 102–103.
Footnote 318, p. 3.
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The National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan identifies climate change as a
threat to biodiversity due to warming temperatures, rising sea levels, and changing
weather patterns.321 It lays out a holistic approach to biodiversity protection and
explains the importance of using adaptation planning to address climate change
impacts on biodiversity.322 The action plan therefore sets goals for climate action,
i.e., “to ensure that pressures, impacts and mitigation measures of climate change
are adequately supported and addressed to conserve the country’s biodiversity.” 323
The first NDC states, “adaptation is not an option—but rather a matter of
survival.”324 The total adaptation cost would be around $126 million, covering
agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, human settlements
and health, education awareness, waste management, coastal protection,
fisheries and marine resources, infrastructure development, and tourism.325
The government plans “to build national capacity to facilitate direct access to
international climate change financing.” 326

G. Disaster Risk Management
The National Disaster Council Act, passed in 1990, established the National
Disaster Council to advise the minister in charge of all disaster-related matters.327
The council is also responsible for organizing preparatory actions, responses, and
recovery from disaster.328 In 2011, the minister for environment, climate change,
disaster management and meteorology was legally assigned responsibility for
administering and monitoring disaster risk reduction.329

XI. Timor-Leste
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste is a small island nation occupying the
eastern half of Timor. It gained independence from Portugal in 1975 and from
Indonesia in 2002. It has a population of almost 1.4 million people.330 Although
it faces high climate change risks, Timor-Leste contributes less than 0.003% to

321

322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329

330

Government of Solomon Islands, Ministry of Environment Conservation and Meteorology.
2009. National Biodiversity Strategic Action Plan. Honiara. p. 24.
Footnote 321, p. 9.
Footnote 321, p. 36.
Footnote 299, p. 11.
Footnote 299, p. 13.
Footnote 299, p. 14.
National Disaster Council Act, secs. 2, 3(1), and 5(a).
Footnote 327, sec. 5(b).
Government of Solomon Islands. 2011. Assignment of Responsibility to the Minister for
Environment[,] Climate Change, Disaster Management and Meteorology. Honiara.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbook: Timor-Leste (accessed 13 October 2020).
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global GHG emissions.331 Timor-Leste has a low population density, with only
29.5% of the population living in urban areas.332
Timor-Leste struggles with food insecurity in rural regions.333 This insecurity is
aggravated by climate change impacts such as unpredictable changes in annual
seasons and rainfall patterns, which in turn lower crop productivity.334 About 30%
of the population lives below the poverty line (footnote 332).
As an island nation, Timor-Leste is vulnerable to sea level rise, increasing
temperatures and consequently increasing incidence of vector-borne diseases,
and changes in weather patterns.335 For example, Timor-Leste depends on the
West Pacific monsoon for rainfall and temperature regulation.336 Climate change
threatens to increase extreme rainfall with risks of flooding. Other climate risks
include ocean acidification, intensified tropical cyclones, coastal erosion, and
coral reef bleaching.337

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Timor-Leste submitted its first nationally determined
contribution (NDC) on 16 August 2017, setting out nonquantifiable mitigation
and adaptation targets. These targets include (i) managing land sustainably,
(ii) reducing the vulnerability of farmland to drought and flood events,
(iii) reforesting degraded land to prevent landslides, (iv) establishing early warning
systems for natural disasters, (v) maintaining mangrove plantations to increase
coastal resilience, (vi) including ecosystem management in national planning,
and (vii) protecting offshore oil and gas production infrastructure from strong
wave damage.338 The first NDC also seeks to establish a climate change unit with
staffing and budget to support policy development.339
Timor-Leste has identified its lack of financial resources as the principal barrier
to mitigation and adaptation initiatives. In its first NDC, Timor-Leste requests
international financial assistance from the Green Climate Fund, the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), and the Least Developed Countries Fund.340
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333
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Government of Timor-Leste. 2017. First Nationally Determined Contributions. Dili. p. 7.
Footnote 331, p. 4.
Footnote 331, p. 5.
Footnote 331, pp. 5, 10, and 16.
Footnote 331, pp. 16−17.
Footnote 331, p. 15.
Footnote 331, pp. 15−16.
Footnote 331, pp. 13, 17−20.
Footnote 331, p. 20.
Footnote 331, p. 22.

259

260

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
As a least developed country (LDC) with a negligible contribution to global GHG
emissions, Timor-Leste focuses its climate policies and framework on adaptation
initiatives.
In 2012, Timor-Leste established its legal and policy framework for environmental
protection and management, and sustainable resource use.341 These laws acknowledge
the need to create adaptation and mitigation measures to address climate change.
Decree-Law No. 01/2013 established the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Environment,
responsible for developing government policies to address climate change.
Due to its status as an LDC and its recent independence from Indonesia in
2002, Timor-Leste has not developed climate change policies or mitigation
plans. Rather, the country is primarily focused on economic development and
adaptation. Its first NDC to the Paris Climate Agreement does not set forth
any quantifiable targets for emission reductions, and emphasizes the national
intention to continue developing its offshore oil and gas resources.
The main climate change action taken by Timor-Leste is in the forestry sector.
The National Policy and Strategy for the Forestry Sector aims to protect 70% of
national forests by 2020 and stresses the importance of afforestation efforts.342
Table 6.13 summarizes Timor-Leste’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
In an attempt to develop economically and improve national infrastructure,
Timor-Leste has developed offshore oil and gas extraction to supplement
government revenues (footnote 333). National crude petroleum resources
are currently processed abroad due to the technologically complex facilities
required for the production (footnote 333). The oil industry has accounted for
approximately 75% of the gross domestic product (GDP) since 2003.343 In the
medium term, Timor-Leste expects that the oil and gas industries will have
important functions in its economic development.344

1. Renewable Energy Policies
Timor-Leste received $1,743,000 from the GEF to pursue a mitigation
project titled “Promoting Sustainable Bio-Energy Production from
341

342

343

344

See Decree-Law No. 26/2012, which established the Environmental Basic Legislation, and Law
No. 3/2012, on the legal authorization for Environmental Basic Legislation.
Government of Timor-Leste. 2007. Government Resolution No. 9/2007, National Policy and
Strategy for the Forestry Sector. Dili.
United Nations, Committee for Development Policy, Vulnerability Profile of Timor-Leste,
CDP2018/PLEN/6.f (12–16 March 2018).
Footnote 331, p. 6.
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Table 6.13: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Timor-Leste
The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste,
2002
Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030, 2011
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2017 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts
Decree-Law No. 26/2012,
Establishing the Environmental
Basic Legislation

Climate change

Government Resolution
No. 9/2007, National
Policy and Strategy for
the Forestry Sector

LULUCF and
REDD+

Decree-Law No. 01/2013,
Establishing the Structure
of the Ministry of Trade,
Industry and Environment

Industry

Other

Non-Legislative
Instruments

National Policy on Forests of
Timor-Leste, 2017
Program of the Sixth
Constitutional Government:
2015-17 Legislature, 2015

Law No. 3/2012, on the
Legal Authorization for
Environmental Basic
Legislation

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.

Biomass.” 345 The project seeks to make it easier to produce sustainably, use
biomass resources, and apply biomass energy technologies.346 With respect to
other renewable energy sources, Timor-Leste is attempting to promote solar
home systems.347

345

346
347

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2019. Mid-Term Review of UNDP/GEF
Project: Promoting Sustainable Bio-Energy Production from Biomass (SBEPB) in Timor-Leste.
New York. p. ii.
Footnote 345, p. iii.
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2013. Democratic Republic of
Timor-Leste. 11 October.

261

262

NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

D. LULUCF and REDD+
About 59% of the total land area is forest-covered, of which 36% is primary
forest.348 Emissions from agriculture, forest, and other land use—comprising the
majority of the country’s GHG emissions—are caused by (i) forest and grassland
conversion; (ii) animal digestion; (iii) agricultural soil emissions; (iv) manure
management; (v) land use, land-use change, and forestry (LULUCF) and biomass
emissions; and (vi) rice cultivation.349 Timor-Leste’s first NDC expresses interest
in (i) exploring REDD+ activities based on national priorities; and (ii) engaging
with the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, a global coalition of governments,
businesses, civil society, and indigenous peoples committed to REDD+
activities.350 Timor-Leste also seeks to plant 1 million trees annually, and protect
at least 70% of forest areas by 2030.351

E.

Adaptation

Timor-Leste is primarily focused on adaptation—especially in its first NDC—
although there are no quantifiable targets or specific policies. However, as a
vulnerable small island nation, Timor-Leste recognizes the need to develop
infrastructure and resilience mechanisms to mitigate the risks of rising sea levels
and increasing extreme weather events.

XII. Tonga
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Kingdom of Tonga, a constitutional monarchy, is an archipelago of four
island clusters in the South Pacific ocean. As a Pacific island country, Tonga
is particularly susceptible to sea level rise, cyclones, ocean acidification, coral
bleaching, and changing rainfall patterns.352 For example, in 2014, Tropical
Cyclone Ian resulted in an estimated pa’anga (T$) 33 million ($14 million) in
damages and an additional T$5.4 million ($2.3 million) in losses.353
Additional climate-related threats include saltwater intrusion affecting
groundwater due to sea level rise, droughts that reduce potable water, and

348
349
350
351

352
353

Footnote 331, p. 10.
Footnote 331, p. 9.
Footnote 331, p. 11.
Government of Timor-Leste. 2017. National Policy on Forests of Timor-Leste. Dili and
footnote 331, p. 13.
Government of Tonga. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contributions. Nuku'alofa. p. 4.
Government of Tonga, Ministry of Meteorology, Energy, Information, Disaster Management,
Environment, Climate Change and Communications. 2016. Tonga Climate Change Policy:
A Resilient Tonga by 2035. Nuku'alofa. p. 15.
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destabilization of climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and fisheries.354
Coastal developments—including mining of beach sand—sea level rise, and
extreme weather events are also accelerating coastal degradation (footnote 354).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Tonga submitted its first NDC on 21 September 2016,
pledging to achieve 50% renewable electricity by 2020 and 70% by 2030.355
Additionally, it commits to reducing electricity line losses to 9% by 2020
compared with a baseline of 18% in 2010 (footnote 355). The first NDC also
contains emissions reduction targets by sector and intends to double its number
of marine protected areas by 2030 (footnote 355). The NDC further identifies
sectors for adaptation, including agriculture, coastal zones, disaster management,
tourism, and water.

2. Overview of Climate Law and Policy
Tonga’s flagship climate change strategy is the Tonga Climate Change Policy
(footnote 353). Launched in 2016, the policy provides a 5-year road map for
addressing climate change impacts and reducing disaster risk. It serves as a
multisector framework, recognizing climate change as “the single biggest issue
that will determine the future of Tonga over [the] coming decades.” 356 Ultimately,
the policy aims to make Tonga climate-resilient by 2035. Specific targets in the
policy include
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

reaching 100% renewable energy by 2035;
securing 30% of land used in forestry or agroforestry by 2035;
protecting all coastal communities by 2035;
shifting the transportation system away from reliance on fossil fuels;
achieving resilient homes, schools, and community halls; and
redesigning roads, coastal areas, buildings, and other infrastructure to
be more resilient.357

Tonga’s approach to mitigation and adaptation also focuses on integrating climate
change planning into development initiatives. The Tonga Strategic Development
Framework 2015–2025, for example, establishes climate change as a national and
international development issue.358 The framework recognizes the risks posed by
climate change and extreme weather, and aims to improve environmental and

354
355
356
357
358

United Nations Development Programme, Climate Change Adaptation. Tonga.
Footnote 352, p. 3.
Footnote 353, p. 7.
Footnote 353, p. 12.
Government of Tonga, Ministry of Finance and National Planning. 2015. Tonga Strategic
Development Framework 2015–2025. Nuku'alofa.
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land management to bolster resilience. Both the strategic framework and the
Tonga Climate Change Policy build on an earlier climate policy: the Joint National
Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk Management
2010–2015 (Joint National Action Plan).359
Tongan climate change policies focus on marine and forest conservation,
combined with quantifiable targets for transitioning electricity production to
renewable energy.
Table 6.14 summarizes Tonga’s climate change legal and policy framework.

Table 6.14: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Tonga
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Tonga, 1875
Tonga Strategic Development Framework 2015−2025, 2015
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area
Climate change

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Tonga Climate Change Policy:
A Resilient Tonga by 2035,
2016
Joint National Action
Plan on Climate Change
Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Management 2010–2015,
2010
Renewable Energy Act
2008

Energy
Forestry

National Forest Policy for Tonga,
2009

Other

Tonga Agriculture Sector Plan
2016–2020, 2016

National Spatial Planning
and Management Act
2012
Environmental
Management Act 2010

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

359

Government of Tonga. 2010. Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and
Disaster Risk Management 2010–2015. Nuku'alofa.
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C. Energy Supply
Tonga currently meets the vast majority of its energy needs by importing fossil fuels.360
In 2016, about 74% of the total electricity generated came from burning fossil fuels,
while 26% was renewable.361 Tonga ranks 205th in the world for carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from energy consumption (footnote 361). Nevertheless, increasing
renewable energy is a principal focus for Tonga in its climate change laws and policies.

1. Renewable Energy Policies
The Renewable Energy Act 2008 seeks to increase renewable energy use
throughout the country by establishing an authority to regulate all renewable
energy projects, and to promote renewable energy electrification services,
especially in remote areas.362 Further, it encourages investment in renewable
energy and recommends research and development initiatives through
partnerships with the private sector.363 This act reflects the larger initiative to
transition to primarily renewable sources.
The Joint National Action Plan sets quantifiable targets, including 50% renewable
energy by 2013 and 10% GHG emissions reductions by 2015, compared with a
2000 baseline.364 Further, the Climate Change Policy aims for 100% renewable
energy by 2035 (footnote 357).

D. LULUCF and REDD+
Tonga’s efforts in forest management are concentrated in the National Spatial
Planning and Management Act 2012, along with the National Forest Policy
for Tonga 2009.365 The act establishes a framework for planning land use and
management, focusing on preserving biodiversity and conserving ecosystems.
The forest policy seeks to support sustainable forest management, specifically
of exotic and indigenous forests, agroforests, and urban trees.366 Like the act, the
forest policy aims to preserve biodiversity, soil, water, and ecosystem integrity
(footnote 366). It additionally integrates mitigation goals by referring to carbon
sequestration and its intent to participate in carbon trading mechanisms.367
In addition, the Climate Change Policy sets a target that 30% of land be used in
forestry and agroforestry by 2035 (footnote 357).
360
361
362
363
364
365

366
367

Tonga Power Limited. Outer Islands Renewable Project.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbook: Tonga (accessed 16 October 2020).
Renewable Energy Act 2008, secs. 3(b), 3(c), and 3(e).
Footnote 362, sec. 3(a).
Footnote 359, pp. 25 and 42.
Government of Tonga, Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Fisheries. 2009. National
Forest Policy for Tonga. Nuku'alofa.
Footnote 365, p. 3.
Footnote 365, p. 5.
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E.

Transportation

Tonga does not have a large transportation industry, especially given its small
territorial size and population. It has one airport with paved runways and 184
kilometers (km) of paved roadways (footnote 361). Nuku’alofa, Neiafu, and
Pangai are the three major seaports.
The Climate Change Policy sets out a broad goal of creating a transportation
system not reliant on fossil fuels. However, there are no quantifiable targets or
specific implementation plans (footnote 357).

F.

Adaptation

Adaptation is a central focus of Tonga’s climate change laws and policies. Like
most other low-lying Pacific island countries, Tonga faces the risk of complete
inundation due to sea level rise. Many of the national climate change policies and
laws reference the need to protect coastal communities and create mechanisms
for disaster management in preparation for increased and extreme weather
events. Nevertheless, the existing legal and policy frameworks implemented by
Tonga lack quantifiable adaptation targets.
The Tonga Agriculture Sector Plan 2016–2020 describes climate change as
the single biggest factor that shapes Tonga’s agriculture and ability to be selfreliant.368 The plan therefore stresses the need to incorporate climate change
adaptation and disaster risk reduction into agriculture sector planning. It also
provides for an updated hydrogeological study to assess water availability.

G. Disaster Risk Management
The Joint National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation and Disaster Risk
Management 2010–2015 articulates six priority goals:
(i)

improving governance for climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management;
(ii) enhancing technical knowledge, information, education, and
understanding of climate change adaptation and disaster risk
management;
(iii) analyzing and assessing vulnerability to climate change impacts and
disaster risks;
(iv) enhancing community preparedness and resilience to impacts of disasters;
(v) providing reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy; and
(vi) cultivating collaboration with civil societies, government agencies,
nongovernment organizations, and the private sector.369
368

369

Government of Tonga, Ministry of Agriculture, Food, Forestry and Fisheries. 2016. Tonga
Agriculture Sector Plan 2016–2020. Nuku'alofa. p. 16.
Footnote 359, pp. 40−42.
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XIII. Tuvalu
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
Tuvalu, a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy, is a group
of nine small, low-lying islands facing a range of severe climate impacts. Climate
threats include sea level rise, flooding, unpredictable rainfall, ocean acidification,
coral bleaching, and more intense cyclones.370 Saltwater intrusion is decreasing
fruit tree yields and destroying crops, thus reducing agricultural productivity.371
Extreme weather events are increasingly damaging productive land and property.372
Tuvalu has had to import fresh water and create emergency desalination plants
to increase water security in the face of drought.373 The sea level has increased by
5 millimeters (mm) annually since 1993.374 All nine islands in Tuvalu are less than
5 meters (m) above mean sea level, with an average elevation of only 1.83 m.375
Tuvalu therefore faces extreme risk from tropical cyclones, tsunamis, and sea level
rise and related impacts such as flooding.
The fact that Tuvalu is the fourth-smallest nation in the world—and extremely
reliant on foreign aid—exacerbates its climate vulnerability (footnote 374).

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Tuvalu submitted its first nationally determined contribution
(NDC) on 22 April 2016. It pledges a 100% GHG emissions reduction in the
electricity sector by 2025, and a 60% reduction in emissions from the entire energy
sector by 2025 compared with 2010 levels.376 Further GHG emissions reductions
from the agriculture and waste sectors are conditional on technological and
financial support (footnote 376).
Tuvalu’s NDC also sets energy-related targets, such as (i) increasing energy
efficiency by 30% on Funafuti, an atoll and the capital; and (ii) generating 100% of
electricity from renewable sources by 2020.377

370

371
372
373
374

375

376
377

Pacific-Australia Climate Change Science and Adaptation Planning Program partners. 2015.
Current and Future Climate of Tuvalu. p. 2, 5–6.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Climate Change Adaptation. Tuvalu.
Footnote 370, p. 2.
BBC. 2011. Tuvalu Declares Emergency over Water Shortage. 3 October.
UNDP, Climate Change Adaptation. 2017. Government of Tuvalu Launches New Coastal
Protection Project to Bolster Resilience to Climate Change. News release. 8 July.
Footnote 374; and Government of Tuvalu. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contributions.
Funafuti. p. 4.
Government of Tuvalu. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contributions. Funafuti. p. 1.
Footnote 376, p. 6.
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2. Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy
Tuvalu’s climate change laws and policies set some of the most ambitious targets
and commitments in the Pacific. The Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and
Environment is the main government entity responsible for climate change.
Under the ministry is the Department of Environment, which directs the Climate
Change Unit. The Prime Minister also launched the National Advisory Council on
Climate Change in 2014 to create a coordinated climate response.378
The two main documents that drive climate change policy in Tuvalu are (i) Te Kaniva:
Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012 (Climate Change Policy), and (ii) Tuvalu National
Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management 2012−2016.
The Climate Change Policy provides a 10-year plan for climate and disaster
risk response and sets seven thematic goals.379 These thematic goals include
increasing renewable energy opportunities, enhancing Tuvalu’s institutional
climate framework, and strengthening adaptation responses (e.g., by conducting
crop studies and managing marine areas).380 The Climate Change Policy also
discusses long-term security given the threat posed by territorial loss, and
recommends establishing a special visa category for climate migrants.381
Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk
Management 2012−2016 also addresses the country’s security in the context of
the existential threat climate change poses.382 The plan aims to predict where
forced migration may occur, conduct a feasibility study on relocation costs, and
develop a climate change migration and resettlement plan for Tuvalu’s nine
islands.383 The plan also sets the same seven goals as the Climate Change Policy:
(i)

strengthening adaptation actions to address current and future
vulnerabilities;
(ii) improving the understanding and application of climate change
data, information and site-specific impacts assessment to inform
adaptation and disaster risk reduction programs;
(iii) enhancing Tuvalu’s governance arrangements and capacity to access
and manage climate change and disaster risk management finances;
(iv) developing and maintaining Tuvalu’s infrastructure to withstand
climate change impacts, climate variability, disaster risks and climate
change projection;
378

379

380
381
382

383

M. Nachmany et al. 2015. Climate Change Legislation in Tuvalu: An Excerpt from The 2015 Global
Climate Legislation Study (A Review of Climate Change Legislation in 99 Countries). London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment. p. 3.
Government of Tuvalu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour.
2012. Te Kaniva: Tuvalu Climate Change Policy 2012. Funafuti. p. 6.
Footnote 379, pp. 4, 13–14, 17–18, and 21−22.
Footnote 379, pp. 25−26.
Government of Tuvalu, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour.
2012. Tuvalu National Strategic Action Plan for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management
2012−2016. Funafuti. p. 33.
Footnote 382, p. 53.
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(v) ensuring energy security and a low carbon future for Tuvalu;
(vi) planning for effective disaster preparedness, response, and recovery; and
(vii) guaranteeing the security of the people of Tuvalu from the impacts of
climate change, as well as the maintenance of national sovereignty.384
In 2015, the government passed the Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund
Act to finance recovery and rehabilitation. The act sets two major objectives: (i) to
provide immediate vital services to citizens in combating the devastating impacts
of climate change and natural disasters; and (ii) to enable the government and
citizens to respond to climate change impacts and disasters in a coordinated,
effective, and timely manner.385 The government committed $2 million out of its
2017 national budget for the fund, primarily for the development of the fund’s
investment policy, operational framework, and payout policy.386
Tuvalu has also integrated climate concerns into its sustainable development
strategy. Te Kakeega III: National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2016
to 2020 dedicates its first chapter to climate change.387 The strategy recognizes
climate risk and adaptation costs.
Table 6.15 summarizes Tuvalu’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Tuvalu is heavily reliant on fossil fuels to meet its electricity and transport
needs.388 It has eight power stations, all powered by diesel-based generations.389
However, the government is committed to increasing renewable energy use and
sourcing 100% of its electricity from renewable energy by 2020 (footnote 377).
Ninety-five percent of the renewable energy will come from solar and the
remaining 5% from biodiesel (footnote 378).

1. Sector-Wide Energy Strategies
The Tuvalu National Energy Policy sets the country’s energy strategy. The policy,
launched in 2009, is governed by the vision of attaining “a prosperous living
standard that is fostered through an energy policy that promotes the provision
of socially, financially, economically, technically, politically and environmentally
sustainable energy systems.” 390
384
385
386

387

388
389
390

Footnote 382, p. 9.
Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund Act 2015, sec. 7.
Government of Tuvalu. 2016. Government of Tuvalu 2017 National Budget. Funafuti. pp. 3, 5, 7, 14,
47 and 50–51. An initial $5 million was set aside in 2016 for the establishment of the fund.
Government of Tuvalu. 2016. Te Kakeega III: National Strategy for Sustainable Development 2016 to
2020. Funafuti.
Footnote 376, p. 5.
Footnote 376, p. 8.
Government of Tuvalu, Ministry of Public Utilities and Industries. 2009. Tuvalu National Energy
Policy. Funafuti. p. 6.
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Table 6.15: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Tuvalu
The Constitution of Tuvalu, 1986
Te Kakeega III: National Strategy for Sustainable
Development 2016−2020, 2016
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

Te Kaniva: Tuvalu Climate
Change Policy, 2012
Tuvalu National Strategic Action
Plan for Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Management
2012−2016, 2012

Climate Change and Disaster
Survival Fund Act 2015

Energy

Tuvalu National Energy Policy,
2009

Energy Efficiency Act 2016
Tuvalu Seabed Minerals Act
2014

Water resources
and coastal zone
management
Disaster risk
management

National Action Plan to
Combat Land Degradation
and Drought, 2006

National Disaster
Management Act 2007

Other

Te Kakeega II: National Strategy
for Sustainable Development
2005–2015, 2005

Environment Protection Act
2008

NDC = nationally determined contribution.
Source: Authors.

The energy policy’s three principal considerations are supply, utilization, and the
environment.391 Its seven major areas are (i) energy sector planning, coordination,
and management; (ii) petroleum; (iii) transport; (iv) electricity; (v) renewable energy;
(vi) energy conservation and efficiency; and (vii) environment.392 The policy seeks to
establish climate change mitigation projects, including renewable energy development.
Besides the 100% renewable electricity commitment by 2020, the policy’s other
renewable energy targets include
(i)
(ii)
391
392

implementing affordable technology in urban and rural areas;
developing knowledge on renewable sources;

Footnote 390, p. 9.
Footnote 390, pp. 14–16.
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(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)

maintaining efficient use of renewable energy resources;
developing expertise in renewable energy installation and management;
building partnerships with those in renewable energy fields; and
preparing an implementation plan for developing renewable energy
technologies by 2020.393

D. Energy Demand
Tuvalu is expected to experience increasing energy demand—likely 3%–4% over
the next 10 years—from growth in the transport and electricity sectors.394 The
government has made efforts to increase energy efficiency. The Energy Efficiency
Act 2016 was passed to promote energy efficiency and conservation, and support
Tuvalu in meeting its first NDC energy efficiency target.
The act authorizes the government to set minimum energy performance and
labeling standards for electrical appliances and other energy-related products.395
Any electrical appliance or product that does not comply with the standards
is prohibited from being imported.396 It also establishes a registry of inefficient
electrical appliances to regulate their importation, use, and sale.397 The act further
provides that noncompliance may result in fines or imprisonment.398
In 1990, the Tuvalu Electricity Corporation was transformed from a government
division into a 100% state-owned corporation with exclusive rights to supply
electricity throughout the country (footnote 394). In 2013, the Renewable Energy and
Energy Efficiency Unit was established within the Tuvalu Electricity Corporation to
(i) help Tuvalu reduce dependence on imported diesel, (ii) reduce carbon emissions,
(iii) improve the efficiency of power generation and supply, and (iv) support the
development of infrastructure for solar and wind power (footnote 394).

E.

Disaster Risk Management

The National Disaster Management Act 2007 establishes the National Disaster
Committee to (i) advise the minister responsible for disaster management on
disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery; and (ii) coordinate all
government and nongovernment responses to disasters.399
In 2012, Tuvalu implemented the National Strategic Action Plan for Climate
Change and Disaster Risk Management 2012–2016, which recommends
establishing the National Strategic Action Plan Coordinating Committee.400
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400

Footnote 390, p. 23.
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2013. Tuvalu (2012). 11 October.
Energy Efficiency Act, secs. 10–11.
Footnote 395, sec. 11(1).
Footnote 395, secs. 17–29.
Footnote 395, sec. 35.
National Disaster Management Act 2017, secs. 7, 8(a), and 8(b).
Footnote 382, p. 10.
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The government passed the Climate Change and Disaster Survival Fund Act
in 2015 to establish a fund to finance recovery and rehabilitation. International
funds and grants channel through the fund. The government may use the fund to
provide emergency relief and enhance climate change resilience.

XIV. Vanuatu
A. Country Snapshot: Climate and Environmental Challenges
The Republic of Vanuatu, a unitary parliamentary republic, is a small island nation in
the western Pacific Ocean. With a population of about 298,000, it is an archipelago
of over 80 islands.401 It is extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change,
specifically the increasing frequency of cyclones and flash floods as well as sea
level rise.402 For example, in 2015, Cyclone Pam destroyed 96% of food crops,
affected 64.1% of the national economy, and caused a loss of $449.4 million.403
Climate change will increase the severity and frequency of these weather events,
threatening human lives, societies, food security, livelihoods, biodiversity, and
infrastructure.404 In addition, the country’s major food stocks—marine fisheries—
are threatened by ocean warming and acidification.405

B. Overarching Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework
1. Mitigation and Adaptation Targets
The Government of Vanuatu submitted its first NDC on 21 September 2016,
committing to reduce its GHG emissions by 30% below business as usual (BAU)
emissions from its entire energy sector.406 Vanuatu also endeavors to generate
100% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2030, depending on receipt
of financial and technical support (footnote 406). Although the NDC does not
set out quantifiable or specific adaptation requirements, it notes that adaptation
is a top priority in its national response to climate change. It also establishes
the National Advisory Board for Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction
and indicates the government’s intention to pursue REDD+ projects to reduce
deforestation.407
401
402

403

404
405

406
407

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The World Factbook: Vanuatu (accessed 16 October 2020).
Government of Vanuatu, National Advisory Committee on Climate Change. 2007. National
Adaptation Programme for Action (NAPA). Port Vila. pp. 16–17.
United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2015. South Pacific—Tropical
Cyclone Pam. Fact Sheet #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2015; and Government of Vanuatu. 2015. Vanuatu
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: Tropical Cyclone Pam. p. ix.
Footnote 402, pp. 3, 7, 14, 16–17, 23, and 33.
United Nations. The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Vanuatu to the United Nations:
Climate Change.
Government of Vanuatu. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Port Vila. p. 4.
Footnote 406, pp. 3–4.
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2.

Overview of Climate Change Law and Policy

Vanuatu ratified the Paris Agreement with the Paris Agreement (Ratification) Act
in 2016. It has demonstrated a commitment to climate action by promulgating
two major climate policies: (i) the Vanuatu Framework for Climate Services, and
(ii) the National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement
(National Climate Change Policy).
The Vanuatu Framework for Climate Services serves as a basis for developing
climate change adaptation strategies based on sustainable and accessible
climate services.408 The term “climate services” refers to the “provision of climate
information in a way that assists end-user decision-making,” requiring ongoing
stakeholder engagement, access to information, and responsiveness to user
needs.409 The framework aims to make climate information more accessible and
useful by developing (i) mobile phone applications for a climate early warning
system, and (ii) a climate communications strategy and action plan.410
The framework is consistent with the Vanuatu National Adaptation Programme
for Action, the Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy
2016–2030, Vanuatu 2030 (the national sustainable development plan), and
the Pacific Islands Meteorology Strategy.411 It also includes a climate services road
map, which offers prioritization, time frames, and indicative costs associated with
the recommendations.412
In 2018, the government launched the National Climate Change Policy, which
specifically manages displacement.413 Displacement occurs when “individuals and
communities are obliged to move, either temporarily or permanently, because
they are no longer able to reside on the land on which they live or lose access to
land and natural resources upon which their livelihoods depend.” 414 The policy
aims to minimize the drivers of displacement, better understand and consider the
population’s needs and wishes, and promote access to disaster-resilient housing.
The policy promotes (i) sustainable return and reintegration at the place of origin,
(ii) sustainable local integration in areas where displaced persons have taken

408

409
410
411

412
413

414

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme. 2016. Vanuatu Framework for
Climate Services. The framework was prepared in consultation with the Government of Vanuatu,
Vanuatu Meteorology and Geo-Hazard Department.
Footnote 408, p. 12.
Footnote 408, p. 8.
Footnote 402; footnote 408, p. 9; Government of Vanuatu. 2015. Vanuatu Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016–2030. Port Vila; Government of Vanuatu, Department of
Strategic Policy, Planning and Aid Coordination. 2016. Vanuatu 2030: The People’s Plan (National
Sustainable Development Plan 2016 to 2030). Port Vila; and Secretariat of the Pacific Regional
Environment Programme et al. 2017. Pacific Islands Meteorology Strategy (PIMS) 2017–2026. Apia.
Footnote 408, p. 44–46.
Government of Vanuatu. 2018. National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced
Displacement. Port Vila.
Footnote 413, p. 9.
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refuge, and (iii) sustainable integration in another part of the country.415 The
government will identify a lead ministry to implement the policy.416
Vanuatu’s other climate change-related legal and policy frameworks focus
principally on adaptation and transitioning to renewable energy. For example,
Vanuatu promulgated the National Green Energy Fund Act (No. 10 of 2018),
which aims to create a fund to support the Updated National Energy Road Map
2016–2030 and the development of renewable energy sources.417
With respect to adaptation, Vanuatu passed the Meteorology, Geological Hazards
and Climate Change Act (No. 25 of 2016), which aims to provide high-quality
forecasting of weather, flood, and climate to improve information dissemination
and increase capacity to respond to extreme weather events.418 The act also
established the National Advisory Board on Climate Change and Disaster Risk
Reduction to oversee this initiative.419
Table 6.16 summarizes Vanuatu’s climate change legal and policy framework.

C. Energy Supply
Like other Pacific island countries, Vanuatu faces significant hurdles in providing
electricity to a small population dispersed across 83 islands.420 In 2018, only a
third of Vanuatu’s population had access to electricity.421 Electrification rates vary
significantly between urban (80%) and rural households (17%).422 Vanuatu plans
to increase electrification to 75% by 2020, with renewables supplying 65% of the
total energy share (footnote 421).
Low electrification rates have made Vanuatu highly dependent on imported fossil
fuels.423 Fossil fuels mainly support urban electricity and transport needs, while
biomass is used mainly for rural cooking. In 2012, diesel oil accounted for 63.3%
of all imported fuel, and generated over 80% of all electricity (footnote 423).
In 2015, nearly all poor households in Port Vila used wood and coconut shells
as their primary fuel for cooking, while higher-income households used gas and
electricity.424
415
416
417

418
419
420

421
422

423
424

Footnote 413, p. 16.
Footnote 413, p. 22.
National Green Energy Fund Act (No. 10 of 2018), secs. 2 and 3(1); and Government of Vanuatu,
Department of Energy. 2016. Updated Vanuatu National Energy Road Map 2016–2030. Port Vila.
Meteorology, Geological Hazards and Climate Change Act (No. 25 of 2016), sec. 2.
Footnote 418, sec. 7.
World Bank. 2017. Vanuatu Rural Electrification Program Benefits Remote Communities. News
release. 22 May.
ADB. 2018. Pacific Energy Update 2018. Manila. p. 15.
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). 2015. Vanuatu Renewables Readiness Assessment.
Abu Dhabi. p. xi.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2015. Rural Electrification in Vanuatu. p. 22.
Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS). 2015. Vanuatu Tropical Cyclone. Briefing Note.
15 March. pp. 3–4.
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Table 6.16: Climate Change Legal and Policy Framework of Vanuatu
The Constitution of the Republic of Vanuatu, 1979
Vanuatu 2030: The People’s Plan (National Sustainable
Development Plan 2016–2030), 2016
Priorities and Action Agenda 2006–2015, 2006 (revised 2013)
National Sustainability Development Strategy 2005−2025,
2005 (revised 2009)
Paris Agreement First NDC, 2016 (submitted)

Area

Policies and Strategies

Acts

Climate change

National Policy on Climate
Change and DisasterInduced Displacement,
2018
Vanuatu Framework for
Climate Services, 2016
National Adaptation
Programme for Action
(NAPA), 2007

Paris Agreement
(Ratification) Act
(No. 9 of 2016)
Environmental
Management and
Conservation Act
(No. 12 of 2002)
(consolidated 2004)
Environmental
Management and
Conservation
(Amendment) Act
(No. 28 of 2010)
Framework Convention
on Climate Change
(Ratification) Act
(No. 24 of 1992)
(consolidated 2006)

Energy

Updated Vanuatu National
Energy Road Map
2016–2030, 2016
Vanuatu National Energy
Road Map 2013–2020,
2013

National Green Energy
Fund Act (No. 10 of
2018)

Non-Legislative
Instruments

continued on next page
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Table 6.16 continued

Area

Policies and Strategies

Forestry Act (No. 26 of 2001)
(consolidated 2006)
Forestry Rights Registration
and Timber Harvest
Guarantee Act (No. 28
of 2000)

LULUCF and
REDD+

Disaster risk
management

Acts

Vanuatu Climate Change
and Disaster Risk
Reduction Policy
2016−2030, 2015

Forestry Regulations,
(Order No. 46 of 2003
and Order No. 41 of
2004)

Meteorology, Geological
Hazards and Climate
Change Act (No. 25 of
2016), 2017
Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulations,
(Order No. 175 of 2011)
Environmental Impact
Assessment Regulations
(Amendment),
(Order No. 102 of 2012)

Environmental
impact
assessment

Other

Non-Legislative
Instruments

Ozone Layer Protection
Act (No. 27 of 2010)
Ozone Layer Protection
(Amendment) Act
(No. 4 of 2014)
Pollution (Control) Act
(No. 10 of 2013)
Statute of the International
Renewable Energy
Agency (IRENA)
(Ratification) Act
(No. 15 of 2012)
Convention on Biological
Diversity (Ratification)
Act (No. 23 of 1992)

Ozone Layer Protection
(Fees and Penalty
Notice) Regulations,
(Order No. 100 of 2011)

LULUCF = land use, land-use change, and forestry; NDC = nationally determined contribution; REDD+ = reducing emissions from
deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement
of forest carbon stocks.
Source: Authors.
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High costs of imported fuel have undermined government efforts to meet
its sustainable development goals.425 Since some urban and rural households
remain without electricity, improving electricity access is a government priority
(footnote 425). Vanuatu has national renewable energy sources such as hydro,
solar, biomass, wave, wind, coconut biofuel, and geothermal (footnote 425).
Tapping into these renewable energy sources could help Vanuatu transition from
its dependence on imported fossil fuels.

1. Renewable Energy Policies
In the electricity sector, Vanuatu’s first NDC has set a target of generating 100%
of electricity using renewable sources by 2030, subject to receipt of financial
and technical support (footnote 406). The NDC also aims to reduce emissions
for the entire energy sector by 30%, compared with a BAU projection, by
2030 (footnote 406). These mitigation goals are to be achieved by doubling
installed wind capacity by 2025, establishing a solar-connected grid by 2025,
and substituting fossil fuels with coconut oil-based electricity generation
(footnote 406). However, these targets are contingent on Vanuatu receiving
significant external funding of $180 million (footnote 406).
Beyond its NDC commitments, Vanuatu set out its National Energy Road Map
2013–2020 (Energy Road Map) in 2013.426 Published by the Department of
Energy with assistance from the Australian government and the World Bank,
the Energy Road Map offers a long-term development plan to reduce reliance
on imported petroleum fuel in the energy sector and promote renewable
energy. The following five energy sector priorities have quantitative targets and
associated strategic directions for action:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

access to secure and affordable electricity for all citizens by 2030;
reliable and affordable petroleum supply throughout Vanuatu;
more affordable energy services in Vanuatu;
an energy secure Vanuatu; and
climate change mitigation through renewable energy and energy
efficiency.427

The Energy Road Map directly responds to the energy sector’s highest priority
objectives from a national development perspective. It seeks to work through the
challenges Vanuatu has faced, including price volatility in the fossil fuel market
and limited government capacity to develop an energy management framework.
Developments in 2015–2016 prompted the government to prepare the Updated
Vanuatu National Energy Road Map 2016–2030.428 Cyclone Pam demonstrated
425
426
427
428

Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP). 2013. Vanuatu (2012). 11 October.
Government of Vanuatu. 2013. Vanuatu National Energy Road Map 2013–2020. Port Vila.
Footnote 426, pp. 5–6.
Government of Vanuatu, Department of Energy. 2016. Updated Vanuatu National Energy Road
Map 2016–2030. Port Vila.
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the importance of having a resilient and reliable energy infrastructure.
The government believed it important that the Energy Road Map reflect
commitments contained in its first NDC, the Vanuatu Infrastructure Strategic
Investment Plan 2015–2024, the Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk
Reduction Strategy 2016–2030, and Vanuatu’s national sustainable development
plan (Vanuatu 2030: The People’s Plan).429 The Updated Vanuatu National
Energy Road Map 2016–2030 focuses on five revised priorities: “accessible
energy, affordable energy, secure and reliable energy, sustainable energy, and
green growth.”430
In 2018, the National Green Energy Fund Act (No. 10 of 2018) was passed to
finance the road map’s implementation.

D. LULUCF and REDD+
In 2000, Vanuatu passed the Forestry Rights Registration and Timber Harvest
Guarantee Act (No. 28 of 2000) to oversee the leasing of forestry rights,
including carbon sequestration rights.
The first NDC advances Vanuatu’s forest management efforts by prioritizing
REDD+ projects to reduce deforestation and implement sustainable land
management practices as part of the country’s mitigation strategy.

E.

Adaptation

As a small island nation vulnerable to sea level rise, Vanuatu recognizes
adaptation as its top climate change priority. Vanuatu’s five main adaptation
priorities are (i) agriculture and food security, (ii) sustainable tourism
development, (iii) community-based marine resources management,
(iv) sustainable forest management, and (v) integrated water resource
management.431 Adequate adaptation would cost 1.5% of Vanuatu’s gross
domestic product annually.432 The government has requested assistance from
the Least Developed Countries Fund to finance adaptation measures aimed at
supporting agriculture and food security as well as integrated water resource
management (footnote 432).

429

430
431
432

Footnote 428, pp. 12–13; Government of Vanuatu, Department of Strategic Policy, Planning
and Aid Coordination. 2015. Vanuatu Infrastructure Strategic Investment Plan 2015–2024. Port
Vila; Government of Vanuatu. 2015. Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy
2016–2030. Port Vila; and Government of Vanuatu, Department of Strategic Policy, Planning and
Aid Coordination. 2016. Vanuatu 2030: The People’s Plan (National Sustainable Development Plan
2016 to 2030). Port Vila.
Footnote 428, p. 3.
Footnote 406, p. 2.
Footnote 406, p. 6.
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The draft National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based
Resources 2012–2022 identifies more than 500 adaptation measures across the
water, livestock, forestry, agriculture, and environment sectors.433

F.

Disaster Risk Management

In 2012, the government established the National Advisory Board on Climate
Change and Disaster Risk Reduction.434 The government also conducted a risk
assessment of the national capacity for climate change and disaster governance,
and incorporated the results of the assessment into the Climate Change and
Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016–2030 (footnote 434).
The policy, focusing on strategic development, aims to make Vanuatu “a resilient
community, environment and economy.”435 The policy identifies six strategic
priorities, categorized into themes that “include climate change adaptation and
disaster risk reduction, low carbon development, and response and recovery.”436
Six principles underpin policy implementation: accountability, sustainability,
equity, community focus, collaboration, and innovation (footnote 434).
In 2016, the government passed the Meteorology, Geological Hazards and
Climate Change Act, which focuses on ensuring high-quality forecasting services
for weather, climate, floods, and geological hazards (footnote 418). It also
requires any person mandated to implement the act to apply the precautionary
principle when fulfilling their responsibilities or exercising their powers.437
Thus, lack of scientific certainty about impacts should not prevent parties from
making decisions to respond or take action to minimize potential adverse risks
or effects.438 Under this law, the National Advisory Board on Climate Change
and Disaster Risk Reduction is charged with providing advice for all disaster
risk reduction and climate change projects in Vanuatu, and establishing climate
change or disaster risk management financing mechanisms.439
The 2018 National Climate Change Policy outlines durable solutions for ensuring
that displaced people in Vanuatu are resilient and have equal opportunities in
Vanuatu’s security, wealth, and prosperity. The policy also envisions “an inclusive
and equitable nation in which no one is left behind.” 440

433

434

435
436
437
438
439
440

Government of Vanuatu. 2011. National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Land-Based
Resources (2012–2022): Second Draft. Port Vila.
Government of Vanuatu. 2015. Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy
2016–2030. Port Vila. p. 1.
Footnote 434, p. 2.
Footnote 434, p. 8.
Footnote 418, sec. 3(1).
Footnote 418, sec. 3(2).
Footnote 418, secs. 9(1)(a) and 10(2)(d).
Footnote 413, p. 17.
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Various principles guide the implementation of the climate change policy,
including respect for customs, human rights and dignity, voluntary and informed
choices, gender equity and responsiveness, environmental and ecological
sustainability, freedom of movement, and protection of traditional knowledge
(footnote 440). The policy identifies the need for community consultation
when working toward durable solutions, including with displaced and host
communities—“guided by principles specific to the displacement context in
Vanuatu, identified through consultation with communities, government and
nongovernment stakeholders.”441

441

Footnote 413, p. 17–18.

Photo by Carlo Navarro/ADB.

Neighbors working together to pull in
a fishing net in Gentuma Raya, Indonesia.
Climate action will take a village, a people, and
a global community (photo by Eric Sales/ADB).

PART SEVEN

CONCLUSION

A

ddressing climate change at Abu Dhabi Climate Meeting in 2019, United
Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres said: “We are in a
battle for our lives. But it is a battle we can win.” 1 Climate change manifests
the interconnectedness of life on Earth, and to reduce its effects, collective
responsibility and action of all countries is crucial. Climate change is not a future
problem; it is happening, and we must act now.
Avoiding the worst effects of climate change requires countries to develop
resilient and low-carbon economies, supported by strong and cohesive national
legal frameworks and informed judiciaries.2 It requires unprecedented levels
of global collaboration, which can only occur if there is certainty about the
destination we are headed for, and if we all commit to getting there.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and the Paris Agreement capture the current international consensus on climate
change.3 Climate science, synthesized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, grounds and guides both treaties. The international legal framework on
climate change stresses the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5ºC—the
ideal destination—but not more than 2ºC above preindustrial temperatures.4
(Report Four provides further information about the international climate change
legal frameworks.)
Without coherent national legal frameworks that enable climate-responsive
economies, climate action is unattainable. National legal frameworks ground
international agreements and principles. Laws and policies operationalize
the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted under the
Paris Agreement and support wider and integrated climate action from different
sectors of society.
Climate change is fueling litigation, and litigation is shaping national responses.

1

2

3

4

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 2019. Guterres:
Climate Action Is a “Battle for Our Lives.” News. 1 July.
M. Nachmany et al. 2017. Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation. London:
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, No. 30822; and Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations
Treaty Series, No. 54113.
Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113. Art. 2(1)(a).
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Citizens are suing their governments over slow or weak climate action, and private
entities over climate risk. The growing trend of climate litigation in Asia and the
Pacific inspired the theme of this report series—Climate Change, Coming Soon
to a Court Near You. ADB is working with judges in the region to support them
in the face of inevitable climate litigation.5 Given the growing number of climate
cases, judges need good quality information about regional legal and policy
frameworks—the purpose of this report.
Judges are central to interpreting laws, moderating executive action, and
safeguarding rights. Their focus on the rule of law and legal ethics and principles
helps bridge the gap between international and national legal frameworks.
In many jurisdictions across Asia and the Pacific, judiciaries are institutions
that can help shape, craft, and improve law and policy, and influence reforms
where needed. Such powers, therefore, make courts an essential component of
domestic climate governance in the region.

I. Key Takeaways
A. National Climate Change Laws and Policies
Reveal Likely Future Litigation Trends
Part Two of this report outlines some key trends observed during the review of
climate laws and policies across Asia and the Pacific. The discussion does not
assess the sufficiency of any particular legal and policy framework. Instead, it
identifies general trends and limitations in laws and policies across the region.
Minding these characteristics and gaps is relevant. Litigants will exploit available
laws and policies or vulnerabilities in future climate lawsuits.
National laws and policies are pivotal for driving and supporting the objectives of
international climate change law. But national legal frameworks are also responding
to global shifts and the pressure of climate litigation. Hence, climate change legal and
policy responses—global and national—and climate litigation are mutually reinforcing.
The cross-cutting nature of climate change presents new challenges for law and
policy makers. Effective responses require sector implementation guided by
national goals. Of the 32 countries surveyed for this report, 24 (75%) typically
use climate policies, action plans, and existing laws to drive national action.6 They
5

6

Report One in this series covers climate science, Report Two looks at climate litigation trends
in Asia and the Pacific and beyond, and Report Four details the international climate change
legal regime.
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, India, Kiribati, Malaysia,
Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Palau, the People’s Republic of China
(PRC), Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, and
Viet Nam do not yet have a framework climate change law, but regulate national climate
responses with a combination of national policies and plans and updates to existing legislation.
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do not have a dedicated, economy-wide climate law—framework legislation—to
guide and ground the national legal and policy structure.
Framework legislation is useful for building a cohesive, whole-of-government
approach to climate regulation. Overarching framework legislation can identify
national institutional arrangements for sectoral action, climate finance, data
sharing, and reporting. Unified climate responses are particularly important over
the next 5–10 years because countries must intensify their climate action. The
Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework also has additional reporting
requirements for low- to middle-income countries.7 As of August 2020, eight of 32
countries (25%) surveyed for this report have adopted a dedicated framework law.8

B. Constitutional Rights Litigation Is Growing—Information
about Constitutional Rights Is Valuable
Claimants across Asia have built climate cases on constitutional rights,
especially the rights to life and environment. The trend in rights-based litigation
reflects a growing global trend for claimants to sue over infringements of their
constitutional or human rights.9
Given the growing popularity of rights-based litigation, it is beneficial for judges to
have access to information about relevant constitutional rights embedded in their
national and equivalent constitutions in the region. Part Three contains summary
tables showing constitutional rights across Asia and the Pacific.

C. Climate Change Legal and Policy Frameworks
Can Be Fragmented
Sector regulation of climate change—a national and cross-cutting issue—can make
it tough to understand how climate change legal and policy frameworks fit together
and function. Meaning is lost in a maze of frequently updated statutes and policies.
Resource constraints in some jurisdictions in Asia and the Pacific can result
in ad hoc printing of statutes and policies and restrict online publishing. Such
occurrences mean that judges, legal practitioners, and international donors
7

8

9

For more information about the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework, see
S. Barakat et al. 2017. A Guide to Transparency under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement.
London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
The Federated States of Micronesia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR),
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu have a framework climate
change law. Fiji and Nepal have drafted framework climate change laws, which are sitting as bills
in their parliaments. Bangladesh has legislatively created a climate change trust fund. Singapore
has a carbon pricing law.
Outside the United States, rights-based lawsuits constitute around 35% of all climate litigation
against governments. See “The Rights Turn in Climate Litigation,” YouTube video, 43:47, from
a presentation given by César Rodríguez-Garavito at the World Commission on Environmental
Law Webinar 4: Climate Change in the Courts on 5 June 2020.
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cannot access a complete or current picture of a country’s climate change
legal and policy framework. Therefore, Parts Four, Five, and Six of this report
summarize the legal and policy frameworks regulating climate change in
32 countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific, including the PRC.

II. Looking Forward
A. ADB and Judiciaries
ADB has been working with judiciaries in Asia and the Pacific since 2010. Climate
change regulation is evolving fast, making it increasingly challenging for judges to
access current and comprehensive material on climate change.
This report seeks to support judiciaries in dealing with climate change and
advancing sustainable development by providing much-needed information for
deciding climate change cases. However, climate laws and policies evolve, so ADB
encourages judges, decision-makers, and lawyers to access current information
on national climate laws and policies from the following databases:









Climate Change Laws of the World, see https://climate-laws.org/.
ECOLEX, see https://www.ecolex.org/.
FAOLEX Database, see http://www.fao.org/faolex/country-profiles/en/.
Pacific Islands Legal Information Institute (PacLii) Databases, see
http://www.paclii.org/.
Asian Judges Network on Environment, see http://www.ajne.org/.
Global Judicial Portal on Environmental Law, see https://judicial-portal.edw.ro/.
United Nations Information Portal on Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (InforMEA), see https://www.informea.org/.

B. COVID-19 Is Slowing International and
National Climate Commitments
The year 2020 will be remembered for the health and financial crisis launched by
the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. As of 26 November 2020,
infections in Asia and the Pacific had reached almost 11.4 million, with around 177,600
deaths.10 COVID-19 had killed around 1,405,000 people globally (footnote 10).
The COVID-19 crisis is slowing global climate action at a time when it is most
critical. The 26th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (COP 26) was postponed to 2021. COP 26 is
10

World Health Organization (WHO). WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard
(accessed 26 November 2020). Countries from Asia and the Pacific fall within the WHO
Southeast Asia and Western Pacific regions.
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critical because countries must still agree on standardized reporting requirements
and time frames, increasing the ambition of country pledges, and mechanisms for
cooperating on climate goals (market-based and non-trade).11
The UN climate change conferences are vital because they bring people together and
scrutinize climate action globally. No COP 26 in 2020 makes it easier for countries to
deprioritize climate in their post-COVID economic recovery plans or to delay submitting
their second NDCs.12 As of 26 November 2020, two states had submitted their second
NDCs to the UNFCCC, while 15 states had submitted their updated NDCs.13
The COVID-19 crisis has slowed the passage of climate laws and policies. As of
26 November 2020, 17 laws and 44 executive instruments (including policies)
had been passed, a slowdown compared with previous years.14 This downturn
is unsurprising, given that lawmakers around the world have refocused their
legislative priorities on COVID-19. Legislators have, understandably, shifted their
focus to health and economic crisis management. Additionally, the practical
impacts of COVID-19 include restricted parliamentary processes and increased
use of online portals to deliver various executive functions.15 Across Asia and the
Pacific, this meant that many government employees worked remotely, where
possible, including those central to climate action.

C. But We Have a Choice to Build New Social Contracts
Throughout 2020, many governments shut down economies and imposed
curfews to flatten the curve of COVID-19 infections and deaths. The new normal
paradigm created by COVID-19 restricted social mobility and changed how we
interact. As road and air traffic lessened, emission and pollution levels dropped,
prompting some to announce the potential climate benefits of 2020.
But global warming has not abated amid the COVID-19 shutdowns.16 Atmospheric
CO2 averaged 409.50 parts per million (ppm) in August 2020 compared with
407.43 ppm in August 2019, and scientists have not yet detected a significant drop
in atmospheric CO2.17
11

12

13

14

15

16

17

For a discussion of the key COP 25 outcomes, see CarbonBrief. 2019. COP 25: Key Outcomes
Agreed at the UN Climate Talks in Madrid. 15 December.
R. Cho. 2020. COVID-19’s Long-Term Effects on Climate Change—For Better or Worse. State of
the Planet. 25 June.
UNFCCC Secretariat. NDC Registry (Interim) (accessed 26 November 2020). The Republic of
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Historically, recoveries from global economic crises have too frequently spurred
greenhouse gas emissions spikes, with governments falling back on fossil fuel
and high emission sectors to reboot economies.18 So, although the COVID-19
crisis, and its associated lockdowns, temporarily reduced emissions, robust
legal and policy frameworks are still needed to build sustainable and resilient
economies. Promising COVID-19 vaccines emerged at the end of 2020, sparking
hope of a return to normal life.19 When economies spring back, it will be critical
for governments and society to prioritize low-carbon and resilient options to
avoid an emissions spike (footnote 18). Such approaches are possible. If there is
a silver lining amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it is that governments and citizens
are willing to go to extraordinary lengths when faced with an extreme crisis, and
climate change has the potential to dwarf the impacts of COVID-19.
In June 2020, the World Economic Forum launched the Great Reset initiative,
aimed at supporting sustainable economic recovery from the COVID-19 crisis.
Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, observed:
The COVID-19 crisis has shown us that our old systems are not fit
anymore for the 21st century. It has laid bare the fundamental lack of
social cohesion, fairness, inclusion, and equality. Now is the historical
moment—the time—not only to fight the virus but to shape the system,
possibly for the post-corona era. We have a choice to remain passive. . .
But we have another choice. We can build a new social contract,
particularly integrating the next generation. We can change our behavior
to be in harmony with nature again. And, we can make sure that the
technologies of the fourth industrial revolution are best utilized to
provide us with better lives. In short, we need a great reset. We have to
mobilize all constituents of our global society to work together. We must
not miss this unique window of opportunity.20

D. Climate Justice and Legal and Policy Frameworks
in the Time of COVID-19 and Beyond
The COVID-19 crisis has also affected courts and climate litigation. Courtrooms
and court registries experienced closures, delaying new filings, especially in
regions without online registries. Trials usually require personal appearance in the
courtroom. Courts are, therefore, trying to find new ways of adjudicating in an age
of face masks, social distancing, and online conferencing.

18
19
20

The Economist. 2020. The Epidemic Provides a Chance to Do Good by the Climate. 26 March.
J. Gallagher. 2020. Covid Vaccine Update: When Will One Be Ready? BBC News. 23 November.
“The World Economic Forum: The Great Reset.” Soundcloud podcast, 2:41, speech given by Mr.
Klaus Schwab, Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, at The Great Reset launch on
4 June 2020, posted by World Economic Forum.

CONCLUSION

Climate activists are unlikely to defer litigation indefinitely, especially if emissions
continue to grow and adaptation programs stall. Social media allows activists to
keep the pressure on the governments and coordinate climate lawsuits. Climate
activists will continue to identify weaknesses in national climate action and within
national legal and policy frameworks.21 As discussed in Part Two of this report,
climate litigation is shaping national legal and policy frameworks, meaning that
judges have an important role in holding governments accountable for meeting
their commitments.
Although it is a global fight, climate change can only ever be fought in our
own backyard, making national legal and policy frameworks foundational to
international climate action. The next 5–10 years are critical for reducing global
emissions, so the climate cannot wait for the world to sit out the pandemic before
taking action.
What humanity must do now is figure out how to continue meeting its climate
goals in the 21st century in the “new normal” and during post-COVID-19
economic recovery. The Paris Agreement is built on science and “points the world
in the right direction.” 22 Because it aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050,
which requires significant emissions within the next 10 years, the agreement also
requires its members to improve on their actions and commitments continually.
Countries must now discern how to build climate‑resilient, carbon‑neutral
economies and maintain momentum with their NDCs. Setting transparent
commitments within well-defined legal and policy frameworks is a good start.
Judiciaries in Asia and the Pacific might be of real use to safeguarding momentum
on domestic climate responses. They are the very institution that can clarify
legal and policy frameworks and hold governments accountable for their climate
commitments—a significant contribution to climate justice. Climate litigation
is asking—and will continue to ask—judges to decide whether these national
climate pledges are scientifically plausible and morally sound. To make these
assessments intelligently and effectively, judges require clear information about
their climate change law and policy frameworks, which is why ADB wrote this
report series.
It is time for us to remember that climate change is not something that any of us
can fix in isolation. But we must each play our part and remember:
It’s not about what it is, it’s about what it can become . . .
Unless someone like you cares a whole awful lot,
Nothing is going to get better. It’s not.23

21

22
23

Part Two of this report examines the trends within the national climate change legal and policy
frameworks in the region.
A. Doyle et al. 2015. Factbox: World Reacts to New Climate Accord. Reuters. 13 December.
Dr. Seuss. 1971. The Lorax. New York: Penguin Random House.
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GLOSSARY
The terms presented in the glossary table have been adapted or taken from a number of sources
listed under the Glossary References at the end of this section.
Adaptation

the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and
its effects, in order to moderate harm or exploit beneficial
opportunities in human or natural systems (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2018)

Adaptive capacity

the ability of systems, institutions humans, and other organisms to
adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or
to respond to consequences (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 2018). See also adaptation

Anthropogenic

of, relating to, or resulting from the influence of human beings on
nature (Merriam-Webster anthropogenic)

Biomass

living or recently dead organic material (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change 2018)

Carbon capture
and storage

(or carbon dioxide capture and storage) a process in which a
relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide (CO2) from industrial
and energy-related sources is separated (captured), conditioned,
compressed and transported to a storage location for long-term
isolation from the atmosphere (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change 2018)

Carbon credit

a tradable credit granted to a country, company, etc., for reducing
emissions of CO2 or other greenhouse gases by one metric ton
below a specified quota (Merriam-Webster carbon credit)

Carbon
sequestration

the process of storing carbon in a carbon pool (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2018)

Climate change
litigation

(or climate change case) any case that: (i) raises climate change
as a central issue; (ii) raises climate change as a peripheral issue; or
(iii) does not explicitly raise climate change but has ramifications for
climate change mitigation or adaptation efforts (definition our own)

Climate justice

Climate justice links human rights and development to achieve a
human-centered approach, safeguarding the rights of the most
vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate
change and its impacts equitably and fairly. Climate justice is
informed by science, responds to science and acknowledges the
need for equitable stewardship of the world’s resources. (Mary
Robinson Foundation—Climate Justice Principles of Climate
Justice)
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Climate migration

human settlement patterns in response to changes in the climate
(International Organization for Migration 2008)

Compressed
natural gas (CNG)

a natural gas mainly comprised of methane stored under
high pressures (while remaining in its gaseous form), mainly as
a means to transport it, or as storage for later use as vehicle fuel
(Stenhouse et al. 2018)

Ecosystem services

ecological processes or functions having monetary or nonmonetary value to individuals or society at large. These are
frequently classified as (1) supporting services such as productivity
or biodiversity maintenance, (2) provisioning services such as
food or fibre, (3) regulating services such as climate regulation
or carbon sequestration, and (4) cultural services such as tourism
or spiritual and aesthetic appreciation (Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change 2018)

Environmental
constitutionalism

a relatively recent phenomenon at the confluence of constitutional
law, international law, human rights, and environmental law;
embodies the recognition that the environment is a proper
subject for protection in constitutional texts and for vindication by
constitutional courts worldwide (May and Daly 2017)

Environmental
impact assessment

an examination, analysis and assessment of planned activities with a
view to ensuring environmentally sound and sustainable development
(United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP] 1987)

Environmental
impact statement

a government document that outlines the impact of a proposed
project on its surrounding environment; meant to inform the
work and decisions of policy makers and community leaders
(Middleton 2018)

Fossil fuels

carbon-based fuels from fossil hydrocarbon deposits, including
coal, oil, and natural gas (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change 2018)

Greenhouse gases

those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural
and anthropogenic, that absorb and emit radiation at specific
wavelengths within the spectrum of terrestrial radiation emitted
by the Earth’s surface, the atmosphere itself and by clouds
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018)

Intergenerational
equity

the principle that states that every generation holds the Earth in
common with members of the present generation and with other
generations, past and future (Weiss 2013)

Intergenerational
responsibility

a legal concept which says that every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony of
nature for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology
(Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993)
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Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC)

the United Nations body for assessing the science related to
climate change (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
About the IPCC)

Intragenerational
equity

relates to fairness among the present generation; primarily
concerns the relationship between developed and developing
countries (Shelton 2008)

Kyoto Protocol

entered into force on 16 February 2005, this international treaty
operationalizes the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change by committing industrialized countries to limit
and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions in accordance
with agreed individual targets (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. 2020. What is the Kyoto Protocol?)

Mitigation
(of climate change)

a human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the sinks
of greenhouse gases (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
2018)

Paris Agreement

entered into force on 4 November 2016, this agreement builds
upon the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate
change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well
below 2°C above preindustrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit
the temperature increase even further to 1.5°C (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2020. The Paris
Agreement)

Particulate matter
(PM)

very small solid particles emitted during the combustion of
biomass and fossil fuels. PM may consist of a wide variety of
substances. Of greatest concern for health are particulates of
diameter less than or equal to 10 nanometers, usually designated
as PM10 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Definition
of Terms Used Within the DDC Pages)

Precautionary
principle

where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation
(United Nations 1992)

Public trust
doctrine

a doctrine asserting that the state holds land lying beneath
navigable waters as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of its
citizens (Merriam-Webster public trust doctrine)

Renewable energy

energy from a source that is naturally replenishing but flow-limited,
and is virtually inexhaustible in duration but limited in the amount
of energy that is available per unit of time (US Energy Information
Administration 2019)

293

294

GLOSSARY

Right to a healthy
environment

the interaction between human rights and the environment;
encompasses the environmental dimensions of the rights to
life, health, food, water, sanitation, property, private life, culture, and
non-discrimination, among others (Human Rights Watch 2018)

Sink

a reservoir (natural or human, in soil, ocean, and plants) where a
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas is
stored (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2018)

United Nations
Framework
Convention on
Climate Change

entered into force on 21 March 1994, this international treaty
ultimately aims to prevent “dangerous” human interference with
the climate system (United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. 2020. What is the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change?)

Vulnerable groups
or people

(or vulnerable persons) minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled
people, elderly people, pregnant women, single parents with minor
children, victims of trafficking in human beings, persons with
serious illnesses, persons with mental disorders, persons who
have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of
psychological, physical or sexual violence, and indigenous peoples
(See European Commission vulnerable person)

Waste-to-energy

the conversion of waste into energy in the form of steam,
electricity or hot water; a hygienic method of treating waste that
reduces its volume by about 90% (Confederation of European
Waste-to-Energy Plants What is Waste-to-Energy)
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National Climate Change Legal Frameworks in Asia and the Pacific
Climate Change, Coming Soon to A Court Near You—Report Three

National legal and policy frameworks underpin international climate action because they are the backbone
of domestic responses to the climate emergency. Unless they support global objectives, local climate action
stalls. Concerned by sluggish national responses to climate change or injured by its impacts, citizens are
filing lawsuits, making courts central to national climate governance. To adjudicate these lawsuits, courts
require current information about their climate change legal and policy frameworks. This report provides
holistic syntheses of the climate legal and policy frameworks of 32 countries in Asia and the Pacific and
discusses key legislative trends and climate-relevant constitutional rights.
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